

ACIÀ

MVSEI
NAPOCENSIS

56 / II / 2019

**ACTA MVSEI
NAPOCENSIS**

56/II

MINISTERUL CULTURII
MUZEUL NAȚIONAL DE ISTORIE A TRANSILVANIEI

**ACTA MVSEI
NAPOCENSIS
56/II**

HISTORICA
2019

CLUJ-NAPOCA
2020

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Editorial Scientific Board: Horațiu Bodale, Claudia M. Bonța, Manuela Marin, Melinda Mitu, Ovidiu Muntean, Oana Toda

Editor-in-chief: Ovidiu Muntean

Volume editors: Manuela Marin, Oana Toda

Technical editing and printing: MEGA Print SRL, Cluj-Napoca.

HONORARY SCIENTIFIC BOARD:

KONRAD GÜNDISCH (Institutul de Cultură și Istorie a Germanilor din Europa de Est, Oldenburg, Germania), IOAN-AUREL POP (Academia Română, Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai), MARIUS PORUMB (Academia Română, Institutul de Arheologie și Istoria Artei, Cluj-Napoca), VALENTIN ȘERDAN-ORGA (Biblioteca Centrală Universitară 'Lucian Blaga', Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai), TUDOR SĂLĂGEAN (Muzeul Etnografic al Transilvaniei, Cluj-Napoca), TORBÁGYI MELINDA (Muzeul Național Maghiar, Budapesta), RUDOLF DINU (Institutul Român de Cultură și Cercetare Umanistică, Veneția), IOAN BOLOVAN (Institutul de Istorie 'George Bariț', Universitatea Babeș-Bolyai)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

CARMEN BORBÉLY

FOTO:

SERGIU ODENIE, AUTORII

FOUNDER:

CONSTANTIN DAICOVICIU

ACTA MVSEI NAPOCENSIS Publicație a Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei. Orice corespondența se va adresa: Muzeul Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei, 400020, Cluj-Napoca, str. Constanti Daicoviciu, nr. 2, Tel/fax: 004 0264 591718; Tel: 004 0264 595677. email: secretariat@mnit.ro	ACTA MVSEI NAPOCENSIS Publication of the National Museum of Transylvanian History. All correspondence will be sent to the address: National Museum of Transylvanian History, 400020 Cluj-Napoca, Constantin Daicoviciu St. no. 2, Tel/fax: 004 0264 591718; Tel: 004 0264 595677. email: secretariat@mnit.ro
--	--

ISSN 1454-1521 (PRINT) și 2783-9710 (ONLINE)

DOI: 10.54145/ActaMN.56

Copyright© Muzeul Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES AND STUDIES

RAUL-ALEXANDRU TODIKA

A few considerations concerning the presence of Hussite-style war wagons as part of John Hunyadi's army..... 9

RALUCA MARIA FRÎNCU

Fire prevention and firefighting as stipulated in the rules and regulations for the neighbourhoods of Sibiu.....27

ANDREA FEHÉR

Baths and bathing in eighteenth-century Transylvania..... 43

MELINDA MITU

Data on the Egyptian Collection of the National Museum of Transylvanian History. The contribution of Baron Balázs Orbán to the creation of the Egyptian Collection of the Cluj History Museum..... 57

CLAUDIA M. BONȚA

Militant portraits. The promotion of Hungarian National History through nineteenth-century graphics. Case study.....73

EUGENIA BÎRLEA

The problem of desertation in the army of the Habsburg Empire: from the reign of Maria Theresa of the first decades of the nineteenth century.....91

OVIDIU MUNTEAN

Two years on the Galician front (1914–1915). Pages in the diary of the Transylvanian Officer Marian Popu..... 109

MIRCEA-GHEORGHE ABRUDAN

Ioan Lupaș – the maker and memorialist of the Union of Transylvania with Romania..... 141

MARIUS MUREȘAN

A ‘Historical Reconciliation.’ The Romanian-Hungarian Treaty of 1996.....163

MARIA-MINERVA ZAH

Cultural and legal aspects of migration in Hungary in the new millennium.....181

CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION

RADU CORDOȘ

The restoration of a Dacian oversized decorated ‘tack’: conventional mechanical cleaning and ultrasound cleaning.....199

CORNELIA ROTARIU

Repaired lacunae and reconstructed parts of a Bronze Age ceramic urn from the 1970s embodied in a new restoration process.....205

REVIEWS

Marin POP (ed.), *Cooperativizare și decooperativizare în România* [Cooperativization and Decooperativization in Romania], Mega Publishing House – Porolissum Press, Cluj-Napoca, 2019, pp. 395. (**Adrian Constantin Rotar**).....219

Sarah S. SNYDER, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War. A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 293. (**Gabriel Zvîncă**).....225

Darkness at Dawn: The Metaphor for Russia’s Post-Soviet Transition. Review on David Satter’s *Darkness at Dawn. The Rise of the Russian Criminal State*, New Haven – London, 2003, pp. 336. (**Ioana Ursu**).....229

Abbreviations.....237

ARTICLES AND STUDIES

A FEW CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE PRESENCE OF HUSSITE-STYLE WAR WAGONS AS PART OF JOHN HUNYADI'S ARMY*

RAUL-ALEXANDRU TODIKA**

Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to bring forward a subject that was long neglected by the Romanian historiography and Slavic studies: the military importance of the contingents of Bohemian mercenaries within the army of John Hunyadi, and the extensive usage of the Wagenburg and the Hussite war wagons as part of the improvements of the armed forces in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary. These changes were made by John Hunyadi during the first half of the fifteenth century, in relation to the tactical and strategic necessities imposed by the wars fought against the Turks. My approach of the topic sheds light on the ability of John Hunyadi to use the offensive, defensive, and logistical potential of this rudimentary but extremely versatile and efficient war machine, and points out at the fact that the Kingdom of Hungary was, at that time, up to date with the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century military technologies. In addition, this paper explores a variety of Christian and Ottoman sources and compares these narratives in regard to the subject. The current Romanian historiography has failed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Hussite-style war wagons, and thus the relevance of this paper is linked to broadening the perspective on the matter.

Keywords: John Hunyadi, Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, Military History, war wagons, mercenaries

Rezumat: Principalul obiectiv al acestui articol este de a readuce în discuție un subiect care a fost mult timp neglijat de istoriografia românească și de exponenții slavisticii autohtone. Este vorba despre importanța militară a contingentelor compuse din mercenari de extracție boemă în cadrul armatei lui Ioan de Hunedoara, conjugată cu utilizarea extensivă a tacticii Wagenburg-ului și a carelor de luptă de inspirație husită. Elementele menționate sunt reprezentative pentru îmbunătățirile aduse, de către Ioan de Hunedoara, în prima jumătate a secolului al XV-lea, forțelor militare din Regatul medieval al Ungariei, din rațiuni tactice și strategice, impuse de luptele împotriva otomanilor. Abordarea acestor chestiuni evidențiază capacitatea lui Ioan de Hunedoara de a instrumentaliza potențialul ofensiv, defensiv și logistic al acestei mașinării de război rudimentare, dar extrem de versatile și eficiente, subliniind totodată faptul că Regatul Medieval al Ungariei a fost foarte bine adaptat tendințelor tehnologice de natură militară ale secolelor XIV–XV. În cadrul articolului sunt utilizate o varietate de surse contemporane, creștine și otomane, realizându-se o comparație a narațiunilor acestora cu privire la subiect. Istoriografia românească actuală nu a oferit o înțelegere profundă a carelor de luptă taborite și, prin urmare, relevanța acestui studiu este dată de contribuția sa la nuanțarea perspectivei asupra problemei.

Cuvinte-cheie: Ioan de Hunedoara, Regatul Medieval al Ungariei, istorie militară, care de luptă, mercenari

* I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of *Acta Musei Napocensis* for their constructive comments, suggestions, and bibliographic references.

** Ph.D. Candidate, 'Babeș-Bolyai' University, Cluj-Napoca, email: todikaraul@yahoo.com.

The presence of Hussite-type war wagons within the army of John Hunyadi was not punctually analyzed *per se* by the Romanian historiography. Brief mentions in previous works can be credited to Mihail Dan¹ and Camil Mureșan.² Internationally, significant contributions had been made by Lajos Kropf,³ Zoltán Tóth,⁴ and, more recently, by Emmanuel Antoche,⁵ Mark Whelan,⁶ and John Jefferson⁷ among others. This article brings forward the topic discussed by the authors mentioned above but offers a more profound and detailed approach. Armed confrontations and numerous military competitions were basic attributes of the political, economic, and cultural normative system of the European society in the High and Late Middle Ages (ten–fifteen centuries). Individuals who opted for a military career were described by the medieval sources as *milites* or *bellatores*. The general principle by which the military contingents encumbered by the customary legal system (*consilium et auxilium*) took shape is already well-known.⁸

The above-mentioned period represented the zenith of the European medieval shock cavalry, the role of which began to fade during the gradual centralization of European kingdoms in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Ignored for a long time during the High Middle Ages, the infantry became an important asset on the battlefield from the fourteenth century onwards,⁹ due to the now largely-used projectile weapons such as bows, crossbows, or arbalests, but mainly because of the emergence and proliferation of firearms. The latter were mentioned for the first time in Europe by a Florentine document from 1326, and then in 1331, on the occasion of the Moorish attack on the city of Alicante, in the *Annales de la Corona de Aragon*. The technology, which was initially used by the Arabs, was embraced by the Spaniards, who used firearms in their military endeavors in order to conquer Gibraltar (1308) and in battles such as those of Baja (1325), Alicante (1331), or Tarifa (1340).¹⁰

A rigorously organized and efficiently led infantry division, equipped with projectile weapons or firearms, could resist cavalry charges as long as it held its formation.¹¹ The battles of Crecy (1346)¹² and of Agincourt (1415)¹³ offer good examples from this perspective, as the heavy French cavalry was staved off by the attacks of the archer divisions of the English infantry.¹⁴ The same can be said in the case of the firm infantry formations equipped with polearms, as the Swiss halberdiers had demonstrated during the battle of Morgarten (1315) against the Habsburg knights.¹⁵

¹ Dan 1944; Dan 1974.

² Mureșan 1968.

³ Kropf 1914.

⁴ Tóth 1916.

⁵ Antoche 2004a, Antoche 2004b, Antoche 2018.

⁶ Whelan 2016.

⁷ Jefferson 2012.

⁸ Ganshof 1952, 9–95.

⁹ Verbruggen 1997, 111.

¹⁰ Barbu 2013, 9.

¹¹ Arnold 2001, 16–19.

¹² Ayton, Preston, Autrand 2007, 109–139; Jarymowycz 2008, 44–49.

¹³ Vukšić, Grbašić 1993, 20; Jarymowycz 2008, 49–53; Curry 2015, 23–32.

¹⁴ Of course, this aspect is just one facet of the overall history of military evolutions, the above-mentioned technologies and tactics actually contributing to the concomitant development of cavalry armor, weaponry and tactics. Vukšić, Grbašić 1993, 24–27; Arnold 2001, 86–105; Jarymowycz 2008, 53–71.

¹⁵ Delbrück 1907, 568–578.

In regard to the present study, an extremely important example of the exponential increase in the efficiency of an infantry-based army, when faced with an opponent having mainly troops of mounted knights, can be observed by taking a look at the Hussite Wars (1419–1436). At the time, the Hussites, coordinated by the great military leader Jan Žižka, adopted the use of gunpowder and a battle-tactic based on the development of the *Wagenburg* (EN: *wagon-fort*, CZ: *vozová hradba*). This approach proved its effectiveness in battles such as those of Nekmíč (December 1419) – the first documented use of the wagon fort during the Hussite wars, Sudoměř (25 March 1420), Vítkov Hill (12 June–14 July 1420), Německý Brod (10 January 1422), or Hořice (27 April 1423).¹⁶

If one takes a look at the circumstances in which Kingdom of Hungary found itself during the reign of Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387–1437), the Hungarian army was based on a specific system of social relations referred to as *familiaritas*.¹⁷ The military contingents were coordinated and structured in the so-called ‘banderial system’,¹⁸ in which the right to equip a *banderium* and lead it to the royal army under one’s own *vexillum* was perpetuated as the privilege of the *true barons*, meaning those holding a baronial office. This system was fully perfected during the reign of King Sigismund.¹⁹ The *banderium* consisted in the honor-holder’s own retinue (of *familiares*, *consanguinei*, *fratres*, *clientes proximi*, lesser noble *servitors*, and *stipendiarii*), the nobles in the general levy, and all the arms-bearing men.²⁰

The Hungarian army of that period, which in terms of structure, capacity, and combat mode applied the old tactics of frontal attacks, no longer met the military tactical requirements of the battle theaters where it had to face his new enemy: the Ottomans. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman military forces surpassed in numbers, organization, and tactics, not only the armies of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, but also those of the majority of the kingdoms that formed the *Respublica Christiana*. The military superiority of the Crescent was established mainly due to the high level of discipline and training of the regular army,²¹ the great number of the military personnel that could be mobilized, its mobility and skillful envelopment maneuvers, based on the coordination and synchronization of all types of combat arms.²² Notwithstanding these circumstances, the army of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary could have been a serious opponent provided it had been placed under a single command. This was not possible because the anarchy that followed the death of King Albert (1437–1439) spread strongly amongst the military men.²³

¹⁶ Turnbull, McBride 2004, 4–15; Antoche 2004a, 92.

¹⁷ This particular aspect of medieval Hungarian military and social history along with its resemblance to the aspects of *bastard feudalism*, of *fiefs-rentes*, and of *clientage* found in the Kingdom of England, the Low Countries, or in the Kingdom of France of the same period had been debated in several works such as Szekfű 1912; Rady 2000, 110–131; Jefferson 2012, 120–130.

¹⁸ Deér 1936, 169–202; Bak 2011, 214.

¹⁹ Pálosfalvi 2018, 20.

²⁰ Barany 2015, 156–158. Due to the fact that it is not the main objective of this article, a more profound understanding of the Angevin legacy and army structure and organization during King Sigismund can be provided by consulting Dan 1974, 49–55; Engel 2011, 213–215; Barany 2015, 153–162; Pálosfalvi 2018, 15–25.

²¹ Elekes 1951, 9–12.

²² Dan 1974, 55–56; Jefferson 2012, 209–211; Pálosfalvi 2018, 448–449.

²³ Dan 1974, 54–55.

During this period, the Ottoman attacks at the borders of the Hungarian Kingdom multiplied occurring almost annually. In 1420, an Ottoman army corps plundered the Land of Hațeg (LAT: Terra Harszoc, RO: Țara Hațegului, HU: Hátszegvidék, GE: Wallenthal), and the city of Orăștie (HU: Szászváros, GE: Broos) and its surroundings, after defeating the troops of the Voivode of Transylvania, Miklós Csáki (1401–1403; 1415–1426) at the Iron Gate of Transylvania. In 1421 and 1432 the surroundings of Brașov (LAT: Corona, HU: Brassó, GE: Kronstadt) and the Land of Bârsa (LAT: Terra Borza, RO: Țara Bârsei, HU: Barcaság, GE: Burzenland) were also looted²⁴

The increasing external danger forced King Sigismund to take firm action towards the reorganization of the military forces by drafting the legislation regarding the *militia portalis* (HU: *telekkatonaság*) and by stimulating the recruitment and mobilization of local peasantry, interested in defending the territorial integrity of the kingdom and its independence.²⁵ He was also interested in the development of light cavalry detachments, or the employment and maintenance of mercenary contingents (both by the king and also by the high nobility).²⁶ A further adaptation and subsequent development of these measures in relation to the tactical and strategic necessities imposed by the battles against the Ottomans was imperative. John Hunyadi (RO: Ioan de Hunedoara, HU: Hunyadi János, SR: Sibinjanin Janko)²⁷ (Voivode of Transylvania 1441–1446; Regent-Governor of the Kingdom of Hungary 1446–1452; Captain-General of the kingdom 1452–1456) managed to put an end to the internal anarchy and laid the foundations of a strong barrier against the Ottoman danger by improving the armed forces.²⁸ Given these developments, the new army of John Hunyadi was made of mercenaries,²⁹ peasant militias, and militias of the petty nobility of the counties, crusaders,³⁰ Balkan volunteers,³¹ and members of the high nobility,³² along with their banners (Lat. *banderium* or *vexillum*).³³ This army was more disciplined, due to the fact that its leadership was energetically exercised only by Hunyadi, the commander known at that time as ‘the most powerful athlete of Christ’. Within the new military system, the heavy cavalry maintained its importance but gradually acted in concert with the typical infantry troops, equipped partly with firearms, partly with melee weapons.³⁴ On the other hand, an extremely important measure taken by John Hunyadi was the strengthening of the existing core of mercenaries, placing them under

²⁴ Pop, Năgler 2003, 260.

²⁵ Rady 2000, 149–151; Engel 2011, 233–235; Barany 2015, 177–178; Pálosfalvi 2018, 21–22. For further clarifications, see the sixth point of the Diet of Temesvár (RO: Timișoara) from 1397: Bak 2019, 312–313, 320–322.

²⁶ Dan 1974, 51–52.

²⁷ For the reasoning behind our use of this variant of the Romanian first name, see Rusu 1999, 14–22.

²⁸ Dan 1974, 56.

²⁹ Pálosfalvi 2018, 26–27

³⁰ Dan 1974, 63–65; Jefferson 2012, 206.

³¹ Dan 1974, 65–66; Whelan 2016, 139, 142.

³² Jefferson 2012, 205.

³³ A particularly large group within the armies of John Hunyadi seems to have consisted of conditional nobles – the knezes from Transylvania, Banat (HU: Bánság) and Maramureș (HU: Máramaros) – mostly of Romanian origin. Dan 1974, 66–71; Hațegan 1979, 225–232; Pop 1988, 377–396; Pálosfalvi 2018, 27–28; Antoche 2018, 252–253.

³⁴ Dan 1974, 58–59.

his direct command. In the following, I shall insist on the importance of these contingents composed of mercenaries, especially on those of Bohemian origin.

Mercenaries were a crucial element of the Hungarian army in the time of John Hunyadi, establishing themselves as a structure preceding the development of the famous *Black Army* (Hu: *Fekete sereg*) during the reign of King Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490).³⁵ They are frequently mentioned in the sources about the numerous battles fought by the great military commander against the Ottomans. Their remuneration came from the personal incomes accumulated by Hunyadi or from the revenues collected by the fiscal apparatus of the kingdom, but some of them went to battle for looting only. There were also cases when Hunyadi could not pay their wages on time, but still the mercenaries remained faithful, due to the esteem and respect they had for him.³⁶ Initially, mercenaries were recruited from the Italian Peninsula. John Hunyadi was fully convinced of the military value possessed by the *condottieri*, which he had observed during his service for Filippo Maria Visconti (1412–1447), the Duke of Milan, from 1431 to 1433. However, ten years later, most of the mercenaries present in the Transylvanian voivode's army were Bohemians.³⁷ This is due to the fact that after the battle of Český Brod (30 May 1434), when the Taborites were defeated, the Hussite Bohemians dispersed in the neighboring regions such as Hungary, Austria, Poland etc.³⁸ The sources mention mercenaries of Bohemian origin taking part in the major battles fought by John Hunyadi. The Long Campaign of 1443 was attended by several Czech mercenaries under the leadership of their captain Jeník z Mečkova,³⁹ as well as by mercenaries brought from Bohemia by Jan Čapek ze Sán⁴⁰ with money obtained through the intermediation of Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini:

Iste serenissimus d. Rex omnino asserit se iturum ad hoc passagium, solum expectatur certa pecunia ventura a Johanne Vayvoda pro stipendio Chapchonis, et suorum pedestrium, qui debent conducere thabor currum.⁴¹

Also, the contemporary Jean Chartier recalls on the same occasion Czech paid soldiers, along with Poles, Hungarians and *vaisves*, most likely Wallachians.⁴² Czech mercenaries took part in the Crusade of Varna (1444)⁴³ where Adam Budovec z Budova was included among the Czechs. Jan Čapek ze Sán and Jeník z Mečkova may also have fought in the above-mentioned military event.⁴⁴ The presence of the Czechs at Varna was also mentioned the Turkish chronicles.⁴⁵ Bohemian paid soldiers were also present during the battles of Kossovopolje (1448)⁴⁶ and Belgrade (1456).⁴⁷

³⁵ Kovács 2000, 77–83; Antoche 2004a, 105.

³⁶ Elekes 1951, 39; Dan 1974, 59.

³⁷ Elekes 1951, 28.

³⁸ Dan 1944, 82.

³⁹ Dan 1974, 80.

⁴⁰ Papajík 2013, 135–136.

⁴¹ Chmel 1837, 114 (doc. 25)

⁴² Iorga 1996, 53.

⁴³ Dan 1944, 124.

⁴⁴ Dan 1974, 60.

⁴⁵ bin Adil 1966, 182–183.

⁴⁶ Wolkan 1912, 74 (doc. 23)

⁴⁷ Elekes 1951, 29; Długosz 2003, 254.

The innovations introduced by John Hunyadi also considered tactical and strategic options. Unlike the previous system, based predominantly on frontal attacks of heavy cavalry troops and relying on the force of impact, the new system created by Hunyadi focused on light cavalry units, much more maneuvering, and infantry, *ipso facto* allowing the execution, in good conditions, of the retreating defensive actions and envelopment maneuvers. The actions of the infantry and cavalry were supported by a new type of weapon (field artillery) and by a new type of military, strategic and logistical support exercised by the instrumentalization of the Hussite-type wagon-fort. The Wagenburg had the role of securing the rear side of the army against any possible enemy flanking⁴⁸ and, at the same time, to provide protection for the supplies of the army.

The Hussite war wagons represented an innovation in the combat technique of the fifteenth century, and an ingenious tactical and strategic option adapted by John Hunyadi.⁴⁹ The Hussite war wagons were large four-wheeled vehicles, pulled by four or more horses, with a cart ladder doubled by two thick hardwood plates, fastened with iron clamps. This was meant to protect the pedestrians, who while sitting in the cart they could shoot with crossbows or arquebuses at the enemy. The opposing cart ladder had an opening with a movable door supported by chains. During the march, the door was kept closed in order not to impede the movement, and in battle it was lowered, giving the soldiers the opportunity to enter the chariot without being noticed by the enemy. Inside of the war wagons wooden boxes were attached to the sides, in which soldiers held their handguns or crossbow arrows.⁵⁰ In the marching column, the war wagons (*Schlachtwagen*) and those intended for transporting people, food, weapons, ammunition, or various pieces of iron, required in case of need to repair the war wagons or weapons (*Proviantwagen*) were arranged in one or more rows, depending on the possibilities offered by the terrain.⁵¹ In this order, the wagons got close to the enemy and, a few hundred meters away from enemy lines, took the defensive formation, organizing themselves into a rectangular or circular shaped camp. The wagon fort also had the function of defending the horses and the supply wagons. When in march, the wagons were preceded by mounted scouts and units specialized in building bridges and repairing roads.⁵²

Within the infantry based Bohemian Hussite army, in each Hussite war wagon fought an average number of 20 soldiers (2 handgunners, 6 crossbowmen, 4 fighters armed with flails, 4 fighters with halberds, spears, pike poles or other types of polearms, 2 shield bearers and 2 wagon drivers). Since Hunyadi's preference for an offensive tactic is well known, one can assume that he reduced the infantry personnel number to the detriment of the cavalry one, his main combat arm of choice.⁵³ In accordance to this aspect, Laonikos Chalkokondyles mentions that war wagons of John Hunyadi had inside of them a shield bearer and a handgunner for the battle of Kossovopolje (1448).⁵⁴ The assertion made by

⁴⁸ Elekes 1951, 6–43; Werner 1966, 217–218; Mureşan 1968, 31, 71; Dan 1974, 59.

⁴⁹ John Hunyadi seems to have studied the Hussite tactics in 1437, when he accompanied King Sigismund to Bohemia. Teke 1980, 88.

⁵⁰ Delbrück 1907, 461; Dan 1974, 80.

⁵¹ Dan 1974, 82–83, 174.

⁵² Dan 1974, 82.

⁵³ Dan 1974, 80–81.

⁵⁴ Kropf 1914, 299; Chalkokondyles 1958, 209.

Chalkokondyles is confirmed by Pasquale De Sorgo's description of the Christian force ('quique currus ad agendum et gubernandum habet equos VI. et homines III'⁵⁵), the Byzantine chronicler omitting the teamster. As might be expected, in the case of adopting the defensive stance and setting up the wagon fort, the number of soldiers who had to defend it multiplied. In order to enhance the war wagon's firepower, artillery pieces were placed between those linked together to form the fort,⁵⁶ and in the march, the first wagons were carrying artillery pieces with the purpose of opening by fire, if necessary, the way for the army to advance. Also, the war wagons had a great force of impact in offensive actions. By their appearance and sturdiness, they were an important element of surprise⁵⁷ and were very effective in both offensive and defensive types of combat, when used as an element of protection against opposing cavalry. In general, the marching speed of the war wagons was relatively low and so was their maneuverability due to their heaviness, unless, being caught in march by the opponent, quickly organized themselves into a Wagenburg.⁵⁸

A weapon of Hussite inspiration and not surprisingly handled by the Czech mercenaries in the battles of John Hunyadi, the war wagons and the use (or possible use) of the Wagenburg are frequently mentioned in the documents⁵⁹ and chronicles of the time.⁶⁰

Antonio Bonfini, the court historian of King Matthias Corvinus, mentions in his *Rerum Ungaricarum decades quatuor, cum Dimidia*, the first use of this innovative weapon by John Hunyadi during the battle of Ialomița River against Şehabeddin Paşa, beylerbey of Rumelia (1442), based on information obtained from eyewitnesses: '... utrunque etiam cornu longo carrorum ambitu circumvallasse, quos omni munitionis genere plane compleverat'.⁶¹

In the Long Campaign, *Longum Bellum*, (1442–1444), 600 war wagons were employed, in addition to others carrying supplies, and Mr. Jeník z Mečkova was in charge of 'arranging the chariots', being most probably tasked with the construction of the Wagenburg:

König Wladislaw hatte 600 Kampfwagen nebst den andern, auf welchen der Proviant geführt wurde ... Herr Jeník von Mečkow ... Mauth diente in dieser Schlacht dem Könige Wladislaw von Polen und Ungarn als Rottmeister bei der Anordnung der Wagen.⁶²

For the same campaign, Orudj bin Adil mentions in the *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman* ('Chronicles of the House of Osman') that John Hunyadi brought with him the war wagons which were carrying artillery pieces:

⁵⁵ Whelan 2016, 139.

⁵⁶ Arnold 2001, 82–83.

⁵⁷ Delbrück 1907, 497–498.

⁵⁸ Dan 1974, 83.

⁵⁹ Papajík 2013, 135–136.

⁶⁰ Regarding the Christian sources which are used in this study, from a historiographical perspective, it is worth mentioning that Jan Długosz used Andreas de Palatio's report to write his *Historiae polonicae*. And Antonio Bonfini came across Długosz's text through Filippo Buonaccorsi's panegyric text about the life of King Vladislas I. Jefferson 2012, 8–9, 386 note 102.

⁶¹ Bonfini 1936, 123.

⁶² Huber 1886, 198.

At the time sultan Murad was mourning, men came and told him that the despot Laz-oglu had sent word to the Hungarian King, which in turn, gave a powerful army to the cursed John [Hunyadi], who brought with him the wagons with canons.⁶³

[tr. by the author]⁶⁴

Andreas de Palatio, the papal collector-general in Poland during 1442–1445, recounts that, before the battle of Varna (10 November 1444), the setting of the Wagenburg according to the Taborite style (arranging the war wagons in a circular manner and protecting them by artillery) by the Christians, until the arrival of the Papal, Venetian and Genovese ships under Alvise Loredan, was discussed and dismissed:

Mane autem facta feria tertia in vigilia sancti Martini, una dumtaxat hora post ortum solis, Theurcos adventare et pariter adesse totus ecce conclamat exercitus, capiund arma milites bellorumque avidi celum et mare vocibus opplent, tentoria levamus et quadrupedibus curribus nostris adiunctis, relictis custodibus Warna et Galatha, Teurcis obviam vadimus, nullo ipsis de curribus thabor instructio, quibus in orbem compositis primo secundo et tercio currum ordine tamquam in fortaliciis solent imperatores hiis in partibus eorum castra munire; nullis eciam nescio quo fato, bombardis seu tormentis instructis, quibus tamen et terreri et offendi pariter hostilis potuisset exercitus.⁶⁵

Alternatively, the same episode is mentioned by Jan Długosz, historian, diplomat and canon at Kraków, in his *Historiae polonicae*:

Capiunt arma milites bellorum avidi, celum et mare vocibus opplent, tentoriis levatis et curribus praeparatis, Teucris obviam itur, nullo de ipsis curribus more thabor instructio, quibus in orbem compositis, primo, secundo et tertio currum ordine velut e fortaliciis tucius pugnasse poterat exercitus. Sed visum est regni ideo currus in ordines non poni, ut singuli, qui in illis latitare consueverant, in aciem prodirent et auccionem facerent exercitum; nullis eciam (nescitur quo fato) bombardis seu tormentis instructis, quibus tamen et terreri et offendi pariter hostilis potuisset exercitus.⁶⁶

Also, not incidentally, Filippo Buonaccorsi, called *Callimachus*, introduces the above-mentioned episode in his *Philippi Callimachi Historia de rege Vladislao*:

Ille uero ante omnia circumspectis locis, per quae aut aperte insultare aut insidiosè erumpere adueniens hostis posset, ne quid discriminis oboriretur per insidias a tergo

⁶³ ‘Pe când sultanul Murad era în doliu, au venit oameni și i-au spus că despotul Laz-oglu a trimis de știre craiului unguresc, care la rândul său, a dat oaste puternică blestematului de Iancu [de Hunedoara] și acesta a adus cu el carele cu tunuri.’ bin Adil 1966, 54.

⁶⁴ Any mistakes regarding the translation of Ottoman sources from Romanian into English are, of course, entirely my own.

⁶⁵ Lewicki 1891, 464 (doc. 308).

⁶⁶ Długosz 2001, 319.

ex ualle, in quam refundi lacunam diximus, inter colles et palustria, fauces, per quas erumpendum erat, sic praeclusit curribus retroactis, ut facilis ad eos receptus foret a loco pugnae destinato. Ex altera uero parte nulla uis timeri posset obstructo aditu et conuersis illuc machinis tormentisque aut exterrendis hostibus auertendisque eminus aut obterendis, si cominus insultarent.⁶⁷

Regarding the total number of wagons present within the Christian army at Varna, Andreas de Palatio indicates 2,000 – ‘... currus uero ultra aderant quam bis mille, non onusti solum victualibus sed auro et suppellectilibus aliisque rebus ...’⁶⁸, but I presume he is talking about the joint number of war and supply wagons. I consider that Palatio’s mentions regarding the presence of the Hussite-type war wagons within the Christian army are plausible, but I express my doubt regarding his true credibility as an eyewitness, mainly due to the fact that he recounts sultan Murad II’s (1421–1444; 1446–1451) death in battle by the hands of Vladislas I (1440–1444): ‘... eciam qui nullus (sic) umquam timuit Omorathbegh magnus Theucer principem christianum, nisi unicum regem Wladislaum, cuius manu, uti dicitur, aruspices eius moriturum esse dudum prophetisarunt.’⁶⁹

Describing the deployment of the Christian troops on the battlefield of Varna, Callimachus mentions the Hussite-type wagons: ‘Nec procul a tergo penes currus et munitiones ueluti subsidiariam aciem constituit uexillum diui Ladislai sub Varadiensi episcopo, adiecto ei Lescone Bobritio cum parua manu Polonorum.’⁷⁰ The same battle formation is mentioned by Antonio Bonfini, which describes the Wagenburg as ‘curru circumspectu’: ‘A tergo apud munitiones et curru circumseptu subsidia vexillumque diui Ladislai collocavit ibique Varadiensis episcopus cum suo agmine et pavro Lesconis Bobricii equitatu constitutus erat.’⁷¹

Orudj bin Adil gives us information regarding the defeat of the crusading army, its withdrawal and the final attack of the Asappes and Janissaries on the Wagenburg:

The infidel army was crushed. Those who escaped, ran away, and the others, some of them died. And the other ones were made prisoners. The Azapi and the Janissaries descended upon the wagons of the infidel [which were] arranged so that they resembled a fortress.⁷²

[tr. by the author]

The same final attack of the Ottomans against the Christian wagon fort is mentioned in the chronicle *Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han* (‘The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Sultan Mehmed Khan’) by its anonymous author:

⁶⁷ Buonaccorsi 1961, 200.

⁶⁸ Lewicki 1891, 461 (doc. 308).

⁶⁹ Lewicki 1891, 468 (doc. 308).

⁷⁰ Buonaccorsi 1961, 202.

⁷¹ Bonfini 1936, 149.

⁷² ‘Oastea necredincioasă a fost nimicită. Cei care au scăpat, au fugit, iar dintre ceilalți, unii au murit. Iar ceilalți au fost făcuți prizonieri. Azapii și ienicerii s-au năpustit asupra carelor necredinciosului așezate astfel încât semănau cu o cetate.’ bin Adil 1966, 56.

... as the infidels who are as low as the earth began to fall like autumn leaves, they lost the power to resist and had to pile themselves panting into their Wagenburgs and prepare to fight with cannon and arquebus. The warriors of Islam, however, paid no attention to the infidels' guns and, like lions that have tasted blood, assaulted their fortification from every side.⁷³

For the battle of Kossovopolje (17–20 October 1448), Laonikos Chalkokondyles indicates the presence of 2,000 wagons within the Christian army.⁷⁴ As in the case of Palatio's recount regarding the number of wagons for the battle of Varna, I once again presume he is talking about the joint number of war and supply wagons. My argument is backed up by an anonymous report from Constantinople, dated 7 December 1448, which mentions 700–800 war wagons:

... sept a VIII^e charios lyés de chaines de fer l'un à l'autre, ens èsquelx charios toutes les nuis ledit Blanc et son ost estoit logyé et achainié, et s'appellent lesdis charios vaghembours, et sur lesdis charyos à grant foison veuglaires et coulouvines.⁷⁵

An accurate description concerning the organization of the Wagenburg in 1448 is given to us by Pasquale De Sorigo, who was an eyewitness to the march of the Christian forces into Serbia:⁷⁶

And for the setting up of camp safely and well, a wagon, together with those which are in the tabur [in tabaro] (that is, five in number, of which each wagon has six horses to drive and govern, and three men: these wagons [are known] by the name tabur), is encamped, and they are arranged over a space of four miles in order to surround the army and to protect it in a beautiful formation. And thus stuffed exuberantly with provisions and all kinds of weapons, they are driven along so that the armies may be supplied with whatever is necessary for them over the course of time.⁷⁷

Regarding the last day of the battle, Orudj bin Adil mentions the failed flanking maneuver of Hunyadi and the flight from the battlefield, the Ghazi attack on the Christian wagon camp, and the response of the defenders with cannon and handgun fire, which caused considerable casualties to the Ottoman army:

The Gazii, by dispersing and shattering the infidels, spread in all directions. The cursed John, seeing all of these, persuaded his army, and by saying: "I leave in order to attack the Turks from behind", he deceived his army. Meanwhile, the Gazii, sensing

⁷³ Anonymous 2006, 63.

⁷⁴ Chalkokondyles 1958, 209.

⁷⁵ Iorga 1926, 38 (doc. 3).

⁷⁶ Whelan 2016, 126, Antoche 2018, 245.

⁷⁷ Whelan 2016, 139, 143.

John's flight, came and fought beside their wagons. From within the wagons they fired with cannons⁷⁸ and handguns, causing many deaths.⁷⁹

[tr. by the author]

The fierce Christian resistance during the defense of the Wagenburg against the Ottoman onslaught is mentioned by numerous Christian documents and chronicles. One of them is a document dispatched on 31 October 1448 to the town council of Braşov by Vlad the Impaler (1448; 1456–1462; 1476):⁸⁰

... Omorath dominus Turcorum in tribus diebus sine omni intermissione contra ipsum dominum Johannem gubernatorem pugna habuisset, ultima die inter curros taboritarum inclusisset, pedester solus imperator inter yanicaros descendisset et omnes extra et intra currus taboritarum percussent et interfecissent.⁸¹

Another relevant document is the 1448 anonymous report from Constantinople:

... quant les Turcs eurent avisé la manière que nos gens tinrent deffance, qu'ils s'estoient tous logyez dedens lesdis charroi, d'une partye desdiz Turcs assaillirent nos gens toutte la nuit, lesquels y conquestèrent bien pro, car nos gens se deffendoient merueilleusement de canons, de coulevrines, tant qu'ils firent très grand dommage aulx Turs et pour cheste nuit ne firent riens.⁸²

Regarding the chronicles, it is worth mentioning the description of Jan Długosz for the same dramatic final moment of the battle:

Noctem secquenti, de feria sexta in Sabbatum, Hungarorum exercitus, videns se confractum et debilitatum, fugam arripuit: paucis ex Polonis et Bohemis in curribus remanentibus, qui Sabbatho, a manere vsque ad meridiem, continuabant certamen, bombardis et balistis se tunando, superueniente tandem Turcorum multitudine, ad extremum victi funt, et Turci, tam spoliis et armis eorum potiti.⁸³

⁷⁸ We presume that the Romanian term *zenberek* (pl. *zenbrecuri*), as a weapon denomination, is a local linguistic adaptation of the *zarobotana* (IT: *cerbottana*, GE: *Blasrohr*), which was a type of low caliber cannon. Another opinion, stated by Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa Mehmet, is that it was a ballistic device used to launch its projectiles through torsion energy or tension conversion, without the aid of gunpowder or other propellants. bin Adil 1966, 55, note 70.

⁷⁹ 'Gaziii, alungându-i și nimicindu-i pe necredincioși, s-au răspândit în toate părțile. Afurisitul de Iancu, văzând toate acestea, și-a învoit oastea și, spunând: „Plec să-i lovesc pe turci pe la spate”, a înșelat oastea sa. În acest timp, gaziii, simțind fuga lui Iancu, au venit și s-au războit lângă carele lor. Dinăuntru carelor se trăgea cu tunurile, puștile și zenberecurile, din care pricină au pierit mulți oameni.' bin Adil 1966, 58.

John Hunyadi's urge for his troops to defend the wagon camp while performing a flanking maneuver with the main purpose of attacking the Ottomans from the rear, and his treacherous flight from the battlefield became a topos for the Ottoman chroniclers of the later sixteenth century. Lütfi 1966, 243; Ali 1966, 348; Kodja 1966, 453; Sa'Adeddin 1966, 316.

⁸⁰ Antoche 2018, 260.

⁸¹ Gündisch 1975, 265 (doc. 2663).

⁸² Iorga 1926, 39 (doc. 3).

⁸³ Długosz 2003, 75.

The presence of the Hussite-type war wagons within the military structures of John Hunyadi, alongside with the introduction of firearms and artillery, proves that the great commander assimilated and applied the most advanced fighting technique of his time. This type of weapon possesses a special versatility, being rudimentary in appearance, but extremely effective in practice, both on and off the battlefield. Due to its multilateral character, one is not allowed to include it in the taxonomy of other types of weapons, which were considered much more conventional.

As mentioned, it can be concluded that land transportation from a military perspective has become extremely significant, providing various functions, both logistical and eminently military. Therefore, the final part of the present article will focus on the identification of human resources that contributed to the Hussite-type war wagon production for John Hunyadi's army, a quite expensive process which required a skilled workforce.

Due to the concentration of craftsmen able to build these mobile vehicles in urban areas and because of the widespread use of mobile firearms, the role of Transylvanian urban centers, especially those of German foundation and tradition, had grown exponentially.⁸⁴ By analyzing a series of documents concerning the city of Braşov, the attempt of John Hunyadi to stimulate a possible production line of war wagons can be observed. More precisely, on 19 March 1443, while John Hunyadi was preparing for the Long Campaign, he asked the people of Braşov to produce Taborite war wagons, mobile firearms, war machines, and all the necessary instruments needed for his army:

Igitur petimus caritative et multum confidenter seriosius committentes quatenus ipsa die ut praedictum est pro honore et salute vestris currus Thaboriorum, simul cum bombardis, pixidibus, machinis et cunctis ingeniis erga nos constitu(i) debeatis et aliud noui facturi alioquin totam dispositionem totumque negotium, quod deus avertat, confundentis.⁸⁵

Some authors consider that this document reflects the good economic relations established between Transylvania and Wallachia, from a time in which Basarab II (1442–1443) still ruled.⁸⁶ I do not oppose this argument, but I consider that the trade relations between Transylvania and Wallachia are just another facet of the Transylvanian economic life of that period. Thus, I am in favor of taking into account the evolution of the internal economic policies of Transylvania, as part of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary and in close relation to the central power. In order to support this argument, I mention that on 6 June 1443, John Hunyadi also communicated to the people of Braşov his intention to set up a monetary chamber (*camera monetaria*) in Sighişoara (HU: Segesvár, GE: Schäßburg), in order to support more easily his aforementioned military requirements:

Quia nos pro nostra apprumtuatione contra insultos Turcos Christi nominis hostes pestiferos, iam proxime exercitualiter instauranda camaram monetariam in Segeswar

⁸⁴ Fara 2009, 231–254.

⁸⁵ Gündisch 1975, 110–111 (doc. 2451).

⁸⁶ Pall 1966, 78–79.

erigere et locare volumus fiendam. Quocirca vestris amicitiiis committimus mandantes quatenus sufficiencia laboreria, ad usum praetactae camerae pertinencia, simulcum monetariis in Brassouia existentibus camariis nostris presentium ostensoribus exportare et exportari facere modis omnibus debeatis et aliud non facturi.⁸⁷

A few days later, on 23 June 1443, returning to what was previously written, among others, Hunyadi reminded the people of Braşov of the Taborite war wagons, specifying that they should be made according to the instructions of a Bohemian craftsman: 'Item petimus vos, quod cum appromptuacione curruum thaboriorum, iuxta demonstracionem ilius Bohemi debitam festinantiam adhibeatis, quoniam ipse Bohemus nobis retulit multum imperiose ...'.⁸⁸ This mention entitles me to assume that there might have been workshops of carpenters, wheelwrights and coopers who exercised for a limited amount of time a conversion of their productive activities in this regard or coordinated their actions in order to produce the wagons according to the instructions of the mentioned craftsmen of Bohemian origin. The fact that they did not possess the knowledge to produce this particular type of weapon⁸⁹ might have been perceived as an expensive inconvenience, which forced Hunyadi to abandon this trial as the lack of written sources regarding this process after the year 1443 indicates.

This affirmation is not far-fetched, because it is well known that John Hunyadi procured over time the great majority of artillery and war wagons from the prosperous urban centers of Upper Hungary.⁹⁰ A proof of this can be found, for example, in a document dated on 26 July 1448, when Hunyadi requested that the wagons and cannon which the town of Bratislava had prepared be shipped via Buda 'to a ford of the Danube near Belgrade':

... requirimus vestras amicitias nobis caras, quatenus currus, quos ibi ad nostram expeditionem executualem preparari fecistis simulcum bombardis nostris et aliis attinentiis, que circa eosdem currus necessario attinent, ad naves disponere et usque Budam ... ad vadum Danubii usque Nandoralbam destinabit ...⁹¹

In conclusion, the army of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the fourteenth century, but especially in the fifteenth century, underwent many evolutionary changes in terms of recruitment, structural, tactical and strategic organization, and especially from the point of view of military equipment. John Hunyadi, the 'invictissimus miles et athleta Christi',⁹² continued the improvement of the Hungarian army started by king Sigismund of Luxembourg, and this aspect is testified by the presence, within the structure of his army, of the Hussite war wagons and Bohemian specialists which were asked to build and operate them accordingly. He made the most of the offensive, defensive, but especially logistical potential of this rudimentary, but extremely versatile and efficient war machine.

⁸⁷ Gündisch 1975, 116 (doc. 2460).

⁸⁸ Gündisch 1975, 116–117 (doc. 2461).

⁸⁹ Cîmpeanu 2017, 356.

⁹⁰ Dan 1974, 85.

⁹¹ Thallóczy, Aldasy (eds.) 1907, 377–378 (doc. 516).

⁹² Féjer 1844, 239 (doc. 86).

Bibliography

Edited primary sources

- Ali 1966 M. Ali, *Künh-ül-ahbar* [The Essence of History], In: M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet (eds.), *Cronici turcești privind țările române*, vol. 1, București 1966, 334–355.
- Anonymous 2006 Anonymous, *The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Sultan Mehmed Khan* [Gazavat-ı Sultan Murad b. Mehmed Han]. In: C. Imber (ed.), *The Crusade of Varna, 1443–45 (Crusade Texts in Translation)*, Aldershot 2006, 41–106.
- Bak 2019 J. M. Bak (ed.), *Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae. The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary*, Budapest 2019.
- bin Adil 1966 O. bin Adil, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman* [The Chronicles of the House of Osman]. In: M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet (eds.), *Cronici turcești privind țările române*, vol. 1, București 1966, 48–64.
- Bonfini 1936 A. Bonfini, *Antonius de Bonfinis Rerum Ungaricarum Decades, tomus III, decas III*, ed. by J. Fögel, B. Ivány, L. Juhás, Lipsiae 1936.
- Buonaccorsi 1961 F. Buonaccorsi, *Philippi Callimachi Historia de rege Vladislao*, Series *Bibliotheca Latina medii et recentioris aevi*, vol. 3, ed. by I. Lichońska, Varsoviae 1961.
- Chalkokondyles 1958 L. Chalkokondyles, *Expuneri istorice*, tr. and ed. by V. Grecu, București 1958.
- Chmel 1837 J. Chmel (ed.), *Materialien zur österreichischen Geschichte. Aus Archiven und Bibliotheken*, vol. 2, Wien 1837.
- Długosz 2001 J. Długosz, *Joannis Dlugossi Annales seu Cronicae Incliti Regni Poloniae, liber undecimus et liber duodecimus, 1431–1444*, ed. by K. Baczkowski, Cz. Pirożyńska, L. Korczak et alii, Varsaviae 2001.
- Długosz 2003 J. Długosz, *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae, liber duodecimus, 1445–1461*, ed. by K. Baczkowski, Cz. Pirożyńska, K. Ożóg et alii, Cracoviae 2003.
- SaʿAdeddin 1966 Hodja M. SaʿAdeddin Efendi, *Tadj-üt Tevarih* [Crown of Histories]. In: M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet (eds.), *Cronici turcești privind țările române*, vol. 1, București 1966, 299–332.
- Féjer 1844 G. Féjer (ed.), *Genus, incunabula et virtus Joannis Corvini de Hunyad*, Budae 1844.
- Gündisch 1975 G. Gündisch (ed.), *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, vol. V (1438–1457), Bukarest 1975.
- Huber 1886 A. Huber, *Die Kriege zwischen Ungarn und den Türken (1440–1443)*. Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte, 68 (1886), 159–207.
- Kodja 1966 H. Kodja, *Bedaʿt ul-vekaʿi* [Magnificent events]. In: M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet (eds.), *Cronici turcești privind țările române*, vol. 1, București 1966, 440–467.
- Lewicki 1891 A. Lewicki (ed.), *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti*, tom. II (1382–1445), Kraków 1891.

- Lütfi 1966 Lütfi-paşa, *Tevarih-i al-i Osman* [The Chronicles of the House of Osman]. In: M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet (eds.), *Cronici turceşti privind  arile române*, vol. 1, Bucureşti .1966, 236–250.
- Thall oczy, Aldasy (eds.) 1907 L. Thall oczy, A. Aldasy (eds.), *Codex Diplomaticus Partium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum*, Budapest 1907.
- Wolkan 1912 R. Wolkan (ed.), *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, II/LXVII (*Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini. Abt. II. Briefe als Priester und als Bischof von Triest (1447–1450)*), Wien 1912.
- Secondary sources**
- Antoche 2004a E. C. Antoche, *Du t bor de Jan  iřka et de Jean Hunyadi au tabur  engi des arm es ottomanes*, Turcica, 36 (2004), 91–124.
- Antoche 2004b E. C. Antoche, *Quelques aspects concernant l’ volution tactique du chariot sur le champ de bataille dans l’histoire militaire universelle. L’Antiquit  et le Moyen Age jusqu’  l’av nement des Hussites (1420)*. In: A. Corvisier (ed.), *Guerre et soci t  en Europe. Perspectives de nouvelles recherches*, Bucarest 2004, 28–48.
- Antoche 2018 E. C. Antoche, *Hunyadi’s Campaign of 1448 and the Second Battle of Kosovo Polje (October 17-20)*. In: N. Housley (ed.), *Reconfiguring the Fifteenth-Century Crusade*, London, 2018, 245–284.
- Arnold 2001 Thomas F. Arnold, *The Renaissance at War*, London, Cassell, 2001.
- Ayton, Preston, Autrand 2007 A. Ayton, Ph. Preston, Fr. Autrand, *The battle of Cr cy, 1346*, Woodbridge 2007.
- Bak 2011 J. M. Bak, *Feudalism in Hungary?*. In: S. Bagge, M. H. Gelting, Th. Lindkvist (eds.), *Feudalism. New Landscapes of Debate*, Turnhout 2011, 203–216.
- Barany 2015 A. Barany, *King Sigismund of Luxemburg and the preparations for the Hungarian crusading host of Nicopolis (1386–1396)*. In: D. Baloup, M. S nchez Mart nez (ed.), *Partir en croisade   la fin de Moyen  ge. Financement et logistique*, Toulouse 2015, 153–178.
- Barbu 2013 D. Barbu, S. A. Luca, *Arme de foc portative din secolele XV–XVII  n muzeele din Transilvania*, Sibiu 2013.
- C mpeanu 2017 L. C mpeanu, *Organizarea militar  a Braşovului p n  la sf rşitul secolului al XV-lea*. In: V. Ciobanu, D. D. Iacob (eds.), *Studii de istorie a oraşelor. In honorem Paul Niedermaier*, Bucureşti–Br ila 2017, 336–359.
- Curry 2015 A. Curry, *Agincourt: Great Battles Series*, Oxford 2015.
- Dan 1944 M. P. Dan, *Cehi, slovaci ři rom ni  n veacurile XIII–XVI*, Sibiu 1944.
- Dan 1974 M. P. Dan, *Un stegar al luptei antiotomane. Iancu de Hunedoara*, Bucureşti 1974.
- De r 1936 J. De r, *Zsigmond Kir ly honv delmi politikaja*, HK, XXXVII (1936), 169–202.

- Delbrück 1907 H. Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Teil III: Das Mittelalter*, Berlin 1907.
- Elekes 1951 L. Elekes, *Armia Guniadi*, *ActaHistHung*, 1/1 (1951), 5–59.
- Fara 2009 A. Fara, *Le relazioni tra Giovanni Hunyadi e le comunità sassoni di Transilvania aspetti politici ed economici (1439–1456)*. In: A. Dumitran, L. Mádly, Al. Simon (eds.), *Extincta est Lucerna Orbis: John Hunyadi and his Time. In memoriam Zsigmond Jakó, (Mélanges d'Histoire Générale. Nouvelle Série, I/2)*, Cluj-Napoca 2009, 231–254.
- Ganshof 1952 Fr. L. Ganshof, *Feudalism*, tr. by Ph. Grierson and foreword by F. M. Stenton, New York–London 1952.
- Hațegan 1979 I. Hațegan, *Cnezii români în lupta antiotomană. Cnezi bănățeni și hunedoreni în luptele lui Iancu de Hunedoara. Atestări documentare (1439–1453)*, *Sargetia*, 14 (1979), 225–232.
- Iorga 1926 N. Iorga, *Les aventures "sarrazines" des français de Bourgogne au XVe siècle*. In: C-tin. Marinescu (ed.), *Mélanges d'histoire générale*, Cluj 1926.
- Iorga 1996 N. Iorga, *Istoria romanilor*, vol. 4. *Cavalerii*, București 1996.
- Jarymowycz 2008 R. J. Jarymowycz, *Cavalry from hoof to track*, Westport 2008.
- Jefferson 2012 J. Jefferson, *The Holy Wars of King Wladislas and Sultan Murad. The Ottoman-Christian Conflict from 1438–1444*, Leiden–Boston 2012.
- Kovács 2000 P. Kovács, *Mattia Corvino*, Cosenza 2000.
- Kropf 1914 L. Kropf, *A régi magyar székervár*, HK, XV (1914), 297–299.
- Mureșan 1968 C. Mureșan, *Iancu de Hunedoara* (2nd edn.), București 1968.
- Engel 2011 P. Engel, *Regatul Sfântului Ștefan: istoria Ungariei medievale: 895–1526* (2nd edn.), tr. by A. Moga and ed. by A. A. Rusu, I. Drăgan, Cluj-Napoca 2011.
- Pall 1966 Fr. Pall, *Iancu de Hunedoara și confirmarea privilegiului pentru negoșul brașovenilor și al bărsenilor cu Țara Românească, în 1443*, *AHC*, 9 (1966), 63–84.
- Pálosfalvi 2018 T. Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács. A History of Ottoman-Hungarian Warfare, 1389–1526*, Leiden–Boston 2018.
- Papajík 2013 D. Papajík, *Jan Čapek ze Sán cseh nemes és szerepe a magyar koronáért folytatott harcban (1440–1443)*, *Aetas*, 28/1 (2013), 128–136.
- Pop 1988 I.-A. Pop, *Statutul social-economic al cnezilor din Țările Române în secolele XIV–XV*, *AIIX*, 25/2 (1988), 377–396.
- Pop, Nágler 2003 I.-A. Pop, *Transilvania în secolul al XIV-lea și în prima jumătate a secolului al XV-lea (cca 1300–1456)*. In: I.-A. Pop, Th. Nágler et alii, *Istoria Transilvaniei. Vol. I (până la 1541)*, Cluj-Napoca 2003, 233–282.
- Rady 2000 M. Rady, *Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary*, New York 2000.

- Rusu 1999 A. A. Rusu, *Ioan de Hunedoara și românii din vremea lui: studii*, Cluj-Napoca 1999.
- Szekfű 1912 Gy. Szekfű, *Serviensek és familiarisok; vázlat a középkori magyar alkotmány és közigazgatástörténet köréből*, Budapest 1912.
- Teke 1980 Zs. Teke, *Hunyadi János és kora*, Budapest 1980.
- Tóth 1916 Z. Tóth, *A huszita eredetű szekérvár*, HK, XV, (1916), 265–311.
- Turnbull, McBride 2004 S. Turnbull, A. McBride, *The Hussite Wars 1419–36*, Oxford 2004.
- Verbruggen 1997 J. Verbruggen, *The art of warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages: from the eighth century to 1340* (2nd edn.), Woodbridge 1997.
- Vukšić, Grbašić 1993 V. Vukšić, Z. Grbašić, *Cavalry: The History of a Fighting Elite, 650 BC–AD 1914*, London 1993.
- Werner 1966 E. Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht. Die Osmanen (1300–1481)*, Berlin 1966.
- Whelan 2016 M. Whelan, *Pasquale de Sorigo and the Second Battle of Kosovo (1448): A Translation*, SEER, 94 (2016), 126–145.

FIRE PREVENTION AND FIREFIGHTING AS STIPULATED IN THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE NEIGHBOURHOODS OF SIBIU

RALUCA MARIA FRÎNCU*

Abstract: Fire was a constant imminent danger, not only for the Transylvanian communities, but for others as well; this article brings forward the way in which the neighborhoods of Sibiu, a model of social organization documented in Transylvania since the fifteenth century, were involved in fire prevention and firefighting by introducing rules and fines into their statutes of organization.

Keywords: Sibiu, neighborhood, statute, fire

Rezumat: Focul a reprezentat permanent un pericol iminent pentru comunitățile transilvănene, și nu numai; prezentul articol aduce în prim plan modul în care vecinătățile sibiene, model de organizare socială atestat în Transilvania încă din secolul al XV-lea, s-au implicat în prevenirea și în stingerea incendiilor, prin introducerea de reguli și amenzi în statutele lor de organizare.

Cuvinte cheie: Sibiu, vecinătate, statut, incendiu

The neighborhood, a model of social organization characteristic of the German population, is documented in fifteenth-century Transylvania.¹ The relatively late emergence of this model of social organization leads us to believe that it was inspired by two other models present in the Transylvanian space, since the twelfth-thirteenth centuries; namely, the religious associations and the guilds. Following their example, the neighborhoods drafted their own statutes and maintained the objects of symbolic character (the sign, the crate, the seal, the flag). Within the community, as shown by the statutes, the neighborhoods had an extremely important social role, both in the social life of the individual and in terms of safety and maintaining order inside the settlement. The administrative and some of the legal problems were solved in the narrow circle of the community, by fathers of the neighborhood. Stephan Ludwig Roth, one of the leading Transylvanian intellectuals of nineteenth century, painted a complex picture of what membership in a neighborhood meant. According to him, the members of the neighborhood were those who:

‘have drunk from the same water fountain, ate a loaf of bread from the same oven, the ones that watched at the bedside of one another during the night, and those who built up their homes with the arms of the commonwealth, those who, in sickness and in adversity, have helped each other as if they were family, those who, in the end, all rested on the same slab, and dug each other’s grave and carried the dead to the

* Ph.D., Museum curator, The National Brukenthal Museum in Sibiu, email: ralucafro@yahoo.com.

¹ Frîncu 2018, 83.

cemetery with their own hands, doing them the ever so sad honor of joining them on their final road, which is the mass of mourning, they praised the merits of the man that was gone, and they took care of the widows and children from the wealth and on behalf of the community – the society of brethren, as it called itself, starting from the local community, the neighborhood, or the close ones.²

Hans Achim Schubert defines neighborhoods as ‘the only forms of local groups in Europe, relatively pure and kept alive until modern times, which were never feudalized and interacted with the modern state while maintaining their old form...’.³

In other words, the neighborhood was an association between neighbors, and the criterion by which the association was made was the spatial one, since it brought together all the major inhabitants of a street. Where the street comprised a large number of houses, it was divided into several neighborhoods. In their operation, neighborhoods imposed different rules on the everyday life of the individual, and their main function was to get the neighbors to give help to and support each other in important moments of life. The neighborhood institution (*Nachbarschaft*) was headed by a father of the neighborhood (*Nachbarvater*), elected for one year from the oldest members, after which he could be re-elected. He was helped by a young father (*Jungerer Nachbarschaftsvater*) and a council (*Altschaft*), made up of eight prominent members of the neighborhood. The role of the council members was to advise neighborhood fathers, check expenses, inspect possible sources that could generate fires, supervise the work of young neighbors during the construction or maintenance of a community fountain.⁴ For services to the community, the leaders were not rewarded, benefiting only from the moral authority and social prestige conferred by their position within the neighborhood.

At the basis of this model of organization were the statutes, brought to the attention of each member accepted to join the neighborhood. By analyzing the organization and the provisions of the statutes of the neighborhoods in Transylvania, we can notice that one of their functions was the *quid pro quo*, offered to the community during important events in the life of each and every one of its members (baptisms, marriages, funerals, illnesses, disasters). Especially beneficial to the community was the support of the newlyweds to build their house. Help was also offered for the renovation of houses and outbuildings or, in the event of a fire, those affected were offered help from the common budget of the neighborhood. Another function was the protection of moral values and good coexistence; in the value system of the Saxon nation, integrity, honesty and credibility occupied a prominent place.

In this paper, we aim to analyze how this model of social organization – neighborhoods – succeeded, through the strict rules imposed to protect their citizens. One of the most important functions of the neighborhood was the constant concern for ensuring the safety of the citizen and his wealth. Fire had always been a danger to the community, which is why neighborhood members had struggled to prevent this major threat. Great disasters caused by fires were also recorded in the *Chronik der Stadt Hermannstadt 1100–1920*.

² Mihăilescu 2003, 14. All the quotations in this paper were translated to English by Carmen Borbély.

³ Schubert 1980, 2.

⁴ Schunn 1936, 11.

One of these occurred in 1556, more precisely on 31 March, when an extremely aggressive fire turned 556 buildings into ashes and killed 81 people. A few days after the fire, the population organized a revolt, on which occasion the royal judge Johannes Roth was killed, since he was accused of being the originator of the disaster.⁵ In 1570 another fire of great proportions was recorded in the chronicle mentioned above. On this occasion about 1303 buildings burned down, which is why King John Sigismund left part of the household tax to be used by the city for the next three years, as this money was needed to rebuild the edifices destroyed by fire.⁶ As evidenced by the records of the time, the fire spread due to gunpowder stored in the Leather Merchants' Tower, which also destroyed the walls of the neighboring towers: the Tanners' Tower and the Round Tower.⁷ Both the fire of March 1570 and that of October or November of the same year, caused significant damage to the city, which led the central authorities to exempt the city from the tax owed to the Prince. In 1572 the city was exempted from paying taxes worth of 299 florins and 88 denars, and for the following year the value of the tax exemption was 360 florins for the first two taxes, respectively 434.80 for the last two censuses.⁸

At the time, the city was divided into neighborhoods, that is, civic (citizen) societies, and the so-called *Zehntschaften*, small military organizations consisting of 10 neighbors, divided according to the four gates of the city and each lead by a captain. As mentioned, the neighborhoods were organized according to their own regulations, and the citizens were invested with certain tasks of signaling and preventing the production of fires. They were also trained in different activities in case of fire interventions, according to the information provided by a document dated 14 February 1696.⁹ (Fig. 1)

Neighborhoods were actively involved in fire prevention and extinguishing actions. At first, the rules were stipulated only by way of provisions in the statutes and various regulations written down in registers or other documents, but in time the documents began to record the acquisition of various materials by which fire could be extinguished or the averted danger. We should note that this issue of citizen safety was given special attention, so provisions were imposed in most statutes by which neighbors were involved in providing overnight guard, surveillance of the field and houses, and to announce the outbreak of a fire. Since the emergence of neighborhoods, this aspect had been treated with the utmost seriousness by all members.

One of the oldest statutes of the neighborhoods of Sibiu was the one issued in 1563, belonging to the neighborhood on *Oberen Wiessen St.* (Livezii de sus – Tipografilor, today). The original document is no longer preserved, the regulation being published by Gustav Seivert in *Die Stadt Hermannstadt. Eine historische Skizze* and taken up by Franz Zimmermann in the work *Die Nachbarschaften in Hermannstadt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Stadtverfassung und – Verwaltung in Siebenbürgen*. The regulation, consisting of 25 articles, is the first testimony attesting the manner of organization of the Sibiu neighborhoods. Its provisions informed citizens about the rights and obligations

⁵ Sigerus 2016, 17.

⁶ Sigerus 2016, 18.

⁷ Seivert 1859, 56.

⁸ Derzsi 2018, 27.

⁹ SJS AN, Vecinătățile orașului Sibiu Fonds, Registers, no. 129a, folios 1–15.

they had after admission into the neighborhood. According to Article 17, we learn that every man enrolled in the neighborhood had to do the night watch. On the night that he performed this service, he had to report to the post before nine o'clock in the evening. Those who were late had to pay a fine of 10 denars.¹⁰ The purpose of the night watch was also to announce possible fire outbreaks. For their prevention, members of the community were obliged to clean the chimneys of their houses; otherwise, they were fined 1 florin.¹¹

The grievances of neighborhood members were not always resolved within the community. Related to the proposed theme of citizens' safety, in 1870 Gustav Seivert talked, in a popular calendar, about a conflict between two neighborhoods regarding the night guard.¹² The small number of men in the community in 1581 sparked conflicts between the neighborhoods of *Salzgasse* (Constituției, today) and *Reisbergasse* (Avram Iancu, today). The neighbors on *Salzgasse* were dissatisfied that three men who belonged to their neighborhood did the night service on *Reisbergasse*. The members of the neighborhood of *Salzgasse* asked the royal judge, Albert Huet, and the seat judge, Emericus Wagner, to settle the conflict: '...the three men no longer want to help us with the common burdens of the neighborhood ... please compel them to serve and do their duty ... where they were assigned long ago.'¹³ Those in *Reisper St.* were unhappy that due to the small number of men in the neighborhood (it should be noted that in 1554, 1573 and 1577, the plague epidemic decimated the city's population),¹⁴ their turn to be on guard came every 14 days, while those in *Reisper St.*, only had to do this service every three weeks.

In the seventeenth century, we encounter the problem of the night watch resumed in a new statute of the Sibiu neighborhoods issued in 1651 – a statute that included five articles related to this topic. The quality of the guard service during the night was extremely important; from Article 20 of the statute we learn that if a fellow citizen was sick or tired and did not feel fit to perform the service, he had to notify the father of the neighborhood to be replaced, otherwise he would have to pay 5 denars.¹⁵ The neighbor who did not perform the tasks prescribed by the statute, that is, guard the streets and the field between the appointed hours, was to be fined 16 denars. Article 24 stipulated that all neighbors had the obligation to perform the night watch service; the one who evaded duties was fined a florin.¹⁶ Articles 26, 28 and 29 were dedicated to the problem of fire prevention. From their content we find out how the hay was stored, we learn that smoking was prohibited in fire risk areas and was only permitted in specially arranged places, and those who did not comply with these provisions paid the neighborhood 50 denars.¹⁷

Security during the night, the rules of fire prevention, the maintenance of cleanliness around the house, as well as that of rivers and wells, were problems resumed in the statute of the Sibiu neighborhoods of 1696, a copy of which was included at the beginning of the registers of the Sibiu neighborhoods. Article 26 obliged citizens to maintain cleanliness in

¹⁰ Zimmermann 1885, 88.

¹¹ Zimmermann 1885, 87.

¹² Pakucs-Willcocks 2018, 152.

¹³ Pakucs-Willcocks 2018, 153.

¹⁴ Pakucs-Willcocks 2018, 156.

¹⁵ Zimmermann 1885, 114.

¹⁶ Zimmermann 1885, 115.

¹⁷ Zimmermann 1885, 115.

the neighborhood, and from this article we learn that: ‘the streams that flow through the neighborhoods must be well maintained in the old water beds by the supervision of the neighborhood fathers, under penalties imposed, as the case may be, by the bailiff.’¹⁸ The provision of the neighborhood watch was discussed distinctly by articles 27–31, most of the problems being taken over, with some amendments, from the older statutes. These articles inform us that each member of the neighborhood was obliged to provide security within the neighborhood, only ‘...Those who are sick or too weak for the night watch should report to burgrave, being allowed to send another man or journeyman, not an apprentice. Whoever is away from the neighborhood and does not keep watch, let him give the neighborhood 5 denars.’¹⁹ The importance of this service was reinforced by the fine that was to be paid by those ‘who do not report to the security immediately after 8 o’clock or go home before 12, for they must pay the neighborhood 3 florins.’²⁰ Penalties were provided for those who ‘do not shout at the night watch and sit in silence; they shall pay 1 florin.’ All the provisions of the night watch also applied to Sunday and holiday watch, during church service. From the following article, we learn that ‘the neighborhood father has the obligation to find a replacement if he does not keep watch at night, and if he should oppose this, without good reason, he should be asked to pay 16 denars.’²¹

One last provision related to security is that of Article 31, from which we learn that ‘security at the gates had to be carried out by every citizen in person, if they were at home, in the city, and were not hindered by important reasons which would cause them to find a replacement someone in their place. He who does not do this shall pay a penalty of 1 florin to the city council. Those on night watch must beware what kind of foreign people enter the city and let the authorities know.’²²

The Statute continues with provisions governing how to act in the event of the outbreak of a fire, as well as the measures to be taken to prevent it, as set out in Articles 33 to 37. Neighborhood members were informed as follows:

If a fire breaks out somewhere in the city, the neighborhood decurions should be immediately prepared with their *decuriae*. One third with a neighborhood burgrave are to take care of the street and at home, in the neighborhood, while the others are to rush to the fire, without delay, one third are to bring axes, a ladder, a hook for fire [like a halberd], and all the others are to fetch shovels and leather buckets... Whoever is found negligent and guilty will be severely punished according to his guilt and offence of the magistrate.²³

In order to prevent the outbreak of fires, the statute proposed that ‘the inspection of hearths and chimneys should be regularly ordered by the fathers of the neighborhood, and that those found guilty should have to pay 50 denars.’ And ‘the chimneys that cannot be cleaned by the chimneys-sweeps should be made known to the mayor, and when fire

¹⁸ Zimmermann 1885, 121.

¹⁹ Zimmermann 1885, 124.

²⁰ Zimmermann 1885, 124.

²¹ Zimmermann 1885, 125.

²² Zimmermann 1885, 125.

²³ Zimmermann 1885, 125.

is to be made in them, water should be brought to the house and the neighbors should be notified immediately, to be able to help with supervision and care, under the penalty of 6 florins.’ In Article 36 of the statute, neighborhood members were warned that they were not allowed to make ‘large fires, especially in neighborhoods with many log houses and shingle roofs, under the penalty of 50 denars.’ Article 37 informed them that ‘hay, straw, and wood shall not be kept by any man upstairs, in chambers and cellars, nor barn hay or straw under the open sky, under heavy punishment; nor shall they handle open light [fire] without a lantern around their hay, straw, wood, or use other fire-making utensils, or take open fire from the street, under the penalty of 50 denars.’²⁴

The huge damage caused by the spread of unattended fire led to the imposition of these rules by the neighborhood statutes, the large fines given to those who did not comply with these provisions being further proof of the danger that fire posed to the community. In 1697 another misfortune fell on the city of Sibiu due to a fire, which broke out in the household of peasant Binder, in the suburb of the city, where three children fell prey to the flames.²⁵

Fire prevention measures were also taken in the eighteenth century; in 1704, to prevent the spread of fires, smoking was prohibited on the streets,²⁶ so that on 1 April 1723 it was also banned in the courtyards.²⁷ Another important decision related to the prevention and extinguishing of fires is that of 1753, when the theatrical society was forced to give up the wooden stage in the large square for the safety of citizens.²⁸ At the end of the eighteenth century, following an imperial order, the neighborhoods had to hire paid night guards. Among the first neighborhoods that obeyed this order were those on *Fleischer St.* (Mitropoliei, today) and *Sporer* (General Magheru, today). The neighborhoods of these streets employed paid guards on 31 March 1759.²⁹ The rapid expansion of the fire was also favored by the material used in constructions (for example, in 1751, there were still 61 wooden houses in the Upper Town, out of a total of 464) and the narrow streets of the city. Starting in 1768, it was strictly forbidden to build wooden houses with a shingle roof, and it was ordered that, within a year, all the chimneys of the Houses should be widened and walled.

Fairs had always been a time of danger for the outbreak of fires. For this reason, prior to their opening, the city magistrate ordered special safety measures, obliging each homeowner to have water hoses and intervention tools ready. The fire prevention and extinguishing instructions issued during Empress Maria Theresa (Fig. 2) or Emperor Joseph II specified, among other things, the obligations of the owners of houses, institutions, guilds, especially those who worked with fire in the exercise of their trade (bakers, soap makers), merchants, chimney sweepers, or those of the Commission for the Investigation of the Causes that Triggered the Fire (*Kommission zur Untersuchung der Ursachen des Brandes*). The contents of these documents indicate the type of building material (brick),

²⁴ Zimmermann 1885, 125.

²⁵ Sigerus 2016, 27.

²⁶ Sigerus 2016, 28.

²⁷ Sigerus 2016, 33.

²⁸ Sigerus 2016, 37.

²⁹ Sigerus 2016, 38.

the city's obligation to have its own equipment and horses ready. To these were added the tools for extinguishing the fire provided by each homeowner.³⁰

The concern for the safety of the citizens was also present in other craft and commercial centers in Southern Transylvania, which had taken over the organizational model of the Sibiu neighborhoods. One of these was Braşov. The oldest document mentioning the existence of neighborhoods was the statute issued in 1533. The provisions of the statutes are almost identical, which demonstrates the spread of this model of organization throughout the Transylvanian space. In the neighborhood register on *Johannis St.* in Braşov there are statutes from different centuries. The first and oldest is dated 1656 and includes, in 18 articles, the obligations of the neighborhood father and of those who were accepted in the neighborhood.³¹ Special attention is paid to the prevention and extinguishing of fires, and from Article 13 we learn that the neighbor who did not carefully watch the fire or whose lantern was broken was severely punished with a fine of 1 gulden.³² The register continued with the sitting protocols of 1666 and 1687, so that on 2 July 1742 a new statute in tone with the times was copied. The statute had 14 articles in which neighborhood issues were presented. Four articles were devoted to the prevention and extinguishing of fires: the person who went into the street with open fire was to pay a fine of 50 denars.³³ A much broader and more elaborate statute was the one issued in 1716, found in an eighteenth-century register, belonging to the same neighborhood on *Johannis St.*³⁴ The safety of the neighborhood was analyzed in Article 7 of the statute, on how to prevent and put out fires. The neighbor who did not clean his house's hearth and chimney was fined 2.5 florins, a very large amount for those times, which demonstrated the seriousness of the act. Those who had the obligation to control the irregularities were welcomed in the yard, allowed to investigate all the hearths, chimneys or possible sources of fire, the discovered irregularities were acknowledged by the neighbor and everything was done in an understanding manner, for quarrels were not allowed. A penalty of 1 florin was paid by the neighbor who went with open fire into a shed, barn, or room. Participation of the neighbors in the night guard of the street was mandatory. As other statutes stipulated too, those who did not announce their absence and left the street unguarded were fined 25 denars, and those who were late to start service in the evening had to pay 12 denars.³⁵

An article dedicated to citizen safety was entitled *Über die Bäckerei* (On Baking) and referred to how the neighborhood oven was to be kept in good working condition. The community appointed a person who was good at baking bread and who was obliged to help neighbors bake it, keep the bakery clean and carefully monitor the fire. If this last provision was not respected, the guilty party paid a fine of 1 florin. The housewives were constrained by statute to wake up early in the morning to bake bread; those caught at night with bread in the oven were punished with 25 denars, for the danger posed by fire during the night.³⁶

³⁰ SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 11, Package 5, unnumbered.

³¹ ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 4/1, unnumbered.

³² ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 4/1, unnumbered.

³³ ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 4/1, unnumbered.

³⁴ ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 6/1, unnumbered.

³⁵ ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 6/1, unnumbered.

³⁶ ABNB, Vecinătățile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. He 6/1, unnumbered.

The activity of the neighborhoods was also known in Mediaș. The concerns for the way of organization, mutual aid and the safety of citizens were voiced in a register of the neighborhood on *Kothgasse* (Mud St.) from 1682. Two statutes are written in this register: one with 12 articles and one, from 1712, with 24 articles. These included all the problems regulating the good behavior of the neighborhood and the fines that were due if the statutory provisions were not obeyed.³⁷

An important statute for the neighborhoods of Mediaș and the seat of Mediaș was that issued by the magistrate in 1794. The document consisted of 12 pages in which the rights and obligations of the members of the neighborhood were presented at length. Among the articles of the statute we find provisions that obliged neighbors to be careful about chimneys, hearths, and possible sources of fire. In order to prevent fires, neighbors were demanded to clean the chimneys more often in winter; whoever did not comply with this paid a fine of 25 denars. Around easily flammable materials such as straw and wood, neighbors were warned not to use fire or 'shake hot ash in wooden pots or on the floor,' for, whoever did not comply with these rules, was to be fined 99 denars. Tobacco users were also warned not to smoke 'outside the room, on the street, in the alleys, in the open field, on carts loaded with straw or hay,' as they would be fined 99 denarii.³⁸ Certain conditions had to be met for the construction of an oven in the house, one of them being that the chimney was to be walled so as not to pose a danger to the neighborhood. Those that were not thus built were demolished and a fine of 99 denars was also paid.³⁹ An important role in ensuring the safety of citizens was played by the neighborhood father. He, helped by other members of the neighborhood, had the obligation to check, both in summer and in winter, the chimneys of all houses to prevent possible fire risks. He had to make sure that water wells were cleaned and the degraded ones repaired. He also dealt with the purchase of the necessary tools for extinguishing fires, using the money raised from fines. Each neighborhood had to be equipped with two fire hooks, two ladders, two barrels for water, and had to find a trough (*Badewanne*) near the well of the neighborhood.⁴⁰

Gradually, part of the tasks of the neighborhoods was taken over by the local administration, as demonstrated by the *Dienstes instruction für die Nachtwächter der Stadt Hermannstad* (Instructions on the Service of Night Guards), a document issued in 1885 (Fig. 3).⁴¹ It was found in printed form in all the Sibiu neighborhoods and, as in the previous documents, one can see the concern for the cleanliness and order of the city. According to this document, the City Police Department (*Die Städtliche Polizei*) was to take over the duties of the neighborhoods, and its representatives had to be informed about the damage to the pavement, public stairs, sidewalks, bridges, public water pipes, but also on the proper functioning of public lighting. From the second half of the eighteenth century, the night watchmen mentioned in the statutes were paid for the work performed from the common fund of the neighborhood, as this service had come out of the remit of the neighborhoods. The guards divided their service, one stood guard from 10 in the evening until 1 o'clock in

³⁷ SJS AN, Muzeul Raional Mediaș Fonds, Register no. 4, folios 1–5.

³⁸ SJS AN, Muzeul Raional Mediaș Fonds, Register no. 4, folios 1–5.

³⁹ SJS AN, Muzeul Raional Mediaș Fonds, Register no. 4, folios 1–5.

⁴⁰ SJS AN, Muzeul Raional Mediaș Fonds, Register no. 4, folio 6.

⁴¹ SJS AN, Vecinătățile orașului Brașov Fonds, Documents, no. 15, package 6, folio 109.

the night, while the second took over and continued until 5 in the morning. From April to September, the service ended at 4 in the morning. Neighborhoods with owners whose material situation allowed this were able to hire more than two guards per night. The neighborhood fathers were informed that a night watchman could not be paid less than 6 Rhenish florins per month. Night watchmen had to be reliable people, without a criminal history, they had to be strong and no older than 50 years. The employment of the guard was confirmed by the City Police Department, which equipped him with a bayonet, the city coat of arms and a whistle. One condition was that this equipment should be worn only at work.⁴²

If the guard did not conscientiously perform his service, was not punctual or came to work in a state of intoxication, he was verbally reprimanded or sanctioned by withholding an amount from his salary, which went into the neighborhood fund. All these problems were brought to the attention of the City Police Department, which took the necessary measures.⁴³

Surviving documents attest the existence of contracts between the neighborhoods and night watchmen. One of these is a contract dated 12 February 1857 (Fig. 4), concluded by Samuel Eder and Math. Schoberberger, fathers of the neighborhood *Burgerthor Vorstadt* (the Upper Burger Gate) with Thodes Valje and J. Konar (?), night guards of the city. They were obliged to provide security during the night for a period of one year.⁴⁴

Changes occurred in the statutes of the neighborhoods of Braşov in the nineteenth century, when a general statute, divided into six chapters, was issued in 1821. The document begins with an article according to which the provisions of the older statutes were no longer valid, which led to the drafting of a new one, adapted to the needs. The fourth chapter was dedicated to the theme analyzed here: it described how to prevent and extinguish fires. Market days represented a danger for the city of Braşov also, which is why the citizens were informed that during the fair each was compelled to have a barrel of water in front of the house; whoever did not comply with this provision was to pay a fine of 1 florin. The neighbors had an obligation to keep the chimneys of the houses clean; those whose chimneys were not clean, when the neighborhood father came to check, would pay a fine between 20 and 80 denars, depending on how caked with soot the chimney was. Each neighbor was obliged to have at least one lantern working properly, which could be used during the night; otherwise, he paid a fine of 25 denars. An article also found in the previous statutes is that by which neighbors who were inattentive and entered the barn or stable with an open fire source were fined 3 florins. The neighbor who did not participate in extinguishing a fire that broke out in the neighborhood was sanctioned with 1 florin. The owner because of whom the fire had broken out was demanded to pay the neighborhood 1 Rhenish florin, because he had neglected the statutory provisions, endangering the entire neighborhood.⁴⁵

For the neighborhoods of Mediaş, a statute was issued in 1820⁴⁶ regulating the prevention and extinguishing of fires. This shows the importance given to this danger –

⁴² SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 15, package 6, folio 111.

⁴³ SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 15, package 6, folio 111.

⁴⁴ SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 3, package 1, unnumbered.

⁴⁵ SJB AN, Liceul Honterus – Braşov Fonds, Documents, no. 52, folios 6–7.

⁴⁶ Plajer 1999–2000, 219–220.

fire and the seriousness with which this problem was treated by citizens. Each neighbor had to try to put out the fire, being equipped with a barrel, an axe or a pickaxe⁴⁷.

Fires constantly posed a danger to the life of the human community. The actions initiated by the neighborhoods and the documents issued by them in the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries formed the basis of the subsequent amplification of measures and forms of organization, and of fire protection in the nineteenth century. The following institutions were set up: The Fire Insurance Company (*Feuerversicherung*, 1845), The Fire, Life and Property Insurance Company (*Lebens- und Sachversicherung gegen Feuer*, 1845), The Firemen's Association (*Feuerpolizei*), which issued its own instructions (1859), that of the chimney sweepers (1858) etc. An order issued in 1853 entrusted neighborhood leaders and street sweepers with observing and announcing fires; also, here are recorded the functions of the pump foreman and the fire commissioner. We also learn that the neighborhoods had five pumps operated by the leader (the Police representative or the Municipal Council – *der Vertreter der Polizei oder Gemeindevorstand*), fire commissioner, mechanic, people on duty at the pumps (carpenters, coopers, hatters), those from the bucket line (neighborhood members) and substitutes (carpenters, locksmiths, blacksmiths, tanners).⁴⁸

In 1872 the Firefighters' Association (*Feuerwehr*) was established, its statute being approved by the Ministry of the Interior. Subsequently, the activities of prevention, extinguishing fires and intervention in natural disasters were taken over by the Volunteer Fire Brigade, which operated until 15 November 1936, when the first military fire brigade company was established in Sibiu, composed of a captain commander, two assistant non-commissioned officers and 40 troops. The act that confirmed the establishment of the above-mentioned subunit is the *Regular Order no. 132* of 11 November 1936. The Sibiu military firefighters had become an elite professional corps in the fight against fires, floods and calamities, being prepared, at any time, to jump to the aid of those who asked for their support. In 1936, by the Law on the organization of firefighters, voted in the Senate, at the meeting of 26 March, the Volunteer Fire Brigade was replaced by military firefighters. At the disbandment, there was only one survivor, Gustav Theiss, who was on the list of those enrolled in 1873.

This article brings to the fore one of the functions of the neighborhoods: namely the concern for the safety of the citizen. After a careful analysis of the provisions of the statutes, but also of the documents of the neighborhoods related to the citizens' safety, we can conclude that fire was a pressing problem for the society of those times. It can be seen that such concerns did not exist only in Sibiu: in the statutes of the neighborhoods in towns such as Braşov and Mediaş, we meet provisions related to this problem. Over time, the issues of field security, fire prevention and extinguishing, order and cleanliness in the streets were taken over by the authorities, but the neighborhoods continued their work while maintaining their most important function, namely that of mutual aid within the community. Through active involvement in community life and their actions, neighborhoods can be considered the initiators of useful services to modern society.

⁴⁷ Plajer 1999–2000, 229.

⁴⁸ SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 10, Package 5, unnumbered.

Bibliography

Primary sources

- ABNB [Arhiva Bisericii Negre Braşov], Vecinătăţile oraşului Braşov Fonds, Register IV. IV. He 2/6; He 4/1; IV. He 6/1.
- SJS AN [Serviciul Judeţean Sibiu al Arhivelor Naţionale], Vecinătăţile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 3, package 1; no. 10, package 5; no. 11, package 5; no. 15, package 6.
- SJS AN, Vecinătăţile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Registers, no. 129a.
- SJS AN, Muzeul Raional Mediaş Fonds, Register no. 4, package 6.
- SJB AN [Serviciul Judeţean Braşov al Arhivelor Naţionale], Liceul Honterus – Braşov Fonds, Documents, no. 52.

Secondary sources

- Derzsi 2018 J. Derzsi, *Incendiul de la Sibiu din 1570. Câteva lămuriri privitoare la data declanşării dezastrului şi la amploarea sa*, HU, 26 (2018), 13–46.
- Frîncu 2018 R. M. Frîncu, *Solidarităţi socio-economice, vecinătăţi din sudul Transilvaniei*, Sibiu 2018.
- Mihăilescu et alii 2003 V. Mihăilescu, G. Coman, F. Pozsony, A. Schiltz, V. Şoflău, *Vecini şi Vecinătăţi în Transilvania*, Bucharest, 2003.
- Plajer 1999–2000 D. Plajer, *Siebenbürgisch-Sächsische Nachbarschaften vom 16. bis zum Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts (3. Teil)*, Forschungen, 46–47 (1999–2000), 219–220.
- Pakucs-Willcocks 2018 M. Pakucs-Willcocks, *Sibiul veacului al XVI-lea. Rînduirea unui oraş transilvănean*, Bucharest 2018.
- Schubert 1980 H.–A. Schubert, *Nachbarschaft und Modernisierung. Eine historische Soziologie taditionaler Lokalgruppen am Beispiel Siebenbürgens*, Studia Transylvanica, 6, Köln–Wien 1980.
- Schunn 1936 W. Schunn, *Die Nachbarschaften der Deutschen in Rumänien*, Hermannstadt 1936.
- Seivert 1859 G. Seivert, *Die Stadt Hermannstadt. Eine historische Skizze*, Hermannstadt 1859.
- Sigerus 2016 E. Sigerus, *Cronica oraşului Sibiu 1100–1929*, tr. by B. Ungar, Sibiu 2016.
- Zimmermann 1885 F. Zimmermann, *Die Nachbarschaften in Hermannstadt, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Stadtverfassung und Verwaltung in Siebenburgen*, Archiv N. F., 20/1 (1885), 47–202.



Fig. 1. First page of the statute issued on 14 February 1696 (SJS AN, Vecinătățile orașului Sibiu Fonds, Registers, no. 129a)




Fig. 2. First page of the regulation on fire prevention, issued by Maria Theresa on 30 November 1771 (SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 11; package 5).




Fig. 3. First page of the instructions on the night guard shift from Sibiu, dated 1885 (SJS AN, Vecinătățile oraşului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 15, package 6).




Fig. 4. Employment contract of the night guard from 12 February 1857 (SJS AN, Vecinătățile orașului Sibiu Fonds, Documents, no. 3, package 1).

BATHS AND BATHING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TRANSYLVANIA

ANDREA FEHÉR*

Abstract: The Hungarian term bath [*fürdő*] has several meanings, from personal cleanliness to thermal and mineral water cures. Although bath, bathing and the presence of healing and regenerating waters is rarely encountered in eighteenth-century Hungarian ego-documents in Transylvania, we have a few descriptions regarding personal hygiene rituals and several notes on bath used for medical reasons and recreational purposes. These later data suggest that thermal cures were very fashionable in Transylvania, and bathing was not only part of the medical culture but also had a strong social dimension. Thus, in the following we would like to address the issue of personal cleanliness, hydrotherapy and the social dimension of spring-thermal cures.

Keywords: ego-documents, personal hygiene, thermal springs, bath, hydrotherapy, healing, social life

Rezumat: Termenul baie [*fürdő*] are mai multe înțelesuri în limba maghiară. Apa putea fi folosită pentru menținerea igienei corporale, dar putea fi la fel de bine utilizată și în scop terapeutic, fie că e vorba de tonifiere și detoxificare, ori de tratament extern balneologic. Cu toate că baia, îmbăierea sau prezența apelor minerale nu constituie principalul subiect al memorialisticii de limba maghiară din Transilvania secolului al XVIII-lea, avem totuși câteva însemnări care privesc igiena corporală a nobililor ardeleni și multe descrieri despre băi termale și stațiuni balneare, despre tratamente și vizite recreaționale. Memorialistica epocii ne sugerează faptul că tratamentele balneare au fost foarte îndrăgite de strămoșii noștri, iar timpul petrecut în atmosfera relaxantă a băilor a contribuit nu doar la detoxifierea și însănătoșirea pacienților, ci și la dezvoltarea unor forme de socializare moderne. Articolul de față, așadar, dorește să abordeze subiectul igienei corporale, al hidroterapiei premoderne și al dimensiunii sociale a băilor termale.

Cuvinte cheie: memorialistică, igienă personală, izvoare minerale, băi, tratamente balneologice, viață socială

Water and personal hygiene

We would like to introduce this topic with a controversial quotation, so often used by researchers when they reflect on the personal hygiene of our ancestors. The one to *blame* for the misconceptions is the most well-known Transylvanian autobiographer, count Miklós Bethlen, who described his personal hygiene routine as follows: ‘I have rarely bathed, especially in cold water. I have washed my feet every two weeks, sometimes every week. I have always cleaned my mouth in the morning, and after lunch and dinner, and gently bathed my eyes with cold water, my hands too frequently, but I have never washed my face except some dust or mud or dirt had soiled it, but the barber shaved my beard every week until I was imprisoned. My head has not been washed for perhaps twenty-five years’.¹ The above

* Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, ‘Babeș-Bolyai’ University in Cluj-Napoca, email: feher_andrea@yahoo.com.

¹ Miklós Bethlen (1642–1716), chancellor of Transylvania, was the most erudite Transylvanian dignitary of the time. His autobiography is one of the best pieces of Transylvanian memoir-literature. Bethlen 2004, 140.

quotation has long determined the views of Hungarian historiography on baths and bathing. Researchers like Béla Radvánszky, Sándor Takáts and Gábor Várkonyi tried to *wash away* this historiographic cliché in their works.² They proved in their studies how Miklós Bethlen's sanitary habits differed from those of his contemporaries, and the explanation for his reluctance is formulated by the historian István György Tóth, who talks about Bethlen's hydrophobia, presuming that this fear had to do with two near-drowning experiences, recorded by the author in his life history.³ The truth is that Bethlen is not that far from the European conception of cleanliness, since for centuries bodily hygiene had meant first of all the cleaning of personal belongings, clothes, and not that of the body; not to mention that in medical treatises the Salernitan prohibition regarding head and hair washing is often referenced.⁴

It is a fact, however, that in the source group we studied, the authors very rarely refer to their washing habits. We see the explanation for this omission rather in the genre-bound nature of retrospective memoirs, where washing up is obviously not among the most important things to remember at old age.⁵ But we wish to draw attention to the medical treaties, especially to the dietetic guide of István Mátyus, which contains a whole chapter regarding personal hygiene.⁶ We will base this subsection of our paper on this treaty, on inventories and on ego-documents. We would like to underline here that we discuss only the Hungarian data, without analyzing the Saxon chronicles or diaries, which in our experience neglect this type of personal data.

In Péter Apor's work, *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae*, the author mentions that in Transylvania early modern travelers used to take their personal toiletries on journeys, since in the carriage, the footman had the task to carry 'the gentleman's sumptuous golden cup, along with his face towel and comb'.⁷ The bowl-dishes and pots used for hand washing are frequently mentioned in all kinds of source types, having been present in many households, not just the noble ones.⁸ Larger pots are also often encountered. We read about long tubs with hoops and small ones used for children,⁹ or for washing the feet and other extremities. The large tubs were usually made of fir or metal, the small ones were made from porcelain and were often decorated. The bath-tubs, especially the smaller ones served multiple functions, since sometimes we can read about mothers who kneaded bread and bathed their children in the same pot.¹⁰

² Radvánszky 1895, 37–38; Várkonyi 1993, 105–122.

³ Tóth 2006, 214.

⁴ Corbin 1986, 158, 179.

⁵ Fehér 2016, 69.

⁶ István Mátyus (1725–1802) was a well-known Transylvanian physician, dietician, and writer. He graduated in Utrecht and completed his medical practice in Göttingen, Marburg and Vienna. He worked as a doctor in Târgu-Mureș, and later was appointed as chief physician of Târnava County. Mátyus 1762, 501–519.

⁷ Péter Apor (1676–1752) was a baron from Háromszék, *comes*, royal judge, and prolific memoir writer. Apor 2010, 48.

⁸ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 140.

⁹ Sámuel Fogarasi (1770–1830) was a Protestant priest, who wrote an autobiography in which he included his academic experiences from abroad. Fogarasi 1974, 227. The translations from the sources are ours, except for Miklós Bethlen's Autobiography and Péter Apor's Memoires.

¹⁰ Szabó 1984, 58, 60.

Eighteenth-century ego-documents mention the bathtub either as part of their author's weekly hygiene routine or used for medical reasons, such as spring detoxification or the treatment of fever-diseases. Regardless of the purpose, hygienic or medical, preparing a bath was a difficult and complicated task. Transporting water, filling or emptying the tub was part of the duty of young servants. We have a few data from memoir-writers who in their youth, during their service at great noble households, used to perform such duties as carrying bathing water. György Rettegi was clearly upset about this task: 'Furthermore, since every week a hot bath has to be prepared for the Lords, I wasn't that well situated to be left out from the water-carrying, so I myself had to carry water in horse-buckets directly from the Someş river'.¹¹ Therefore, it may be inferred that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, nobles already used to take weekly warm-baths, which was done much more frequently than experts would have recommended in this century.¹² In the secondary literature, it is often mentioned that some nations preferred cold baths, considering the hot ones dangerous.¹³ Mátyus for instance advised his readers to take as many baths as possible to avoid 'the unpleasant stink', and to wash especially their feet, without specifying if he was considering cold or hot water for this cleaning ritual.¹⁴ The fashion of hot baths in Transylvania suggests a German influence, since they enjoyed the hot-tub;¹⁵ not surprisingly, the first mention of the bathtub is related to the German-born wife of the Prince Gábor Bethlen. This is one of the few data which recall female bathing, otherwise the ego-documents did not mention female hygiene rituals.¹⁶ Even if hot-bath was preferred medical treaties still continued to promote cold-baths for the face and eyes, praising the beneficial effects of spring-waters.¹⁷

We do not know exactly if these tubs were placed in a separate room, or in the bedchamber, turning this into a bathing closet. We found two seventeenth-century data regarding the existence of bathrooms, but otherwise there are no mentions of the exact location where these tubs were installed. Noble inventories contain descriptions of expensive and imported bathing dresses and bath-sheets, but the majority of our data suggest that bathers were undressed,¹⁸ and not just those who bathed in their own tubs, but also those who enjoyed bathing in rivers and lakes, which can be concluded from the fact that city laws annually renewed their bath-regulation because of the high number of nude bathers.¹⁹

The presence of towels was widespread too, sources suggesting that nobles used different towels for their hand, face and head.²⁰ Nobility and wealthy citizens did use soap

¹¹ György Rettegi (1718–1786) was a member of the small nobility, performing some minor administrative task in Dăbâca County. Rettegi 1970, 63.

¹² Corbin 1986, 178.

¹³ Marschner, Marschner 1995, 23.

¹⁴ Mátyus 1762, 501–502.

¹⁵ Smith 2007, 234.

¹⁶ Except maybe those concerning the wet-nurses, who were supposed to be clean – but how they achieved this, we do not know.

¹⁷ Mátyus 1762, 502–503.

¹⁸ Szabó 1984, 57, 60.

¹⁹ Szabó 1984, 57–58. The controversial nature of the public bath is evident in several contemporary works, since this type of bathing was always associated with immorality. Corbin 1986, 176.

²⁰ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 140; Magyary-Kossa 1931, 369.

for bathing, household books give recipes for their preparation, and inventories often recall fine floral scented soaps, or perfumed Turkish soaps.²¹ Mátyus cannot stress enough the importance of the soap, considering this an indispensable bathing-tool, and especially a precious hair-care product, since unlike Bethlen, Mátyus urges his readers to wash their hair often, and to avoid the artificial oily hair-treatments and use instead herbal plants and soap.²² Some of the analyzed authors were familiar with perfumes as well. For the young elite and even for the educated middle classes personal cleanliness were marks of being genteel, and using fresh scented waters became part of their bodily hygiene ritual.²³ As the young Count József Teleki mentions in his account book: 'I bought a bottle of fine-smelling water' in Amsterdam.²⁴ The hygiene of the mouth was also present, since bad-breath was a stigma. For this reason, Mátyus included in his treaty several recipes for teeth-powder. According to the physician people should wash their mouth after every meal with cold water (but not after they consumed spicy and hot dishes) and clean their teeth with a thin piece of bone, straw or feather.²⁵

The majority of mentions regarding the presence of bath-tubs in noble households are healthcare-related, which suggests that bathing was considered a therapeutic practice as well.²⁶ László Székely tells the story of a four-year long illness he suffered from, described as 'the cold shakes', which he tried to cure by sweating in a bathtub for hours: 'On my cold day, I went out to hunt or ride, and as soon as I felt I was starting to shiver, I went home quickly, lay into the tub, but it always shook me even more. Every once in a while, I continued this, sitting for a while in the bathtub, getting out of it from time to time, sweating a lot but still without any use'.²⁷ Some used baths to cure their affections, and some out of fashion – in the springtime, as part of their yearly detoxification, since it was commonly believed that the human body, like nature, renewed itself every spring,²⁸ a process that was being encouraged by conscious patients in various ways. István Wesselényi performed spring detoxification treatments in the bathtub: 'This evening, I started an herbal bathe-cure prescribed by a surgeon [...] I sat in the bath for an hour, both in the evening and in the morning, and I went to bed right away'. Bathing was followed by serious detoxification, as the author also used laxatives and ordered bloodletting from his surgeon as well, interventions which weakened his otherwise healthy body: 'I myself have

²¹ Szabó 2005, 140–141.

²² Mátyus 1762, 501, 503.

²³ Smith 2007, 226; Corbin 1986, 75.

²⁴ József Teleki (1738–1796) was the member of one of the most influential Transylvanian families, a well-educated noble, politician and writer. Teleki 1987, 293. Similarly, he frequently mentions (several times per month) the money paid for wig-masters and hairdresser services, which suggests that, in opposition to Bethlen, he did care a lot about his hair and coiffure. Teleki 1987, 268–310.

²⁵ Mátyus 1762, 504–506.

²⁶ Corbin 1986, 72. Noble correspondence, trial records abound from such data regarding herbal baths from the sixteenth century on. Szabó 1984, 57–59.

²⁷ László Székely (1716–1772) was an educated Transylvanian aristocrat, book collector, translator, and memoir writer. Székely 2019, 368.

²⁸ Some consider that going to the bath in the spring had a spiritual meaning as well, since peasants believed in the Pentecost-purification, and in the fact that water had special powers in this period of the year, therefore bathing would help to regenerate the body after winter and in the same time strengthen it for summertime work. Kósa 1993, 206–207.

terrible headache and dizziness since my bleeding, and I feel that this particular cure rather harmed than eased my pain, I have not been well ever since²⁹.

Hydrotherapy: the healing power of water

We found little data on the use of private bathing and washing spaces, but we did find more on the use of mineral waters with therapeutic effect. István Halmágyi,³⁰ Péter Bod,³¹ György Rettegi, István Wesselényi and László Székely discuss contemporary spas in their retrospective personal narratives. Their testimonies suggest that Transylvanians, regardless of their rank or wealth, spent a great deal of time and money on their annual thermal cures. These bath cures were usually a collective enterprise, the majority of our data suggesting that nobles travelled to the locations with their family or in the company of their friends, therefore water cures satisfied also a communal need.

This popular addiction to springs and baths was strongly supported by the medical personnel of the time, since physicians could not emphasize enough the positive effects of medicinal waters. By the end of the eighteenth century, we already have professional literature on balneology to popularize knowledge of water cures and to spread their use. Maria Theresa's decrees from 1763 also urged this enterprise since district physicians had to systematically record data about thermal waters and spas.³² We would mention here the treatises of István Hatvani on the thermal springs in Oradea (Bihar County); the book signed by Ferenc Nyulas on Transylvanian mineral waters and those on the springs from the Rodna Mountains, which was rich in mineral waters, therefore analyzed by István Mátyus as well; Michael Neustaedter's work on Borsec and Homorod (both in Harghita County); and the guide of János Stadler on the healthy use of the springs from Herculane (Caraş-Severin County).³³ The reason medical staff was involved in this process has to be found in the Galenic health conception of the time, according to which diseases resulted from the imbalance of the four basic humors of the body. The ultimate goal of the physician was to restore the proper balance, to remove the toxins from the body.³⁴ This was accomplished with the help of bloodletting performed with instruments or leeches, cupping, through diets and purgation. Hydrotherapy, which is probably the most versatile form of therapy, is closely linked to the latter therapeutic method, which could explain the enthusiasm of the medical personnel regarding thermal cures.

On infrastructure

How should such a treatment be conceived? First of all, people had to get to the scene, and no matter how naive this statement is, it is not irrelevant. Traveling consumed

²⁹ Baron István Wesselényi de Hadad (1673–1734) was a politician who supported the Habsburg House, comes of Middle-Solnoc and Cluj Counties, and president of the *Deputatio*. He is the author of the most elaborate eighteenth-century diary. Wesselényi 1983, 429; Wesselényi 1985, 552.

³⁰ István Halmágyi (1719–1785) worked as a concipist in the Transylvanian *Gubernium*, and left a remarkable heritage in the form of diaries: Halmágyi 1906.

³¹ Péter Bod (1712–1769) was a renowned Transylvanian Calvinist pastor, author of several works, among which an autobiography: Bod 2007.

³² Daday 2005, 15; Kósa 1999, 10–11.

³³ Hatvani 1777; Nyulas 1800a; Nyulas 1800b; Mátyus 1968; Magyary-Kossa 1940, 114; Kapronczay 2010, 27.

³⁴ H. Balázs et al. 2007, 32.

time and money, took days rather than hours and required a careful itinerary. In addition to economic factors, the weather also had to be taken into account,³⁵ since many mineral springs, as will be discussed below, were inaccessible during most of the year. The best months for bathing were May and September, so for the most of the year, the settlements near the thermal springs were empty. Therefore, not surprisingly, most of our data suggest that Transylvanians sought the pleasures of the waters between May and June. If by chance the mineral water was in the proximity of a village, then the patients would rent some rooms from the local peasantry, or ask permission from the local aristocracy to spend time in their mansion-houses.³⁶

We have to underline that most of the Transylvanian springs we are to write about were at the very *beginning* of their development. Visiting the bath sometimes supposed considerable financial and human efforts. There were some springs without any infrastructure at all, and situated too far from the inhabited areas. In Herculane for instance, poor people lived in tents and improvised huts till the middle of the nineteenth century, and by night gathered around a great fire where they fried some meat. This nightly ritual was one of the attractions of the thermal spa.³⁷ But not everyone was willing to accept these primitive circumstances; we know for instance that the Transylvanian prince Gábor Bethlen went to Jimbor (Braşov County) with several carts transporting building material, furniture, and textiles. Houses were built in a hurry, tents were set up, and the interior was made cozy and comfortable with carpets, blankets, and pillows.³⁸ István Halmágyi described similar conditions during his thermal cures. Visiting the mineral springs from Băţani (Covasna County), the author could not find neither accommodation nor food. Despite these shortcomings, the popularity of the place was not affected. Halmágyi mentions several dignities in his diary, from county judges to nobility, all willing to sacrifice their comfort in hope for some healing benefits. Under these circumstances, most of the patients were living in improvised wooden huts and tents built near the water source. Since their food reserves were also limited, they went out every day to fish.³⁹

Food supplies were a constant preoccupation of these early thermal tourists. Halmágyi mentions in his diary the huge amounts of food he took with himself on these occasions. He travelled most of the time with one of his colleague and friend, Veress, with whom he shared a mutual interest in the use of mineral waters. Veress had relatives near Geoagiu (Hunedoara County), a very beloved spa destination in Transylvania.⁴⁰ During their stay there, they were often invited to Veress's relatives to dine. Because of its popularity, Geoagiu was always full, so in this location the two governmental employees were just as often invited to dine with the local nobles. The hospitality of the latter could be

³⁵ Mackaman 1998, 16.

³⁶ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 147–148; H. Balázs et al. 2007, 54.

³⁷ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 148.

³⁸ Kovács 2018, 51.

³⁹ Halmágyi 1906, 410.

⁴⁰ The history of Geoagiu is traceable to Roman times, and the hot spring and bath never lost its popularity. Many Transylvanian princes attended this bath, such as Gabriel Bethlen, Gheorghe Rákóczi II, Mihai Apaffi I, Sigismund Báthory, or the Princesses Isabella and Catherine of Brandenburg. It seems that female patients were more preoccupied by the aesthetics of the place; for instance, in 1564, Princess Isabella ordered the construction of a luxuriant bathing pool there, surrounded by gardens and orchards. Magyary-Kossa 1931, 197.

easily explained, everyone being eager to know more information regarding state affairs, and the two public servants could provide interesting insights from the Government. On the other hand, the two officials were just as happy to enlarge their social network.⁴¹

Among the *classic problems* of food and shelter, many had to face difficulties regarding mobility.⁴² Borsec (Harghita County) for instance, was almost inaccessible in the eighteenth century. We learn from the travelogue of Halmágyi that the roads were despicable and really muddy even in July, therefore patients had to ask favors from the local administrator in order to rent horses and carts; otherwise they could not reach the location.⁴³ Borsec could not offer patients any comfort, but despite that, it was the most expensive spa of its time. Due to its inaccessibility, patients had to rent from the local peasants not just horses and carriages, but had to hire some servants to bring them food supplies and mineral water, since the settlement was not in the proximity of the famous spring.⁴⁴

On treatments

The above description suggests that most of the patients were willing to change their priorities and to endure Spartan conditions in order to obtain some relief from their pain, regardless of whether that was a physical condition or one concerning the soul since many Transylvanians cured their melancholy too at spas. One of them was László Székely, who visited Doboşeni (Covasna County) several times, but mentioned the physical affection he treated there only once.⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that the mineral water from Doboşeni was not recommended for everyone, as suggested by a letter from the Kornis family archive: 'His Excellences are both fresh, but they are no longer visiting Doboşeni, since the results of the test arrived, and the Doctors considered that these waters were dangerous and very strong for his Excellency' (1755).⁴⁶ The quotation suggests therefore that the mineral water could be tested for its properties, which also shows that by the middle of the century our physicians were familiar with modern chemical testing methods. However, in the ego-documents, we rarely find evidence of such analyses.

Another famous bath was the aforementioned Geoagiu, known for its therapeutic properties since Roman times. And its popularity seemed to grow in this century, since it was a beloved meeting-place for the elites of that time. However, mineral water was brought there every day by horse carts, just as in Borsec. In Geoagiu, patients could undertake two types of treatments. One was the *classic* sour water cure, which consisted of drinking a significant amount of mineral water; and the other treatment, which is closer to our present perception regarding baths, was the actual bath. This could mean a total bath – spending some hours immersed in the pool – or a partial one, sinking only the injured body-part into the water.

⁴¹ Fehér 2016, 73–74.

⁴² Kósa 2009, 5; and it seems that these problems were encountered in most of Hungarian bath-locations, not only in Transylvania. Várkonyi 2009, 69–70.

⁴³ Halmágyi 1906, 316.

⁴⁴ Fehér 2016, 74.

⁴⁵ Székely 2019, 360, 392–393.

⁴⁶ The letter of Antal Baló in Szabó 1996, 683.

Despite our contemporary understanding of bathing, the popularity of early modern thermal spas was not due to the bathing opportunities, but to the presence of mineral springs there. Here is a good example on Veress's treatment from Borsec: 'He [Veress] bathed his feet twice an hour every day and drank the water, taking with me [Halmágyi] to 3 Cups [1 Cup = 1,4 Liter], which we continued to do so for a week; we stayed altogether for 23 days, bathing only three times'.⁴⁷ The purpose of baths was the consumption of sour water rather than the dip-in-the-water type of treatment, especially since the diary only mentions three bathing sessions during a three-week stay.

As mentioned before, the actual thermal cure was rather a drinking dietary treatment, which involved the consumption of a certain amount of mineral water. But what did a drinking cures involve exactly? The answer is to be found once again in the diary of Halmágyi: 'Two years ago we went to visit Borsec, which, in my opinion, has the best water in Transylvania, and perhaps in Europe as well, in terms of power and taste. But this water caused 5, 6, 7, 8 stools every day. After the fifth we could not sit until evening'. The author compared the properties of the mineral waters in Borsec and Bățani, considering the latter better: 'The waters from here caused only 3–4 stools a day, and without any pain. Probably because the sour water from Borsec is full of *sal alkali*, and that from Bățani, although it also has *sal alkali*, but it has in addition some other particles, which caused us to have so many stools, but without side effects. Its effect was so much better because it penetrated into the blood more and consequently used me more'. As we noticed, Halmágyi, a person of enlightenment, inquired about the chemical composition of the water in order to better understand the way his body reacted to the healing properties of mineral waters.

During the stay, it was wise to follow the recommendations of professional healers, 'to follow their advice about the nature of one's disease and the bath appropriate for the cure'.⁴⁸ Although, according to the literature, the wealthier travelled to the baths with their own pharmacist or personal doctor,⁴⁹ in eighteenth-century Transylvanian memoirs, we find no reference to bath masters or surgeons, except in that of Miklós Bethlen, who mentions the presence of his private doctor: 'I also took Doctor Ferenc Pápai, who administered me a purge and bled me against the oncoming of the stroke that I mentioned; nor did I have any further symptoms'.⁵⁰ This quote suggests the aforementioned presumptions we made regarding the combination of different treatments during a thermal cure.

We are rarely able to depict, based on the descriptions of their symptoms, what kind of diseases were treated with mineral, healing waters. Our sources suggest, as does the secondary literature, that those who regularly sought thermal treatment usually wished to cure their skin diseases, rheumatism and eye pains. Visitors however, with a few exceptions, treated themselves more on the basis of local experience, which sometimes could go beyond the theoretical knowledge of the physicians. By the end of the century we know of travelling physicians, who visited all the major thermal spas in order to give advice to patients,⁵¹ but professional balneologists appear only in the second part of the

⁴⁷ Halmágyi 1906, 316.

⁴⁸ Hembry 1990, 8.

⁴⁹ Takáts 1961, 82–84.

⁵⁰ Halmágyi 1906, 302.

⁵¹ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 149.

nineteenth century. What we can depict, however, is that the actual cure consisted of consuming four–five liters of mineral (sour) water daily, preferably in the early hours of the morning. Thereafter, the patient had nothing else to do except to relax or rely on the healing powers of the water. According to the secondary literature, it was presumed that during the water-cure the patients would fast and keep a diet,⁵² but for Transylvania we did not find any data to support that statement. Just as in the case of the actual bath. We would presume that bathing played an important part during the thermal cure, but it seems, as we mentioned, that drinking the water was more important than spending time in it. Although there are some descriptions regarding the creation of artificial basins near the spring, which were padded with wood and blankets for the comfort of the patients,⁵³ Transylvanian sources do not mention bathing.

Sparkling social life

Recent literature emphasizes the social dimension of thermal cures. Contemporary books and articles on this topic suggest that treatment was not among the most important components of the yearly bath-experience, since most of the visitors were preoccupied, in fact, with the expansion of their social networks and friendships.⁵⁴ Some consider that in the eighteenth century, public baths played the role of the later salons, and that therapy was not as important as it was once thought. In England, France, and Germany, modern and comfortably furnished hotel rooms, parks and restaurants provided the scene for a vibrant social life.⁵⁵

In Transylvania, great investments in thermal tourism were still in an incipient phase. The scale of the funding enjoyed by Western European establishments was achieved here only a century later, in the golden age of thermal tourism. The lack of investments in the leisure industry, however, did not stop Transylvanians from visiting these settlements. Our data suggest that no matter how Spartan the conditions were, many thermal spas were crowded, and not just with those who sought healing. The concerns of the physician József Szotyori from Târgu-Mureş at the end of the century suggest that in Transylvania, as in Western Europe, the nobility visited the baths for fun: ‘It is the human duty of the wealthy and healthy Gentlemen to consider the poor and sick patients of the bath, to keep quiet, and to avoid shouting, shooting, and playing music at least during the night’.⁵⁶

Our sources, as it has already been revealed, only partially support the relationship between social life and bathing, as the primary goal of our ancestors continued to be the treatment of diseases. Reading the diary entries of István Halmágyi, it is difficult to imagine the sparkling social life of the patients who were in perpetual purgation. Apart from this, the listing of the nobility present in the autobiographies and diaries of Péter Bod, István Halmágyi and László Székely suggests that, nevertheless, there was a social aspect to bathing here as well.⁵⁷ We identified in the eighteenth-century

⁵² Ozment 1986, 126.

⁵³ Várkonyi 1993, 116.

⁵⁴ Hembry 1990, 21.

⁵⁵ Blackbourn 2002, 12.

⁵⁶ Spielmann 1964, 32–33.

⁵⁷ Articles concerning the Hungarian bath-culture in general also strengthen this assumption. Várkonyi 2005, 426–428; Várkonyi 2009, 68.

ego-documents some topics related to social life, such as marriage, patronage, political gossip, and prostitution.

Katalin Péter repeatedly addresses the important role of baths in the private life of the Hungarian aristocracy.⁵⁸ A visit to the bath could coincide with family planning, not on a sophisticated level as described in Jane Austin's novels, but on a smaller scale. László Székely, for example, helped his brother-in-law, Zsigmond Toroczkai, to obtain the hand of Eszter Teleki, by visiting the family on their annual bath-cure, and spending some time with them in order to *promote* Toroczkai.⁵⁹ The often cited István Halmágyi, otherwise a convinced bachelor, was almost dragged into a marriage, by the age of 47, during one of his treatments. He gallantly mentions that the daughter of István Kun would have been a great match, but not for someone who settled for solitary life.⁶⁰ The rumor spread really fast, and Halmágyi had to face some difficulties in order to clear his reputation. From this experience he learned to avoid dinners at families with girls of marriageable age.

The priest Péter Bod mentions seven occasions on which he took bath-cures in his autobiography. The priest visited the mineral springs in Geoagiu every year, where he spent between one or two weeks, depending on the generosity of the bath-guests. He always enumerates the nobles present there, but rarely informs us of the results of the treatment. The allegiance of Bod to Geoagiu could be explained with his attachment to the bathing company, more precisely to their purses.⁶¹ Many of the author's treatments were financed by protestant nobles, just as his literary works. We consider that in this case, just as in the eighteenth century, the cultural elite used bath-treatments for fundraising as well.⁶² The experiences of István Halmágyi were somehow similar. The governmental secretary was often invited to dine with the nobility, during which the eager nobles could gather important political information from Halmágyi, while on the other hand, the author could also benefit from these experiences – not to mention that for someone with a limited budget a good meal during treatments was priceless.

We know from secondary literature that most of the criticism regarding baths – regardless if we are referring to bath-houses in towns or bath-treatments at spas – are concerning ethical and moral issues, since bathing was associated with immorality. In the description of the famous thermal spas from Felix, Oradea, György Rettegi mentions, slightly stupefied, the behavior of the Catholic clergy in the very proximity of the shrine of Saint László. The ecclesiastical importance of the place contributed greatly to the development of this settlement, since it was visited in large numbers by pilgrims in search of healing since the middle ages.⁶³ The prayers at the shrine and the healing properties of the thermal springs from here made the settlement near Oradea one of the most visited by Transylvanian authors.⁶⁴ However, Rettegi, who visited the bath in May 1764, 'less for the sake of refreshment, than for inquiring about my estates in the noble county of Bihor',

⁵⁸ Péter 2008, 92.

⁵⁹ Székely 2019, 392–393.

⁶⁰ Halmágyi 1906, 273.

⁶¹ Bod 2007, 120–138.

⁶² Kósa 1999, 183–190.

⁶³ Péter 2009, 12, 14–15.

⁶⁴ Magyary-Kossa 1929, 144–145; Csukovits 2003, 45, 66. On Reformation, pilgrimage, and bath, see Hembry 1990, 4–20.

does not reflect on the healing power of the waters (otherwise extremely efficient in eye treatments) or on miracles, but on the misbehavior of the clergy, who were animating the night-life with their immoral activities, 'spending money with two hands on a woman named Szántó'.⁶⁵ We have to stress that Rettegi was a Protestant, therefore his reluctance towards the Catholic clergy and holy places must be also taken into account when interpreting these data since there was no greater satisfaction in the eighteenth century for a Protestant than to point out the shortcomings of the Catholics. Despite the subjectivity of Rettegi, it is undeniable that an environment so different from everyday social conventions may have given rise to libertine behavior.

Conclusions

We introduced our topic with a quote from Miklós Bethlen, which suggested that in Transylvania, bathing with cleaning purposes was not a fashionable practice at all. Our sources, however, suggest a different perspective. Most of the noble households, even those among the wealthy bourgeois, had their own bathing equipment and wash-tubs. Personal hygiene was important and desirable in early modern Transylvania; however, the perception of cleanliness might have had different meanings throughout the centuries. It is obvious that attitudes toward hygiene and body had changed radically by the end of the eighteenth century due to Habsburg and presumably French influence.⁶⁶ It was especially the youth who took a greater interest in the use of cosmetics and other health-care products. The nostalgic memoir of Péter Apor describes the *real male* of the seventeenth century as being less sophisticated or *French* as the youth of his time. French manners (dressing and personal body care) turned, in the author's conception, Transylvanian males feminine.⁶⁷

But water implies a 'variety of cultural meanings',⁶⁸ from hygiene to health or just recreational purposes. Most of eighteenth-century Transylvanian authors show a general interest in mineral waters and write about these shared leisure experiences, which suggests that baths and bathing had a prominent social dimension. First of all because patients never went alone to these spas, but with their families, friends and their household. Socializing in a cozy atmosphere could result in the expansion of family ties, since many young girls have been courted at public baths; therefore, it could result in the creation of new alliances (family or political as well). Baths provided the perfect scene for gossip, regardless if that was concerning lighter or much more serious topics, since much intrigue went on there. It is, however, undeniable that in the eighteenth century, many visitors chose to endure the treatment for therapeutic reasons. Not to mention that it is hard to imagine that after the consumption of several liters of mineral water, knowing the side effect of these cures, patients were eager to meet and socialize with others. Visiting baths still remained for many sick people 'a symbol of hope',⁶⁹ even if this activity was gradually associated more and more with pleasant relaxation and collective recreation.

⁶⁵ Rettegi 1970, 166.

⁶⁶ Corbin 1986, 128; Smith 2007, 248.

⁶⁷ Apor 2010, 25.

⁶⁸ Anderson 2002, 1.

⁶⁹ Stuart 2002, 34.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Apor 2010 P. Apor, *Metamorphosis Transylvaniae*, tr. by B. Adams, London 2010.
- Bethlen 2004 M. Bethlen, *The Autobiography of Miklós Bethlen*, tr. by B. Adams, London 2004.
- Bod 2007 P. Bod, *Önéletírása*, ed. by E. Egyed, J. Elemér, Marosvásárhely 2007.
- Fogarasi 1974 S. Fogarasi, *Marosvásárhely és Göttinga. Önéletírás (1770–1799)*, ed. with introduction and explanatory notes by I. Juhász, Bukarest 1974.
- Halmágyi 1906 L. Szádeczky (ed.), *Halmágyi István naplói (1752–53, 1762–69) és iratai (1769–1785)*, Budapest 1906.
- Hatvani 1777 I. Hatvani, *Thermae Varadiensis examine physico et medico subjectae ...*, Viennae 1777.
- Magyary-Kossa 1929 Gy. Magyary-Kossa (ed.), *Magyar Orvosi Emlékek*, vol. I, Budapest 1929.
- Magyary-Kossa 1931 Gy. Magyary-Kossa (ed.), *Magyar Orvosi Emlékek*, vol. III, Budapest 1931.
- Magyary-Kossa 1940 Gy. Magyary-Kossa (ed.), *Magyar Orvosi Emlékek*, vol. IV, Budapest 1940.
- Mátyus 1792 I. Mátyus, *Ó és új diaetetica*, Pozsony 1792.
- Mátyus 1968 I. Mátyus, *A radnai ásványvizekről*. In: J. Spielmann, Z. Nagy Szőkefalvi, P. Soós (eds.), *A kémikus és balneológus Mátyus István és kora*, Budapest 1968, 12–15 (=Orvostörténeti Közlemények, 45 (1968)).
- Nyulas 1800a F. Nyulas, *Az Erdélyi országi orvos vizeknek bontásáról közönségesen*, Kolozsvár 1800.
- Nyulas 1800b F. Nyulas, *A Radna vidéki vasas borviznek bontásáról*, Kolozsvár 1800.
- Rettegi 1970 Gy. Rettegi, *Emlékezetre méltó dolgok*, ed. with introduction and explanatory notes by Zs. Jakó, Bukarest 1970.
- Szabó 1984 A. T. Szabó (collect. and ed.), *Erdélyi Magyar Szótörténeti Tár*, vol. IV (Fém–Ha), Bukarest 1984.
- Szabó 1996 A. T. Szabó (collect.), *Erdélyi Magyar Szótörténeti Tár*, vol. VIII (M–Meg), ed. by M. Vámszer et alii based on A. T. Szabó's collection, Budapest–Bukarest 1996.
- Szabó 2005 A. T. Szabó (collect.), *Erdélyi Magyar Szótörténeti Tár*, vol. XII (Szák–Táv), ed. by F. Kósa et alii based on A. T. Szabó's collection, Budapest–Kolozsvár 2005.
- Székely 2019 L. Székely, *Gróf Székely László Önéletírása*, ed. by A. Fehér, Budapest–Kolozsvár 2019.

- Teleki 1987 J. Teleki, *Egy erdélyi gróf a felvilágosult Európában (Teleki József utazásai 1759–1761)*, ed. with introduction and explanatory notes by G. Tolnai, Budapest 1987.
- Wesselényi 1983 I. Wesselényi, *Sanyarú világ. Napló 1703–1708*, vol. I, ed. by A. Magyari, Bukarest 1983.
- Wesselényi 1985 I. Wesselényi, *Sanyarú világ. Napló 1703–1708*, vol. II, ed. by A. Magyari, Bukarest 1985.
- Secondary Sources**
- Anderson 2002 S. Anderson, *Introduction. The Pleasure of Taking Waters*. In: S. C. Anderson, B. Tabb (eds.), *Water, Leisure and Culture: European Historical Perspectives*, Oxford–New York 2002, 1–6.
- Blackbourn 2002 D. Blackbourn, *Fashionable Spa Towns in Nineteenth-century Europe*. In: S. C. Anderson, B. Tabb (eds.), *Water, Leisure and Culture: European Historical Perspectives*, Oxford–New York 2002, 9–21.
- Corbin 1986 A. Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant. Odor and the French Social Imagination*, New York 1986.
- Csukovits 2003 E. Csukovits, *Középkori magyar zarándokok*, Budapest 2003.
- Daday 2005 A. Daday, *Újabb kuriózumok az orvostudomány magyarországi történetéből*, Budapest 2005.
- Fehér 2016 A. Fehér, *Fürdőkultúra a 18. századi erdélyi emlékiratokban*, *Erdélyi Évszázadok*, 1 (2016), 67–80.
- H. Balázs et alii 2007 É. H. Balázs, L. Krász, Gy. Kurucz, *Hétköznapi élet a Habsburgok korában (1740–1815)*, Budapest 2007.
- Hembry 1990 Ph. M. Hembry, *The English Spa, 1560–1815: A Social History*, London 1990.
- Kapronczay 2010 K. Kapronczay, *A magyar medicina történeti emlékei és forrásai*. In: K. Kapronczay (ed.), *Az orvostörténelem századai*, Budapest 2010, 20–39.
- Kósa 1993 L. Kósa, *Fürdőkultúra és természetszemlélet kapcsolata a felvilágosodástól a 20. század elejéig*. In: Á. Várkonyi, L. Kósa (eds.), *Európa híres kertje. Történeti ökológiai tanulmányok Magyarországról*, Budapest 1993, 201–222.
- Kósa 1999 L. Kósa, *Fürdőélet a monarchiában*, Budapest 1999.
- Kósa 2009 L. Kósa, *Az erdélyi fürdők aranykora*, *Korunk*, 20/8 (August, 2009), 3–8.
- Kovács 2018 A. Kovács, *Fejedelmek gyógyítói. Gógyítók, gyógyszerek és gyógyítás az erdélyi fejedelmek udvarában a 17. század első felében*, Budapest 2018.
- Mackaman 1998 D. P. Mackaman, *Leisure Settings: Bourgeois Culture, Medicine and the Spa in Modern France*, Chicago 1998.
- Marschner 1995 J. Marschner, *Bath and Bathing at the Early Georgian Court*, *Furniture History*, 31 (1995), 23–28.

- Ozment 1986 S. Ozment, *Magdalena and Balthasar. An Intimate Portrait of Life in 16th-Century Europe Revealed in the Letters of a Nuremberg Husband and Wife*, New Haven 1986.
- Péter 2008 K. Péter, *Házasság a régi Magyarországon. 16–17. század*, Budapest 2008.
- Péter 2009 Z. I. Péter, *A Nagyvárad melletti termálfürdők rövid története*, *Korunk* 20/8 (Auguszt, 2009), 11–17.
- Radvánszky 1895 B. Radvánszky, *Magyar családélet és háztartás a XVI. és XVII. században*, Budapest 1895.
- Smith 2007 V. Smith, *Clean. A History of Personal Hygiene and Purity*, Oxford 2007.
- Spielmann 1964 J. Spielmann, *Szotyori József*, *OOKK*, 31 (1964), 9–39.
- Stuart 2002 J. Stuart, *The Culture of the Water Cure in Nineteenth-century Austria (1800–1914)*. In: S. C. Anderson, B. Tabb (eds.), *Water, Leisure and Culture: European Historical Perspectives*, Oxford–New York 2002, 23–35.
- Takáts 1961 S. Takáts, *Régi magyar fürdősök*. In: K. Benda (ed.), *Művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok a XVI–XVII. századból*, Budapest 1961, 81–86.
- Tóth 2006 Gy. I. Tóth, *A magyar művelődés a kora újkorban*. In: L. Kósa (ed.), *Magyar művelődéstörténet*, Budapest 2006, 164–249.
- Várkonyi 1993 G. Várkonyi, *Hévizék és fürdők a 17. században*. In: Á. Várkonyi, L. Kósa (eds.), *Európa híres kertje. Történeti ökológiai tanulmányok Magyarországról*, Budapest 1993, 105–121.
- Várkonyi 2005 G. Várkonyi, *Arisztokrata társasági élet a kora újkori Magyarországon*. In: N. G. Etényi, I. Horn (eds.), *Idővel paloták... Magyar udvari kultúra a 16–17. században*, Budapest 2005, 415–432.
- Várkonyi 2009 G. Várkonyi, *“Isten a hővízbe vezetvén ...” Tradíció vagy divathullám, fürdőkultúra a 17. századi Magyarországon*. In: K. Juhász (ed.), *Tiszta sorok. Tanulmányok a tisztaságról és a tisztálkodásról*, Budapest 2009, 66–73.

DATA ON THE EGYPTIAN COLLECTION OF THE NATIONAL MUSEUM OF TRANSYLVANIAN HISTORY. THE CONTRIBUTION OF BARON BALÁZS ORBÁN TO THE CREATION OF THE EGYPTIAN COLLECTION OF THE CLUJ HISTORY MUSEUM

MELINDA MITU*

Abstract: This paper aims to highlight the contribution of the famous Hungarian historian and ethnographer of Szekler origin Balázs Orbán, born in the village of Polonița, near Odorheiu Secuiesc, to the establishment of the Egyptian Collection of the Cluj History Museum, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Baron Balázs Orbán is best known for his main work, *A Székelyföld leírása*, published between 1868 and 1873. Its six volumes represent a genuine encyclopedia of the region. Balázs Orbán was a prominent intellectual of the era in which he lived – he was a writer, historian, ethnographer, a corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy (since 1887), politician in the Independent Party, and a participant in the 1848 revolution. He had an adventurous life, reminiscent of the romantic novels of Mór Jókai or Victor Hugo. To the latter Balázs Orbán was linked by a beautiful friendship, largely due to their shared belief in the liberal and democratic ideas of the era in which they lived. This paper aims to present the years spent by Balázs Orbán in the Orient, as well as the cultural fruits of this period. In his youth, at the age of only 19, the future Hungarian scholar made a trip for several months to the Near East. On this occasion, he acquired a series of valuable Oriental artifacts, which he later donated to the Transylvanian Museum Society, the prestigious Transylvanian cultural institution founded by Count Imre Mikó in 1859, whose collections are preserved today in the heritage of the National Museum of Transylvanian History in Cluj-Napoca.

Keywords: Balázs Orbán, Near East, Transylvanian Museum Society, Székely Land.

Rezumat: Lucrarea de față dorește să evidențieze contribuția renumitului istoric și etnograf maghiar de origine secuiască Balázs Orbán, născut în satul Polonița, lângă Odorheiu Secuiesc, la constituirea colecției egiptene a muzeului de istorie clujean, în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea. Baronul Balázs Orbán este cunoscut îndeosebi pentru opera sa principală, *A Székelyföld leírása*, apărută între anii 1868–1873, cele șase volume ale acesteia constituind o adevărată enciclopedie a regiunii respective. Balázs Orbán a fost un intelectual de mare valoare al epocii în care a trăit – a fost scriitor, istoric, etnograf, membru corespondent al Academiei Maghiare (din 1887), politician în Partidul Independent și Pașoptist. A avut o viață aventuroasă, desprinsă parcă din romanele romantice ale lui Mór Jókai sau Victor Hugo. Cu acesta din urmă Balázs Orbán a și legat o frumoasă prietenie, datorată în special crezului lor comun în ideile liberale și democratice ale epocii în care au trăit. Lucrarea de față își propune să prezinte anii petrecuți în Orient de Balázs Orbán, ca și roadele culturale ale acestei perioade. În tinerețe, la vârsta de doar 19 ani, viitorul savant maghiar a făcut o călătorie de câteva luni în Orientul Apropiat. Cu ocazia acesteia, el a achiziționat o serie de artefacte orientale valoroase, pe care mai târziu le-a donat Societății Muzeului Ardelean, prestigioasa

* Ph.D., Museum curator, National Museum of Transylvanian History, Cluj-Napoca, email: mitu_meli@yahoo.com.

instituție culturală transilvăneană înființată de contele Imre Mikó în anul 1859, ale cărei colecții se păstrează astăzi în patrimoniul Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei din Cluj-Napoca.

Cuvinte cheie: Balázs Orbán, Orientul Apropiat, Societatea Muzeului Ardelean, Ținutul Secuiesc.

This paper aims to highlight the contribution of the famous Hungarian historian and ethnographer of Szekler Origin Balázs Orbán, born in the village of Polonița, near Odorheiu Secuiesc, to the establishment of the Egyptian Collection of the Cluj History Museum in the second half of the nineteenth century. Baron Balázs Orbán is best known for his main work, *A Székelyföld leírása* ('Description of Székely Land'),¹ published between 1868 and 1873, its six volumes representing a genuine encyclopedia of the region.

Less well known are the travels of Orbán Balázs to the East and West alike, as well as their cultural fruits. In his youth, for example, at the age of only 19, the future Hungarian scholar embarked on a journey to the Near East that lasted several months. On this occasion, he acquired a series of valuable Oriental artifacts, which he later donated to the Transylvanian Museum Society, the prestigious Transylvanian cultural institution founded by Count Imre Mikó in 1859, whose collections are preserved today in the heritage of the National Museum of Transylvanian History in Cluj-Napoca (hereafter MNIT).

I. The Egyptian Collection of the National Museum of Transylvanian History – An Overview

Among the more than 400000 cultural assets in the patrimony of the MNIT there is an important collection of Egyptian artifacts. The collection impresses not so much in terms of its dimensions (it has only approx. 60 items), but of the rarity or sometimes even the unique character of these objects in the cultural space of Romania.²

The piece of resistance of the collection is a human mummy³ that probably belonged to a woman, along with the two pieces of the sarcophagus that housed it (the base and the lid), dating from The Ptolemaic Period and originating from the archaeological excavations at Gamhud, Egypt. The mummy arrived in Cluj in 1909, following its donation of businessman Fülöp Back to Transylvanian Museum Society. It was Back who, in 1907, sponsored the archaeological excavations carried out by Austrian, Hungarian and Polish specialists from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Gamhud, in northern Egypt.⁴

Besides this mummy (an almost unique piece in Transylvania – in this region there is only one human mummy, at the Franz Binder Museum of World Ethnography in Sibiu), the History Museum in Cluj also houses other rare and interesting artifacts. They came to Cluj in particular through donations to the Transylvanian Museum Society made in the

¹ Orbán 1868–1873. From the vast bibliography dedicated to the main work of Balázs Orbán, we should mention: Kelemen 1929, 24–28; Kós jr. 1957, 438–451; Mikó 1968, 946–948; Bolgár 2010, 94–98.

² On the collection of Egyptian artifacts of the MNIT, see: Bunta et alii 1967, 75–80; Cihó et alii 1988, passim; Gruia, Gruță 2013, 18–19; Vincze 2014, 195–196; Gruia 2017, 18–19.

³ For the human mummy from the MNIT heritage see: Cihó et alii 1988, 32; Boroș 2003, 373–374; Vincze 2014, 195–196; 497; 664; Beu-Dachin, Nemeti 2017, 12–13; Gruia 2017, 18–19.

⁴ See Vincze 2014, 195–196.

second half of the nineteenth century by a number of Transylvanian nobles.⁵ Balázs Orbán was one of the most distinguished of these donors.

The Egyptian Collection also includes a series of plaster casts of Egyptian pieces and statues from various European collections, made by the well-known London company Domenico Brucciani & Co in the early twentieth century.⁶

II. The donations made by Baron Balázs Orbán

Returning to the donations of Egyptian artifacts made to the Cluj History Museum in the second half of the nineteenth century, it should be emphasized that the most important donation was that made by the Transylvanian Baron and polyhistor Orbán Balázs. He laid the foundations of the Egyptian Collection, offering the Transylvanian Museum Society, between 1860–1861, c. 40 Oriental objects, most of Egyptian origin (with the exception of a vase and two covers of books in Arabic script, brought from Palestine, and two stone fragments from the Parthenon area). Orbán acquired those goods following his trips to the Holy Land, Egypt and Greece in 1848 – ‘trips that left indelible traces in his soul.’⁷

1. From the life and work of Balázs Orbán

Next, we will present some data on the life and work of Balázs Orbán, in order to understand the cultural context that led to those museum purchases. Balázs Orbán was a prominent scholar of the age in which he lived, a writer, historian, ethnographer, a corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy (from 1887), a politician in the Independent Party, and a participant in the 1848 revolution.⁸ He also had a very exciting, adventurous life, reminiscent of the novels of Mór Jókai and Victor Hugo.⁹

Balázs Orbán was born on 3 February 1829, in a Szekler noble family, in Polonița, Harghita County, near Odorheiu Secuiesc. He died in Budapest on 19 April 1890. He studied at the Roman Catholic and Reformed schools in Odorheiu Secuiesc and ‘according to his school certificates, the future Transylvanian polyhistor was an eminent student in all subjects.’¹⁰ In the spring of 1846, at the age of 17, Balázs Orbán interrupted his studies, accompanying his parents to the Ottoman Empire, to take over his maternal grandmother’s inheritance from Istanbul. Taking advantage of his stay in Constantinople, the young Orbán made a long journey to the Near East.¹¹

⁵ Besides Balázs Orbán, the old inventory records of the Transylvanian Museum Society mention, for example, Count Gergely Bethlen or Count Ábrahám Nemes.

⁶ Gruia 2013, 6; Gruia 2017, 18–19. On plaster casts after Egyptian MNIT pieces and statues, see also Vincze 2014, 283.

⁷ Szentmártoni 1929, 11. All the quotations in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

⁸ On the life and work of Balázs Orbán, see: Szentmártoni 1929, 10–23; Kelemen 1929, 24–28; Kós jr. 1957, 436–451; Mikó 1968, 943–950; Várady, Lővey, 2009, 8–15; Balázs 2009, 5–11; Bolgár 2010, 91–100.

⁹ Balázs 2009, 5.

¹⁰ Balázs 2009, 6.

¹¹ Balázs Orbán left Transylvania on 20 April 1846, via Braşov, traveling to Istanbul via Wallachia and Moldova, and then sailing on the Black Sea. He recorded his impressions in a diary. He arrived in the capital of the Ottoman Empire on 11 May. His journeyed through the Greek islands, and then through Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece between 28 March and October 1848, arriving back in Istanbul on 29 October 1848. See Ádám Balázs’s note in Orbán 2009, 294.

‘Human desire is so insatiable and boundless!’, as Orbán stated in his travel memoirs. ‘In Galați all I wanted was to see Istanbul, and when this city of the East revealed its delightful images to me, when I explored all the remains of its grandiose past and its present beauties, I wanted to travel further. Then Byzantium became a gateway through which I wanted to pass into the fascinating world of the East.’¹²

Thus, in the spring of 1848, shortly after the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution, ‘seeing with joy and with an emotional heart the peaceful agreement between the nation and the emperor, as well as the liberation, without bloodshed, of my adored homeland,’ Orbán, who was only 19 years old, decided to travel to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Greece, ‘to those places where – according to him – science, art and freedom were born.’¹³

Orbán set sail from Istanbul, visited several islands in the Aegean Sea, reached Rhodes, and then Cyprus. After landing in Beirut, he continued his way through Syria and Palestine joining caravans, crossing deserts and mountainous areas with the help of Bedouins, and visited the cities of Nazareth, Jerusalem, Jericho, and Bethlehem. In Egypt he was fascinated by the library of Alexandria, but also by the pyramids of Giza: ‘I was standing in front of the Great Pyramid of Kheops. A holy fear gripped my heart, I felt overwhelmed by this colossal construction,’¹⁴ as Orbán wrote in his later accounts, showing a typical romantic sensibility.

In the summer of 1848, the Hungarian traveler arrived in Athens. However, he was no longer able to quietly admire the beauties of the Parthenon, because in Athens he was to learn about the dramatic events of the Hungarian Revolution. ‘From here, he hurriedly went to Constantinople, where he recruited Italian, Polish and Hungarian volunteers with the aim of joining the Hungarian Revolutionary Army. When this could not be achieved, following the surrender of Siria, Orbán remained in the Ottoman capital, where he organized an association of Hungarian and Polish emigrants.’¹⁵

Orbán’s unconditional support for the Hungarian exiles around Lajos Kossuth would also turn him into a political emigrant. He was pursued by the Austrian authorities, especially when the young Orbán, fascinated by the personality of the leader of the Hungarian Revolution, offered to accompany Kossuth during his exile in Kutahya. Together with the English Consul here, Orbán even managed to thwart an assassination attempt by poisoning against Lajos Kossuth, an attempt masterminded by Austrian agents.¹⁶

In 1851, the Austrian authorities asked the Ottoman Empire to extradite Orbán on the grounds that he had an obligation to perform military service in the Imperial Army. Faced with the new danger, Orbán left the Ottoman Empire and, between 1851 and 1857, he lived, alternately, in London and on the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, in the English Channel. A particularly important period of his life was that of the years 1853–1855, which he spent in London, where he assiduously attended the library and exhibitions of Oriental Art at the British Museum, thus enriching his knowledge in the field of Orientalism, acquired until then in the field.¹⁷

¹² Orbán 2009, 44.

¹³ Orbán 2009, 43–44.

¹⁴ Orbán 2009, 66.

¹⁵ Balázs 2009, 6; See also Mikó 1968, 944.

¹⁶ Balázs 2009, 6–7.

¹⁷ Balázs 2009, 8; See also Kós Jr. 1957, 437; Mikó 1968, 944.

Both in London and on the island of Jersey, Orbán met a whole series of French, Italian, Russian and Hungarian refugees. As he himself confessed, ‘among the revolutionaries of 1848 everywhere there were barely a few people with whom I had not been in contact, for there was the deepest sense of solidarity among these pioneers of freedom who had taken refuge in England.’ Orbán met, for example, Giuseppe Mazzini, Louis Blanc, and Ledru-Rollin. To Victor Hugo he was linked by a strong friendship. The great French writer often welcomed the young Hungarian emigrant to his home on the island of Jersey, alone or accompanied by Count Sándor Teleki, another famous Hungarian revolutionary (originally from Baia Mare, owner of the estate and the castle in Coltău), who was also in exile. Orbán, a man of many talents, at one time repaired a watch of the French novelist. On other occasions he took photographs of portraits and natural landscapes, along with Hugo’s sons.¹⁸

Between 1857 and 1859, Orbán, this ‘Ulysses of the Szeklers,’¹⁹ was again in Constantinople, from where, like his illustrious predecessor in the eighteenth century, the scholar Kelemen Mikes, he sent home his ‘free letters from the East’ (entitled *Reports from Constantinople*), intended for the magazine *Kolozsvári Közlöny*, recently published in the city on the Someş. There, in the Orient, Orbán discovered his literary vocation and formed his own style.²⁰

2. The donations made by Balázs Orbán to the Transylvanian Museum Society (1859, 1860)

It was in the East that Baron Balázs Orbán’s desire to give precious Oriental artefacts to cultural institutions in his country of origin gained shape. Orbán had been aware of the importance of museum collections and their research since his time in London. As seen above, between the years 1853–1855, in the British capital, he came into contact with the Oriental Art collections of the British Museum, studying them and doing research with a view to publishing his notes from the first period spent in the Orient, in 1846–1851.

During the second period (1857–1859) spent in the Ottoman Empire, specifically in 1859, when Orbán learned of the establishment of the Transylvanian Museum Society, he tried to send a crate of Oriental antiquities to it (from Istanbul to Cluj).²¹ He announced his intention in an open letter sent to the editor of the Cluj magazine *Kolozsvári Közlöny*, a letter published in its 90th issue, dated 31 August 1859. The document also contained the ‘list of the collection of antiquities sent to the Transylvanian Hungarian Museum.’²²

The letter sent by Balázs Orbán is of interest primarily because it highlights the reason that prompted the act of donation. In perfect resonance with the romantic nationalism of the era, it could only be ‘proof that the Hungarian, no matter how far away from his

¹⁸ Balázs 2009, 7. On the years spent in the West and the contacts of Balázs Orbán with famous revolutionaries of the time, see also: Szentmártoni 1929, 14; Kós Jr. 1957, 437; on Balázs Orbán’s photography skills, see Kós Jr. 1957, 442–443 and Miklósi-Sikes 2001, 176. The appropriation of this technique would be of great use to him a decade later, when he took the photographs for the last three volumes of *A Székelyföld leírása*.

¹⁹ The term belongs to the Hungarian writer Imre Mikó (not to be confused with Imre Mikó, the count of the same name, one of the founders of the Transylvanian Museum Society), in Mikó 1968, 945.

²⁰ Balázs 2009, 7; See also Kós Jr. 1957, 438.

²¹ Kós Jr. 1957, 445.

²² Orbán 1859, after Orbán 2009, 22–24; on these aspects, see also Kós jr. 1957, 445.

homeland, does not forget to devote every thought and attention to it,' having the obligation to 'gather spiritual and material honey' for the nation to which he belongs.²³ Secondly, the account contained interesting descriptions of donated items. Thus, according to Orbán's account, one of these, a crocodile mummy, would have been 'a smaller species of crocodile, namely *crocodilus suchus* from the catacombs of the Sahara,' being considered a 'harbinger of the God of fertility, since it always appears during the period of growth of the Nile.' As for the granite or limestone fragments collected from the tombs in the Sahara or around the pyramids, Orbán wished to point out that he had found them broken into pieces, in their sites, and that he was not the author of such 'savage mutilations of monuments.'²⁴

Moreover, during his journey through the Orient, Orbán criticized several times the local authorities' negligence in protecting monuments and the fact that they were not interested in setting up local museums to preserve the remains. Moreover, the local authorities allowed European travelers to dislodge various monuments or artifacts from their historical and natural environment and transport them to their home countries.²⁵

The Hungarian traveler's desire to reveal to his Transylvanian compatriots the miracles of the East through the artifacts he shipped from Istanbul was very strong. Unfortunately, these first 'treasures' (listed in the contents of the above letter next to 47 distinct positions) never reached Cluj. Due to the difficult navigation of commercial vessels on the Black Sea, caused by the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Italy, the traces of the boat that was supposed to carry the precious cargo from the capital of the Ottoman Empire to the Romanian ports remained lost. The editor of *Kolozsvári Közlöny* stated in a later issue of the magazine that the shipped items had not reached their destination.²⁶

But Balázs Orbán, a devoted friend of the Transylvanian Museum, could not resign himself to such failure. After his return (later that year) to Transylvania, on his estate at Polonița, the Hungarian baron put together a collection of objects similar to those shipped from Istanbul and in 1860 proceeded to send it to Cluj. Here, Károly Szabó, 'the librarian and provisional custodian of the antiquities of the Transylvanian Museum,' included the artifacts in a list of donations.²⁷ They were then transcribed, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, in one of the inventory registers of the Transylvanian Museum Society, and in the 1970s in the registers of the current MNIT in Cluj-Napoca (in those years: The History Museum of Cluj).

Among the more than 40 objects he donated²⁸ were mummified human organs (two hands, two phalluses) and animal mummies (a baby crocodile, two ibis birds); statuettes

²³ Orbán 2009, 22.

²⁴ Orbán 2009, 23.

²⁵ Orbán 1861, vol. IV, 54, after Kós Jr. 1957, 446, n. 61.

²⁶ Orbán 2009, 294 (note by Á. Balázs).

²⁷ Colecția MNIT, no. C₁ 1380: 'Kimutatása A régiségeknek, képeknek és szobroknak, melyek 1860. év novemb[er]1-sőig az erdélyi orsz[á]gos múzeum-egylet régiségtárába beadattak. Összeállította Szabó Károly múzeumi könyvtárnok és ideiglenes régiség-őr, Kolozsvárt, 1860. november 10-én' [trans.: 'table of the Antiquities, paintings, and sculptures donated to the antiquities collection of the Transylvanian Museum Society until 1 November 1860. Prepared by Szabó Károly, librarian and provisional custodian of the Antiquities of the Transylvanian Museum, Cluj, 10 November 1860'].

²⁸ Despite the many overlapping descriptions and determinations of objects donated by Balázs Orbán, belonging to the museographers of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries, most of the items could be easily identified.

of Egyptian deities and other anthropomorphic statuettes, of the *ushebti* type, made of faience, wood or bronze; statuettes of sacred animals or birds, made of wood, from Ancient Egypt; amulets, stone fragments from pyramids and the cardboard of a sarcophagus.

3. Other important achievements of Baron Balázs Orbán in Transylvanian museums

In fact, the important donation of 1860 was not Balázs Orbán's only contact with Transylvanian museums. Following his many trips to Székely Land, the Baron collected and continued to donate archeological pieces, especially prehistoric ones, to the Transylvanian Museum. It is known that in his desire to draw up a vast monograph of Székely Land, Orbán roamed several hundred localities of Szekler counties.²⁹ He 'climbs church towers, visits still standing traces of villages and fortresses, the well-known mineral water springs and places of pilgrimages, dares to enter caves, descend into mines and roam every corner of the Szekler mountains and passes.'³⁰ Following these pilgrimages, he acquired a series of archaeological objects. Aware of their scientific value, he sent them to the Transylvanian Museum in Cluj, for preservation and protection.

Orbán also repeatedly launched appeals to his Transylvanian compatriots, in order to enrich the heritage of the Cluj Museum. He made significant contributions to the establishment of the Museum of the Szekler Industrial Art in Târgu-Mureş (1886), as well as to exhibitions on the topic of 'Szeklerhood' or the 'domestic industry of Transylvania,' under the auspices of the Hungarian Cultural Society of Transylvania (Erdélyi Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület, hereafter EMKE), in 1886, 1887 and 1888. Such initiatives also led to the establishment by the Carpathian Transylvanian Association (Erdélyi Kárpát Egyesület) of the Ethnographic Museum in Cluj in 1891. Also, given the special archaeological remains on the territory of Turda, Orbán repeatedly called for the establishment of an 'archaeological museum, which could be admired by visitors from every corner of the world' in the city on the banks of the Arieş. These initiatives were later supported by archaeologist and ethnographer István Téglás,³¹ one of Orbán's younger admirers. Along the lines of protecting the Transylvanian heritage, Orbán also spoke up, in the country and in the Orient, in favor of protecting historical monuments and against the transport of local cultural goods to Vienna, as was widely the case during the Austrian neo-absolutist regime.

4. The journey to the Orient, 1861

In 1859, after the relaxation of political conditions in the monarchy, Balázs Orbán managed to return to his native lands, where he had, like any person of his standing, various administrative and political functions. These assignments allowed him or even gave him the opportunity to travel through the villages and boroughs of Székely Land.

²⁹ In this monograph, Balázs Orbán made, for example, 'the first inventory of medieval monuments in the Szekler region' striving 'to indicate, where appropriate, their Romanesque or Gothic character', thus leaving us 'a huge database'; see Herman 2009, 247.

³⁰ Kós Jr. 1957, 442; See also Mikó 1968, 945.

³¹ On all these museal concerns of Balázs Orbán in Transylvania, see: Kós Jr. 1957, 445–446.

Before writing his major work, *A Székelyföld leírása*, Balázs Orbán was driven by the desire to remain, for a time, emotionally connected to the Oriental world in which he had lived for more than thirteen years, so he published the impressions of the time he had spent in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the reports of his journeys through Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Greece, in a six-volume book entitled the *Utazás Keleten (Journey to the Orient)*.³² The work appeared in Cluj, at the publishing house of János Stein, in 1861.

The book was received with reservations by the official critics of the time, but 'in this age of eagle feathers [a reference to the two-headed eagle in the coat of arms of Austria, a symbol of the hostility of the Habsburg House against the Hungarians during the neo-absolutism period] the public read with pleasure a book that was full of idealism and love of the homeland.'³³

In fact, Orbán proved to be an excellent observer of the places he visited, offering detailed geographical, historical and ethnographic descriptions in the pages of his work, recounting with humor, but also with respect and empathy, his impressions of the customs of the locals, their degree of civilization, the complex problems of the poor, be they Turks, Arabs, Greeks, or Jews.

In Jerusalem, for example, he showed visionary spirit and observed the unjust situation of the Jews, who, 'after so many bloody battles, so many misfortunes and persecutions they had suffered' were still 'without a country in their own country.' Orbán expressed the conviction that 'only political freedom, only the emancipation of peoples can achieve the justice taught by Christ and our mission is to achieve this goal.'³⁴

Orbán was fascinated with the Orient, but this reverence did not prevent him from observing its darker aspects, especially in terms of respect for human dignity within Oriental societies, by comparison with European societies. These observations underlay his frequent reflections on universal emancipation, formulated throughout the book.

Moreover, Balázs Orbán was guided by the ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity his entire life. As he wrote, these democratic principles constituted his own *Holy Trinity*: 'my religion is that preached by Plato, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Christ, and its apostles are Savonarola, Dante, Petrarch, Thököly, Rákóczi, Washington, Robespierre, Foscarini, Petőfi, and others. The martyrs of my religion are those who gave their lives proclaiming freedom and defending people's rights.'³⁵

By 'freedom and people's rights' Orbán understood not only political and national rights, but also the emancipation of disadvantaged groups in the Eastern and Western worlds, children and women respectively. In Cairo, for example, seeing the trade in Abyssinian young women and children, the Hungarian traveler reacted as follows: 'I left [this place] in disgust and shame ... with a bleeding heart, seeing the transgressions committed upon my fellowmen, my brothers.'³⁶ Later, arriving in Athens, meditating on the famous Athenian democracy, he expressed his conviction that one of the pressing tasks of the future 'is undoubtedly the emancipation of women, from that subordinate state to

³² Orbán 1861.

³³ Szentmártoni 1929, 12.

³⁴ Orbán 2009, 53.

³⁵ Orbán 2009, 70.

³⁶ Orbán 2009, 62.

which these angels of the earth are punished... Let us give women those rights with which they have anyway been endowed by nature just like we have, and in this way humanity will surely reach the Eden of freedom much faster...³⁷

Such examples, telling for the humanism and the liberal, deeply democratic beliefs of the Szekler Baron, explain why he was received with sympathy in the entourage of Victor Hugo, considered at that time ‘the greatest democrat of the nineteenth century, the herald of social democracy.’³⁸ It seems that Hugo, impressed by Orbán’s love for freedom and caring for him like his own son, claimed that if he had ‘two hundred French Orbán Balázs,’ he could defeat the tyranny of Napoleon III.³⁹

Balázs Orbán proved his ‘devotion to the cult of ideals,’ through his writings (books and numerous articles in the press of the time), through his political speeches in the Hungarian parliament and through specific deeds. He lived modestly, but supported various cultural institutions of the Hungarians in Transylvania financially.⁴⁰

In the above lines I mentioned his efforts to support the Transylvanian Museum Society. However, he also made important donations for the establishment of the Cluj Theatre. In his will he bequeathed considerable sums to the EMKE, as well as to the Unitarian College in Cristuru Secuiesc (‘with the aim of ending the Szekler emigration’).

Such gestures meant that after his death, Balázs Orbán remained known in the public consciousness as ‘the greatest Szekler.’ This value judgment was also predicated, of course, on his scientific and literary work. Balázs Orbán was an important scientist, a polyhistor, whose research provided a wealth of data relating to his native Szekler land and remained entrenched in the history of the Szeklers as a scholar dedicated to the quest for scientific truth.⁴¹

Nowadays, Transylvanian museography owes to Balázs Orbán the Oriental artifacts with which he contributed to the enrichment of the cultural heritage. Given their rarity and museum value, the objects donated by the Szekler Baron have been part of the main exhibition of the present-day History Museum in Cluj since its opening in 1964. The Egyptian objects collected by Balázs Orbán were displayed in that era (specifically in 1988) and in a national temporary exhibition, entitled *Egyptian Antiquities in Romanian Collections*. It is not surprising, however, that throughout the communist era no label mentioned the connection of these artifacts with their donor.

In recent times, most of the objects donated by Balázs Orbán have been admired in several temporary exhibitions organized by MNIT, at the headquarters of our museum,⁴² as well as in large-scale national exhibitions dedicated to Egyptian civilization. Such events were organized by the Szekler Museum of Ciuc in Miercurea Ciuc (2009–2010), the Dacian and Roman Civilization Museum in Deva (2009–2010), the Maramureş County Museum of History and Archaeology in Baia Mare (2012), or the Satu Mare County Museum (2015).⁴³

³⁷ Orbán 2009, 71.

³⁸ Szentmártoni 1929, 14.

³⁹ Szentmártoni 1929, 14.

⁴⁰ Szentmártoni 1929, 15–16; See also Balázs 2009, 11.

⁴¹ Szentmártoni 1929, 14; Balázs 2009, 11.

⁴² See, for example, the exhibition *Egypt and Its Mysteries*, 18 May–18 June 18 2018.

⁴³ See the exhibitions: *The Art of Egypt during the Pharaohs* (MNIT participation in the exhibition organized by the Szekler Museum in Miercurea Ciuc and the Museum of Fine Arts in Budapest, at Miercurea Ciuc,

A special moment in the history of Oriental artifacts donated by Balázs Orbán occurred in 2019, on the occasion of the 190th anniversary of the birth of the Hungarian historian and ethnographer. The ‘Haáz Rezső’ Museum in Odorheiu Secuiesc and the MNIT marked this anniversary by organizing, at both museum offices, a temporary exhibition dedicated to the life and activity of Balázs Orbán, highlighting in particular his years spent in the East, as well as their results: the donation of Oriental artifacts to the Transylvanian Museum and the publication of his travelogues. The exhibition was entitled *Orbán Balázs: Travels to the Orient*⁴⁴ and was first opened at the Museum headquarters in Odorheiu Secuiesc, on 3 February 2019 (the 190th anniversary of Orbán’s birth), and then at the headquarters of the Cluj History Museum, from 20 August to 17 November 2019.

On this occasion, for the first time in 160 years since the donation of Balázs Orbán, emphasis was laid the relationship between the Oriental objects in the heritage of our museum and their original donor. The visiting public could thus become acquainted with this less well-known aspect of the Hungarian polyhistor – as an enthusiastic explorer of the fascinating world of the Orient.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

Colecția MNIT C₁ 1380 Colecția Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei, Cluj-Napoca, Modern History Fonds, document no. C₁ 1380.

Secondary Sources

- Balázs 2009 Á. Balázs, *A legnagyobb székely*. In: B. Orbán, *Sztambultól Szejkéig* (3rd end.), ed., foreword, and bibliography by Á. Balázs, Kolozsvár 2009, 5–12.
- Bolgár 2010 D. Bolgár, *Orbán Balázs orientalizmusa*, Korunk, XXI/8 (August 2010), 91–100.
- Boroş 2003 D. Boroş, *Technical Data Concerning the Mummy and its Accessories, in the Collection of the National Museum of Transylvanian History, in Cluj-Napoca (Romania)*, ActaMN, 37–38/II (2000–2001/2003), 373–374.
- Hermann 2009 G. M. Hermann, *Secuiei. Istorie, cultură, identitate*, Miercurea Ciuc 2009.

9 October 2009–7 February 2010); *Egyptian Antiquities* (MNIT participation in the exhibition organized by the Museum of Dacian and Roman civilization in Deva, at the venue of the Museum in Deva, 10 October 2009–31 January 2010); *In Search of Immortality. Hidden Treasures of Ancient Egypt* (MNIT participation in the exhibition organized by the Maramureş County Museum of History and Archaeology in Baia Mare, at the venue of the Baia Mare Museum, in the period 19 September–17 December 2012); *Egypt of the Pharaohs* (MNIT participation in the exhibition organized by the ‘Móra Ferenc’ Museum in Szeged and the Satu Mare County Museum, with the Satu Mare Museum as venue, 11 February–10 September 2015, then travelling to Bistrița-Năsăud and Deva, in 2015–2016).

⁴⁴ I also wish to thank my colleagues Miklós Zoltán, director, and Szász Hunor, museographer at the ‘Haáz Rezső’ Museum in Odorheiu Secuiesc, as well as Fazakas Szabolcs, President of the ‘Székelyföldi Legendárium’ Association, for this successful collaboration.

- Kelemen 1929 L. Kelemen, A történetíró Orbán Balázs. In: *Ki volt Orbán Balázs? Emlékezés a legnagyobb székelyre, születésének századik évfordulóján. 1829. febr. 3. – 1929. febr. 3., Székelykeresztúr 1929*, 24–28.
- Kós jr. 1957 K. Kós jr., *Orbán Balázs, a néprajzkutató*. In: A. Bodor, B. Cselényi, E. Jancsó, Zs. Jakó, A. T. Szabó (eds.), *Kelemen Lajos Emlékkönyv. Születésének nyolcvanadik évfordulójára*, Kolozsvár-Bukarest 1957, 438–451.
- Orbán 1861 B. Orbán, *Utazás Keleten*, vol. I–VI, Kolozsvár 1861.
- Orbán 1868–1873 B. Orbán, *A Székelyföld leírása történelmi, régészeti, természetrajzi s népismeai szempontból*, vol. I–VI, Pest 1868–1873.
- Orbán 1895 B. Orbán, *Az Erdélyi Magyar Múzeumnak küldött régiséggyűjtemény jegyzéke*, Kolozsvári Közlöny, 90 (31 August 1859).
- Orbán 2009 B. Orbán, *Utazás Keleten* (fragments). In: *Sztambultól Szejkéig* (3rd end.), ed., preface, and bibliography by Á. Balázs, Kolozsvár 2009, 25–111.
- Mikó 1968 I. Mikó, *Orbán Balázs a szülőföld szerelmese*, *Korunk*, 27/7 (July 1968), 943–950, https://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00458/00379/pdf/Korunk_EPA00458_1968_07_0943-0950.pdf, accessed 15 March 2020.
- Miklósi-Sikes 2001 Cs. Miklósi-Sikes, *Fényképezés és műtermek Erdélyben 1839–1916*, Székelyudvarhely 2011, 176.
- Szentmártoni 1929 K. Szentmártoni, *Emlékezés Báró Orbán Balázusra, a legnagyobb székelyre, születésének századik évfordulóján*. In: *Ki volt Orbán Balázs? Emlékezés a legnagyobb székelyre, születésének századik évfordulóján. 1829. febr. 3. — 1929. febr. 3., Székelykeresztúr 1929*, 10–23.
- Várad, Lövey P. P. Várad, L. Lövey, *Erdély – Székelyföld – A legnagyobb székely*, Veszprém 2009.
- Vincze 2014 Z. Vincze, *A kolozsvári régészeti iskola a Pósta Béla-korszakban (1899–1919)*, Cluj-Napoca 2014, 195–196.

Exhibition guides and catalogues

- Bunta et alii 1967 M. Bunta, H. Daicoviciu, Șt. Ferenczi, V. Marica, I. Pintea, C. Pop, N. Vlăsa, *Muzeul de Istorie din Cluj*, Bucharest 1967, 75–80.
- Ciho et alii 1988 M. Ciho, D. Alicu, E. Glodariu, A. Igna, *Antichități egiptene în colecțiile din România*, Cluj-Napoca 1988.
- Gruia, Gruită 2013 A.-M. Gruia, I. Gruită *Wunderkammer / Cabinetul de curiozități*, Cluj-Napoca 2013, 18–19.
- Beu-Dachin, Nemeti 2017 E. Beu-Dachin, I. Nemeti, *Arheologia clujeană. O privire din culise*, Cluj-Napoca 2017, 12–13.
- Gruia 2017 A.-M. Gruia, *Colecția egipteană / The Egyptian Collection*. In: M. Mitu, D. Comșa (eds.), *Din colecțiile Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei / From the Collections of the National Museum of Transylvanian History*, Cluj-Napoca 2017, 18–19.



Fig. 1. Baron Balázs Orbán in Oriental clothes. Photo by Ferenc Veress, second half of the nineteenth century ('Lucian Blaga' Central University Library, Cluj-Napoca, Special Collections Fond, BCUCLUJ_FCS_FOTO_III0002_fr).



Fig. 2. Baron Balázs Orbán. Photo by Ferenc Veress, second half of the nineteenth century ('Lucian Blaga' Central University Library, Cluj-Napoca, Special Collections Fonds, BCUCLUJ_FCS_FOTO_IO011_fr).



Fig. 3. Akhom funerary falcon, made of wood. The solar disc on the top is missing, but its grip hole is visible. Egypt. The Late Period (Colecția MNIT, no. V 1661; image from the MNIT Archive).



Fig. 4. Akhom funerary falcon, wooden, brightly colored. The solar disc on his head is missing. Egypt. The Late Period (Colecția MNIT, no. V 1662; image from the MNIT Archive).



Fig. 5. a. Mummified human hand. It probably belonged to a woman. Egypt. The Ptolemaic Period; **b.** Mummified baby crocodile. Egypt. The Late Period; **c.** Human mummy fragment. Wooden hand and forearm, from a child's mummy. Egypt. The Ptolemaic Period (Colecția MNIT, nos. V 1712, V 1681, and V 1678; images from the MNIT Archive).



Fig. 6. **a.** Bronze statuette, representing a cat (the sacred animal of the goddess Bastet), in a sitting position. Around the neck it wears a rope with an Aegis, made in high relief. Egypt. The Late Period; **b.** Serpentine statuette, representing a cat, in a sitting position. The head of the statue is missing. Egypt. The Late Period; **c.** A cat's sarcophagus. Wooden piece, painted in black, composed of three distinct parts: the body divided into two and the socket. The inside features a special cavity for housing the cat's mummy. Egypt. The Late Period (Colecția MNIT, nos. V 1711, V 1710, and V 1679; images from the MNIT Archive).



Fig. 7. **a.** Ptah-Sokar-Osiris anthropomorphic statuette, made of painted wood. Egypt. The Late Period; **b.** Mummy-shaped funerary statuette (*ushabti*), with hieroglyphs, made of faience. Egypt. The Late Period; **c.** Mummy-shaped funerary statuette, anepigraphic, painted wood. Egypt. The New Empire (Colecția MNIT, nos. V 1663, V 1672, and V 1668; images from the MNIT Archive).

MILITANT PORTRAITS. THE PROMOTION OF HUNGARIAN NATIONAL HISTORY THROUGH NINETEENTH-CENTURY GRAPHICS. CASE STUDY

CLAUDIA M. BONȚA*

Abstract: This work presents a series of group portraits of past Transylvanian leaders and of nineteenth-century politicians, signed by Magyari Lajos and Miklós Barabás, from the heritage of the National Museum of Transylvanian History in Cluj-Napoca. Throughout the nineteenth century, as nationalist sentiment expanded in Europe, interest in national history and historical figures was extremely high and people genuinely revered historical figures. The cult of these personalities was intensively cultivated, in all environments. There was major popular enthusiasm, in an atmosphere animated by the patriotic spirit. This subject was frequently approached in the periodicals of the nineteenth century, which published not only historical prose and biographies, but also images, which ensured a greater impact of these publications on the public. The Hungarian society of the era developed a genuine educational program based on the heroic past and on portraits of personalities.

Keywords: nineteenth century, national history, lithography, portrait.

Rezumat: Lucrarea prezintă o serie de portrete de grup ale liderilor Transilvaniei de odinioară și ale oamenilor politici din secolul al XIX-lea, semnate de Magyari Lajos și Miklós Barabás, din patrimoniul Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei din Cluj-Napoca. Ca o constantă a secolului al XIX-lea, în contextul amplificării sentimentului naționalist în întreaga Europă, interesul ridicat pentru istoria națională conduce la o adevărată venerație pentru figurile istorice. Cultul acestor personalități este promovat intens, în toate mediile, cu un entuziasm popular major, într-o atmosferă animată de spirit patriotic. Subiectul a găsit un teritoriu propice în presa vremii din decursul secolului al XIX-lea, unde dincolo de povestirile istorice sau biografiile publicate, imaginile au constituit un factor major de interes asigurând un impact sporit asupra publicului și succesul publicațiilor. Societatea maghiară a epocii a dezvoltat un adevărat program educativ bazat pe trecutul eroic și pe portretele personalităților.

Cuvinte cheie: secolul XIX, istorie națională, litografie, portret

Throughout the nineteenth century, as nationalist sentiment expanded in Europe, collective interest in national history, the cult of heroes and of personalities prevailed, and people genuinely revered historical figures. The cult of these personalities was cultivated with great popular enthusiasm in all environments, in an atmosphere animated by the patriotic spirit and the struggle for recognized constitutional rights. This subject was frequently approached in the periodicals of the nineteenth century, which published not only historical prose and biographies, but also images, which ensured a greater impact of these publications on the public. The Hungarian society of the era was no exception to the

* Ph.D., Museum curator, National Museum of Transylvanian History, Cluj-Napoca, email: bonta.claudia@mnit.ro

general rule and developed a genuine educational program based on the heroic past and on portraits of personalities who ‘played an essential role in shaping the identity of the community.’¹

The strong interconnection between the national language, history, education and the civic spirit dominated Hungarian society in the mid-nineteenth century.² Public good, education and moral advancement were the key phrases of the time. National progress became the main concern for society. The elites enthusiastically embraced the national cause and understood that national goals could be successfully supported by historical legends. Legends, myths, the collective past, cultural values, all these made up the elements that strengthened confidence in the present.³

In the early period of Hungarian nationalism, political and cultural issues were closely interrelated and public opinion was strongly influenced by educated members of the elites⁴ who understood the importance of the common historical past in channeling national aspirations and the fact that the historical past could strengthen national consciousness. The power of history and its role in cultivating national feeling was not a novelty for Hungarian society, which could boast of the existence of a tradition in terms of the publication of series of works that presented heroic figures from the Hungarians’ glorious past to the general public. Some examples of inspirational historical writings were Péter Révai, Ferenc Nádasdy, *De monarchia et sacra corona regni Hungariae centuriae septem*, Ed. Götz, Francofurti (Frankfurt), 1659, and *De sacra Corona Regni Hungariae, Augustæ Vindelicorum* (Augsburg), 1613,⁵ significant works that nonetheless lacked illustrations. The important role played by images, historical portraits or printed maps of the Hungarian Kingdom in the political propaganda, ‘the mutual reinforcement between text and image in such a way as to shape public opinion,’⁶ was understood from early on in time, so various works, maps, and historical chronologies, accompanied by portraits of prominent historical figures, appeared in the seventeenth century. Over the years there were published several such works⁷ designed to speak to the world about the role played by Hungarians in history. However, the standard for this kind of work remains, by and large, the so-called *Mausoleum of Nádasdy*, a work published thanks to Count Ferenc Nádasdy (1623–1671): *Mausoleum Potentissimorum ac Gloriosissimorum Regni Apostolici Regum et Primorum Militantis Ungariae Ducum*, printed by Endter publishing house in Nuremberg (Nürnberg) in 1664.⁸ This emblematic work told the story of the Hungarian kings and chieftains and presented portraits of the rulers of Hungary from *Keve, I Dux Ungarorum*, to the Habsburg emperor *Ferdinandus IV, XLIV Rex Ungariæ*. The inclusion of portraits of the rulers and kings of Hungary in *Mausoleum Potentissimorum ac Gloriosissimorum*

¹ Johannesson 1986, 41–99. All the quotations in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

² Török 2015, 89.

³ Török 2015, 107–155.

⁴ Barany 1994, 174–208.

⁵ Etényi 2015, 33.

⁶ Etényi 2015, 20.

⁷ On this, see Mroziewicz 2016.

⁸ *Mausoleum* 1664.

Regni Apostolici Regum et Primorum Militantis Ungariae Ducum brought tremendous popularity to this work, which was frequently reprinted and is still appreciated today.

In the 1830s and 1840s prints became a prominent form of instruction in Paris, where a whole generation of artists contributed to the popularity of illustrations by using new lithography techniques to disseminate images in various forms, from individual prints, annexes of publications, to albums, books, periodicals or journals, frequently on the title page of the publication.⁹ By means of lithography, an accessible graphic means in terms of the costs, with a broad dissemination given the possibility of multiplying lithographic plates, the public became familiar with the key characters of national history, with relevant historical episodes, with landscapes that presented various places in the country, etc. In the Hungarian space, the success of lithography also rested on its broad dissemination, on the affordable costs and, last but not least, on the contribution of extremely talented artists such as Miklós Barabás (1810–1898), considered the most prominent representative of the Hungarian lithography genre. The peak of lithographic art in Hungary was reached in the middle of the nineteenth century, but the passion for history and the interest in lithographic plates continued until the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The plates circulated individually, as supplements to press publications or in special albums. The range of themes was quite extensive: portraits, landscapes, genre scenes, but historical subjects predominated. Even though lithographs based on historical scenes enjoyed real success, 'portraiture was the most common pictorial genre in the periodicals of the era and its role in the moral education of the community and in the formation of collective memory were the factors that made the genre appealing and led to a genuine mass production.'¹⁰

In the Hungarian area, the 1830s were marked by the great number of literary and encyclopedic magazines that popularized knowledge. This contributed to the building of a wide national culture. With the liberalization of the political regime and the alleviation of censorship in the reform era, Hungarian men of culture were interested in bringing the great problems of Hungary's modernization into public debate, emphasizing the educational potential of the press and making penetrating observations on the society of the era. While initially most Hungarian publications had a cultural role, this changed around the time of the revolution, when interest in the political factor increased. This led to a strong development of the political press after 1840. In Transylvania, most of the Hungarian-language Transylvanian periodicals were published in Cluj: *Erdélyi Híradó* [The Transylvanian Gazette], originally published (between 1827 and 1832) as *Hazai Híradó* [The Country's Gazette], and then, between July and November 1848 as *Kolozsvári Híradó* [The Cluj Gazette], *Múlt és Jelen* [Past and Present], *Márczius Tizenötödike* [March 15], *Vasárnapi Újság* [The Sunday Gazette]. The encyclopedic character of the press of the time was reflected in the program of developing some aspects of the national ideal through carefully selected visual representations.¹¹ Along with scenes inspired by historical subjects, portrait galleries played an important role in the formation of national identity. Paradoxically, the popularity of the genre was to prove, in fact, detrimental to the

⁹ Revész 2009, 109–134.

¹⁰ Revész 2009, 109–134.

¹¹ Mitu 2000, 260–273; Mitu, Mitu 2014, 189–195.

artistic quality of those portraits: the higher the demand for lithographic plates, the higher the volume of work. In the pursuit of profit, the execution time of lithographs decreased, which automatically led to a decrease in their quality, a situation noted by experts even in the case of the most famous artists, such as Barabás Miklós, where we can distinguish ‘a certain execution mannerism.’¹² In the end, it was precisely the oversaturation of the market, through the abundance of works that brought about the decline of lithography.

The journals of the era make a habit of publishing supplements with lithographs featuring portraits of personalities accompanied by an explanatory text, a small biographical record that ensured the dissemination of information to the general public. The deeply educational and patriotic approach presented to the general public exemplary personalities who had made their mark on history, people who put the public good above the personal one, prominent personalities, models of ethics or cultural personalities, writers, artists but also contemporary politicians. The Hungarian press of the mid-nineteenth century reached a point where strong public interest stimulated the proliferation of these publications: ‘readers were excited to see Hungarian personalities whose careers were a direct model of life, a moral example, ... a paragon of spiritual excellence.’¹³ This cultural contextualization of the press proved to be particularly educational, popularizing portraits of personalities designed to be moral landmarks or civic models for the community. For a long time, prestigious publications such as *Vasárnapi Újság* [The Sunday Gazette] or *Az Ország Tükre* [The Country’s Mirror] persisted in publishing portraits of prominent public figures. Works of this type continued throughout the century. For instance, such a work, signed by Márki Sándor, *Magyar Pantheon, A magyar történelem, művészet és irodalom 150 kimagasló alakja, képekben és rövid életrajzokban föltűntve*, was published in Budapest in 1884. As its title says, it presented 150 portraits of leading figures in the history of art and literature, placed on special pages, where the images of these figures were accompanied by a brief biography.¹⁴ This tradition would only end with the rise of the sensational press of the early twentieth century.¹⁵

In general, this kind of lithographic portraits had in common some distinctive elements such as the emphasis on facial details, with a maximum focus on the physiognomies. Frequently, little attention was paid to the background or the use of a small number of additional elements such as ornamental frames. The simplicity and sobriety of the technique and the lack of any artifice were the watchwords. The historical authenticity of the portraits was scrupulously respected and the use of reliable documentary sources for the image was resorted to, in order to render exactly the figure of each character. The series of portrait galleries composed a ‘virtual national pantheon,’ in which collective ideals were embodied by the selected personalities.¹⁶

The graphic collections of the National Museum of Transylvanian History in Cluj-Napoca include a large number of lithographic portraits from the nineteenth century. The most numerous are those of personalities of Hungarian public life, statesmen,

¹² Nagy 1934, chap. VI.

¹³ Revész 2009, 109–134.

¹⁴ Marki 1884.

¹⁵ Revész 2009, 109–134.

¹⁶ Revész 2009, 109–134.

revolutionaries, intellectuals, prominent figures of culture, writers, and artists. They reveal a genuine flair for immortalizing everything whatever Hungarian society had most valuable at the time. However, the effort did not stop here. Attempts were made to recover important personalities of national history. Thus, a series of engravings and lithographs on historical subjects, as well as a series of portraits of the Kings of Hungary or the Princes of Transylvania appeared. The nostalgia for a glorious past was intended to be an incentive for contemporary generations, called to rise to the level of their ancestors and bring back the glory of yesteryear to the homeland. The desire to synthesize a millennial history was transposed not only in individual portraits, but also in group portraits of prominent historical personalities. Transylvania quickly aligned itself with this trend and enriched the periodicals of the time with historical portraits of Transylvanian rulers. In this sense, there are some works in the collections of the National Museum of Transylvanian History in Cluj-Napoca that drew our attention. These are lithographs containing a series of group portraits of the past leaders of Transylvania, the rulers of Hungary and the politicians of the nineteenth century.

One of the most interesting lithographs in the National Museum of Transylvanian History (hereafter MNIT) collections, entitled *ERDÉLY NEMZETI FEJEDELMEK*¹⁷ [Transylvanian National Princes], presents a series of grouped portraits of the Transylvanian princes. The portraits are disparate, in the form of heads arranged on several registers. Overall, the image is rather clumsy, a conglomerate of heads that seem to be the result of a drawing exercise, but the portraits are well individualized, each accurately reproducing the face of one of Transylvania's princes. The accurate rendering of their physiognomy is the sign of a careful documentation, the images being executed probably after official portraits of the princes. Although they are rendered on the same plate, the portraits are self-contained, completely independent, and none of the characters interfere in any way with the surrounding characters. The image is a historical chronology, aimed at educating the public about the glorious history of the characters who ruled Transylvania in the era of the Principality, considered as the Golden Age of the province. In the MNIT collections, there are two variants of this plate: one is less crowded, with fewer characters and a simple list of the names of the princes, while the other is more complex, with twice the number of characters and with detailed explanations. It is relevant that the author considered it necessary to number each character and to add, at the bottom of the plate, the names of the characters as well as, in the case of the second plate, the years in which they ruled the country. The approach is commendable given the complicated history, numerous reigns and the lack of a hereditary dynasty, in the true sense of the word, in Transylvania. The line of princes begins, naturally, with the first Prince of Transylvania, Sigismund Zápolya and ends with the last, Michael Apafi II, and the historical timeframe is 1541–1690, precisely overlapping the epoch of the Principality.

The first plate (Fig. 1),¹⁸ *Erdély Nemzeti Fejedelmek*, made in 1843, is simple. It contains the portraits of only nine characters, mentioned without the years related to each one:

¹⁷ We have faithfully transcribed the texts and names on all the lithographs presented, as presented in the original, without any grammatical corrections.

¹⁸ Lithograph *Erdély Nemzeti Fejedelmek*, Colectia MNIT, no. F 8250, size: L = 58 cm; l = 44.5 cm. There are two copies of the lithograph in the MNIT Collection.

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Zápolya Sigmund | 4. Rákoczi Ferencz | 7. Kemény János |
| 2. I ^{ső} Rákoczi György | 5. Rhédei Ferencz | 8. I ^{ső} Apafi Mihály |
| 3. II ^{ik} Rákoczi György | 6. Barcsai Ákos | 9. II ^{ik} Apafi Mihály |

Below the picture, on either side, the technical specifications are given: author, location, dating, etc. ‘Gondosan felkeresett / hiteles képekről’ [From authentic/ carefully searched images] and ‘Kőre Magyarai m... / (1)843 Kolosv(árt)’ [On stone, by Magyarai ... (1)843, in Cluj]. The positioning of the characters is quite random, with counter clockwise reading, but the portraiture accuracy is very high. Even if the series of characters begins correctly, with Sigismund Zápolya, between him and the next Prince, George Rákoczi I, there is a temporal hiatus of 90 years, when a series of princes not mentioned in this plate reigned. Attention is focused on the characters who dominated the history of the principality in the last 60 years.

The second plate (Fig. 2)¹⁹ is a reprint from 1844, as the title *Második kiadás* [Second edition] informs us. / *ERDÉLY NEMZETI FEJEDELMEK*; it contains 18 characters covering the entire period of the Principality of Transylvania and provides more information. For each of the Princes, the year in which they began to reign and the duration in years (év, abbreviated é.) or months (hónap, abbreviated h.) of their governance is given:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Zápolya Zsigmond 1541. 24. é. | 10. Brádenburgi Katalin 1629. 1. é. |
| 2. Báthori István 1571. 5. é. | 11. Bethlen István 1630. 1. é. |
| 3. Báthori Kristoph 1576. 5. é. | 12. Rákoczi György I 1631. 17. é. |
| 4. Báthori Zsigmond 1581. 15. é. | 13. Rákoczi György II 1649. 8. é. |
| 5. Báthori András 1599. 7. h. | 14. Rhédei Ferencz 1658. 3. h. |
| 6. Bocskai István 1605. 1. é. 3. h. | 15. Barcsai Ákos 1658. 2. h. |
| 7. Rákoczi Zsigmond 1607. 1. é. | 16. Kemény János 1660. 2. h. |
| 8. Báthori Gábor 1608. 5. é. | 17. Apafi Mihály I. 1661 29. é. |
| 9. Bethlen Gábor 1613. 16. é. | 18. Apafi Mihály II. 1690. 9. é. |

Under the image, on either side of the image and under the text with the dates of the princes are inscribed: technical data, the advertisement, the author, the date, location, publisher, price, etc. ‘Országszerte felkeresett/ hív képekről:’ [From authentic images searched throughout the country] ‘Ajándék Életelvekhez képekben, félévi jártatásra’ [Supplement to ‘Életelvek képekben’ for the half-year subscription], respectively ‘Kőre rajzolta Magyarai/ 1844 Kolosvárt’ [Drawn on stone – lithographed – by Magyarai, at Cluj, in 1844]/ ‘Kiadja Sz.háromsági / Magyarai Lajos Kolosvártt’ [Edited by Sz.háromsági Magyarai Lajos, in Cluj] / ‘Az ev. ref. Koll. nyomdájában’ [In the printing house of the Evangelical-Reformed College]. ‘Külön ára 1 f p p’ [unique price 1 fpp]. The heads are arranged on five horizontal registers, arranged in rows of four figures, alternating with rows of three figures each. According to the title, the chronology is devoted exclusively to recognized national princes and does not mention the ‘interruptions’ caused by the turbulent history of the era. Thus, the governorates of Michael the Brave,

¹⁹ Lithograph *ERDÉLY NEMZETI FEJEDELMEK*, Colectia MNIT, no. F 8251. Size: L = 51 cm; l = 44.5 cm.

Giorgio Basta²⁰ or Emeric Thököly²¹ are not referenced. The interruptions in the reigns of Sigismund Báthori²² or Michael Apafi II are also not mentioned, and they are noted as if they had enjoyed linear reigns for 15 years, or 9 years, respectively. We can note the absence of several characters in the first plate (Ştefan Báthori, Cristofor Báthori, Sigismund Báthori, Andrei Báthori, Ştefan Bocskai, Sigismund Rákoczi, Gabriel Báthori, Gabriel Bethlen, Catherine of Brandenburg, Ştefan Bethlen) but also the presence of Francis Rákoczi II, leader of the anti-Habsburg struggle, proclaimed Prince between 1704 and 1711, absent in the much more complete second drawing. Andrei Báthori and Michael Apafi II are rendered after posthumous portraits, and the portraits of the characters found on both plates (Sigismund Zápolya, George Rákoczi I, George Rákoczi II, Francis Rhédei, Acaţiu Barcsai, Ioan Kemény, Michael Apafi I, and Michael Apafi II) are almost identically rendered.

The author of these lithographs is Magyari Lajos, a painter, lithographer, editor, and poet who was active in Cluj in the mid-nineteenth century.²³ Considered ‘the most prolific artist of the 1840s and 50s,’ the artist studied in Târgu-Mureş and had the ambition to impose himself on the publishing market in Transylvania. Even though, at first, he was reprimanded for the awkwardness of the drawing, he quickly demonstrated real progress through his works.²⁴ He had several publishing initiatives such as ‘*Életelvek képekben*’ or ‘Kiskövet,’ the latter being the space in which he published over 70 lithographs between 2 January 1846 and the beginning of 1848. In the opinion of specialists, in terms of the workload, he could stand next to Miklós Barabás and Carol Popp de Szathmári. As for the qualitative aspect, his lithographs were fluctuating: some were very good, others surprisingly weak, due, perhaps, to the large volume of work and the time pressure, since the magazine was published on a weekly basis. Portraits predominated among his drawings, but he also made landscapes or compositional scenes.²⁵

²⁰ From late 1599 to 1601, Transylvania was witness to a series of fast-paced events, with short and intense, contentious reigns, such as those of Michael the Brave (which began after the Battle of Şelimbăr, on October 28, 1599, and lasted until the Battle of Mirăslău, on September 18, 1600), Giorgio Basta (the imperial troops had control over Transylvania from July 1600 to February 1601), Sigismund Báthory (who claimed the throne of the principality in February 1601 and lost it in the Battle of Guruslău, on August 3, 1601), General Basta (who regained control of the principality after July 1601). The troubled and unstable period continued with the governorates of Sigismund Báthory (who again claimed the throne of the principality and abdicated definitively, in 1602, after the defeat suffered against Basta in Teiuş), Moise Secuiul (proclaimed prince with Ottoman support in the spring of 1603 and killed in the battle near Braşov against Wallachian Voivode Radu Şerban, on July 17, 1603) and again General Basta, Governor of Transylvania in the name of the emperor, see Bonţa 2018 (2019), 25–26; Köpeczi et alii 2002.

²¹ After the death of Michael Apafi I, the Ottoman Porte appointed to the throne not his successor, Michael Apafi II, who had already been confirmed by the Diet, but Thököly Imre (Emeric), who had control of the country between 1690 and 1692. The Imperial military victories changed the balance of power, Thököly was removed and Michael Apafi II occupied the princely throne, see Bonţa 2018 (2019), 38; Köpeczi et alii 2002; Bérenger 2000, 263–265; Ingrao 2000, 85.

²² Sigismund Báthory was Prince of Transylvania several times, between 1581 and 1602. His reigns were interrupted by successive abdications and unexpected returns to the throne of the Principality of Transylvania, see Köpeczi et alii 2002.

²³ Magyari Lajos (Szentháromsági Magyari Lajos), 17 April 1813, Tâmpa / Székelytompán – 19 December 1859, Cluj, see Éber, Gombosi 1935, 73; Szabó, Szabó 2003, 439; Murádin 2017.

²⁴ Nagy 1934, chap. VI.

²⁵ Murádin 2017.

Another emblematic lithograph for this study, entitled *ERDÉLYI FŐKORMÁNYZÓK*, [The Governors of Transylvania] (Fig. 3)²⁶ depicts under the signature ‘g(róf) Bánffy György,’ a group portrait of the governors of Transylvania, selectively rendered by the same author, Magyar Lajos. This time, the author chose another way of rendering the group portrait. He made a central portrait, of the bust type, of Teleki József, surrounded by the heads of six of his predecessors. The plate with the portrait of Count Teleki József (1790–1855), Governor of Transylvania in 1842–1848, is part of the series of efforts to recover the Hungarian national history in an era deeply marked by political and national unrest: the mid-nineteenth century. Depicted in a bust-like frontal portrait, the count is wearing a threaded coat in keeping with the fashion of the times and is surrounded by some of his predecessors who governed Transylvania. It is a group portrait made in Cluj in 1843, which selectively portrays the governors of the principality, in a list that includes only a few characters, the recognized national governors. The image is structured in a symmetrical manner, the portrait of Count Teleki being flanked by three heads on each side, with the portraits arranged in an arch, like an aura surrounding the governor. Each portrait is well individualized, with distinctive features and characteristic elements (such as wigs, more or less powdered, worn by the characters, and simple or twisted moustaches). The images testify to a rigorous documentation undertaken by the author of the lithograph. A series of numbers appear next to the heads, and at the bottom of the plate, the name of the governor is strictly specified next to the corresponding number. The explanations are diligently noted: the name of the main character, Gróf Teleki József, is inscribed at the center. The title of the plate is inscribed underneath, *ERDÉLYI FŐKORMÁNYZÓK* and then the following are listed, in two columns:

1. I^ó G. BÁNFFI GYÖRGY

Kézirata, utánczó képe nem léteztén

[There is no image, hence his signature]

2. G. KORNIS ‘SIGMOND

3. G. HALLER JÁNOS

4. G. KEMÉNY LÁSZLO

5. B. BRUCKENTHAL SÁMUEL

6. II^{ik} G. BÁNFFI GYÖRGY

7. G. KORNIS JÁNOS

Thus, the governors Sigismund Kornis (Governor of Transylvania between 1713 and 1731), Ioan Haller (1734–1755), Ladislau Kemény (1758–1762), Samuel Bruckenthal (1777–1787), Gheorghe Bánffy II (1787–1822), Ioan Kornis (1838–1840) are conveyed with their respective titles: gróf (Count), abbreviated to G. or báró (Baron), abbreviated as B. As for Governor Gheorghe Bánffy I (1691–1708), he does not appear with an individual portrait but has his signature reproduced and is nominally mentioned, with the indication that his portrait is not rendered. On either side of Count Teleki’s portrait are marked technical data, the publisher, the author, the date, the location of the workshop ‘Az ev. ref. Col. Lithog.’ [Lithographic Institute of the Reformed College], respectively ‘Természetről Magyar / (1)843 Kolosv[árt]’ [After Nature, by Magyar / 1843, in Cluj].

The third series of lithographs that reflect the theme of this study is that of the plates depicting the portrait of the members of *ELSŐ MAGYAR FÜGGETLEN FELELŐS*

²⁶ Lithograph *ERDÉLYI FŐKORMÁNYZÓK*, Colectia MNIT, no. F 8252B, size: L = 52 cm; l=45 cm. There are three copies of the lithograph in the MNIT Collection.

MINISTERIUM [The First Responsible Independent Hungarian Government] (Fig. 4).²⁷ The lithograph shows members of the Batthyány government, which ruled the country for a short time, between 23 March and 2 October 1848. The image is a group of nine individual portraits brought together by the subject. Portraits are deeply individualized and, just like in previous cases, completely independent from the surrounding figures. It is a simple sequence of individual portraits placed on the same page, since the aim was to render a historical group of contemporary personalities. The characters are lined up on two rows of four portraits arranged ascending towards the center, two by two, with Lajos Batthyány, at the top, since he was the head of this government. Every minister and their fields are mentioned below the portraits: *Deák Ferenc – igazság* (Justice Minister), *Kossut Lajos – pénz* (Minister of Finance), *Batthyányi Lajos – elnök* (Prime Minister), *Ötvös Jozsef – nevelés* (Minister of Culture and Education), *Szemere Bertalan – belügy* (Minister of Interior), *Mészáros Lázár – hadügy* (Minister of Defense), *Klauzál Gábor – földmivelés, ipar* (Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Trade), *Szécsényi István – közlekedés* (Minister for Public Works and Communication), *Esterházi Pál – külügy* (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On either side, in italics is written ‘Barabás 1. kiadásáról / Egy bajszon kül’ [After the first edition of Barabás, except for a moustache], respectively the author and the year, ‘Magyari/ 1848.’ The original of this image belonged to Miklós Barabás.²⁸ The image of the first Hungarian government was taken and multiplied by various engravers and is found in many other museum collections.²⁹ A faithful copy of the original lithograph also appears in the MNIT collections (Fig. 5),³⁰ but Magyari Lajos also executed this more original version of this portrait in which he added, perhaps out of patriotic zeal, a moustache on the face of Prince Esterházi, to emphasize the authentic Hungarian character of this government. He did not hesitate, however, to acknowledge his intervention – which explains the clarification ‘After the first edition of Barabás, except for a moustache.’³¹

²⁷ Lithograph *ELSŐ MAGYAR FÜGGETLEN FELELŐS MINISTERIUM*, Colection MNIT, no. M 5388, size: L = 41.7 cm; l = 52 cm. There are four copies of the lithograph in the MNIT Collection.

²⁸ The Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum Collections, Budapest, Történelmi Képcsarnok, no. 8844. For the assistance she provided us in our efforts to compare Magyari’s copy with the original of Barabás, we thank museographer Eszter Apor, the Hungarian National Museum Budapest.

²⁹ See Kedves 2012, 11, and the collections of the Magyar Kereskedelmi és Vendéglátóipari Múzeum, Budapest, no. VF_28_912; Kottra 1999, 9–10, etc.

³⁰ Lithograph *ELSŐ MAGYAR FÜGGETLEN FELELŐS MINISTERIUM*, MNIT Collection, no. M 5385, size: L=32.5 cm; l = 50 cm. The lithograph has extremely blurred writing; there is a single copy in the MNIT Collection.

³¹ In the original lithograph by Miklós Barabás, which is preserved in the collections of the Hungarian National Museum in Budapest, Esterházy Pál, one of the members of the first independent and responsible Hungarian governments of 1848, appears depicted without a moustache, being the only who embraced the Western style. All other members of the government proudly displayed prominent moustaches, and six of them had beards. In this copy executed by Magyari, Prince Esterhazi is also rendered with a moustache, like the other protagonists of the lithograph, probably due to the desire of the Transylvanian engraver to emphasize the Hungarian character of the new revolutionary government. It is known that in that era, the Hungarian nobility (especially the liberal and democratic nobles) had the habit of wearing moustaches and beards. This fashion served, to some extent, precisely to demonstrate its originality compared to the fashion of the aristocratic elites of Western Europe. See also the study dedicated to the topic ‘Legendary beards, bellicose moustaches’: Fogarasi 2017.

The last panel selected for this study is an interesting mix between the portraits of the Kings of Hungary, those of the leaders of the struggle for freedom and the politicians of the Hungarian government of 1848, under the suggestive title *TÖRTÉNELMÜNK KORSZAKALKOTÓI* [The Creators of Historical Eras of our (National) History] (Fig. 6).³² Below the picture is the technical information related to the author, the publishing house, the printing house: 'kőre rajz Barabás' [drawn on stone – lithographed – by Barabás] respectively 'Kiadó tulajdonos Szinay István' [owner of the publishing house Szinay István] respectively 'nyomt. Reiffenstein és Rösch Bécsben' [Reiffenstein and Rösch printing house in Vienna]. There are 24 portraits rendered in large oval medallions, from Attila to members of the first Hungarian government in 1848, all enclosed by a laurel leaf border. The portraits are neatly conveyed, the physiognomies are correct, and the details suggestive. This time the presentation is selected by Barabás Miklós according to the significant historical eras and only some of the Hungarian kings are portrayed. They are joined by famous military rulers, characters who marked the history of Hungary, the fathers of the Hungarian nation – in the artist's vision. We should note the absence of the Habsburg emperors but also the presence of the Hungarian freedom fighters and some of the most representative princes of Transylvania. Below the image, the title and below, positioned on the place of each medallion, is the name of the depicted character: *Attila, Árpád, Szent István, / Szent László, Kálmán [Könyves], IV. Béla, Nagy Lajos, Hunyadi János, I. Mátyás, I. János (szapolyai) / gr. Zrínyi Miklós (szigetvári), Báthory István, Bocskay István, Bethlen Gábor, I. Rákóczy György, gr. Zrínyi Miklós (költő és hadvezér)* [poet and general], *Tököly Imre / II. Rákóczy Ferencz, gr. Bercsényi Miklós, József nádor, gr. Szécsényi István, gr. Batthyányi Lajos, Kossuth Lajos, Deák Ferencz.*

Beyond the inherent clumsiness of such works, for instance, the sheer immobility of the characters or the rigidity of their physiognomies, we should appreciate the consistency of the authors in rendering fragments of Hungarian national history and thematically grouping them. We should mention the documentary accuracy, the clear individualization of the characters and the attention to provide correct information to the public about the dates and characters. The lack of background gives the images sobriety and encourages the viewer to focus on the portrayed faces. The series presented here is an example of national propaganda that engages the glorious history of the ancestors and the graphic arts alike, offering contemporary landmarks in terms of ideal visual identity. Through their work, artists such as Magyari Lajos or Barabás Miklós became opinion formers of the middle of the nineteenth century, educators who understood the mobilizing role of history, artists who left posterity a series of militant portraits, attesting the Hungarian cultural nationalism that enlivened their era.

³² Lithograph *TÖRTÉNELMÜNK KORSZAKALKOTÓI*, MNIT Collection, no. M 4415, size: L = 86.5 cm; l = 66.5 cm.

Bibliography

- Barany 1994 G. Barany, *The age of royal absolutism, 1790–1848*. In: P. F. Sugar, P. Hanák (eds.), *A History of Hungary*, Bloomington–Indianapolis 1994, 174–208.
- Bérenger 2000 J. Bérenger, *Istoria Imperiului Habsburgilor. 1273–1918*, București 2000.
- Bonța 2018 (2019) C. M. Bonța, *Watercolour portraits of Transylvania's Princes*, ActaMN, 55/II (2018/2019), 21–44.
- Colecția MNIT + no. Colecția Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei, nos. F 8250, F 8251, F 8252B, M 4415, M 5385, M 5388.
- Éber, Gombosi 1935 L. Éber, Gy. Gombosi, *Művészeti Lexikon*, vol. 2 (L—Z), Budapest 1935, Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár, https://adtplus.arcanum.hu/hu/view/Lexikon_MuveszetiLexikon_2, accessed 25 April 2019.
- Etényi 2015 N. G. Etényi, *The genesis and metamorphosis of images of Hungary in the Holy Roman Empire*. In: G. Almási, Sz. Brzeziński, I. Hom (eds.), *A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541–1699. Vol. 3. The Making and Uses of the Image of Hungary and Transylvania*, Cambridge 2015, 15–44.
- Kottra 1999 Gy. Cs. Kottra (ed.), *'Fényesebb a láncnál a kard...' Emlékkialítás az 1848–49 évi forradalom és szabadságharc 150. Évfordulójára*, Budapest 1999.
- Fogarasi 2017 K. Fogarasi, *Legendás szakállak, harcias bajuszok*, Klauzál Gábor Társaság (September 2017), <http://www.klauzal.hu/cikk/816.html>, accessed 26 May 2019.
- Ingrao 2000 Ch. W. Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618–1815*, Cambridge 2000.
- Johannesson 1986 L. Johannesson, *Mass Mediated Faces. 19th Century and New Concepts of Visual Identity*. In: N.-A. Bringéus (ed.), *Man and Picture. Papers from The First International Symposium for Ethnological Picture Research in Lund 1984*, Stockholm–Lund 1986, 41–99.
- Kedves 2012 Gy. Kedves (ed.), *Catalogul Colecției de Relicve. Muzeul de Relicve Arad. Vol. II. Lucrări grafice, fotografii, documente*, Szeged 2012.
- Köpeczi et alii 2002 B. Köpeczi, L. Makkai, A. Mócsy (eds.), *History of Transylvania. Vol. I. From the beginning to 1606*, 2001, Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár, <https://mek.oszk.hu/03400/03407/html/1.html>, accessed 25 June 2018; *Vol. II. From 1606 to 1830*, 2002, Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár <https://mek.oszk.hu/03400/03407/html/164.html>, accessed 2 July 2018.
- Magyar Kereskedelmi és Vendéglátóipari Múzeum, Budapest, Magyar politikus államffi, 1848, *Az első magyar független felelős minisztérium, a Batthyány-kormány tagjainak fényképe*, no. VF_28_912, Magyar Nemzeti Digitális Archívum, <https://mandadb.hu/tetel/480314>, accessed 15 April 2019.

- Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum, Budapest, Történelmi Képcsarnok, *Barabás Miklós: A Batthyány Lajos-féle Minisztérium*, no. 8844, <https://nmn.hu/hu/cikk/huenkezelt-ecsettel/>, accessed 25 may 2019.
- Márki 1884 M. Sándor, *Magyar Pantheon, A magyar történelem, művészet és irodalom 150 kimagasló alakja, képekben és rövid életrajzokban föltűntve*, Budapest 1884, Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár, <https://mek.oszk.hu/03600/03616/03616.pdf/>, accessed 23 April 2019.
- Mausoleum* 1664 *Mausoleum Potentissimorum ac Gloriosissimorum Regni Apostolici Regum et Primorum Militantis Ungariae Ducum*, Nürnberg 1664, Internet Archive <https://archive.org/stream/mausoleumpotenti00nori?ref=ol#page/n6/mode/2up/>, accessed 24 April 2019.
- Mitu 2000 M. Mitu, *Problema românească reflectată în cultura maghiară din prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea*, Cluj-Napoca 2000.
- Mitu, Mitu 2014 S. Mitu, M. Mitu, *Ungurii despre români. Nașterea unei imagini etnice*, București 2014.
- Mroziewicz 2016 K. Mroziewicz, *Nation Made Visible: The Hungarian Political Community in Illustrated Books (ca. 1350–1700)*, *Colloq. Humanist.*, 5 (2016), 19–36. DOI: 10.11649/ch.2016.003/.
- Murádin 2017 J. Murádin, *Én bolygó szél vagyok? – Egy székely litográfus a reformkorban*, *Székelyföld*, XXI/7 (July 2017), 135–147.
- Nagy 1934 Z. Nagy, *A magyar litográfia története a XIX. Században*, Budapest 1934, <https://mek.oszk.hu/08400/08414/08414.htm>, accessed 16 April 2019.
- Révész 2009 E. Révész, *Virtuális Panteonok. Grafikai Arképcsarnokok a 19. századi Hazai Populáris Grafikában*, *TMB*, XXXIV (2009), 109–134, http://real-j.mtak.hu/12900/1/EPA02120_TBM_34.pdf, accessed 22 April 2019.
- Szabó, Szabó 2003 A. Szabó M., E. Szabó M., *Erdély Helységnevszótár / Dicționar de localități din Transilvania / Ortsnamenverzeichnis für Siebenbürgen*, Cluj 2003.
- Török 2015 B. Zs. Török, *Exploring Transylvania: Geographies of Knowledge and Entangled Histories in a Multiethnic Province, 1790–1918*, Leiden 2015.




Fig. 1. Erdélyi Nemzeti Fejedelmek, National Transylvanian Princes, lithograph, Colecția MNIT, no. F 8250.



Fig. 2. ERDÉLYI NEMZETI FEJEDELMIEK, NATIONAL TRANSYLVANIAN PRINCES, lithograph, Colectia MNIT, no. F 8251.




Fig. 3. ERDÉLYI FŐKORMÁNYZÓK, GOVERNORS OF TRANSYLVANIA, lithograph, Colecția MNIT no. F 8252b.



Fig. 4. ELSŐ MAGYAR FÜGGETLEN FELELŐS MINISZTERIUM, THE FIRST INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBLE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, lithograph, Colecția MNIT, no. M 5388.



Fig. 5. ELSŐ MAGYAR FÜGGETLEN FELELŐS MINISZTERIUM, THE FIRST INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBLE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, lithograph, Colecția MNIT, no. M 5385.



Fig. 6. TÖRTÉNELMÜNK KORSZAKALKOTÓI, CREATORS OF HISTORICAL AGES, lithograph, Colecția MNIT, no. M 4415.

THE PROBLEM OF DESERTATION IN THE ARMY OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE: FROM THE REIGN OF MARIA THERESA OF THE FIRST DECADES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

EUGENIA BÎRLEA*

Abstract: The article analyses the problem of desertion in the army of the Habsburg Empire and in the regiments recruited from Transylvania in the eighteenth century, a century considered by the historiography of the last decades as the classic ‘era of deserters.’ The causes of desertion are varied and they concern mainly the mode of recruitment specific to those times, when most men did not freely choose to become soldiers.

Discipline based on harsh physical punishment, the strenuous efforts to which soldiers were subjected, especially during campaigns, the very poor hygiene and sanitary conditions, alcoholism and mental illnesses (*melancholia*, *Heimweh*) and, last but not least, the desire for adventure influenced this phenomenon.

There were young men who defected without any qualms of conscience, going from one regiment to another or even from another army to another. In theory, defection was punishable by death, but in practice there was a wide variety of mitigating circumstances in the application of punishments, and the number of those executed was very small in relation to the number of defectors.

Keywords: Habsburg Empire, army, Transylvanian regiments, soldiers, desertion.

Rezumat: Articolul analizează problema dezertării în armata Imperiului Habsburgic și în regimentele recrutate din Transilvania în secolul XVIII, secol considerat de către istoriografia ultimelor decenii drept epoca clasică a dezertorilor. Cauzele dezertării sunt variate și rezidă în principal în modul de recrutare specific vremii, când cei mai mulți nu alegeau în mod liber să fie soldați.

Disciplina bazată pe pedepse fizice aspre, eforturile mari la care soldații erau supuși, mai ales în timpul campaniilor, condițiile igienice și sanitare extrem de precare, alcoolismul și bolile psihice (*Melancholia*, *Heimweh*) și, nu în ultimul rând, dorința de aventură sunt factori care au influențat acest fenomen.

Au existat tineri care dezertau fără nici o mustrare de conștiință și treceau de la un regiment la altul sau chiar de la o altă armată la alta. Teoretic, dezertarea se pedepsea cu moartea, dar în practică exista o mare varietate de circumstanțe atenuante în aplicarea pedepselor, și numărul celor executați era foarte mic în raport cu numărul dezertorilor.

Cuvinte cheie: Imperiul habsburgic, armată, regimente transilvănene, soldați, dezertare.

Introduction

In the eighteenth century, desertion was hotly debated, because it was frequently encountered, but historians have only approached this topic openly for the past few

* Ph.D., Librarian, Library of the Romanian Academy, Cluj-Napoca, email: eugeniabirlea@gmail.com.

decades. The legal regulations of the era¹ could be the subject of extensive research. The magnitude of the phenomenon of desertion in the eighteenth century led Michael Sikora to call this century the 'era of deserters.' His Ph.D. Thesis, *Disziplin und Desertion: Strukturprobleme militärischer Organisation im 18. Jahrhundert* (Discipline and Desertion. Structural Problems of Military Organization in the Eighteenth Century), defended at the University of Cologne in 1994, marked a milestone in research on this issue. Two years later, together with Ulrich Bröckling, Michael Sikora edited the volume *Armeen und ihre Deserteure: vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit* (Armies and Their Deserters. A Neglected Chapter of Military History in the Pre-Modern Era), published in Göttingen in 1998.

While in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries military rulers faced uprisings and mass defections of mercenary armies, the process of setting up and disciplining a standing army had ended by the eighteenth century. Under the reign of Maria Theresa, a final stage of unifying the army took place at the level of regulations, uniforms, justice, etc. The eighteenth century was considered the classic era of standing armies and their social disciplining, but also an age of desertion.

After Sikora's book was published, other German historians also turned their attention to the armies of the former German states. A good example is the book of historian Stefan Kroll about the army of Saxony,² in which the chapter on desertion is extremely well documented.

Still, no historian has so far devoted extensive research to the issue of desertion in the Habsburg Army of that century.³ We should note here two articles written by the historian Christoph Tepperberg, an employee and then Director of the War Archive in Vienna (2001-2019). The article on the legislation on desertion,⁴ although focused on the decades before 1848, makes numerous references to the period after the middle of the eighteenth century too. The other study looks at the relationships between desertion and crime, the permeable boundaries between the category of soldiers and that of criminals.⁵ In times of great need for recruits, the army quickly accepted in its ranks even the most infamous and dangerous robbers, as Nicolae Stoica de Hațeg has delightfully described the situation of the thieves in the Mehadia Mountains, pardoned at the cost of enlistment.⁶ There is also a Ph.D. Thesis on desertion in the Habsburg Army from 1753 to 1881,⁷ which has the merit of having studied, on the basis of archival documents, the problem of desertion in the case

¹ We shall name just a few *Militär-Justiz-Norma*, 25 June 1754, replaced on 31 December 1768 by *Theresianische Peinliche Gerichtsordnung* (*Constitutio criminalis Theresiana*). This *Constitutio* was supplemented by other articles of law and military regulations, all of which contained regulations on desertion. On 1 October 1798, however, *Direktiv-Regeln in Desertions-Sachen* appeared, which were later completed as needed. Archduke Carl inspired a number of important amendments, ordered the drafting of a new regulation for infantry and cavalry (1807), and in 1808 published *Kriegsartikel für die k. k. Armee*. These laws and regulations remained in force until the post-1850 reforms.

² Kroll 2006.

³ Research on desertion has mainly focused on the period of the two World Wars.

⁴ Tepperberg 1993a, 197–223.

⁵ Tepperberg 1993b, 94–113.

⁶ Stoica De Hațeg 1981, 220–225.

⁷ Horton 2016.

of two infantry regiments. One was Infantry Regiment no. 31, a Transylvanian regiment, called the Orosz Regiment at that time,⁸ after the name of its owner.

In this study we propose, based on unpublished sources, to outline a few aspects of the problem of desertion in the Austrian army, from the reign of Maria Theresa to the first decades of the nineteenth century. We will not refer to the Border Guard regiments that have been the subject of many books and articles and had their own system of organization and recruitment.⁹

Causes of desertion

Desertion had multiple causes. A first cause lay in the recruitment system itself.¹⁰ In the period to which we refer, there were three types of recruitment in the Habsburg Army.¹¹ Recruitment was voluntary (*Werbung* or *Anwerbung* in German), on a contract basis. The future soldiers received a sum of money (*Handgeld*) when the contract was made, and were then paid more or less regularly. In addition to contract-based recruitment, another way of hiring military emerged under the reign of Leopold I (1658–1705), namely recruitment made by the authorities of each province. They were divided into counties (or seats and districts), towns and boroughs. In the language of the time, this kind of recruitment was called *Aushebung*, *Rekrutierung* or *(Land)rekrutenstellung/ ex officio Stellung*. Local authorities took advantage of the opportunity and sent into the army young men who had broken the law or were undesirable, some even unfit for military service – of course, without the free consent of the future soldiers. The complaints of the military authorities to the Aulic War Council apparently did little to help. The custom of sending turbulent individuals or suspects to the army long remained in use, since the army was regarded as a correctional institution.¹² The Saxon chronicles in the Land of Bârsa and other sources mention the capture of recruits by violence, ‘especially in the case of Romanians,’¹³ as well as their reaction, their fleeing into the forests. The Saxon villages felt insecure and petitioned the government, which prohibited recruitment avoidance and urged the fugitives to return.¹⁴

What the historian Stefan Kroll says about the Saxon army is true of all the armies of that time: in years of peace violent recruitments were sporadic, but in times of war, when the numbers of recruits increased sharply, the complaints of those drafted by force were ignored by the authorities.¹⁵ The soldiers thus recruited were naturally the first candidates for desertion.

⁸ Baron Joseph Orosz (Oross), owner of the regiment in 1780–1792. In 1764 he was Major-General, and in 1783 Field Marshal-Lieutenant. See von Wrede 1898, 338.

⁹ Bariț 1874; Göllner 1973. We shall limit ourselves only to the most famous works, the bibliography being much richer.

¹⁰ Tepperberg 1993b, 96; Sikora 1998, 91–100; Kroll 2006, 525–540.

¹¹ Bîrlea 2015.

¹² Anger 1887, 935.

¹³ All the quotations and transcriptions in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

¹⁴ Teutsch 1904, 474.

¹⁵ Kroll 2006, 130.

Between 1771–1781 the Habsburg Army introduced, following the Prussian model, a third way of recruiting and supplementing troops, the system of conscription and recruitment circles (*Conscription- und Werbbezirkssystem*), based on the principle of the obligation of each citizen to defend his country. Nevertheless, entire social categories were exempt, and so were some provinces that had kept their old constitutions and military laws. Not all provinces, including Hungary and Transylvania, accepted this system. Under the new system, men aged between 17–18 and 40 years were recruited, and military service was for life. However, by the Patent of 4 May 1802, Archduke Charles (1771–1847), president of the Aulic War Council, limited the length of service to 10–14 years for those subject to conscription.

Another cause of desertion was the brutal treatment of soldiers by officers and non-commissioned officers. With all the efforts of the Enlightenment emperors, swearing and beating were commonplace on the training field,¹⁶ to which are added other severe punishments. Caning the trainees was practiced beating with sticks over the back that caused ruptures or contusions of the ribs and diseases of the lungs, it was later replaced by beating over the buttocks, less harmful, but could affect the genitals. The legislation tried to limit physical punishment, but there were cases when, as a result of the application of these corrections, some soldiers died.¹⁷ In addition to the death penalty, the harshest punishment was that of running the gauntlet (*Gassenlaufen*). 300 soldiers were positioned in two rows, each with a bundle of two or more rods or canes (in the cavalry they used belts), and the culprit had to run between them several times. The most serious variant, similar to a death sentence, was when the convict had to run 10 times between these rows.¹⁸ In the Hungarian regiments, which included Romanians, beating was used very widely.¹⁹ Although the law protected the soldiers from the abuses of despotic officers, it seems that beating was part of the soldiers' daily life.²⁰

Another reason for conflict that led to desertion as the saving solution concerned military furlough and refusal of permission to marry. Rarely granted precisely for fear of desertion, the effects of this harsh treatment sometimes had the opposite effect. There were cases of soldiers who deserted after many years of military service when they were not allowed to leave for a serious reason: it was harvest time, someone in the family was sick, etc. Between military duty and family bonds, some soldiers decide in favor of family and deserted.²¹ Permission to marry was granted to a small number of soldiers, so violation of this right was another reason for discontent. The authorities of those times had many prejudices against married soldiers; they were considered fearful and hesitant on the battlefield. The soldiers' families put a financial burden on the army, and if the soldiers died, the families were left without a livelihood.²² The life of the soldiers, especially during longer campaigns, was full of deprivation and contributed directly to growing discontent, to such an extent that their only solution was desertion. Campaign life meant diseases

¹⁶ Fenner von Fenneberg 1847, 61–67.

¹⁷ Beinl 1804, 362–364.

¹⁸ Beinl 1804, 365–367.

¹⁹ Fenner von Fenneberg 1847, 94–95.

²⁰ Beinl 1804, 363.

²¹ Sikora 1998, 97.

²² Sikora 1998, 98.

or even epidemics, irregular payment, and famished soldiers dressed in rags. Prolonged stationing in unwholesome regions,²³ where many fell ill and died, was another reason for disgruntlement that could lead to the same outcome.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, although military service was for life in the Hungarian regiments, the soldiers were considered apt for battle for an average 12–14 years, after which they were released because they became ill. Medical and hygienic conditions were so bad that in the period from 1814 to 1830, 20% of soldiers died from exhaustion and diseases. More soldiers aged 25–35 died in hospitals than on the battlefield, even though they could have served for many more years.²⁴

We listed only the main causes of desertion, but they could be varied and complex, depending on the ability of each soldier to withstand the rigors of military life. On the other hand, some soldiers had turned desertion into a profitable way of life and managed to escape, to defect from one regiment to another, from one army to another, to collect the money they were given upon enrolment, as we will see in the biography of Johann Steininger.

The extent of the phenomenon

Michael Sikora found that the average of deserters was about 1–3% in the armies of Central Europe during peacetime.²⁵ But between 1713 and 1740, more than 300000 soldiers deserted from the Prussian army, that is, an entire army, since in 1712 Prussia had a total of 35584 soldiers.²⁶ Those who lived in Prussia could see how hard the authorities struggled to contain the defection phenomenon. Royal edicts obliged a large part of the population to take part in catching them, and laws upon laws were published to that end. All the inhabitants had to be attentive to suspicious persons, and the priests read ordinances in the pulpit aimed at limiting the phenomenon.²⁷

Researcher Stefan Kroll has tried to show, in addition to the quantitative dimensions of desertion, which categories of soldiers were more often tempted to defect. He has also explored to what extent the suspicion against married soldiers and foreigners hired on a limited-time contract was justified. His research focuses on desertion in the Saxon army between 1717 and 1792.

Kroll divided the studied period into several sub-periods, concluding that the highest number of deserters in the Saxon army was recorded between 1717 and 1727, the figures being comparable to those in Prussia between 1713 and 1740, a period of accelerated increase in the number of soldiers.²⁸ The periods of reforms in the Saxon army, that is, between 1728 and 1730 and after 1763, witnessed a growing number of deserters.²⁹

²³ Diseases due to the unhealthy climate in Banat or northern Italy were well known. In 1828, surveyor Joseph Adalbert Krickel wrote that of the 900 soldiers in Timisoara, more than two thirds lay sick with colds. See Cernovodeanu, Buşă 2005, 259. The region of Mantua, in northern Italy, was also well known for that. See Steegmeyer 1801.

²⁴ Tepperberg 1993b, 98.

²⁵ Sikora 1998, 90.

²⁶ Sikora 1996, 69.

²⁷ Sikora 1998, 86.

²⁸ Kroll 2006, 511.

²⁹ Kroll 2006, 511

Their number in the period 1717–1727 was impressive: in 1718, 17.1% in the infantry and 2.6% in the cavalry; in 1719, 15.9% in the infantry and 1.7% in the cavalry, etc.; from approx. 25,000 soldiers who served in the infantry 7,671, or 31% deserted. In the period 1764–1767, for which there are statistics at the level of the entire army, the figures were as follows: in 1764, 4.2%; in 1765, 4.0%; in 1766, 4.2%; in 1767, 3.6%.³⁰ Desertion was less common in the cavalry; while in the infantry every third soldier had deserted at least one time, in the cavalry only every tenth soldier had.³¹

The author has also reached interesting conclusions regarding the time of desertion, in the same period of maximum desertion. Apart from 1717, when more soldiers with experience deserted, in 1718–1728 the number of first-time deserters was much higher. For example, in 1720, 210 experienced soldiers and 623 young soldiers deserted; in 1725, 65 experienced soldiers and 437 inexperienced ones did so.³² Compared to the large number of defectors, few, and only in exceptional cases, were executed, according to the author.³³

The authorities could record desertions relatively easily in times of peace, but in times of war this was much harder. After the great battles, the authorities could not tell the difference between the prisoners, the strays and the genuine deserters, many having switched from one category to another. A well-documented period was that of the War of the First Coalition against France, between 1793 and 1796. The army that went to war in 1793 had 9700 soldiers, and the losses suffered were 1,161, deserters amounting to 19.3% of the total losses. The number of foreigners employed in the Saxon army who deserted confirms the prejudice of contemporaries that foreign soldiers deserted more often. The statistics for the years 1765–1768 confirm it. Of the 635 foreigners recruited between 1763 and 1765, 258 deserted during that period.³⁴

The author also studied the phenomenon of desertion in the case of the Sachsen-Weissenfels Infantry Regiment, between 1740 and 1742. Dividing the number of desertions by months, he observed that the most losses were in March–April and September–October, with the greatest losses recorded during garrison service and mobilization for the war of the Austrian Succession (April 1740–March 1741). During the time when the troops were marching to the battlefield and during the battles fought on enemy territory, defections were minimal. Regarding the rank of deserters, all of 130 deserters were soldiers apart from 4 corporals and 2 quartermaster sergeants. The vast majority of these deserters were unmarried, the number of married deserters being very small. Most of these 130 were young, newly recruited soldiers; 43.6% of deserters had no more than 6 months of military service; 8.3% of deserters had served for at least 10 years. The outbreak of a war did not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of defections. External circumstances were much more important: the weather, the supplies, the place where the troops were stationed, the general course of the battle and also the good or demoralizing atmosphere within the army. One should also not underestimate the observation that fleeing was

³⁰ Kroll 2006, 512–513.

³¹ Kroll 2006, 514.

³² Kroll 2006, 514.

³³ Kroll 2006, 516–517.

³⁴ Kroll 2006, 518–519.

the most common form of resistance not only among soldiers, but also among peasants and craftsmen.³⁵

Famous defectors

The Saxon soldier Friedrich Christian Sohr deserted from Görlitz on 17 March 1784, and returned to his unit after eight months. He published his autobiography,³⁶ the episode of desertion occupying two-fifths of the text. The author was not the son of a peasant, for his mother was the daughter of a merchant, and his father a lawyer. Born in Görlitz in 1748, he studied at the gymnasium there, then unsuccessfully tried to become a merchant, and after the death of his father he joined a Saxon infantry regiment as a quartermaster sergeant at the age of 27, participating in the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779). He wrote not only about desertion, but also about his feelings throughout this adventure, the obvious purpose of which was to provide the image of a sinner repenting of the sin he had committed, taking into account the prejudices of his society towards deserters. Sohr had alcohol problems, indulged in bad companionship and came into conflict with his superiors. Fearing harsh punishment, he deserted.

Once he fled, he managed to reach the Austrian border without problems, pretending to be a soldier on leave. He found accommodation without anyone asking him for a leave permit, and the next day he had the shamelessness to pose as one hunting down a deserter. Being a non-commissioned officer, he aroused less suspicion. When he got to Prague, he received a permit from the police and headed for Vienna. In the Austrian capital he managed, with the help of some Saxon compatriots, to evade the control of the authorities. But a compatriot wrote to his relatives in Görlitz where he was, so his mother and brother-in-law sent him several letters in which they reproached him for the unpleasant consequences of his irresponsible gesture. His brother-in-law obtains his reprieve, so the punishment he received was a brief time in jail where he had to live on bread and water. His desertion was possible because he was supported by the population of the provinces he had crossed, as people provided him with food and a place to sleep. He certainly took the decision to return because he thus stood a chance of getting a more lenient punishment. Sohr's defection occurred for several reasons. Among these, his problems with alcohol and his fear of punishment were the most important.³⁷

Another eighteenth-century deserter was Ulrich Bräker (1735–1798), a Swiss conscript recruited by the Prussians in 1756, who deserted the same year during the Battle of Lobositz at the beginning of the Seven Years' War. He recounted the adventures of his desertion, as well as his entire life, in a book published in 1789.³⁸

These biographies pale by comparison with the story of Johann Steininger who, by the age of 29, had deserted 15 times.³⁹ His story was recorded and published by Gustav Diezel (1817–1858). He met him in the prison of Hohenasberg,⁴⁰ a former fortress near Suttgart, where he spent several months, in 1841, having been imprisoned for his liberal

³⁵ Kroll 2006, 521–524.

³⁶ Published anonymously under the title *Meine Geschichte* in 1788.

³⁷ Kroll 2006, 541–545.

³⁸ Bräker 1789. It was recently reissued by Werner Günther and appeared in Stuttgart, Reclam Press, 2010.

³⁹ Diezel 1841, 92.

⁴⁰ Today it is a very frequently visited museum.

ideas. Our hero was then a pensioner who was allowed to live in that fortress and who impressed the writer with his clear mind, very accurate memory and his cheerful heart.⁴¹

He began his story by acknowledging that desertion was a widespread phenomenon. 'If the desire for desertion were not so peculiar to that time in which I lived during my youth, I would say that it was handed down to me by my father.'⁴² His father, himself a soldier in the army of the Duchy of Württemberg, deserted when the Duke wanted to sell part of the regiment and served for many years in the army of Piedmont. Born as the son of a soldier in 1763, Johann Steininger had to become a soldier. He practiced playing the drums two hours a day and learned everything a drummer had to do. He had not taken the oath yet when he first deserted because he was only 16 at the time.⁴³

His desertion was caused by his strong desire to travel to see the world. On April 10, 1779 he tore all his military insignia off his clothes and left Turin for Württemberg, without telling his parents anything. The first day he went alone, and by the next day he was already heading to Switzerland, in the companionship of a French deserter. At night they received food and a place to sleep at a monastery on Mount Saint Bernhard. He parted ways with the deserter and set off for Freiburg, finding another fellow traveler. He pointed out that he had caused his parents great concern, so he suddenly decided to return home. He stayed overnight in the same places and managed to get into Turin unnoticed.⁴⁴ He spent one night in custody, was reinstated as a drummer, received a new uniform and took the oath. He was scorned and mocked for months by his comrades for voluntarily returning after he had made it all the way to Lausanne.⁴⁵

Because of this contempt, his stay in Turin became unbearable and he soon decided to flee again, along the same route, with two other soldiers. They walked about 7 hours on the first night. The next day they stayed hidden in a hemp field and only in the evening did they set off further. The peasants hosted them, fed them and showed them the way. He broke up with his comrades and believed that they were later caught by the peasants.⁴⁶ He crossed the border with the help of a Swiss shepherd, then was helped by a Swiss family after crossing the border into Switzerland.⁴⁷ After a little tangle in Bern, he continued with the help of very hospitable peasants on the road to the homeland of his parents.⁴⁸ There he enrolled in the army of Duke Carl after obtaining from the sovereign forgiveness for his father, who had deserted before his birth.⁴⁹

A few months before the expiration of the contract signed with the Duke of Württemberg, he signed a new contract. Receiving 9 florins, he ran to the pub, where two other soldiers convinced him to defect and flee to a nearby town, the purpose of which was to sign a new contract and receive other money. They were caught, but not hanged: they were given the punishment of running three times, every few days, between 300 soldiers

⁴¹ Diezel 1841, 14–15.

⁴² Diezel 1841, 17.

⁴³ Diezel 1841, 17–20.

⁴⁴ Diezel 1841, 21–22.

⁴⁵ Diezel 1841, 24.

⁴⁶ Diezel 1841, 25–30.

⁴⁷ Diezel 1841, 31–32.

⁴⁸ Diezel 1841, 35–37.

⁴⁹ Diezel 1841, 39–40.

armed with rods and had to stay in prison, with chains around their hands and feet, for two and a half years.⁵⁰

His adventures continued at this pace. Barely spared the rest of the punishment, he deserted again, being immediately recruited by the Austrians and receiving 36 talers.⁵¹ Sent to a unit that was in Belgium, he arrived first in Brussels, then in Namur. After two to three months, our hero, along with two others, again fled to Maastricht, where they were recruited by the Dutch. But even there he remained only from the end of 1787 until March 1788,⁵² when he fled, again accompanied by other soldiers,⁵³ managing to reach a village close to Maastricht, where they let themselves be recruited by the Prussians, who offered them more money.⁵⁴ He also fled from there, before reaching the regiment for which he had been recruited.⁵⁵ He set out for Stuttgart, but because his money had run out, he left again to be recruited for the Danish army, signing a ten-year contract and receiving 'the beautiful sum of 200 florins.'⁵⁶ This was the summer of 1788. He had not yet reached the Danish Regiment and was already harboring plans for desertion, when the King of Denmark decided to pay another 200 florins to those soldiers who would commit themselves for life: of the 22 new recruits, only three had the courage to make this commitment, including our hero. He admitted that he was not going to stay even the first 10 years. This time he deserted alone with the help of a girl, a servant at an inn, whom he had promised to marry but did not keep his promise.⁵⁷ Within a few weeks, he was recruited again by the Austrians near Mainz, receiving 36 Gulden. The Austrians needed soldiers for Joseph II's war with the Turks.⁵⁸ He was recruited by the Austrians a second time, and he would be employed by them once more.⁵⁹ Having cashed the money, he masterminded his escape from the house of recruits where they were put up.⁶⁰ In a few days he was again recruited for another regiment in Mannheim, where he remained for about four weeks. He also defected from here because, one evening, he went with several soldiers to a party and returned to the barracks too late, thus risking punishment. They fled to a neighboring locality, met with Austrian recruiters who needed soldiers, and were immediately hired. This time he reached Selin, at war with the Turks.⁶¹ Participating in that war, he fell ill with dysentery, as did tens of thousands of other soldiers in the Austrian camp near Belgrade. After the end of the campaign, in the period of peace which followed the death of Joseph II and the accession of Leopold II, the regiment was moved to Olomouc and he enjoyed the freedom that inspired his thought of desertion once again. He fled using a clever ruse, and after a few days of walking through Bavaria he was hired

⁵⁰ Diezel 1841, 49–54.

⁵¹ Diezel 1841, 55–57.

⁵² Diezel 1841, 58.

⁵³ Generally, soldiers deserted in very small groups of two or three or alone. Desertions in larger groups were considered plots.

⁵⁴ Diezel 1841, 59

⁵⁵ Diezel 1841, 61.

⁵⁶ Diezel 1841, 64.

⁵⁷ Diezel 1841, 64–65.

⁵⁸ Austria was involved between 1788–1790 in the Russo-Austro-Turkish War (1787–1792).

⁵⁹ Diezel 1841, 65–66.

⁶⁰ Diezel 1841, 66–67.

⁶¹ Diezel 1841, 68–69

by a new regiment of Bavarian grenadiers.⁶² He spent the winter of 1790–1791 in Munich, but when spring came, on March 1, he fled with two more comrades. Having managed to reach Tyrol, on the border with Italy, he was hired under a false name by a Piedmontese regiment, but, after many adventures,⁶³ he fled again⁶⁴ and enrolled himself, in Genua, for a regiment in Naples. He had no other choice, for he had already deserted so many times, from so many armies, that he risked being recognized. Arriving in Naples, he enrolled in a Swiss regiment, where he stayed for a couple of weeks. Then, getting acquainted with two compatriots from Württemberg, they decide to defect together. After a few days of walking, a large band of peasants chased them, they were overwhelmed and surrendered, and the local authorities sent them back to the Naples regiment.⁶⁵

Held in custody for two days, they were subjected to a summary investigation and sentenced to death. The regiment was taken out to the site of military drills, tables and chairs were put up for the prosecutor and for the court martial. He recounted simply and poignantly about the death sentence, about the excruciating wait for almost an hour, when the adjutant of the regiment went to the king for confirmation of the conviction, and about the time when each soldier had to roll the dice for his own life. The one who threw six points was pardoned. The only lucky one was our hero, the other two scored fewer points and were immediately shot. He admitted that the hardest moment of his life was when he said goodbye to the two of them.⁶⁶ He was then forced to stand next to the corpses of his comrades until all the soldiers of the regiment had paraded by, being thus offered a lesson.⁶⁷

Shortly after this dramatic moment, he escaped for the last time. Feeling drawn to France from his youth, he enlisted in its army, which he served faithfully for 20 years, from 1791 to 1811. He was a brave soldier, participated in the campaign against the rebels in Vendée, in Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt, was wounded and promoted, and then retired to his homeland, where he met the publicist Diezel, who laid out his adventures on paper.⁶⁸

Desertion from the Transylvanian regiments

At the beginning of Empress Maria Theresa's reign, only three regular infantry and eight Hussar regiments came from the Hungarian provinces.⁶⁹ The number of regiments recruited from Hungary was therefore small, compared to all of the Austrian troops – 119 regiments in 1728.⁷⁰ Maria Theresa's reign was linked to an increase in troops in the Hungarian provinces and the establishment of Transylvanian regiments. Infantry Regiment no. 31, called by contemporaries the Haller Regiment,⁷¹ was established in

⁶² Diezel 1841, 73–75.

⁶³ Diezel 1841, 81.

⁶⁴ Diezel 1841, 82–83.

⁶⁵ Diezel 1841, 84–85.

⁶⁶ Diezel 1841, 86–88.

⁶⁷ Diezel 1841, 88.

⁶⁸ Diezel 1841, 89–91.

⁶⁹ Alexich 1889, 120.

⁷⁰ Anger 1887, 939.

⁷¹ Count Samuel Haller von Hallerstein (?–1777), in 1757 Field Marshal-Lieutenant, in 1764 General of artillery, owner of the regiment between 1747–1777. See von Wrede 1898, 338.

Hungary in 1741, but became Transylvanian in the eighth decade, when it was assigned a new recruitment territory, around Sibiu.⁷² Infantry Regiment no. 51, the Gyulai Regiment,⁷³ organized in Hungary at the beginning of the century, was moved to Transylvania in 1741. At first, it was recruited throughout the province, but as of 1781 only from the north of it, the general staff being based in Cluj.⁷⁴ Infantry Regiment no. 62 was organized later, in 1798, from battalions taken from other regiments, including the two Transylvanian ones.⁷⁵ Hussar Regiment no. 2 was organized in the first years of Maria Theresa's reign.⁷⁶ The Border Guard troops were set up in the seventh decade.

It is evident that the demand for soldiers was higher than ever before, so it is not surprising that desertion was endemic. The Hungarian recruits, brought up in a spirit of great freedom and having a very developed sense of honor, loathed military discipline, which often made use of truncheon strikes, so desertions were a phenomenon common to all the regiments organized in the Hungarian provinces.⁷⁷

At the end of the War of Succession, Marshal Maximilian Count Browne (1705–1757) wrote to Empress Maria Theresa about the losses of his army in the Var camp, in the Nice area: 1046 soldiers died in hospitals, 1098 deserted, while the enemy lost only 134 dead, 91 wounded and 393 prisoners. From 30 November 1746 to 6 February 1747, the losses of Transylvanian Infantry Regiment no. 51 amounted to 7 dead, 2 wounded, 19 taken prisoner and 32 deserters, the number of deserters exceeding all other losses.⁷⁸ In 1759, the regiment lost 162 dead and 45 deserters. The regiment was at war with Prussia, being part of the Army Corps led by cavalry General Andreas Hadik (1710–1790).⁷⁹ By 1757 desertion had grown to such an extent that the Aulic War Council sent instructions to all regiments to limit the phenomenon.⁸⁰ In December 1761, severe orders were given to the garrison battalions of Transylvanian Infantry Regiments no. 31 and 51 to stop deserting.⁸¹

The patent issued by Maria Theresa of June 27, 1762 resumes earlier decisions to draconically punish not only defectors, but also those who aided them. Despite having been published, these laws had been ignored. Therefore, the patent imposed very severe punishments for those who supported deserters by word and deed: if someone convinced a soldier who had already taken the oath to defect or an already deserting soldier to join a foreign army, or if he opposed military detachments that pursued deserters and injured one of these pursuers, in these three cases that person could be punished by death, even if she was a woman. Hiding deserters or helping them to flee further after deserting, even just by showing them the way, was punishable by 10 years of hard labor; lesser sentences were passed if help was given outside the locality from which soldiers had deserted.

⁷² von Wrede 1898, 337.

⁷³ Count Franz Gyulai (1714–1787) Major General, owner of the regiment between 1759–1787. See von Wrede 1898, 471.

⁷⁴ von Wrede 1898, 470.

⁷⁵ von Wrede 1898, 543.

⁷⁶ von Wrede 1901, I, 237.

⁷⁷ Kirchtaler 1895, 8.

⁷⁸ Maendl 1897, 191.

⁷⁹ Maendl 1897, 252.

⁸⁰ Pillersdorf 1857, 118.

⁸¹ Maendl 1897, 273.

But all those who supported defectors had to be exposed for three days with an inscription hanging in plain sight, on which the crime could be read. Those people who recognized a defector and did not give him shelter, but also did not arrest him, could receive the following punishments: a fine of 24 or 40 florins, a three-day exposure with an inscription around the neck and three years of work for the public use. The patent provided harsh penalties also for blood relatives who helped the deserter to flee.⁸²

The severity of punishments was kept in balance by an attempt to recuperate the defectors through general amnesty, *General-Pardon*. Such amnesties were also granted on the occasion of a happy event in the imperial family. For instance, in 1751, an amnesty was granted to all deserters and arrested people, on the occasion of the birth of one of the Empress's children.⁸³ These amnesties were published periodically, especially after the great battles, and they benefited deserters who had become convinced that life as a fugitive was not easy at all. Historians consider them to be expressions of the powerlessness of the authorities to limit the phenomenon⁸⁴ and believe that their frequency encouraged desertion.⁸⁵

The Government of Transylvania issued, on the basis of the imperial decree of August 18, 1785, a decision regulating the compensation due to the state following the loss of a soldier by desertion. It acknowledged that desertion was higher in Hungarian regiments (including Transylvanian regiments) than in German regiments, and that a third of the fugitives returned to German regiments, while only a fifth were recovered in Hungarian regiments.⁸⁶ Confiscation of the assets of the deserter was not legislated in the Hungarian provinces; the state sought to compensate itself from the assets of the deserter, the amounts established being lower in Transylvania than in Hungary: 60 florins for infantrymen and double for those in the cavalry, who fled by horse. Only if they joined another army would their wealth be confiscated.⁸⁷

The lists of prosecuted defectors, published by the Transylvanian government and kept in the funds of the Cluj Branch of the Romanian Academy Library, provides precious clues about the sheer size of the phenomenon. These were soldiers from Transylvanian Regiments or from other regiments, but who deserted on Transylvanian territory. In the absence of images on ID cards and given the limited possibilities to centralize and track the movement of the population, the chances of the military institution to catch them were quite slim. As the book about Johann Steininger suggests, it was quite easy for a fugitive to get hold of forged papers with false names, and the fact that the shortage of soldiers was chronic everywhere and that deserters could immediately enlist in another army or regiment also increased the chance of their not being caught.

These notices are from 1788–1791, the years when the war with the Turks was under way. The most interesting is the list of the 24 soldiers who fled from the Reserve Division of the Splény Regiment⁸⁸ in 1788. Given that a campaign against the Turks

⁸² FV 109–111.

⁸³ Maendl 1897, 203–204.

⁸⁴ Burschel 1998, 81.

⁸⁵ Sikora 1998, 106.

⁸⁶ CRV 939, 1

⁸⁷ CRV 939, 2.

⁸⁸ Baron Gabriel Splény (1734–1818), Marshal Lieutenant from 1785, owner of the regiment from 1788–1818. See von Wrede 1898, 471.

caused so many desertions in a single regiment, the preparation phase of the war was most likely the time chosen by the fresh soldiers to defect.⁸⁹ The time and place of the desertion are not specified, and neither is the alleged cause. Only the name, age, place of birth, stature, appearance, uniform pieces and weapons with which the soldiers left are listed, as well as the languages that each deserter spoke. There are many soldiers with Romanian names from Hunedoara, Sibiu, Făgăraş and Alba Counties, plus several others from the Szekler area, probably Romanians, judging by their names and the fact that they spoke both languages (Romanian and Hungarian, Hungarian being written down before Romanian). 13 spoke only Romanian, 3 of them also spoke Gypsy, 8 spoke Hungarian and Romanian, and only one spoke Hungarian and a little Romanian.⁹⁰ Other lists of wanted defectors specify more details. For example, Private Joseph Franz Gröbl of Lower Austria, member of an artillery transport unit, deserted at about 5 a.m. on June 29, 1789, from the Gross-Prossdorf station⁹¹ in Transylvania. It is also stated that he was recruited in September 1787 and that he had not been a soldier until then.⁹² Some descriptions noted the profession and religion of the deserter, as in the case of the soldiers Iuon Pocular, from Cipăieni, Mureş County, and Gabor Pur, from Dumuslău (present-day Sălaj County). They also deserted from the Splény Regiment, but when and where they deserted is not specified.⁹³ The soldiers Simion Todora, originally from Albac, Alba County, and Iuon Mihaly, from Remetea, the same county, fled from the same regiment, from Cluj, on July 9, 1798. Both were of Orthodox faith and spoke only Romanian.⁹⁴ The Greek Catholic soldier Petru Szentpitrian from Cluj fled from the military hospital in Monora (Mănărade, near Blaj) on July 1, 1789. The following day there were more desertions: a soldier from the Belgioiso Infantry Regiment, in Kassel, and two Greek-Catholic Romanian soldiers from a transport troop, namely Costa Filip (20 years old) from Szászváros (Orăştie) and Nicola Pakolnay from Bogna⁹⁵ (33 years old).⁹⁶ At dawn, on August 18, 1789, three soldiers fled from the Splény Regiment, from an outpost company located in Sărăcineşti, on the border with Wallachia: Ştefan Moldovan, from Sânmihai, Cluj County, recruited in 1779, an experienced soldier; György Süth (Gheoghe Suciuc?) from Magyardécse (Cireşoia), Solnoc County, present-day Bistriţa-Năsăud County, recruited on December 10, 1787; Mihai Potra from Sebesvár (Bologa), Cluj County, a soldier since 1787.⁹⁷ The deserter Thoma Marcu, an adventurer, was hunted down in Alt Futtak, in southern Hungary, in December 1788.⁹⁸ He stated that he was born in Vienna, then changed his story to Sibiu. He spoke several languages (German, Latin, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian) and was a very cunning man.⁹⁹ Two other soldiers deserted during a march from Sibiu to Timişoara

⁸⁹ Kroll 2006, 563.

⁹⁰ FV 888.

⁹¹ Gross-Prossdorf is, most likely, Großprobstdorf, formerly Proştea Mare, today Târnava, Sibiu County.

⁹² FV 1028, 1

⁹³ FV 1022.

⁹⁴ FV 1030, 1.

⁹⁵ This was probably Bunea Mare, Făget village, Timiş County.

⁹⁶ FV 1030, 2–3.

⁹⁷ FV 1032, 4.

⁹⁸ This was O-Futtak, present-day Futak, in Serbia.

⁹⁹ FV 860

in October 1789.¹⁰⁰ In one case the reason for desertion was mentioned: the relationship with an immoral woman.¹⁰¹

While in 1788-91 defections could be caused by the misfortunes of a bloody war, like the one with the Ottoman Porte, 1780 was a year without military conflicts and yet 25 soldiers deserted from the Orosz Infantry Regiment, Regiment no. 31, in September.¹⁰² By December 1780, the authorities had recovered 21 of them, some having returned on their own. Almost all were soldiers. Only one private first class and two drummers were among the defectors, which confirms the conclusion of historian St. Kroll, that non-commissioned officers deserted rarely and officers extremely rarely. The investigation revealed that only 11 of the 25 had voluntarily enrolled as soldiers. The rest had been forcibly sent to the army by the local authorities. Of the 25 fugitives, 16 were Romanians, five Hungarians, three Saxons and one German. For most of them, that is, for 15 of them, this was not the first desertion, but the second or third. For one, this was the sixth desertion in five years, but he had returned of his own will.¹⁰³ Of the four deserting soldiers who were not found, two had deserted during furlough, the third was freshly recruited, and the fourth was described as being drunk.¹⁰⁴

It is obvious that the officers who investigated the case also had other sources of information besides the statements of the deserters. To establish the causes of the desertion, they learned about the vices they suffered from: they were drunkards, troublemakers, womanizers, thieves, etc. The investigators established several reasons for desertion. Immoral character was invoked in seven cases. Fear of punishment for a previously committed offense was another reason. The Hungarian soldier Johan Szücs, a volunteer in the army, got seriously drunk while in charge of the mail and deserted for fear of punishment, but was captured on the third day. Johan Eckhard stole money, and Onye Piszárul committed a theft. Both feared punishment. Three cited drunkenness as a cause, probably knowing it would be regarded as a mitigating circumstance, as Michael Sikora¹⁰⁵ has shown, and two others cited drunkenness and other reasons. Two soldiers fled because they were not allowed to go on vacation. Johan Muntyán was recruited voluntarily, but he did not like military service and suffered from depression, being 'dejected all the time,'¹⁰⁶ while Petrus Buna was brought into the regiment because he was a vagrant, but he did not want to be a soldier. In several other cases, desertion was attributed to indolence, while two soldiers claimed that they had been persuaded by others. Johan Molnár mentioned his financial debts as the reason. The lure or influence of women played a role in the desertion of at least two soldiers.¹⁰⁷

The punishments that were applied to them were quite varied. Those who had never deserted before and had willingly returned received light punishments.¹⁰⁸ Many of the

¹⁰⁰ FV 1102, 1-2

¹⁰¹ FV 1102, 1.

¹⁰² Horton 2016, 101.

¹⁰³ Horton 2016, 101-102.

¹⁰⁴ Horton 2016, 103.

¹⁰⁵ Sikora 1998, 100.

¹⁰⁶ Sikora 1998, 100.

¹⁰⁷ Horton 2016, 107.

¹⁰⁸ Horton 2016, 112.

caught soldiers who had also deserted previously were punished on several counts: for the act of desertion, for any other crimes they committed before or after desertion, as well as for their vices. Private Katona was on his second desertion and received the penalty of running the gauntlet four times. Johann Eckhardt was on his third desertion when he was caught. He had deserted for fear of punishment for the loss of 24 Gulden. Throughout his career, he collected an impressive list of punishments: twice punished with running the gauntlet for desertion, 30 truncheon strikes for selling his drum, standing guard as punishment for having been drunk and quarrelsome, and several truncheon strikes for 'delays' on duty. For the third defection he received 10 running the gauntlet laps.¹⁰⁹ The most interesting case was that of Johan Molnár, who was on his sixth desertion. He had volunteered in the army, but he was a drunkard, a thief, had debts and neglected his service.¹¹⁰ Unlike most, he had returned to the regiment of his own accord. He was punished with running the gauntlet three times, three truncheon strikes for desertion, and twenty-five truncheon strikes for his character flaws. He was incarcerated in the regiment's prison for a while for selling his trousers and intentionally breaking his sword.¹¹¹ As St. Kroll concluded, only very few deserters were executed.

Conclusions

Studying this phenomenon of desertion has enabled us to draw some brief conclusions. Desertion was the main cause of the abusive recruitment system, and many became soldiers against their will, being sent into the army by force. The conscripts were men who had broken the law, were undisciplined and irresponsible. The army was regarded as a correction institution, as a place where bad habits could be changed and discipline could be established. Even those who were hired under contract of their own will were sometimes lured by dishonest means, which means they had a reason for desertion.

Another important cause that significantly enhanced the phenomenon was alcoholism. It affected the armies of the time because it was responsible for some of the most serious violations of discipline. Many of the defections were staged in pubs. Other causes, no less significant, were the length and difficulty of military service, poor sanitary conditions, which made the chances of survival slim, and death, which was lurking everywhere. Moreover, the harsh corporal punishment that soldiers were threatened with led many to defect after committing a crime. Last but not least, some were driven by a great desire for adventure, the army providing an environment conducive to a life without responsibility, as the biography of the soldier who deserted 15 times shows.

¹⁰⁹ Horton 2016, 113.

¹¹⁰ Horton 2016, 205.

¹¹¹ Horton 2016, 111.

Bibliography

- Alexich 1889 H. Alexich, *Die freiwilligen Aufgebote aus den Ländern der ungarischen Krone im ertsen schlesischen Krieg* (I), MKA (N. F.), IV (1889), 113–193.
- Anger 1887 G. Anger, *Illustrierte Geschichte der k. k. Armee dargestellt in allgemeiner und specieller culturhistorischer Bedeutung von der Begründung und Entwicklung an bis heute*, vol. II, Wien 1887.
- Bariț 1874 G. Bariț, *Istoria regimentului al II-lea românescu*, Brașov 1874.
- Beinl 1804 A. J. Beinl, *Versuch einer militärischen Staatsarzneykunde in Rücksicht auf die kaiserliche königliche Armee*, Wien 1804.
- Bîrlea 2015 E. Bîrlea, *The Recruitment of Soldiers in the Habsburg Army in the 18th Century*, ActaMN, 52/II (2015), 90–105.
- Bräker 1789 U. Bräker, *Lebensgeschichte und natürliche Ebentheuer des Armen Mannes im Tockenburg*, Zürich 1789.
- Burschel 1998 P. Burschel, *Die Erfindung der Desertion. Strukturprobleme in deutschen Söldnerheeren des 17. Jahrhunderts*. In: U. Bröckling, M. Sikora (eds.), *Armeen und ihre Deserteure: vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit*, Göttingen 1998, 72–85.
- Cernovodeanu, Bușă 2005 P. Cernovodeanu, D. Bușă (eds.) *Călători străini despre Țările Române în secolul al XIX-lea*, New Series, Vol. II (1822–1830), București 2005.
- CRV + no. Colecția de carte veche românească, Biblioteca Academiei Române, Filiala Cluj.
- Diezel 1841 G. Diezel, *Leben und Abenteuer des Johann Steininger, ehemaligen herzoglich württembergischen und kaiserlich österreichischen soldaten von 1779–1790, späteren Tambour-maitres und Kanoniers unter der französischen Republik und dem Kaiserreich von 1791–1815, nachherigen königlich württembergischen Regiments-Tambours und jetzigen 79jährigen Invaliden auf Hohenasberg*, Stuttgart 1841.
- Fenner von Fenneberg 1847 F. D. Fenner von Fenneberg, *Oesterreich und seine Armee*, Leipzig 1847.
- FV + no. Colecția de foi volante, Biblioteca Academiei Române, Filiala Cluj.
- Göllner 1973 C. Göllner, *Regimentele grănicerești din Transilvania, 1764–1851*, București 1973.
- Horton 2016 J. M. Horton, *In Service of the State: Desertion, Discipline and Army Life in the Habsburg Monarchy 1753–1781*, Ph.D. Thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 2016.
- Kirchtaler 1895 L. Kirchtaler, *Geschichte des k. u. k. Infanterie-Regimentes Nr. 2 für immerwährende Zeiten Alexander I. Kaiser von Russland*, Viena 1895.

- Kroll 2006 S. Kroll, *Soldaten im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen Friedensalltag und Kriegserfahrung. Lebenswelten und Kultur in der kursächsische Armee 1728–1796*, Paderborn 2006.
- Pillersdorf 1857 A. F. Pillersdorf, *Das 57. Infanterie-Regiment Fürst Jablonowski und die Kriege seiner Zeit*, Wien 1857.
- Maendl 1897 M. Maendl, *Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 51*, vol. I (1702–1802), Klausenburg 1897.
- Sikora 1996 M. Sikora, *Disziplin und Desertion. Strukturprobleme militärischer Organisation im 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1996.
- Sikora 1998 M. Sikora, *Das 18. Jahrhundert. Die Zeit der Deserteure*. In: U. Bröckling, M. Sikora (eds.), *Armeen und ihre Deserteure: vernachlässigte Kapitel einer Militärgeschichte der Neuzeit*, Göttingen 1998.
- Steegmeyer 1801 F. Steegmeyer, *Bemerkungen über die Krankheiten, welche unter der Garnison zu Mantua während der Blockade von 30-ten May 1796 bis zum 3-ten Februar 1797 geherrscht haben*, Wien 1801.
- Stoica de Hațeg 1981 N. Stoica de Hațeg, *Cronica Banatului*, ed. by D. Mioc, Timișoara 1981.
- Tepperberg 1993a Chr. Tepperberg, *Räuber, Mörder, Deserteure. Fahnenflucht und Bandenkriminalität im Vormärz, dargestellt am Beispiel zweier Verbrechergruppen*, JbLkNÖ, 59 (1993), 197–223.
- Tepperberg 1993b Chr. Tepperberg, *Rechtsnormen zum 'Verbrechen der Desertion' in der k.k. Armee, vornehmlich für die Zeit des Vormärz*, MÖStA, 43 (1993), 94–113.
- Teutsch 1904 J. Teutsch, *Nachlese zu den kurzgefassten Jahrgeschichten von Ungarn und Siebenbürgen*. In: *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Brassó. IV. Chroniken und Tagebücher*, vol. I (1143–1867), Brassó 1904, 403–489.
- von Wrede 1898 A. von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht. Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol. I, Wien 1898.
- von Wrede 1901 A. von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht. Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*, vol. III/1, Wien 1901.

TWO YEARS ON THE GALICIAN FRONT (1914–1915). PAGES IN THE DIARY OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN OFFICER MARIAN POPU

OVIDIU MUNTEAN*

Abstract: Marian Popu was born in 1889 in the village of Diviciorii Mici in Solnoc-Dăbâca County and came from a Romanian family of intellectuals, his father being a teacher. He attended primary school in his native village and then attended secondary and high school in Gherla. After graduating from high school, in 1909 he enrolled in the ‘Ludovika’ Honvéd Military Academy in Budapest. Here he attended classes for three years and graduated in 1912, obtaining the rank of second lieutenant. Among his teachers there was also Lieutenant-Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, who would later be his regimental commander on the Galician front. In 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, Marian Popu was promoted to the rank of lieutenant major and was sent to the Galician front at the head of a subunit of the Honvéd Infantry Regiment no. 32 of Dej. In 1914–1915, the Romanian officer reached this front four times. Each time he fought on the front line. His memory recalls the grim reality of the war, the entry into the front line of battle, the marches, the cold, the terrible death of his comrades but also the periods of convalescence spent in the military hospitals of Vienna and Dej. Here he was treated three times due to illness, exhaustion and the fact that he was shot in the arm during the offensive of May 1915. After the stabilization of the front, in the fall of 1915, Lieutenant Marian Popu reached the front line on defensive fighting positions in a forest in the area of Bedrykivti, on the banks of the Tupa River. Here he remained until June 1916, when he was forced to retreat after the start of the offensive led by Russian General Alexei Brusilov.

Keywords: Transylvania, First World War, memoirs, Galician front, 32nd Honvéd Regiment in Dej

Rezumat: Marian Popu s-a născut în anul 1889 în satul Diviciorii Mici din comitatul Solnoc-Dăbâca și provenea dintr-o familie românească de intelectuali, tatăl său fiind învățător. Școala primară a făcut-o în satul natal iar apoi a urmat cursuri gimnaziale și liceale la Gherla. După absolvirea liceului, în anul 1909 s-a înscris la Academia militară de honvezi ‘Ludovika’ din Budapesta. Aici a urmat cursurile timp de trei ani și a absolvit în anul 1912, obținând gradul de sublocotenent. Printre profesorii săi de aici a fost și locotenent-colonelul Aurél Stromfeld, cel care mai apoi îi va fi comandant de regiment pe frontul din Galiția. În 1914, la izbucnirea Primului Război Mondial, Marian Popu a fost avansat la gradul de locotenent major și a fost trimis pe frontul din Galiția în fruntea unei subunități a Regimentului de infanterie nr. 32 honvezi din Dej. În anii 1914–1915, ofițerul român a ajuns de patru ori pe acest front, de fiecare dată în prima linie. Memoria sa reține realitatea sumbră a războiului, intrarea în prima linie de luptă, marșurile, frigul, moartea cumplită a camarazilor săi dar și perioadele de convalescență petrecute în spitalele militare din Viena și Dej. Aici a fost tratat de trei ori datorită îmbolnăvirii, epuizării și faptului că fost împușcat în braț în timpul ofensivei din mai 1915. După stabilizarea frontului, în toamna anului 1915, locotenentul Marian Popu va ajunge în prima linie pe poziții de luptă defensive într-o pădure din zona localității Bedrikiivți, pe malul râului Tupa. Aici va rămâne până în iunie 1916 când va fi nevoit să se retragă după declanșarea ofensivei conduse de generalul rus Alexei Brusilov.

* Ph.D., Museum curator, National Museum of Transylvanian History, Cluj-Napoca, email: ovidiu2505@yahoo.com.

Cuvinte cheie: Transilvania, Primul Război Mondial, memorialistică, frontul din Galiția, Regimentul 32 honvezi Dej

Among the Romanian soldiers from Transylvania who wrote about their personal saga during the years of the Great War, the figure of Lieutenant-major Marian Popu, author of memorialistic notes (some of which have been published lately), has caught our attention.¹ Individual memory as part of collective memory retained both ‘traumatic-type memories that caused negative emotions’ and ‘vivid memories,’ which reflect the actual experience of the positive event. The recollections recorded here underlie ‘autobiographical memory’ and are of great personal importance in that they involve strong emotions that persist for long periods of time.² Written in the form of handwritten notebooks and typed sheets, Marian Popu’s memoirs are part of a larger museum collection that also contains personal items, documents, photographs, study transcripts, diplomas, military patents and so on.

We will focus in this study on the memorialist notes written by Lieutenant-major Marian Popu, which recount the events in which the author took part from the outbreak of the war and his mobilization on the Galician front (1 August 1914) until the winter of 1915–1916, when the front stabilized after the massive withdrawal of the Tsarist armies, following the Austro-German Gorlice-Tarnów offensive (see Annex 1). In between these temporal landmarks, the pages written by the author recount his participation in the war and his direct experience on the Galician front line. As we will see, the Romanian officer was always in the front line of battle and marched towards those advanced positions with the troops under his command, except during the periods of convalescence spent in military hospitals, when he was ill or suffered from exhaustion (November and December 1915), or when he was shot in the arm and evacuated from the front (May 1915).

Marian Popu was born in the village of Diviciorii Mici, located near Gherla, on 19 September 1889 and was the youngest of a family of six children. His father, Vasile Popu, was a teacher at the confessional school in his native village, having been appointed to this position by the Greek-Catholic bishop Mihai Pavel (14 November 1876). A few years later, his father was elected a member of the Association of Greek-Catholic Teachers around Gherla, as evidenced by the diploma kept in the family archive (Fig. 1).

In the period 1895–1901, the student Marian Popu attended the primary school in Gherla. In 1901 he was admitted to the state high school in town, which he graduated in 1909 with a baccalaureate diploma (Fig. 2). In the same year he enrolled and, following an exam, he was admitted to the ‘Ludovika’ Honvéd Military Academy in Budapest. There he attended classes for three years with outstanding results, as can be seen in the annual graduation matriculations (Fig. 3–5). In August 1912 he graduated from military school, being promoted to second lieutenant at the graduation ceremony of the class 1912 of active officers (Fig. 6).

After graduating from school, he was initially assigned to the 23rd Honvéd Regiment, as part of the battalion deployed in Deva. Since four military units of Honvéd were

¹ Muntean 2018, 61–90.

² Ticu 2004, 11–13.

established in March 1913, including the 32nd Honvéd Regiment of Dej, he took advantage of this opportunity and asked to be transferred closer to home:

On 1 March 1913, 4 more Honvéd regiments were established in the following way: the 4th Battalion was taken from each regiment and 4 new regiments were formed. There were 28 Honvéd infantry regiments. The 29th and 30th Regiments were established in Budapest, the 21st Regiment in Veszprem and the 32nd Regiment in Dej. Since I was from Someș County, I asked to be moved to the 32nd Regiment in Dej. On March 1, I reported to the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment. The 2nd Battalion was in Bistrița, where I served as platoon commander until January 1, 1914 when I was moved by the regimental commander to the 1st Battalion in Dej. Here I was given command of the 2nd Company, [formerly] led by a captain who had passed the major exam and who was transferred to Bistrița as battalion commander. I also had command of the pioneer platoon and was a teacher at the reserve officer school, operating on the brigade in Dej – (32nd and 12th Honvéd Regiments).³

Thus, the new Infantry Regiment no. 32 of Dej had three battalions with recruitment areas in Dej, Bistrița and Zalău (Fig. 7). The Romanian officer recalled an episode from the summer of 1913, when, after the concentration maneuvers of the three battalions that made up the regiment, he helped to evacuate the residents of the town of Beclean, which had been flooded by the Someșul Mare River. During these manoeuvres, he was in danger of drowning after falling into the water from a life raft. His efforts to help the victims were later rewarded by the award of a diploma by the Ministry of War in Budapest (Fig. 8).

In August 1914, with the outbreak of war, Marian Popu was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-major,⁴ being initially appointed officer who had to assign reservists who were to be mobilized in the war (Fig. 9). In this capacity, for two weeks, he supplemented the regimental force and also contributed to the establishment of two independent battalions, one of which was sent to the Fortress of Przemyśl,⁵ while the other was put at the disposal of the Austrian Seventh Army that had begun to organize in Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Then, on 18 August 1914, Lieutenant-major Marian Popu received command of the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment and left by train from Dej for the Galician front. The assembly area of the entire Honvéd Regiment was the town of Staryi Sambir (Ukraine). Gradually, the subunits that had arrived here by train regrouped and set off to the first line.

In his memoirs, the Romanian officer recorded the total solar eclipse of 21 August 1914 as a harbinger of the misfortunes to follow. His first experience on the front, however, was to be a short one because, immediately after the eclipse, he fell ill with a kidney condition and was urgently sent to the Red Cross Hospital in Dej, where he was taken care

³ Biography of Colonel Popu Marianu, see: *Colecția MNIT*, no. C 3117/1, 9.

⁴ His rank corresponded to the rank class no. X in the hierarchy of senior officers. See Deák 2009, 31. During the period we have analyzed, Lieutenant-major Marian Popu was entrusted, each and every time, with the command of an infantry company.

⁵ Between August and September 1914, the city was the scene of terrible clashes between the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist armies. The fortress was completely encircled by the Russian military, bombed and subjected to a long siege until March 1915, when it was forced to surrender. See Tunstall 2016, 25–35.

of and began a recovery treatment. After healing, he remained at Dej on a two-week leave and then received an order to return to the front.

In mid-November 1914 he was mobilized a second time at the head of a marching battalion and sent by train to Krakow to refresh the regimental troops. He reached the front line, south of Krakow, in the area of the Polish town of Skawina. After a period of disorientation, he finally managed to find the advanced units of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment and, from the village of Wieliczka, he crossed the Vistula River to the north, coming into contact with the vanguard of the Tsarist troops. Tasked with capturing the Russian supply trains, the 3rd Company commanded by the Romanian officer immediately came under Russian artillery fire and began retreating and sheltering in trench lines, some of which had been abandoned by the Russians shortly before. During these fights, the losses of his unit began to grow. He was impressed by the sudden death of a corporal, right next to him, who was buried in the place where he died. This period marked him deeply because he knew from the beginning the sordid reality of war and faced all its horrors (death, cold, hunger, squalor, exhaustion) – which he described in his diary.

In the face of increasing pressure from the enemy, units of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment began withdrawing from the battle line between Plawowice and Myslawczyce. Some subunits surrendered en masse to the Russians, who gradually sneaked in between the trenches. From the command post of the regiment, located in the village of Hebdów, he received the order to ensure the tactical withdrawal of the regiment, since the Russian attack had led to the complete disorganization of the defense lines. In this moment of confusion, under the fire of the Russian infantry, the officer managed to escape in extremis from captivity with the help of a horse-drawn cart that moved the cannons. The confusion was now generalized and he witnessed the killing of the driver of this cart by an artillery shell. Gradually, all the subunits of the regiment were retreating, being replaced by fresh forces. Exhausted by the previous battles and marches, Lieutenant-major Marian Popu was evacuated from the front at the end of November 1914, being sent to the Reserve Hospital no. 1 in Vienna for rehabilitation.

After his recovery, on 17 December 1914 the Viennese doctors sent him home on a four-week leave, from 17 December 1914 to 13 January 1915, as shown in his discharge sheet from this hospital (Fig. 10).

This episode of convalescence, after discharge from the Viennese hospital, brought an end to the Romanian officer's first year of combat on the Galician front. Next, he remained in Dej for a period of four months, where he was assigned to the sedentary part of the regiment. Again, as an officer, he contributed to the rescue of people and materials from the waters that flooded the city of Dej.

But the incessant hostilities on the Galician front always imposed the need for trained soldiers to replace the many human losses. On 1 April 1915, Lieutenant-major Marian Popu received command of a marching company with which he began training and, two weeks later, left for the third time on the front (15 April 1915). Arriving with his subordinates in the village of Komarno, he was ordered to advance to the first line of battle. He was placed here in the 304th Honvéd Regiment, in the 1st Battalion, having the position of Commander of the 3rd Company. His unit was strategically placed between German

troops, in preparation for the great Austro-German Gorlice-Tarnów offensive that began on 1 May 1915.⁶

In this context, the fighting began. First, there were scattered attacks and then the troops advanced in pursuit of the retreating Russians. The horrors of war could be encountered at every turn and the Romanian officer recalled the corpses of soldiers who were seen between the lines once the snow had melted in the mountains. To his surprise, he met Romanian soldiers from Bessarabia, who were part of the Russian army, in front of his line, in the midst of an attack. The night time attempt of the company commanded by Marian Popu to break through the barbed wire line and the obstacles placed in the territory that separated the lines from the trenches, was immediately discovered by these Romanian soldiers enlisted in the Tsarist army. The scene that followed was truly astounding. From their own shelters, the Bessarabian soldiers called out to them in Romanian, saying that they knew of his intention to attack and his strategy once these obstacles were removed. In the end, the fighting position was conquered and the Romanian officer remembered that the trenches deserted in a hurry by the Russians were full of corpses and that he managed to find 'warm food and bread' there.

He recalled that after crossing the Dniester, they pursued the Russians towards the city of Drohobych where, in retreat, the Russians had burned the existing oil fields and 'black smoke covered all the surrounding heights.' After the conquest of this locality, his unit advanced with great losses in the direction of Stebnik-Stryi. The Romanian officer noted that now the 304th Honvéd Regiment was almost decimated, having only two companies of 160 men each, a battalion command group and two machine guns. However, he was ordered to advance into a forest up to 5 m from the enemy's defensive line. The strong counterattack of the Russian soldiers surprised the other company on the right flank, Lieutenant Nader's company, which began to surrender *en masse*. Faced with this situation, his company retreated to new positions in order not to fall into captivity.

On 29 May 1915, during this retreat, Marian Popu was shot in the arm. Immediately he was given first aid by the combat medics in Ulicine village, then he was evacuated from the front through the hospital station 'Diaconissa' in Debrecen and arrived again at the Red Cross Hospital in Dej, where he was cared for. He recalled at the end of this episode that his former unit (304th Regiment of the 51st Honvéd Division) was completely decimated in the course of the fighting and was never re-established.

Thus, the Romanian officer would spend the first two months of the summer of 1915 in convalescence at Dej. After the wound began to heal, in early August 1915, he was ordered to leave for the front for the fourth time. This time, he was sent to Zalishchyky, a settlement on the bank of the Dniester River, not far from the front line, and was appointed commander of the 3rd Company belonging to the 5th Battalion of the 20th Honvéd Regiment (Fig. 11). At Dej, before leaving for the front, he also recorded the visit of his mother in his memoirs (5 August 1915).

In the first two weeks of September 1915, the unit led by Marian Popu carried out a general attack on the Russian troops, departing from Zalishchyky. The pursuit of the retreating Russian troops lasted throughout this period, across the Dniester River line, and was carried out on a broad front with numerous losses among officers and soldiers.

⁶ See Stratz 1933, 141–147.

In mid-September 1915 the death of a battalion commander (Captain Vaskó) was recorded and the numerous counterattacks of the Tsarist troops caused a retreat of the Austro-Hungarian troops in Zalishchyky, the village from which the attack had begun 12 days before. Soon, his battalion led by Captain Hutiray was replaced by fresh troops from the 305th Honvéd Regiment and, consequently, a well-deserved rest and recovery period in Chisălău was granted to the company commanded by the Romanian officer.

For his 'brave conduct' during these battles from 2 to 14 September 1915, the Romanian officer was awarded the bronze *Signus Laudis* medal. This distinction was bestowed upon him, in a solemn setting, on 20 October 1915, after returning, as we will see, to the front line in the fortified battle positions in Doroshow Forest (Fig. 12).

Marian Popu mentioned next the air attack in the afternoon of 24 September 1915, when Russian military planes bombed the positions of his company located west of the Dniester, and the fact that Bulgaria joined the Central Powers (28 September/11 October 1915).⁷

Basically, after these battles, a new stage of hostilities on the Galician front was entered, from a tactical point of view, that of the war of positions. The front stabilized towards the end of September 1915.

After a period of convalescence of about a month, on 13 October 1915 the company commanded by Lieutenant-major Marian Popu was sent back to the front line, in the area of Bedrykivti, with the aim of replacing a Czech military unit. Therefore, his unit took over and had to defend and strengthen a 400 meters long front in Doroshow Forest, on the bank of the Tupa River. The distance to the trenches built by the Tsarist troops was about 1 km and both sides, facing each other, began a war of attrition and at the same time a long process of building and strengthening the fortifications, which lasted until June 1916:

We were 1,500 steps away from the Russian line. We began to improve the position and build the 10 m line and the 500 m line at the back of the front. I formed two teams of 8 men to handle the two mine-throwers and two teams of 40 men to handle the flamethrower. In the 10 m line (from the first line) we built shelters for people to rest. Here we also built shelters against artillery bombardment at a depth of 7 m below the ground. In front of the position, on the entire front of the brigade, a band of obstacles made of barbed wire was built, and in the middle of this band was placed an obstacle in which high-voltage electric current was circulating. We prepared for the stabilization war by improving and completing the position. This operation [ran] from October 1915 until June 1916, when Brussilov's offensive, the Russian offensive,⁸ was launched. Here we faced sporadic attacks all the time.⁹

⁷ Preda 2019, 23.

⁸ The offensive led by Russian General Alexei Brusilov was carried out on the Eastern Front, from the Baltic Sea to the northern border of Romania. It penetrated more than 100 km into the enemy dispositive. Soon, because of lack of reserves, armament and ammunition this offensive died out, causing the counteroffensive of the Central Powers. See Preda 2019, 43.

⁹ Biography of Colonel Popu Marianu, see: Colecția MNIT, no. C 3117/1, 20. All the quotations and transcriptions in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

In this situation, the constant concern for both sides was to strengthen and maintain their strategic defensive positions in Doroshow Forest. In order to prevent a surprise attack, the construction of underground shelters for the protection of front-line troops, especially necessary in the event of a massive bombardment with heavy artillery, began at the same time. In this regard, the author recalled that he himself had detonated with explosives a ruined building in front of his line, a building that could have provided a strategic base in the event of a surprise attack by the Russians. In the conditions of the war of positions, the strategic situation gradually worsened. The opponents were not the Russian troops, but the cold and winter that had set in everywhere in November 1915. The large amount of snow that had fallen had covered the forward surveillance posts and clogged the trenches, making it necessary to periodically remove the snow with shovels and store it in front of the parapets.

The practicality and inventiveness in the construction of defensive fortifications in the forest in the sector commanded by the Romanian officer, as well as the fact that he was highly appreciated by his superiors, aroused the envy of the other company commanders. Convinced of this, Lieutenant Marian Popu tells us in his diary of a conflict he had with his Hungarian counterpart, Lieutenant Tükö.

During the period when Marian Popu was on leave in Dej, he was permanently replaced at the command of the company by Lt. Tükö. Therefore, to his surprise, the Romanian officer was moved to another company, in a sector of the front line that was totally neglected from a strategic point of view. An inventive spirit, the Romanian officer also carried out at his new strategic location works of fortification, camouflage and reinforcement of the parapets with braided twigs, and his activity was appreciated on several occasions by the senior officers and even by the commander of the 51st Honvéd Division, Colonel Béla Bekesi.

The simmering conflict with the Hungarian officer broke out one evening at the mess where the officers were dining. Lieutenant Tükö threatened the Romanian officer with a denunciation that would have damaged his career, telling him that he knew for sure that Lieutenant-major Popu had offended and insulted a Hungarian soldier from his former company with the words: 'Freeze, Hungarian dog!' This had allegedly happened during an inspection in the trenches, when that soldier greeted the Romanian officer with his hands in his pockets.

The Romanian officer denied this accusation and, moreover, came out to the report of the regimental commander (at that time, this was Lieutenant-Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, his former teacher from the period of military studies at the 'Ludovika' Academy in Budapest), demanding that he punish Lieutenant Tükö for slanderous allegations that could not be proved. In order to clear his name, he then also addressed the War Council of the 51st Honvéd Division and was interrogated on this matter. During the interrogation, he again denied the allegations and replied that Lieutenant Tükö hated him first of all because he was Romanian¹⁰ and stated that he was more highly regarded and appreciated by his superiors. After several terms, the disciplinary investigation ended with the indictment of

¹⁰ It should be noted that in addition to the horrors of war, Romanian soldiers on the front also faced the humiliating treatment of Hungarian officers. In February 1915, an order of the Ministry of War was issued. According to it, officers were to instruct soldiers 'to say that they are Hungarian citizens with Wallachian lips.'

Lieutenant Popu. This episode was not recorded in his documents and did not affect his military career. He was later promoted to captain at the end of 1917.¹¹

At the end of this part of the diary, the author recounts two other events on the front that caught his attention. First of all, he notes the meeting with Lieutenant-Colonel Alexandru D. Sturdza,¹² who came to visit the front in Zalışchyky, in the sector of his company in Doroshow Forest. In the diary, the author writes that in March 1916, he was sent by the Great General Staff of the Romanian Army to ‘ascertain our (Austrian) situation in the field.’ Moreover, for this unusual visit he was ordered to put on the front line of the Zalışchyky front Romanian military who had been decorated for deeds of valor, precisely to make a favorable impression on him. After visiting the fortifications and shelters on the front line, on his departure, Colonel Sturdza addressed him in Romanian with the words: ‘See you again, who knows where?’ Marian Popu noted in the pages of his diary that this visit of the Romanian military delegation was a good opportunity to gather information on the training and equipment of the Austrian army because, just five months later, Romania was to declare war on Austria-Hungary (14/27 August 1916).

The second significant episode that caught his attention and is recorded in the diary is a very special one. It concerns the voluntary cessation of hostilities during the Easter period of 1916, in the front sector where the company of Marian Popu was also located. This type of fraternization during the great Christian holidays was also recorded in writing by the French, English and German soldiers in the trenches on the Western Front, especially in the early years of the war.¹³

He recalled that the initiative for this action belonged to the commander of the Tsarist troops fighting in the front line. At Easter time, he sent a large cake to Lieutenant-Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, commander of the Honvéd Regiment. The latter immediately responded to the call made by the Russians, came out of the trenches and walked between the lines along with other officers of his general staff, including Marian Popu. The Russian commanders also came here and congratulated each other on the occasion of Easter, and most likely they were followed by other military from both warring sides. This unusual meeting, the fraternization of former enemies and the short period of peace in *no man’s land* was animated by a music orchestra, which played until the two barrels of beer brought here for this purpose were over. Then the soldiers from each camp returned to their own trenches with the promise that during this period of Easter holidays they would not shoot at each other and there would be silence. The Romanian officer also recalled that the command of the 51st Honvéd Division immediately sent the order by telephone to end this meeting, but the regimental commander, Aurél Stromfeld, calmly replied that nothing would happen during it.

Therefore, in the text contained in the documentary annex below, Lieutenant Marian Popu presents himself as a character directly involved in the Great War, as an

The same order prohibited the wearing of the tricolor cockade, the intoning of national songs and the use of the Romanian language. It imposed the exclusive use of the Hungarian language. See Șerban 1999, 211.

¹¹ See the Transcript regarding the military activity of Officer Marian Popu, Colecția MNIT, no. C 3116.

¹² Later known as ‘the traitor Colonel Sturdza’ after his defection from the Romanian Army and his joining the enemy forces (16 February 1917). See Hațieganu 1929, 11.

¹³ See Ferro et alii 2005. Such testimonies of fraternization on the occasion of Christmas in 1914 were also the basis for the production of the artistic film *Joyeux Noël*, directed by Christian Carion (2005).

officer of the Austro-Hungarian army, obviously concerned with recording in writing his personal experience,¹⁴ an experience accumulated during the war years. He recorded here a complete chapter of history lived for many years, a page in the history of the Great War, in the trenches of which many Romanian soldiers from Transylvania fought.¹⁵

In view of this, we considered that removing the life and activity of the Romanian officer from anonymity and oblivion was necessary. This process was carried out through an intellectual effort carried out in two directions. On the one hand, our efforts were aimed at displaying in an exhibition for the public the museum objects from the Marian Popu collection and at reconstructing, with their help, the moments and sequences of life he experienced on the battle fronts. In this regard, we organized the temporary exhibition *Remembering the Great War. 1914–2014* which was accompanied by a bilingual catalog in which museum objects from the collection of the Romanian officer were also published.¹⁶ Opened at the museum's headquarters on 27 June 2014, the exhibition was subsequently itinerated to other museums in the country. It is worth remembering here that this thematic exhibition was also opened in the city of Dej,¹⁷ the place where our hero was hospitalized several times after returning from the front and spent more than four years in the military garrison of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment (Fig. 13).

On the other hand, in editorial terms, by publishing the original memorialistic notes of the Romanian officer in two parts we had in mind the completion of his war journey that spanned a period of more than five years, starting from the moment of his departure to the Galician front (18 August 1914) until the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Hungary in the autumn of 1919. In essence, the autobiographical and memorialistic notes, written in the heat of the moment or later, represent a form of perpetuation and transmission of the memory of the war, lived intensely in the front line of battle. The cultural background of the author is reflected in the quality of his written discourse and in the perspective of his narrative on the war. He brings us details about the sufferings and hardships he had to endure: the long-term separation from his family, the increasingly precarious food and hygiene conditions of the front line, the reality of the squalid conditions in the trenches, the attempts to occupy the positions of the enemy, the cold, the hunger, the ever-present danger of death, the injuries sustained, and the experience in the military hospitals where he was treated, etc. Thus, reading this text, the reader has before his eyes an exercise in living memory regarding an exceptional event that decisively marked the destiny of an entire generation.

¹⁴ See Radosav 2014, 5–54.

¹⁵ In human terms, between August 1914 and November 1918, Transylvania provided 926500 soldiers and officers on the battlefield. Relative to the population of the province of about 5.6 million inhabitants (according to the 1910 census), the percentage of those who directly participated in military operations was 16.5%. Compared to the total number of soldiers mobilized from Transylvania, Romanians represented over 52%, with 484374 soldiers sent to the front. The Romanian military was assigned to 12-line regiments (2 Braşov, 31 Sibiu, 33 Arad, 37 Oradea, 5 Satu Mare, 43 Caransebeş, 50 Alba Iulia, 51 Cluj, 61 Timişoara, 62 Târgu-Mureş, 63 Bistriţa and 64 Orăştie) and 6 Honvéd regiments (21 Cluj, 22 Târgu-Mureş, 23 Sibiu, 4 Oradea, 12 Satu Mare and 32 Dej Regiment respectively). See Maior 2004, 178; Şerban 1999, 206. From that point of view, Lieutenant-major Marian Popu recalled in his notes that he trained soldiers four times and then went to the Galician front at the head of marching subunits, necessary to complete the troops after so many human losses (August 1914, November 1914, April 1915 and August 1915 respectively).

¹⁶ Muntean, Mitu 2014, 42–49, 74–76, 79, 84–85.

¹⁷ The exhibition commemorating the Great War (1914–1918) and Dej personalities, opened at the Dej Municipal Museum – Dej Military Circle on 22 September 2016.

ANNEX I

The biography of Colonel Popu Marian [1914–1915], Cluj, 1945

*

On 1 August 1914, the general mobilization was decreed. I was assigned as company commander to the 3rd Company. Captain Hollo was commander of the 1st Company. Captain Boroş – of the 2nd Company. Lieutenant Kertesz – of the 4th Company. Thus framed, the 1st Battalion and the staff of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment boarded a military train at the Dej station on 18 August, and I left for the regiment's assembly area, in Stary-Sambor,¹⁸ where I disembarked and continued the march on foot north to the Pnekut village. On 19 August the 2nd Battalion arrived here.

The 2nd Battalion was not informed of the arrival of the 1st Battalion, which was stationed in the same village on the night of 18 to 19 August. On the 20th, the signaling teams of that Battalion trained in the surrounding hills. At one of these signal posts, observers from the 1st Battalion read the following signaled telegram: 'The first division of enemy cavalry, marching south approaching.' Seeing these telegrams, the 1st Battalion believed them to be true, became alarmed and sent infantry patrols to the ridges of the hills leading north.

The next day there was a solar eclipse that darkened the sun for a few minutes.

As I was suffering from cystitis, I was sent to the Red Cross Hospital in Dej on the same day, from where I received a leave of 14 days after the cessation of treatment. After the expiration of my furlough, I went to Dej to the sedentary part of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment to which I belonged. I was assigned warehouse company commander at the 2nd Company and I operated until 15 November 1914.

On 15 November, I was appointed commander of a marching battalion, which I led to refresh the 32nd Honvéd Regiment, on the Dej-Budapest railway, on the line to Krakow in Silesia, where the Russians had contact with our troops.

Arriving at Skavina station,¹⁹ south of Krakow, I disembarked and the stage commanders could not tell me where the 32nd Honvéd Regiment was. They told me to follow the cannon sounds, to the East.

I learned that in the neighboring village there was a unit of telegraphists of a command corps. I went with the battalion there and asked the team commander to send a telegram to the Krakow Fortress command, asking for orders. After a few hours I presented myself to find out the answer, but the detachment of telegraphists had left.

I was disoriented. The next day I returned with the battalion to Skavina, where I had landed. I found a supply depot, requisitioned 5 carts that we loaded with supplies, and headed east on the road with the battalion. Arriving in the town of Wielicka,²⁰ I met the 32nd Honvéd Regiment supply officer, who had come for supplies to this town. Appreciating that the food brought by me was enough for a small regiment, I continued on my way to Russian territory, crossing the Vistula River on the improvised military bridge.

¹⁸ Today the village of Staryi Sambir, Ukraine.

¹⁹ Today the city of Skawina, Poland.

²⁰ Today Wieliczka, Poland.

We arrived in the evening at a farm north of the Vistula where we found the command of the brigade, the military commander Tanarky and the commander of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment, [Lieutenant-Colonel] Szent-György.

I was ordered to stay overnight on the farm because the next day the soldiers were to be assigned to subunits, supplementing the regimental troops. The next morning, when the sun had not yet risen, I found that the command of the brigade and the small troop had left without notifying me. I straddled my horse and rode alone in an eastward direction, listening to the noise made by the departed brigade. I ordered the battalion's alarm and went after the brigade, which I found resting in a forest. I also spent the night in that forest. The next morning, we were assigned to the 32nd Honvéd Regiment. The soldiers were brought by me for refreshment (the marching battalion) and I was appointed commander of the 3rd Company.

We were about to set off marching north. The brigade filed to the north and two 15 cm long barrel guns (old type) were attached to an artillery regiment.

In the afternoon of the same day, while we were marching, we were called by the company commanders to the head of the column of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment, where we were told that the brigade had a special mission to capture the supply trains of the Russian units retreating to the north, and that we should encourage the people to keep marching.

It was a Saturday afternoon. Our artillery patrols began to circulate looking for good places to place the artillery. In front of us was a ridge, and when I appeared with my company here, the Russian artillery started shooting at us. On the north slope of the ridge there was a village in which, advancing, I entered with my company. At that time, the Russian infantry began to fire. I was struck by the fact that next to me was a corporal who was hit in the chest by the bullet and whom I buried there. We were ordered to advance into battle formation. We deployed the company and moved forward. I found a 6 m wide creek with a fast and deep water over which I could not pass.

We found a bridge that connected the village of Plavevica²¹ with the village of Mysta-Cica²² which we crossed and advanced, but we had no connection, either on the right or on the left, with the other companies left behind. Beyond the creek we came across some Russian-dug ditches. The evening had set. I stopped by this ditch with the company and sent a platoon back to the battalion commander to tell him to cross the Szrenina stream on the bridge that we had also crossed and to come to our company, because the bridge was defended with machine guns by the Russians and could not be crossed during daytime.

The battalion commander, Captain Jurenak, came to my command post the next day, on Sunday morning, where we stayed for 6 days, day and night, at 100 m to 500 m from the Russian line.

We were supplied around 1–3 o'clock at night. It was November, cold, the ground was frozen. One bread and boiled frozen meat for every 10 people.

On the sixth day of standing on that line, face to face with the enemy, at about 8 in the evening, while I was in a shelter with the battalion commander, there was heavy gunfire in our line of battle. I went to the company command post, and the battalion commander, Captain Jurenak, accompanied by a platoon, left me alone in line with my company, the

²¹ Today Plawowice, Poland

²² Today Myslawczyce, Poland.

3rd Company. I had the rank of lieutenant and had two machine guns in the company sector, commanded by Second Lieutenant Tery Kalman, and the 4th Company, the former reserve of the battalion under the command of Second Lieutenant Kertes.

Now I had to make a decision since I was the oldest officer of the three. I consulted with them: what was to be done? We came to the conclusion that we would retreat, under the guise of darkness, crossing the only bridge there was. During this time a noise was heard from the line on the left flank of the company. I sent Second Lieutenant Kertes, with the 4th Company, to ascertain what had happened since there had been no Russian penetration in my company line.

After half an hour of unrest, Second Lieutenant Kertes returned with the company, bringing 80 Russian prisoners with him. I formed the column of the two companies, the two machine guns, and the 80 Russians, whom I divided between the companies, entrusting them with the boxes of machine gun cartridges and, without noise, we crossed the bridge over the river between the two villages. It was around midnight and we headed in the direction we'd come from six days before. On the southern slope we encountered a line of shooters consisting of troops of Austrian hunters who were stationed there to support our retreat. After a march of about 6–10 km that night, I found my 32nd infantry rgt. I presented myself to the regimental commander, handed over the prisoners, after which I entered the farm where the rgt was, in the stables, with the soldiers to rest. After the 3 hours of rest, I received an order from the regimental commander to form the regiment reserve with the company at a point on the road, in front of Hebdov village.²³ The command post of the regiment was located in this village. That same afternoon, at about 15 o'clock, the regimental commander and the adjutant came to my command post. After half an hour of conversation, we were surprised by a projectile (shrapnel) fired by the Russians that hit the adjutant's ordinance, breaking his arms. The regimental commander and the adjutant left, and I stayed with the company. After it got dark, the regimental commander gave me an order to leave by taking a specific road, going out into the village to the north, walking on high ground and filling a gap of about 3 km, the gap between the 3rd and 2nd Battalions, to prevent the Russians from penetrating into this gap.

I was told that there was the master sergeant Gavriş from the pioneer platoon who has barbed wire and poles (I should note that the earth was frozen).

Leading the company up, I saw two combat medics climbing down with a stretcher on which they brought from the line Lieutenant Szirti (with a lung wound), who had been the commander of the 2nd Battalion. I moved forward and heard a noise and shouted, 'Who is there?' and master sergeant Gavriş answered me. I asked him what he was doing there, and he said he was sheltering Second Lieutenant Ady, commander of the 3rd Battalion. He also told me that he had no wire or poles to help him build the obstacle. Then we continued moving through the darkness, it was cold and everyone had straw in the tent sheet, so that when we stopped, we could place them under our feet.

Advancing through the darkness, I met a second lieutenant of the regiment who asked me for some men, saying he had no soldiers. I gave him 10 soldiers from my company to help cover the gap, so as to prevent the Russians breaking through during the night.

²³ Today Hebdów, Poland.

We continued our way through the darkness and came across the command post of the 1st Battalion, the commander being Captain Jurenak. I introduced myself to him and he gave me orders to place the men in some existing shelters to keep the soldiers away from the cold. At the crack of dawn, I went to the command post, to Captain Jurenak, and requested an order. He told me we were withdrawing, and that I and my company should be backing the withdrawal. I reported that this task was too difficult for me since I did not know the tactical situation and he appointed another one, sending me back. At the northern exit of the village, I found the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Szent-György, who asked me if the others were retreating. I answered yes. The sun was up. The regimental commander ordered me to advance with the company on a ridge to the north, where I found the commander of the 1st Battalion, Captain Jurenak.

We fought back the enemy and formed a battalion reserve of 25 men from the company. I and the battalion commander sat in a makeshift shelter covered with a plank door and a thin layer of earth. Around 9 o'clock the Russians started firing artillery on our line and the shooting lasted until 15 o'clock. At this time a corporal came to the command post and reported to the battalion commander that some of our soldiers were surrendering to the Russians on the left flank of the battalion.

Then we retreated in order not to fall into captivity. In the valley behind us, our artillery was harnessing horses because the Russians had appeared on the ridge and were firing at the artillery. I managed to get hold of the barrel of a cannon and crawled about 400 m on foot until I reached the ridge back. There was a commotion in the artillery because of a bad road. I left the cannon barrel and climbed on the auto-cannon, next to the horse's leader. At that moment an infantry projectile hit the conductor on the middle horse of the cannon, which fell to the ground. We continued our retreat until we escaped from enemy action.

I do not know to what extent the troops withdrew, since I was exhausted by the previous battles and marches, the first in my career, and I was evacuated to Vienna. Those battles lasted from 13 November to 26 November 1914. On 28 November I arrived in Vienna, where I was admitted to the Reserve Hospital no. 1. On 17 December, I obtained a leave from this hospital until 15 January 1915.

From 14 January to 31 March 1915, I served as a pioneer officer of the 32nd rgt. P.S. (sedentary part) in Dej. During this period, we worked to save people and materials when the Someş flooded the city of Dej.

Between 1 and 15 April 1915, I was in command of a marching company which I trained. On 15 April I left with the company to the Beskitez front in the Eastern Carpathians via the Alşo-Veretzke point. I had at my disposal five carts with effects and supplies that I had to hand over to the units on the front.

At Alşo-Veretzke I handed over the carts drawn by horses to a German command and I divided the effects and supplies to the people, since I had no road I could take with the carriages across the Carpathians, except by following narrow paths. The supply of the infantry division where I had to report was east of the Carpathians and was supplied by 800 Russian prisoners.

On the same day, in the evening, we arrived in the Comarno²⁴ village, where we found the command of the Honvéd division. I reported to the Chief of Staff, who ordered

²⁴ Today Komarno, Ukraine.

me to continue my journey through the night to the front line. I did not leave, I stayed in the village, I sheltered the soldiers in the houses of the people and in the stables and, the next morning, I went to the front where I found the 304th Honvéd Regiment in the front line, with Lt. Colonel Företer. I was assigned to the 2nd Battalion as commander of the 3rd Company.

Here we were flanked by the Germans, alternating one Honvéd battalion and one German battalion. The first line, where I was with the company, passed on the north side of a forest where a stream flowed. Between the lines there were corpses and the snow had melted. The fighting started, the Russians were on the ridge and we were down on the edge of the forest. At night we would send a platoon to the obstacles of the Russians that were made of barbed-wire *chevaux de frise* and made shelter in front of these obstacles in order to storm the Russian position from this ditch, breaking through their obstacles before that. In the morning we retreated to our line. Our intention to attack the Russians was also learned from some of our soldiers who defected to them. The Russian soldiers – Moldovan soldiers from Bessarabia – shouted in Romanian: ‘We know what you want! To tie our *chevaux de frise* with barbed wire, pull them to make a breach and attack us!’ We kept standing in front of each other, firing our guns, both we and the others.

One day, in the morning, I received orders from the battalion commander to attack the enemy position at about 15 o’clock, because my company was the pivot of the brigade and the brigade would also attack at the same time. I asked the battalion commander to postpone the attack until the next morning because I planned to go with the company in front of enemy obstacles, and in the morning to attack from there. The commander disagreed. At 15 o’clock we came out with the company from the line and set off on the attack. The enemy also fired from the front and from the right flank, so the attack was unsuccessful and the company lost two platoon commanders and fifteen men. The company stopped. The next morning, at dawn, making a reconnaissance, we found that the Russians had withdrawn from position, from the ridge. I and the company continued to advance, going down a slow slope and crossing over a small valley. I was received with infantry fire from the next ridge: Weltza hill.

The infantry fired, as we found out, on command. One shot followed by a volley, at frequent intervals. We passed with the company through the enemy fire band, without losses, climbing the slope towards the enemy. To the right, next to my company, was a German battalion. We continued our advance down a long slope towards the enemy, who received a few of our cannon shots. As we advanced, on the long slope, we made only one stop. The Germans were far behind us, they advanced very slowly. Arriving with the company near the ridge, we found in front of the ridge ditches that had been very recently abandoned by the Russians. They’d left behind a few dead, warm food and bread. After the reorganization of the company, we advanced in the same direction, overtaking our neighboring troops by about 3 km.

We continued to advance in the direction indicated by my commanders and leaving the village of Drohobicz on the left, we bypassed it to the right, arriving in the village of Stebnik. South of this village, in front of a railway where there was a canton, we stopped in front of the enemy we found there. In the meantime, the rest of the battalion that Captain Szabo commanded had arrived. After 3–4 days of facing the enemy and, of

course, exchanging rifle and machine gun fire, the battalion commander gave me orders to attack in an afternoon. I asked him to accept postponing the attack until the next morning, because during the night we could approach the enemy without loss. He refused it. He said that he personally wanted to fire machine guns at the enemy over our troops. The land had no shelters. We started the attack and, in half an hour, we had 9 dead and 11 wounded in the company. The result was the loss of human lives.

The next day other troops took over and we also took the positions of other troops to the right. Cholera vaccinations were made here. Three days later, the 304th Honvéd Regiment to which we belonged took over. We went into action in a forest south of the town of Stryi. The regiment was decimated. The commander was a major. The battalion commander was Captain Szabo. The regiment had only two companies, for lack of troops, with 160 men each. In the battalion there were two machine guns and the General Staff. It was my company, Lieutenant Popu Marian, and the company of Reserve Lieutenant Nadler, of German origin. This advance of ours in the Carpathians was the result of the Austro-Hungarian armies' breach of the Russian front at 'Gorlicze' and the Russians retreated east into Galicia. We found ourselves with the 304th Honvéd Regiment reduced to two companies and a battalion command group in a forest, face to face with the enemy. After a few days in this state, we were ordered to advance up to 5 m in front of the enemy. The battalion commander came to my command post and, together with the two companies, we set out for the forest ridge. Arriving at ridge, we were met with heavy infantry fire. We took cover and waited until the fire of the Russians subsided. We had no losses because the bullets were passing over us.

Arriving at the riverbed I found a creek. It was starting to rain. Thus, the Russians on the right flank on the hill were able to count how many we were. About 10 a.m. before lunch, a corporal came to me and reported that Lieutenant Nadler's company had begun to surrender to the Russians on the right flank. What was I supposed to do? I also retired with the company, saving it from captivity. During this movement, as I didn't want people to stay in place, I was hit in the lower left arm by a bullet, after which I was led to a first-aid post in Ulicno.²⁵ I was bandaged and sent back into the country through the hospital station 'Diaconissa' in Debrecen, to the Red Cross Hospital in Dej.

With this last activity, the 304th Honvéd regiment was disbanded. On 4 July 1915, I was entrusted with the command of a company of recruits for training (following the improvement of a wound I had suffered) at the sedentary part of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment. On 5 August 1915, my mother came to see me in Dej. She was a widow, my father had died on 20 September 1912.

On 6 August 1915, I went to Sighetul-Marmației, sent by the sedentary part of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment, to an officer Guidance Centre to fill the gaps on the front. On 7 August, I presented myself and was sent to Zalesziesiky,²⁶ to the V/20 Honvéd Battalion, whose commander was Captain Hutiray and which was in the front line, 100–500 m from the enemy line. ...

Together with the battalion, we occupied a position east of Zalesziesiky, where we waited for the attack of the Russians. I was in the front line with the whole battalion.

²⁵ Today Ulicine, Ukraine.

²⁶ Today Zalishchyky settlement, Ukraine.

The battalion commander and the command group were behind the brigade. On 12 September 1915, we found ourselves in the reinforced position of Zalesziesiky, from where we started our attack on 1 September. Lt. Colonel of the General Staff Bekesi Béla was the brigade commander of the four Honvéd battalions. I waited for the attack at night but in vain. On 13 September, I received the sad news that battalion commander Vasko had died. On 14 September, some Russians approached our positions. We fired shots. 3 soldiers died and 5 were wounded. On 15 September, the 305th Honvéd Regiment changed us from the front line and we retreated to Kiseleu village,²⁷ west of the Dniester, at rest (for recovery). On 16 September, our brigade commander, Lt. Colonel Bekesi Béla inspected us. On 17 September, at 2 p.m., I left the village of Kiseleu and arrived at Zalesziesiky. On the 18th we rested in the barracks. On the afternoon of 24 September, planes appeared above our positions, dropping 3 bombs. One fell on the railway west of the Dniester. On 7 October we were informed that war had broken out between Bulgaria and Russia and Venizelos, the president of the Greek Council of Ministers, had resigned. On 13 October 1915, I was ready to go to change a regiment of Czechs in Doroshov Forest, east of the Dupa stream²⁸ and Bedrikowce village,²⁹ south of Zalesziesiky. We received a sector of about 400 m for the company. After the departure of the troops we had replaced, I found in the sector of my company two 10-caliber mine-throwers and a flamethrower. The position I received was completely neglected. I formed with the company and two more platoons under the command of Reserve Lieutenant Bancui – a foothold under my command. I also received a machine gun station with which I could hold the front of the Vedres Battalion, on my left, under fire. We were 1,500 steps away from the Russian line. We began to improve the position and built the 10 m line and the 500 m line at the back of the front. I formed two teams of 8 men to handle the two mine-throwers and two teams of 40 men to handle the flamethrower. In the 10 m line (from the first line) we built shelters for people to rest. Here we also built shelters against artillery bombardment at a depth of 7 m below the ground. A band of obstacles made of barbed wire was built in front of the position, on the entire front of the brigade, and in the middle of this band was placed an obstacle in which high-voltage electric current was circulating. We prepared for the stabilization war by improving and completing the position. This operation [ran] from October 1915 until June 1916, when the Brussilov offensive, the Russian offensive, was launched.

Here, throughout the time mentioned above, we had to stave off sporadic attacks. To secure the position and build the works, we installed small surveillance posts in front of the line and those secured the construction of the position. In front of my company, at 200-300, there was a ruin of a stone building, a good base for the enemy to attack. We found explosive material, ecrasite at the command of the battalion that was now commanded by Captain Horvath (Captain Hutiray had left). I got 10 kg of ecrasite and tied it with Bickford Primacord (detonating cord). I got out of the line and, passing the obstacle band, I went alone with this material to the ruin that was located between the fronts and placed the explosive in several spots and tied it with Bickford Primacord (detonating cord) so it was ready for explosion. Brigade Commander Bekesi came to see this operation. I went to

²⁷ Today Chisalau, Ukraine.

²⁸ Tupa River, tributary of the Dniester River, Ukraine.

²⁹ Today Bedrykivtsi settlement (Zalishchiy district), Ukraine.

the ruin all by myself, set fire to the Bickford and returned to position. Within seconds of my return, there was an explosion that produced smoke and a large cloud of debris. The Russians started firing artillery. They couldn't figure out what had happened.

The surveillance post was attacked one night by the Russians, when they lost a few soldiers. In the 51st Honvéd division we were assigned to, there were no specialists for handling the mine-thrower and flame thrower. They sent to me, in the first line, an artillery lieutenant with 26 men, whom I trained.

During the entire period of stay in this position (October 1915–June 1916) both we and the Russians continually improved the shelter and we braided the edges of the ditches from twigs to protect them from wear.

In mid-November 1915, one morning we found ourselves buried in the snow. It snowed all night, all the ditches filled with snow. The lookout posts were in the snow up to their necks in place. We cleared the soldiers' rest shelters of snow, and then we started clearing the ditches. The Russians, too, were busy with this operation. Two, three days after that, we noticed that the Russians had erected a snow wall in front of the positions so that we could proceed with the work to improve them. There were always incursions, with by us, or by the Russians, and this situation lasted until June 1916, as I showed above.

In February 1916, I took a two-week leave of absence to Dej, and upon returning from furlough I learned that I had been replaced in command of the company by Lt. Tükö. I was appointed commander of another company in the forest, completely neglected in terms of building the position. Within two weeks, I had addressed this problem and the battalion commander gathered the company commanders in my sector. Setting an example of the work done by my company, he ordered them to follow my example in the execution of the works. This happened on several occasions and caused envy among the other commanders, especially Lt. Tükö, who had taken command of my company while I was on leave. ...

During the stay in this position, every Saturday, we company commanders were at the table at the battalion, 300–400 m behind the front. The other days we had lunch with the battalion commander and with a platoon commander from each company.

One of these Saturday nights, around 11 p.m., I left the building to go to the company. At the door of the building I was greeted by Lieutenant Tükö, who was drunk, coming from outside. Seeing me, he stopped me and told me that he knew about me a matter for which if he denounced me, I would be shot. I managed to make him tell me why he threatened me. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Pop Victor, company commander, also came out. I stopped him and asked him to stay here so he could hear Lieutenant Tükö's accusations against me. Tükö put it this way: that while I was commander of the company that he currently was in charge of, I had allegedly walked through the ditch and found a soldier who greeted me with his hand in his pocket. I had allegedly asked him why he greeted me with his hand in his pocket and he had allegedly replied that he was cold and I had allegedly said: 'Freeze, Hungarian dog!' I told him that this was a lie and that he should take note that I would come out to report to the battalion. Having said that, I left. Lt. Pop Victor went after him in the room and then Lt. Tükö, in his drunkenness, beat himself in the chest and said to Captain Horvath, the battalion commander: 'Captain, I have told Lieutenant Popu what I have reported to you!'

The next day I went out to the battalion report, demanding that Lt. Tükö should be punished for lying. Captain Horvath tried to stop me. Seeing this, I asked to report to the regimental commander. On the second day, in the morning, I showed up for reporting to the regimental commander, who, at that time, was Lieutenant-Colonel of the General Staff Aurel Stronefeld, since Lt. Colonel Bekesi was on leave.

Lt.-Colonel Aurel Stronefeld was the Chief of Staff of the 'Hodfy' Army Group, who was in charge the regiment for a period. Lt.-Colonel Stronefeld was my professor of tactics at the 'Ludovica' Military Academy in Budapest in 1911–1912. I reported what had happened to him and asked for the Council of War to file an investigation against me so as to clear my name. Stronefeld then told Captain Horvath that he had known me for 6 years and did not believe that I would have uttered these incriminating words. I requested in writing that the Council of War should investigate me. In 1918, this ended with me being released from the investigation for lack of evidence.

In March 1916 Lt. Colonel Cantacuzino Sturdza came from Romania on the Zalesziesiky front, on the front of our regiment. He was probably sent by the Romanian General Staff to ascertain our (Austrian) situation in the field. Before coming to our position, we had received orders from our commanders to put the decorated Romanian officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the front line because this line was to be visited by Cantacuzino.

He also came to the sector of my company, where he visited the position of the rest shelter and the bomb shelter (seven meters below the ground). When he left the sector of my company, he addressed me with the following words in Romanian: 'See you again, who knows where?' I immediately understood the purpose of Sturza's visit – intelligence concerning the readiness and situation of the Austrian army. In August 1916 Romania entered the world war against the Austrians.

Lt.-Colonel Stronefeld Aurel became a general. In 1919–1920 he was the commander of the Hungarian army during the time of the Communist Kun Bela against whom the Romanian troops fought in their advance towards Budapest.³⁰

During his stint as regimental commander at the regiment I was a part of, during the Easter holidays of April 1916, while I was in command of my battalion, with him, the battalion commanders and company, in the building in Doroshov Forest, at one point a sergeant from our battalion came in with a cake of ½ m diameter saying that the Russian commander in front of us had sent this cake to our commander, since these were the Easter holidays. Then Lt.-Colonel Stronefeld stood up, and all of us with him together went between the first lines of battle, where the Russian officers also came, congratulating us on the occasion of the holidays. We carried two barrels of beer and the music that played until all the beer was drunk. Then we got back into position, the Russians did the same, so this scene ended with the promise not to fire our weapons at each other, to be quiet. During our meeting, the 51st Infantry Division, under whose command I was, had been informed of the meeting, sent a telephone order to cease the meeting. Lieutenant-Col. Stronefeld called the Division not to be worried because nothing would happen as a result of this meeting. When the titular regimental commander [Lt.-Col. Bekesi] returned, Stronefeld returned to his post in the General Staff service at the 'Hodfy' Army Group.

³⁰ Aurél Stromfeld was the chief of Staff of the Hungarian Red Army that launched hostilities against Czechoslovak and Romanian troops in May 1919. See Preda 2019, 290.

Following my request to be investigated by the division's Council of War in the matter of the charge brought against me by Lt. Tükö, according to whom I had said to a Hungarian soldier 'Freeze, Hungarian dog!', towards the end of April I was called in by the Council of War for questioning. I showed that this was a setup and a guilt born because I was better seen by the commanders than him, that the framed accusation had allegedly been committed in November 1915, while I was in command of the company currently commanded by Lt. Tükö, and this was now April 1916. Under what circumstances and when was Lt. Tükö informed by the soldier about this accusation against me? The regulation stated that a complaint could only be made after 24 hours and within 3 days. So, it was clear that this accusation had been brought against me because of his hatred, because I was a Romanian. This research had no effect on my situation since, on 1 November 1917, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Colecția MNIT + no. Colecția Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei, Cluj-Napoca, nos. M 7325, M 7327, M 7328, M 7329, M 7330, M 7332, M 7333, M 7336, M 7338, M 7675, C 3086, C 3089, C 3117/1, C1 5283.

Secondary sources

- Deák 2009 I. Deák, *Mai presus de naționalism. O istorie politică și socială a corpului de ofițeri habsburgici (1848–1918)*, Cluj-Napoca 2009.
- Ferro et alii 2005 M. Ferro, M. Brown, R. Cazals, O. Mueller, *Frères de tranchées*, Paris 2005.
- Hațieganu 1929 E. Hațieganu, *1-iu Decembrie 1918*, *Patria*, 19 May 1929, 11–12.
- Maior 2004 L. Maior, *Românii în armata habsburgică. Soldați și ofițeri uitați*, București 2004.
- Muntean 2018 O. Muntean, *Three years of war (1916–1919). Pages from the journal of the Transylvanian officer Marian Popu*, *ActaMN*, 55/ II (2018), 61–90.
- Muntean, Mitu 2014 O. Muntean, M. Mitu, *Rememorând Marele Război. 1914–2014/ Remembering the Great War. 1914–2014*, Cluj-Napoca 2014.
- Preda 2019 D. Preda, *Sub semnul Marii Uniri. Campaniile armatei române pentru reîntregirea țării 1916–1920*, București 2019.
- Radosav 2014 D. Radosav, *Memoria 'de jos' a războiului. Câteva considerații*, *AIO*, XIV (2014), 5–54.
- Stratz 1933 R. Stratz, *Der Weltkrieg*, Berlin 1933.
- Șerban 1999 I. I. Șerban, *Românii în armata austro-ungară în anii Primului Război Mondial*, *AUA hist.*, 2–3 (1998–1999), 201–215.
- Ticu 2004 Ctin. Ticu, *Memoria autobiografică. Definierea sau redefinirea propriei vieți*, Iași 2004.
- Tunstall 2016 G. A. Tunstall, *Written in Blood. The Battles for Fortress Przemysl in WWI*, Bloomington 2016.





Fig. 1. Diploma of member of the Association of Greek-Catholic Teachers around Gherla, 22 September 1881, Colecția MNIT, no. M 7325.

22 - 1909 1

GIMNÁZIUMI ÉRETTSÉGI BIZONYÍTVÁNY.



aki Popa Marián,
Hisderecsereu (Soluca: Dolos a m.) született 1889. évi
 szeptember hó 12-én, görög katolikus vallású, miután a
 középiskolai tanfolyamot és pedig: az I-III osztályt a szamosújvári
 m. kir. állami főgimnáziumban.

elvégezte s jó erkölcsi magaviseletet tanúsított, az alulírott
 bizottság előtt érettségi vizsgálatot tett, következő eredménnyel:

Magyar nyelvből és irodalomból: elégséges
 Latin nyelvből és irodalomból: elégséges
 Történelemből: elégséges
 Matematikából: elégséges
 Fizikából: elégséges

A gimnázium többi tantárgyaiban következő előmenetelt tanúsított:

Vallásban: jó
 Görög nyelvben és irodalomban: elégséges
 Német nyelvben és irodalomban: elégséges
 Filozófiai propedeutikában: elégséges
 Földrajzban: jó
 Természetrészben: jó
 Rajzoló geometriában: elégséges

A fentebbiek szerint a szabályszerű követelményeknek
megfelelően, őt a főiskolai tanulmányokra **érettnek** nyilvánítjuk.

Erről neki a szamosújvári m. kir. állami főgimnázium
 pecsétjével és saját aláírásunkkal ellátott jelen bizonyítványt kiadjuk.

Kelt Szamosújvár, 1909. évi június hó 12-én.

Vannay Deleha
 k. kir. Min. főigazgatója
 a vizsgáló bizottság elnöke

Horváth László
 a vizsgáló bizottság tagja

Fecskő János
 a vizsgáló bizottság tagja

Mikó János
 a tanítvány- és iródtanár

Stia János
 a költészet-tanár

Tharsas Gyula
 a matematikai és fizika tanár

a vizsgáló bizottság tagjai.




Fig. 2. Graduation Diploma, Gherla, 12 June 1909, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7327.




Fig. 6. Image from the graduation of the class of 1912, 'Ludovika' Military Academy, Budapest, Colecția MNIT, no. C 3086.




Fig. 7. Barracks of the 32nd Honvéd Regiment from Dej, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7675.



Fig. 8. Patent for the Bronze Medal of the Imperial Red Cross, Budapest, 3 February 1915, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7333.





Fig. 9. Patent of advancement to the rank of Lieutenant-major, Budapest, 9 August 1914, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7332.



K. u. k. Militärkommando in Wien

Rekonvaleszentensammelstelle

Nr. 4810/1

Urlaubsbewilligung.

Dem Herrn k. u. k. *Oberlt. Marian Papir*
J. How. J. R. 32

ist zufolge KM-Erlaß, Abt. 10, Nr. 7902 vom 22. September 1914, ein Urlaub aus Gesundheitsrücksichten nach *Perescer u. Des*


für die Zeit von *vier Wochen*

bewilligt worden.

Dieser Urlaub wird am *17* ten *Dezember* l. J.
angetreten und geht am *13* ten *Jänner* 19 *15* zu Ende.

Wien, am *16* ten *Dezom.* 19 *14*

Schmölzer



Gesehen beim Abgehen

Fig. 10. Sick leave certificate, Vienna, 16 December 1914, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7336.








Fig. 11. Notebook with Campaign notes, August–September 1915, Colectia MNIT, no. M 7338.



Fig. 12. Photo of Marian Popu, Wyszów, 5 September 1915, Colectia MNIT, no. C 3089.





Muzeul Național de Istorie al Transilvaniei Cluj-Napoca
Primăria Municipiului Dej
Muzeul Municipal Dej
Cercul Militar Dej

**„Comemorând Marele Război (1914-1918)
și personalități dejene”**

**Vernisajul expoziției va avea loc în 22 septembrie 2016, ora 12,30
în incinta Cercului Militar Dej**
Prezintă: dr. Ovidiu Muntean și Constantin Albinetz

**Expoziția va rămâne deschisă pentru public
până în 10 octombrie 2016 la sediul Cercului Militar Dej**





Fig. 13. Poster of the temporary exhibition dedicated to Officer Marian Popu, Dej, 22 September 2016, Colecția MNIT, no. C1 5283.

IOAN LUPAȘ – THE MAKER AND MEMORIALIST OF THE UNION OF TRANSYLVANIA WITH ROMANIA

MIRCEA-GHEORGHE ABRUDAN*

Abstract: A prolific historian, a professor of the Andreian Seminary in Sibiu, parish priest of Săliște and an archpriest of Mărginimea Sibiului, a professor of the ‘King Ferdinand I’ University in Cluj, a titular member of the Romanian Academy, a talented publicist, a co-founder of the Institute of National History in Cluj, a deputy in the Parliament of Greater Romania, a minister in the Averescu and Goga-Cuza governments, a patriot and victim of the Bolshevik regime in the 1950s’ Romania, Ioan Lupaș is a scholar with the aura of a saint. Fr. Lupaș is part of the admirable generation of those who committed themselves with all their power and selflessness to the national movement of the Transylvanian Romanians, those who achieved the Union of Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș with the Kingdom of Romania on 1 December 1918 and then fought for the consolidation of national unity during the interwar period. Lupaș is part of the leading gallery of the makers of Greater Romania, and one of the few historians-participants who later wrote relevant pages about the astral event in which they were active participants. The study provides a brief biography of Ioan Lupaș, focusing on the activity of the archpriest at the time of the First World War, his involvement in the organization of the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia, and the way in which he subsequently remembered the events and feelings experienced in the year of the ‘fortunate fulfilling of long-awaited goals’ and of ‘thoroughly well-deserved triumph’.

Key words: First World War, Romania, Săliște, Alba Iulia, memoirs.

Rezumat: Istoric prolific, dascăl al Seminarului Andreian din Sibiu, paroh al Săliștei și protopop al Mărginimii Sibiului, profesor al Universității ‘Regele Ferdinand I’ din Cluj, membru titular al Academiei Române, publicist talentat, cofondator al Institutului de Istorie Națională din Cluj, deputat în Parlamentul României Mari, ministru în guvernele Averescu și Goga-Cuza, patriot și victimă a regimului bolșevic din România anilor ’50, Ioan Lupaș este un savant cu aureolă de mucenic. Părintele Lupaș face parte din generația admirabilă a celor care s-au angajat cu toată puterea și abnegația în mișcarea națională a românilor ardeleni, a celor care au realizat unirea Transilvaniei, Banatului, Crișanei și Maramureșului cu Regatul României la 1 Decembrie 1918 și apoi au luptat pentru consolidarea unității naționale în perioada interbelică. Lupaș face parte din galeria de frunte a făuritorilor României Mari, precum și dintre puținii istorici-participanți care au scris ulterior pagini relevante despre evenimentul astral la care au fost părtași activi. Studiul abordează pe scurt biografia sa, insistând apoi asupra activității protopopului Ioan Lupaș în timpul Primului Război Mondial, a implicării sale în organizarea Marii Adunări Naționale de la Alba Iulia și a modului în care rememorat ulterior evenimentele și sentimentele trăite în anul ‘fericitelor împliniri îndelung așteptate’ și al ‘triumfului deplin meritat’.

Cuvinte cheie: Primul Război Mondial, România, Săliște, Alba Iulia, memorialistică.

* Ph.D., Scientific researcher III, Romanian Academy, ‘George Barițiu’ Institute of History, Cluj-Napoca, email: mirceapadre@yahoo.com.

The life, activity, and work of Ioan Lupaș

Ioan Lupaș was born on 9 August 1880 in Sălișteța Sibiului,¹ a village that can be characterized as a bastion of Orthodoxy and Romanianism in Transylvania,² where both saints of the Orthodox Church and prominent figures of Romanian culture were born over time.³ From his ancestors he inherited, therefore, a strong, unshakable attachment to the 'Romanian law' and the 'ancestral Church,' which he cultivated and defended through his discourses, publications, academic standing and moral conduct throughout his life.

He studied at the state gymnasium in Sibiu and the 'Andrei Șaguna' Romanian gymnasium in Brașov, graduating from all high school classes as an eminent student.⁴ On a scholarship from the Gojdu Foundation, he studied at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy of the University of Budapest (1900–1904), which also awarded him his doctorate.⁵ A one-year specialization at the University of Berlin followed. Returning to Sibiu, he became a Professor of Church History and of Romanian History at the Theological-Pedagogical Institute, where he taught until 1909, when he was dismissed, at the pressure of the Hungarian government, due to his 'militant nationalist' conduct.⁶

During his student and teacher years, Ioan Lupaș was part of the *tinerii oțeliți* [Steeled Youth] group, together with Octavian Goga and Octavian Codru Tăslăuanu, with whom he founded the magazine *Lucafărul*. The militant attitude, the passion with which he studied the history of the Romanians and the vigor with which he fought the policy of the Hungarian governments' Magyarization policies drew the anger and enmity of the authorities. Following the article *Toate plugurile umblă* [All the Ploughs Are Walking], published in the newspaper *Țara noastră* in April 1907,⁷ a pamphlet in which he discussed the suffering of the Romanian peasantry in the context of the peasants' revolt in the kingdom, Lupaș was tried by the Hungarian Royal Court of Justice in Cluj 'for agitation against the owners' group' and sentenced to three months in prison and a fine of 200 kroner. He was imprisoned in Szeged, between 1 August and 1 November 1908,⁸ where he wrote a good part of a monograph on Metropolitan Andrei Șaguna,⁹ a well-known work that would bring him the 'Adamachi' Prize of the Romanian Academy (1909). At the proposal of Nicolae Iorga, he was elected Corresponding (14 May 1914) and Titular Member (17 May 1916) of the Romanian Academy.¹⁰

A parish priest and archpriest at Săliște (1909–1919), he had a fruitful activity, causing 'a actual revolution' in the pastoral, educational, cultural, historiographical, and social realms, involving himself in all spheres and areas of the life of Romanians in Mărginimea Sibiului, which led to the revitalization of the ecclesial, social and cultural

¹ Petruțiu 2000, 105–144; Păcurariu 2014, 342–344; Păcurariu 2015, 441–448; Edroiu et alii 2008; Crișan 2013.

² Țața 2006.

³ Irimie et alii 1985; Grosu 1990; Hanzu 2009; Cosma 2020.

⁴ Lăpădat 1943, 463–464.

⁵ Lupaș 1904; Lupaș 2004.

⁶ Păcurariu 2016, 358. All the quotations and transcriptions in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

⁷ Lupaș 1937, 20–25.

⁸ Lupaș 1937, 27–33.

⁹ Lupaș 1911; Lupaș 1999.

¹⁰ Rusu et alii 2016, 180–182.

life of the Orthodox Church in the area. Archpriest Lupaş was a good preacher¹¹ and an ardent supporter of the idea that Romanian life could develop through school, church, commercial or economic corporations and different types of associations.¹²

On 1 September 1919, by Decree no. 12158 of the Romanian Governing Council, he was appointed full Professor at the University of Dacia Superior in Cluj, where he taught the modern history of the Romanians and the history of Transylvania until the spring of 1945, when he was ‘purged’ by the new communist power that was installed in the country. In addition to teaching and publishing, Ioan Lupaş made a perennial contribution to the development of Romanian historiography by establishing, on 1 February 1920, the Institute of National History, the first institution of this profile in the Romanian area, whose director he was until 1946.¹³

Ioan Lupaş created an impressive historiographical, theological and publishing work that totals over a thousand books, textbooks, volumes of studies, scientific and journalistic articles, reviews and reading notes, most of them dealing on topics pertaining to the history of the Romanians, in general, of the Transylvanian Romanians, in particular, the history of the Romanian church and culture.¹⁴ Among these, a number of works have enjoyed remarkable editorial success, being appreciated by contemporaries and later historians: *Istoria românilor* [The History of the Romanians] (15 editions); *Istoria Bisericii Române* [The History of the Romanian Church] (8 editions); *Mitropolitul Andrei Şaguna* [Metropolitan Andrei Şaguna] (4 editions); *Istoria unirii românilor* [The History of the Romanians’ Union] (2 anthumousand 4 posthumous editions); *Istoria bisericească a românilor ardeleni* [The Ecclesiastical History of the Transylvanian Romanians] (1 anthumous, 2 posthumous editions); *Studii, conferinţe şi comunicări istorice* [Studies, Conferences and Historical Communications] (5 vol.). Many of his works have withstood the passage of time and have been reissued by Ştefan Pascu and Pompiliu Teodor,¹⁵ Marina Vlasiu,¹⁶ Doru Radosav,¹⁷ Nicolae Edroiu,¹⁸ Camil Mureşanu,¹⁹ Dorel Man,²⁰ and Mircea-Gheorghe Abrudan.²¹

After retirement he settled permanently in Sibiu, where he had taken refuge after the Vienna Diktat of 1940. The Securitate (the communist secret police) followed him step by step,²² considering him ‘enemy of the popular democracy regime’ because he had been involved in political life in interwar Romania, as a deputy, senator and minister in two governments. The onset of harassment and persecution came with his exclusion from the Romanian Academy in 1948. The next stage occurred at the beginning of 1950, when the regime stopped his pension. Arrested on the night of 5 to 6 May 1950 and subjected to an

¹¹ Lupaş 1916; Lupaş 1918.

¹² Sofronie 1980, 703-709; Wünsch 2017, 72–84; Wünsch 2007.

¹³ Edroiu 2017, 21–28; Edroiu et alii 2008, 25–40.

¹⁴ Crăciun 1943, XXVIII–LXVIII; Edroiu et alii 2008, 93–202; Crişan 2013, 299–382, 429–438.

¹⁵ Lupaş 1977.

¹⁶ Lupaş 1988.

¹⁷ Lupaş 2011.

¹⁸ Lupaş 2006.

¹⁹ Lupaş 2007.

²⁰ Lupaş 2006; Lupaş 2007.

²¹ Lupaş 2018.

²² Pleşa 2008, 165–198; Pleşa 2017, 347–374.

interrogation at the Regional Directorate of the Securitate in Sibiu,²³ he was imprisoned in the Sighet prison in the so-called lot of 'former dignitaries,' on the cursory charge that 'during the bourgeois-landowner regime he carried out an intense activity against the working class.'²⁴ He was released on 5 July 1955, by a decree of pardon. He signed with a trembling hand a pledge not to discuss with anyone anything that had happened during his interrogation and incarceration. His daughter confesses that the fear inoculated by the Securitate bodies led him not to write his memoirs, or to talk too much about detention, but says that he forgave his persecutors.²⁵ He spent the last ten years of his life in Bucharest, with his daughters, who lovingly cared for him. On 26 June 1967, the Ceaușescu regime tried to recuperate him, conferring him 'the title of Professor Emeritus for long activity and special merits, as well as for the contribution made to the development of higher education.'²⁶

The learned priest Ioan Lupaș passed away at the venerable age of 87 years, on 3 July 1967. He was buried in the cemetery of Cernica Monastery near Bucharest. On his grave cross is written his creed with testamentary value: 'History teaches us to know the past, to understand the present and to believe in the future of Romania.'

Dr. Ioan Lupaș, Archpriest, in the turmoil of the First World War

The attack in Sarajevo, on 28 June 1914, on the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, happened while Ioan Lupaș was fully engaged in pastoral-cultural-social activity in the parish and Deanery of Săliște. After the memorial service he celebrated in the great church of Săliște, eight days after the death of the archduke, whom he mourned as a Romanian, a Christian, and as a citizen, because 'such a strong supporter of the aspirations of our people' had died, as he said in the sermon delivered on that occasion,²⁷ Archpriest Lupaș told first praetor Peter Drăghiciu that 'the assassination in Sarajevo was the beginning of the collapse of the monarchy.'²⁸ Fr. Lupaș later testified that what he had stressed at that time was the fact that 'this murder meant the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy' and knew that 'days of terrible trial and suffering' would follow, which the Romanians would have to endure with 'hope of redemption,' for, according to the word of the Holy Scripture, 'only those who endure to the end will be saved' (Matthew 24: 13).²⁹

In the first two years of the Great War Archpriest Ioan Lupaș remained in the midst of his faithful in Săliște, encouraging them, praying for the health and protection of those mobilized, and for the strengthening of the morale of those left at home. He urged the latter to contribute to the fundraising campaigns organized for those on the front and for the wounded, to give some of their wealth to the orphans and widows. He never lost faith in his Romanian national beliefs.³⁰ One of the difficult moments of collective sadness for

²³ Abrudan 2020, 164–191.

²⁴ Opriș 2004, 339–368.

²⁵ Buculei 2000, 142–155.

²⁶ Crișan 2013, annexes, illustration no. 17.

²⁷ Lupaș 2006, 25–30.

²⁸ Lăpădat 1943, 466.

²⁹ Stanca 2015, 91–92.

³⁰ Lupaș 1916; Lupaș 1918; Deteșan 2015, 535–549.

the entire local community was the episode of the requisition of the bells by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in the summer of 1916. A photo kept in the Lupaș family archive immortalized the moment of the heavy sentiments with which the people in Sălișteea parted with the bells of the large church in the village. The bells were surrounded by the community – the priests, led by Ioan Lupaș, men, women, and children–, adorned with flowers and wailed for as in a funeral procession. The people’s grief for the lost bells³¹ and the feelings experienced then were laid out on paper by Archpriest Ioan Lupaș in an article simply titled ‘The Bells,’ in which he likened them to ‘dear and beloved friends,’ now shrouded in a ‘curtain of tears.’ Again, the shepherd was called to ease the pain of his believers and turn their hearts to God. In his view, this sacrifice was not to be accompanied by despair, but by hope in God, ‘who will reward all’ according to the psalmist’s word: ‘Offer the sacrifices of righteousness, and put your trust in the Lord.’³² He gave free rein to the same experiences and feelings in the poem ‘Farewell to the Bells,’ which expressed both the pain and the hope that the sacrifice would not be in vain, nor would it remain unrewarded on a good day of freedom. The lyrics reveal to us a sensitive, less known side of Lupaș the scholar, which is why we consider it appropriate to quote them here:

You too, hallowed old bells/
Are leaving for the great battle for the throne and the
country!.../
A source of tears - that’s all we are left with, /
To ease the burden of our
crying heart./
When it comes down from the high towers /
Your ancient, heavy and
holy brass, /
All the people shudder/
And their Christian thought is frightened.../
In days of light and celebration/
you proclaimed to us of the Lord strength, /
Calling
us to prayer and worship, /
In our hearts, you have planted living power - /
To fight
with undefeated valor, /
Paddling through the sea of troubled life,/
And may the goal
of our struggle forever be/
Light and faith and justice.../
In hard days you were like
guardians/
Of our faithful and humble lives /
And when we were in pain ... you gave
us comfort/
Healers of oppressed hearts./
In your voice faith has been entwined/
The
faith of so many hardworking ancestors./
Now go, and bring victory/
To the beloved,
valorous, mighty men./
Henceforth your godly chant/
Changes into the voice of a
storm; /
That is why the parting is painful.../
But may the mercy of the Lord be upon
us,/
May He listen to the voice of our hearts,/
May justice rain down upon us from
the holy heavens;/
The reward of too many sufferings /
Let them bring the holy day
of liberty. ...³³

Deeply aware of his role and purpose in the midst of the villagers of Sălișteea, especially during the difficult years of the world war, Ioan Lupaș declined in 1915 the invitation of Professor Nicolae Iorga and of Ion Duca, Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Instruction, to take over the vacant Chair of Church History at the University of Bucharest, confessing that he could not ‘leave the faithful in these difficult days. I could never return to them if I knew that I had left them like a fool in the hour of peril.’³⁴ The appreciation

³¹ Benga 2016; Holom 2006.

³² Lupaș 1916, 1–2.

³³ Lupaș 1916, 1.

³⁴ Lăpădat 1943, 467.

he enjoyed in the academic, cultural and political circles of Bucharest was seen on 17 May 1916, when at the age of 35, Archpriest Dr. Ioan Lupaş was elected titular member of the Romanian Academy, filling the seat that was vacant after the death of the Greek Catholic Canon Ioan Micu Moldovan. The Transylvanian press welcomed this choice with ‘great joy,’ publicly offering ‘our much-appreciated historian (...) the warmest congratulations on this well-deserved accolade.’³⁵

And yet, even if he did not do it willingly, Ioan Lupaş was forced to leave the people he shepherded for eight months, as he was arrested on the evening of Romania’s entry into the war (15/28 August 1916) and interned in a camp in Rust, in western Hungary, then forcibly transferred to Budapest. A few years later he would recollect with serenity the watershed moments and the ‘days of terrible trial’ of those years, stating that he thanked ‘God for all these sufferings’ which he considered ‘redeeming,’ since they had not been in vain, but meant ‘the contribution of the Romanian priesthood in Transylvania to the war for the union of the nation.’ For Archpriest Lupaş, as well as for hundreds of members of the clergy throughout Transylvania, the news of the Romanian Army’s entry into Transylvania triggered euphoria: ‘I bowed before the holy altar, thanking God for giving me the opportunity to live this great moment in the history of the nation. It was the most sublime mass in my career as a priest.’³⁶ The course of the following events was suggestively recalled by the historian himself:

In the evening, at 7 pm, while we were dining, fully armed gendarmes entered. I will never forget the fear of my wife and three little children. They arrested me and escorted me to their barracks, where, overnight, they also brought the priest Valeriu Popovici from Sibiel. In the morning they escorted us to Sibiu, from where with 14 other companions we wandered for a whole week through the country, all the way to Şopron. At the railway stations the plebs shouted to us: “Here are the Wallachian priests, they must be hanged!” At Salonta Nicolae Rocsin came out to the train station, bringing us bread and wine. I hadn’t eaten in 2–3 days. At Czell Dömölk, we stopped in front of a cemetery and the detectives comforted us that they would kill us later that night. I was hospitalized in Rust, where I fell ill because of the air filled with chalk-white dust and the damp housing. At the intervention of the univ[iersity] Professor Angyal David,³⁷ on 13 Oct.[ober] I was moved to Budapest, where I stayed interned until 6 April 1917. Back home, on the Annunciation Day [25 March], I served at the altar, showing the people that just as I had been snatched from their bosom on the Day of the Assumption, I returned on Annunciation Day, so for the holy struggle of the nation this was a message that good things awaited us after the suffering we all went through in the winter of 1916–1917. The hardest moments I’ve ever experienced were when the news came that Sălişteia had been destroyed by Bavarian artillery. My wife and children, threatened to be shot by the Hungarians, wandered ten days through the forests, without shelter.³⁸

³⁵ Gazeta Transil. 1916, 2.

³⁶ Stanca 2015, 91–92.

³⁷ Engel David (1857–1943): Hungarian historian, professor, politician, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

³⁸ Stanca 2015, 92.

Despite the sufferings and humiliations, he experienced between August 1916 and March 1917, Ioan Lupaş confessed a few years later: ‘Thank God for all these redeeming sufferings.’³⁹

Returning home on the eve of the Annunciation of 1917, Archpriest Ioan Lupaş did not seem to have been intimidated, nor did he revise his Romanian national attitude despite the humiliations to which he was subjected by the Hungarian authorities. His sermon on the day of the imperial feast of the Annunciation once again proved his optimistic belief in the better future of the nation: ‘Keep in mind that the good news of today, refreshing the soul of whole Christendom, sheds upon our righteous people a new and strong ray of hope in the righteousness of God who, according to an old and wise saying, is neither late, nor in a rush, but when He is needed, He arrives.’⁴⁰ The Easter celebration of the same year was the right occasion for Father Ioan to encourage the people of Săliştea again and to translate the joy of the resurrection from the religious-spiritual level onto the national-Romanian level: ‘Will our people be ready for this resurrection? The good Lord knows how much we have suffered, how we have fought, and how I have not given a moment of rest to my word and my pen, that the great hour of redemption may find us all with the oil of righteous faith burning in our lighted lamps, how the Bridegroom found the wise virgins who, watching and awake, hastened to go out to meet him.’ Dumitru Lăpădat, one of the eyewitnesses of that moment, who remembered the words and exhortation of Father Ioan Lupaş, said that after leaving the church the intellectual believers understood the allusion of their priest regarding the national resurrection and embraced the exhortation to be prepared for that moment.⁴¹

The vigilance which he urged his believers to adopt was, however, a state that Ioan Lupaş himself lived and embodied, day by day and hour by hour. Thus, in the very difficult times for the existence of the Romanian confessional schools in the border area of Banat and Transylvania with the Kingdom of Romania was imperiled, since the order of Albert Apponyi, Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Instruction in Budapest, of 2 August 1917, had transformed them into Hungarian schools by establishing a ‘cultural zone or border.’ In the plenary sessions of the Archdiocesan Consistory of 9/22 November 1917 and 2/15 July 1918, Archpriest Ioan Lupaş of Săliştea protested, requesting that the Archdiocese Synod should be convened to discuss this vital issue. In the 18 Orthodox deaneries of the Archdiocese of Transylvania targeted by the order of the Hungarian minister there were 362 confessional schools. They were to be passed into state administration first by stopping the financial aid offered to teachers (30 June 1918) and forcing the parishes to cede them, then by putting them under criminal investigation and confiscating them by the government commissioner who was sent to take over the schools in the counties on the border with Romania, to expropriate those that refused to surrender and to set up state-run primary schools.⁴² The schools of Aciliu, Cacova, Amnaş, Gura Râului, Mag, Săcel, Tilişca, Topârcea, and Vale in the Deanery of Sălişte were affected by the ministerial order, while those in Sălişte and Galeş, which did not have state subsidies because they

³⁹ Stanca 2015, 92.

⁴⁰ Lăpădat 1943, 473.

⁴¹ Lăpădat 1943, 474.

⁴² Păcurariu 1986, 164–178.

were entirely supported by the parish community, escaped the first effect of the Hungarian government measures. In order to prevent the closure of the school in the future, the parish committee of Săliște, presided over by Ioan Lupaș, adopted, in its meeting of 20 June 1918, a resolution that was voted on unanimously. This resolution stated the parishioners' 'desire and resolve to support the Greek Orthodox Romanian school in Săliște of their own means,' and added that there was 'no legal or allowable reason for shutting down the religious school.'⁴³ Ioan Lupaș and his students were therefore firmly determined to defend the existence of their denominational school, which they appreciated as 'one of the oldest and best people's schools in our entire metropolitanate (...) considering that just like it did in the past, it may render in the future the best services from a religious and patriotic point of view, and will therefore remain under the shield of our church.'⁴⁴ Although, on 26 June 1918, the Archpriest of Săliște reported to the consistory that the parishes of Amnaș, Cacova, Galeș, Mag, Tilișca and Vale had agreed to 'decide to stop the confessional schools and rent the buildings for the state schools envisaged to be set up in these communes,' he was not willing to abandon the fight to defend the confessional school system in Sibiu. Firstly, he publicly disavowed the pressure and blackmail exerted by the local Hungarian authorities (praetors and notaries) on teachers and members of parish committees. Secondly, he encouraged the teachers not to believe the pension loss threats and urged them not to report to the Hungarian state inspectorate like any other state employees. He also appealed to the Archdiocesan Consistory to support the cause and dignity of the confessional teachers. Last but not least, Archpriest Ioan Lupaș listened, comforted and urged the Romanians, clergy and laity alike, not to give up their support of the confessional schools despite all the chicanery, blackmail and threats from the Hungarian civil authorities. His unpublished notes preserved in the archive of the Săliște Deanery testify to the countless discussions he had with people on this subject during 1918.⁴⁵ The fact that the villagers of Săliște and Mărginimea Sibiului listened to the advice of the archpriest denotes an undeniable reality: Archpriest Ioan Lupaș was considered a trusted leader of the Romanian nation and the Orthodox Church in the region. On the other hand, the surrender and closure of the confessional schools amounted to a betrayal of the nation and the Church, the signatories of the acts of sale of the school buildings becoming accursed traitors in the eyes of the villagers. The scene described by Ioan Lupaș in an autographed document of 9 March 1918 is as telling as possible in this sense:

On the day of the Forty Martyrs, a parishioner from Săcel, Ana Constantin Dicu, came accompanied by a daughter of hers and said, with tears in her eyes, that since the parish committee of Săcel decided to sell the school building, their family could no longer have peace in the village, for everyone cursed them and even the little children shouted after them in the street that they had sold the language and the law to the Hungarians. It is true that her husband voted, with 3 other men from the mayor's office, who were also members of the parish committee, in favor of the sale, while four others headed by the old man Ghiță Macrea voted not to sell (...) She asked

⁴³ Hanzu 2009, 146–148.

⁴⁴ Hanzu 2009, 150.

⁴⁵ Hanzu 2009, 148–151.

if it was true that by this vote her man had sold out his language and his law, because if that was true, she would no longer dare to go out into the world because of shame, nor could she find peace anywhere on the face of the earth.⁴⁶

Archpriest Ioan Lupaş – Creator of the Union of Transylvania with Romania

The faith and hope of Archpriest Ioan Lupaş in the justice and success of the Romanian national cause came true at the time of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, in the autumn of 1918.⁴⁷ In those moments that were crucial for the destiny of the Romanian nation, the Archpriest of was one of the most vocal advocates of the Transylvania's unconditional union with Romania, being involved with all of his strength in the action of convincing the villagers in Mărginimea Sibiului to sign up the resolutions of the union, to draw up the credentials, as well as to mobilize the people of Sălişte to participate in the National Assembly in Alba Iulia.

On 24 October/6 November 1918 Ioan Lupaş summoned the people of Sălişte to a popular meeting in which it was decided to establish the National Council and the National Guard of Sălişte. The archpriest was elected president of the council, and the second lieutenant Ioan St. Şteflea became commander of the guard. On the same day the 180 members of the National Guard of Sălişte, made up of demobilized soldiers, craftsmen, and peasants from Sălişte, Vale, Sibiul, Cacova, Orlat, Săcel, Mag, Amnaş, Aciliu, Tilişca and Galeş submitted a vibrant Christian national oath, most likely compiled by the archpriest himself:

I, N. N., a voluntary member of the national guard of S., swear to the triune God: to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, on the Cross, and on the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, and on the sanctity of the national flag, that I will uphold the honor, dignity, and interest of the Romanian nation to the last breath, and that I will always be a loyal friend to its friends, and an enemy of its enemies; I swear that I will defend the life, honor and wealth of every citizen, without distinction of nation, and that I will respect the rights and freedoms of the individual nations, just the way I want the rights and liberties of my nation to be respected by all, I swear I will show unquestioning obedience to my superiors, military and civilian, in any circumstances, and in the case of an infringement of the public order, I will willingly surrender myself to the sentences that will be applied to me, in the interest of soldierly order and discipline. So may God help me and grant me the salvation of my soul! Amen.⁴⁸

Following the example of the people of Sălişte, all the villages in the rayon of Sălişte formed national councils that took over the local administration and ensured the peaceful transition of power.

The irenic spirit stemming from the Holy Scripture and his priestly ministry led Archpriest Ioan Lupaş to launch, in the complicated context of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the outbreak of the revolution in Transylvania and

⁴⁶ Archive of the Sălişte Deanery, Documents entries-exits 1917–1918 cited in Hanzu 2009, 150–151.

⁴⁷ Albani 1938, 11–27; Lupaş 2018, 55–96.

⁴⁸ Românu 1918, 2; Boromiz 2019, 73–75.

Banat,⁴⁹ a public appeal suggestively titled *Un sfat creștinesc către toți fiii națiunii române* [A Piece of Christian Advice to All the Sons of the Romanian Nation]. Published in the edition of 8/21 November 1918 of the newspaper *Românul* in Arad, in the same issue that printed the convocation of the National Assembly of the Romanian nation of Hungary and Transylvania in Alba Iulia, the exhortation of Archpriest Ioan Lupaș aimed to keep the Romanians calm, to avoid violent excesses or vengeful outbursts and to prepare for the ‘Great Feast of our people’s national resurrection and freedom,’ ‘not as soldiers of war, but as soldiers of defense.’ The state that Romanians were called to embrace in those ‘blessed moments’ when the ‘rusty shackles of injustice were broken’ and the ‘oppressors of peoples collapsed’ was that of forgiveness, harmony and peace among all people, a state that the Orthodox Church urged them to show during the Easter holidays: ‘With a pure soul, cleansed of all passion and wickedness, with fear of God, with faith, let us approach the holy and great feast of national freedom and resurrection!’ The freedom the Romanians were experiencing in those days was not to be converted, in his opinion, into ‘lust, passion, malice, or any desire for revenge,’ which ‘humiliate and harm human dignity’, but rather ‘what the Scripture says and is so simple and easy to understand: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’, in order to prove to the world that ‘we are worthy to stand besides all of the free nations of the world.’ In order to protect themselves against the aforementioned excesses, to maintain public order and guard social peace, Ioan Lupaș recommended that all the National Councils and Guards should resort, ‘in any public work,’ to the ‘clean and strong passion of the youth, the restrained and discreet judgment of men and the wise counsel of elders.’⁵⁰

Acting in the same spirit of freedom and liberty, a few days earlier, on 5/18 July 1918, Archpriest Ioan Lupaș, in his capacity as a director of the denominational schools in the Deanery of Săliște, decided to suspend the teaching of the Hungarian language in the denominational school of Săliște, showing thus that the Romanians’ had taken resolute steps on the path to national self-determination. The final break with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the unification with Romania would surely occur. A hotbed of national culture, the school in Săliște stood by the archpriest in all the episodes of the Union, the teachers drawing up the lists for the credentials and championing the participation of as many Romanians from Sibiu as possible in the People’s Assembly of Alba Iulia.⁵¹

Skillfully exercising his role as archpriest, Ioan Lupaș convened the National Council on 8/21 November 1918 at 11.00 in the Great Hall of the National House in Săliște. The meeting was attended by four delegates from Săliște, two each from Sibiel, Săcel, Orlat, Galeș, Tilișca, Aciliu and Vale, as well as other intellectuals from Săliște and neighboring villages. After Second Lieutenant Ioan St. Șteflea presented the organization stages of the local national councils and guards and evoked the ‘propaganda made in the communes by Dr. Stan Șteflea, Dr. Ioan Lupaș, Dr. Dumitru Borcea, Emilian Stoica and Ioan Popa,’ in order to establish these bodies, the members and the leadership of the National Council of

⁴⁹ The events of the autumn and winter of 1918 that led to the forced expulsion of the old authorities and the taking over of power by the Romanian national bodies remain entrenched in war memoirs under the name of ‘revolution.’ See Stricatu 2017, 143–146; Bârlea 2004, 261–266.

⁵⁰ Lupaș 1918, 2.

⁵¹ Hanzu 2009, 152.

the Săliște circle were elected. Archpriest Ioan Lupaș was elected president of the political body.⁵² In this capacity, he was actively involved in the organization of the people's meetings for signing the adhesion form. Bearing the title, 'Our Resolution,' it envisaged the union of 'the territories of the Romanian region of Transylvania, Bănat, Hungary, and Maramurăș with the Kingdom of Romania.' He also played an important role in organizing the assemblies for the election of delegates from Mărginimea Sibiului to the Great National Assembly in Alba-Iulia on 1 December 1918. Thus, on 12/25 November 1918, 1,690 people from Săliște signed the document 'Our Resolution.' At the top of the list was Dr. Ioan Lupaș and at the bottom was his wife, Ana Lupaș. Among the signatories there were two of the minor children in the archpriest's family, Semproniu Lupaș and Hortensia Lupaș, which testifies once again to Ioan Lupaș's firm attachment and unshakable commitment to the Romanian national cause.⁵³ Moreover, the enthusiastic example of Săliște was followed by all the Romanian localities in Mărginimea Sibiului between 25 November and 1 December 1918. The resolutions of accession to the union were signed by 6,975 people, as follows: Săliște 1,690, Jina 875, Rășinari 783, Tălmăcel 442, Poiana Sibiului 427, Tilișca 408, Orlat 391, Sadu 292, Mag 275, Aciliu 245, Vale 225, Săcel 190, Boița 147, Galeș 140, Amnaș 135, Poplaca 119, Cacova 96 and Râu Sadului 95.⁵⁴

Following the convening of the National Assembly by the Central Romanian National Council of Arad and the issuance of the regulation on the election of its deputies, the people of Săliște elected 12 deputies, as follows: Archpriest Ioan Lupaș, delegate from the Orthodox Deanery of Săliște; lawyer Nicolae Petra, second lieutenant Ioan St. Șteflea, locksmith Dumitru Moga and Dumitru Beju from the Council of the Săliște National Circle; Oprea Borcea jr. from the National Council of Săliște; doctor Nicolae Comșa and merchant Ionel Comșa from the House of Preservation in Săliște; Maria Iordache Roșca and Maria Oprea Borcia from the Society of Romanian Orthodox Women in Săliște; tanner Ioan Bucșan and blacksmith Daniil Bârsan from Săliște.⁵⁵ Their credentials were submitted to the secretariat of the Alba-Iulia assembly, being preserved in the collection of the Union documents from the National Museum of the Union in Alba Iulia. Together with the 12 elected and de jure deputies, Săliște sent an unofficial delegation consisting of 100 people who took part in the National Assembly in Alba Iulia. Among these people was Dumitru D. Roșca, a student at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Vienna, enlisted as a soldier in the Romanian National Guard in Săliște. He perfectly captured the atmosphere that reigned among the Romanians in Săliște and Mărginimea Sibiului in those days: 'After the date of the Great National Assembly had been announced, the whole of Mărginimea Sibiului fretted about the desire to go to Alba Iulia. But there was also the question of transport.'⁵⁶ 'The transport problem' and the severe weather conditions prevented most of the people of Săliște from travelling to Alba-Iulia. The research so far contends that, even in these difficult circumstances, a hundred of the inhabitants of Săliște, in addition to the 12 official delegates, participated in this great gathering, together

⁵² Boromiz 2019, 76.

⁵³ See the decision of the Săliște people in the original and in transcription in Tatu et alii 2018a, 231–265.

⁵⁴ Tatu et alii 2018a, 9–396; Boromiz 2019, 20–21.

⁵⁵ Boromiz 2019, 77–78, 127–140.

⁵⁶ Boromiz 2019, 79–80.

with 120 people from Galeș, 61 from Aciliu, 30 from Jina, and hundreds of others from around this area.⁵⁷

The journey of the people of Săliște to Alba Iulia began on the morning of 30 November 1918. After the delegates of the Săliște circle and a lot of inhabitants from the commune gathered in front of the House of Archpriest Ioan Lupaș, a short prayer was said and, ‘with the sign of the cross’ before a convoy of carriages and carts pulled by horses, pedestrians and riders was formed that moved towards Alba Iulia. On the way they were joined by other Romanians from Galeș, Tilișca, Apoldul de Sus and Apoldul de Jos. In Miercurea Sibiului the junction was made with another convoy of carts, led by Archpriest Simion Alămorean of Alămor. In the evening they reached Sebeș, by night time they were in Lancrăm, and at dawn on Sunday 1 December they crossed the Mureș heading for Alba Iulia. The teacher Alexandru Iosofin Săliște, a member of that convoy, was to recall, years later, the events and the euphoric atmosphere of that day. He wrote:

I can still see the great procession and can feel the thrill of the holy joy from the moment of departure. (...) Dressed for the holiday, we walked as if to a wedding, with the flags fluttering, singing the songs of our national revival. (...) In our joy we did not even notice the Germans who were slowly retreating on the side of the road to their country. On the morning of the historic day, we were moving towards the fortress of Bălgrad slowly because of the crowd that had gathered on the road from every corner of the country. We sang all the way, the whole Mureș Valley resounded with our voices. (...) Our pride was all the greater because we knew that we were led by one of the great fighters of our national cause.⁵⁸

Arriving in the city, the delegates attended the meeting in the Casina Hall (Military Circle), and the people gathered in *Câmpul lui Horea* [Horea’s Field]. A painting done by artist Dumitru Cabadaef in 1926, today kept in the Museum of the Deanery of Săliște, shows Ioan Lupaș dressed in clerical garb, up on the dais and speaking to the people gathered in *Câmpul lui Horea* about the decisions made in the Casina Hall, where the 1,228 delegates had adopted the ‘Resolution’ of the union of ‘all the Romanians in Transylvania, Banat and the Hungarian Country with Romania.’ In recognition of the role he played in the Union, Archpriest Lupaș was elected a member of the Great National Council and General Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Instruction of the Ruling Council, a political body that governed Transylvania until 1920.⁵⁹

Having returned to Săliște with his Romanian parishioners, on 21 November/4 December 1918, Archpriest Lupaș presided over the extraordinary meeting of the parish committee in the festive hall of the school, emphasizing, ‘in electrifying words, the outstanding decisions of the Assembly of Alba Iulia (...) to join this Romanian land to Romania,’ ardently wishing ‘that the joining of Transylvania and the Romanian parts of Hungary will be eternal and that Greater Romania will grow and flourish year after year.’⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Tatu et alii 2018a, 6.

⁵⁸ Iosof 1943, 392.

⁵⁹ Boromiz 2019, 84–85.

⁶⁰ Hanzu 2009, 152.

This was the most beautiful declaration of love for Greater Romania that anyone could have uttered in those days.

In the following months Archpriest Ioan Lupaş organized in Sălişte a series of celebrations in honor of illustrious personalities who visited Transylvania after the event of December 1, again playing very well the role of the undeniably charismatic leader of the local community of Sălişte. The series of these festive receptions was opened by the French General Henri Mathias Berthelot on 20 December 1918/2 January 1919.⁶¹ The head of the French military mission in Romania was received in the large square of Sălişte by thousands of Romanians from Mărginimea Sibiului, men, women and children dressed in folk costumes, carrying flags and posters with the inscriptions ‘Vive la France!’ and ‘Vive le grand general Berthelot!’ When the French general arrived in Sălişte, he was greeted with bread and salt, the choir singing ‘Bine aţi venit!’ [Welcome!] and ‘Trompetele răsună’ [The Trumpets Resound], followed by the welcome words spoken by Nicolae Comşa, prefect of Sibiu County, and by Archpriest Ioan Lupaş, who honored the general with the following short speech in Latin:

Most illustrious man and our cherished general!

On this very rare occasion please allow us to voice in Latin the untold joy that fills the heart of our nation, which can see you and greet you cordially in our village called Sălişte.

The news that you have, in the last two years, given tremendous help to our soldiers and liberators in the holy war waged for the Latinity and freedom of our entire nation has reached our ears. This is why we shall always pronounce your name with the greatest reverence. And because the Romanian people are accustomed to remembering the blessings they have received, we ask you to kindly receive the expression of our deepest thanks and this prosphora (bread hallowed in the altar of our church), these two wooden vessels, usually called *ploscă*, as glasses to be raised, this cheese prepared by our shepherds and these fabrics woven and embellished by the hands of our wives and daughters.

May the mercy of Almighty God and eternal glory be with you, with the blessed nation of France and with all its heroic and beloved sons for eternity.⁶²

A *hora* was danced next and other local popular dances in which the French general Berthelot was seen spinning ‘a clever young lady.’ Deeply impressed by such a ‘parade, which can rarely be seen,’ the general left Sălişte in the sound of the French anthem, sung by the local choir, and amid cheers from the hundreds of Romanians in Mărginimea Sibiului. Five months later, in May 1919, General Henri Mathias Berthelot sent the Sălişte commune council a telegram expressing his gratitude for the triumphal reception organized by the people of Sălişte: ‘Thank you from the bottom of my heart for your kind attention. I assure you that I will always have a special interest in the Romanian cause, which is so dear to me. I cannot leave Romania without leaving here a part of my heart.’⁶³

⁶¹ On the general’s Transylvanian tour, see Abrudan 2018, 107–111 or Tatu et alii 2018b, 119–176.

⁶² Lupaş 1918/1919, 546–547.

⁶³ Boromiz 2019, 512; Tatu et alii 2018b, 157.

What followed was the visit of Crown Prince Carol in April 1919, then of the royal family on 1 June 1919. King Ferdinand, Queen Mary and Princess Ileana were accompanied by an officer corps and greeted with enthusiasm by the people of Sălișteana in the large square of the village, headed by the Archpriest Ioan Lupaș, who gave a moving welcome speech. Father Lupaș stressed at that unique moment that ‘our people in Sălișteana and the neighboring villages have the most happy and unique opportunity to bow with humility and faith before Your Majesties, in which they see the embodiment of their age-old desire for national unity and freedom,’ ‘this great day’ being ‘the most wonderful moment in the life of our people in these areas: the moment of reward and redemption from the darkness of millennial suffering.’⁶⁴

The last visit organized by Archpriest Ioan Lupaș was that of Professor Nicolae Iorga, on 10 January 1920. The guest scholar was celebrated in the festive hall of the local school, being honored by a moving speech delivered by the archpriest, which evoked the personality of the scholar and the positive influence he exerted on the Romanian students in Budapest in the first decade of the twentieth century.⁶⁵

Professor Ioan Lupaș – a memorialist of the Great Union of 1918

Professor Ioan Lupaș did not write his memoirs systematically. The twilight of his life was marked by the Communist dungeon at Sighet, by the fear of the Communist repressive apparatus and, after his release from prison, by the uncertainty of tomorrow and the weakening of his bodily powers. His daughter Ioana Vlasiu confessed that the fear inoculated by the Securitate organs and his deep Christian spirit led him not to write his memoirs, nor to talk too much about the period of detention.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the teaching, publishing, and scientific activity of research on the historical past spared him from the temptation of systematically recording the events he had experienced. As a professor, he considered that the reconstruction of recent history was a difficult undertaking from a professional point of view, since the historian could be indebted to human passions.⁶⁷ However, several articles and texts, published by Ioan Lupaș in his long activity can be seen as belonging to the memorialistic genre, particularly those that referred to the moments and the people that visibly marked his life. Among these works are: *Amintiri din temnița ungiurească de la Seghedin* [Memories from the Hungarian Dungeon in Seghedin],⁶⁸ *O convorbire cu Dr. Augustin Bunea. Amintiri* [A Conversation with Dr. Augustin Bunea. Memories],⁶⁹ *Adunarea națională de la Alba Iulia* [The National Assembly of Alba Iulia],⁷⁰ *Câteva amintiri despre Regele Ferdinand* [Some Memories of King Ferdinand],⁷¹ *În amintirea unui prieten* [In Memory of a Friend],⁷² and *Câteva amintiri din copilăria și din*

⁶⁴ Lupaș 1937, 127–132; Boromiz 2019, 524–533.

⁶⁵ Crișan 2013, 42–43.

⁶⁶ Buculei 2000, 142–155.

⁶⁷ Lupaș 2018, 64.

⁶⁸ Lupaș 1937, 27–33.

⁶⁹ Lupaș 1909, 545–548.

⁷⁰ Lupaș 1919, 3–8.

⁷¹ Lupaș 1927, 267–276.

⁷² Lupaș 1931, 102–104.

tinereţea lui Octavian Goga [Some memories of Octavian Goga's Childhood and Youth].⁷³ Reading them reveals that they were written 'in the heat of the moment,' or immediately after the episodes of imprisonment in Szeged and of the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia, or after the demise of the personalities he evoked: the historian and canon Augustin Bunea, King Ferdinand I of Romania and his good friends, the priest Titu Morariu from Sebeş, and 'poet of our suffering,' Octavian Goga, his friend from adolescence.

The text about the National Assembly of Alba Iulia was published in the first issue of the literary magazine *Luceafărul* in 1919, whose faithful contributor Ioan Lupaş was throughout its existence. The article has a bipartite structure, the first part being a memorialistic text in which the author describes the events and reproduces the resolution of the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia, while the second part represents a historical-sentimental evocation of the figure of Voivode Michael the Brave, illustrated as a symbol and model of 'national unity,' as he appears in the memorable work of Nicolae Bălcescu. In fact, in this text, as in many others, the figure of the historian, teacher and philosopher Ioan Lupaş is revealed, as he does not engage in a simple scientific or pathetic reconstruction of an event or historical personality, but strives to extract lessons for his contemporaries and discover the meanings of history.

The preamble of Lupaş's reflection is the 'unbearable' situation of the Romanians in Transylvania after Romania's entry into the war and the decisive change of course once the United States joined the Entente forces. In his opinion, this intervention was a saving one for the 'oppressed nations of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,' their voice being able to give effect now to the 'postulates regarding freedom and national unity,' which triggered an 'untold joy' in the 'whole Romanian people': 'Everyone, child or grown-up, eagerly awaited the day when the declaration of the Romanian deputies in the Parliament of Budapest would resound, unleashing the downfall of millennial Hungary and the wretched idea of a Hungarian unitary national state.' Ioan Lupaş reproduced in his text his dialogue, from those days of the dissolution of the dual monarchy, with the soldier Toma Draşovean from Cunţa, considering the latter's retort as 'characteristic of the mindset of the Romanian nation in Transylvania': 'You should know, Father, that it is a wedding like never before, not even when the Green Emperor married his daughter to the Red Emperor did they have such a wedding. That is why we are so happy, because we are all going to the wedding.' In other words, the waves of joy that the Transylvanian Romanians were experiencing were likened to the atmosphere of joy typical of a wedding.⁷⁴

In the following lines, the memorialist Lupaş comes into play. He sketches his own vision of the memorable Sunday of 18 November/1 December 1918:

The National Assembly of Alba Iulia, although it was held in such an inappropriate time, when the roads were covered in snow and the train traffic was very arduous, but it exceeded all expectations. The interest of the people in the epochal decision they expected from this assembly was so great that they came by the tens and hundreds of thousands from the most remote lands: from the Banat occupied by the Serbs, as well as from Maramureş, Sătmar, Sălaj and distant Bihor, even from Ugocea. Those

⁷³ Lupaş 1938, 397–402.

⁷⁴ Lupaş 1919, 3.

who could not fit in trains, came on foot or in carts. The roads from Sibiu to Alba Iulia, passing through Săliște, Miercurea and Sebeș, were crowded on the eve of the Assembly with the beautiful groups of horse riders from Poiana and with a very large number of carts from all the villages of Sibiu County, who, under the flame of our proud tricolor, were rushing to Alba Iulia as if to an unprecedented feast. The peasants of Aciliu⁷⁵ said: ‘We are all going to Bălgrad to hear what our ruler say and decide, and if anyone happens to say different from what we wish, we’ll shoot him on the spot.’ But who could think or feel differently than that which enlivened the millions of Romanians? Or who would have dared to withhold the desire that burst with elemental power from all those chests filling the air with cries of joy: *Long Live Greater Romania!*⁷⁶

The assembly held in the hall of the Casina in Alba Iulia and on *Câmpul lui Horea* is described as follows:

On the morning of 1 December 1918 in the streets of Alba Iulia, only with great difficulty could you find a place. After the divine service, where ‘Awaken Thee, Romanian’⁷⁷ and the ‘March of the Romanian Legionary’⁷⁸ were sung instead of the *priceasna* (church hymn), the endless groups began to parade under the gate of Michael the Brave to the field where the People’s Assembly was to be held, and the 2,000 representatives of the electoral circles, churches and various establishments met in the military casina hall in the fortress. The crowd of over 100,000 listened to the speeches of Bishop Miron Cristea, Dr. Iuliu Hossu and Dr. Aurel Vlad, Dr. Aurel Lazăr, Dr. Saftu, Dr. S[ilviu] Dragomir about the great significance of the day and the decision to join Greater Romania. And the culminating points in the Assembly of Representatives were the speeches of Vasile Goldiș and Dr. Iuliu Maniu.⁷⁹

Lupaș then quotes extensively from the speeches of the two founders of the Union, limiting himself to making brief remarks on the two masterful speeches, stating that they aroused the ‘general approval’ of the audience and triggered several times the ‘unanimous and lively applause of the assembly’. Next, archpriest notes that ‘after the speeches of Mr. Goldiș and Mr. Maniu, the Assembly voted unanimously and with boundless enthusiasm’ the resolution proposed by Vasile Goldiș, which he reproduces in a slightly different version from that published and printed in the minutes of the assembly.⁸⁰ Then he recounts the creation of the Great National Council, and the Ruling Council, governing bodies of which was also to be a member:

⁷⁵ For details about their involvement in the event, see Vulcuțiu 2018.

⁷⁶ Lupaș 1919, 3–4

⁷⁷ This is the famous poem *An Echo* by Andrei Mureșanu, the 1848 revolutionary, on a melody by Anton Pan.

⁷⁸ The author of this hymn was the Orthodox catechist Dr. Ioan Broșu, a generation colleague of Silviu Dragomir and Nicolae Bălan, son of the Orthodox priest Ioan Broșu from Dârstele Brașovului, author of a book of sermons – published in Arad in 1917 – delivered during the first two years of the war in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Sibiu. See: Broșu 2018; Broșu 1918, 1.

⁷⁹ Lupaș 1919, 4.

⁸⁰ Lupaș 1919, 5–6.

In keeping with section 12, at the suggestion of Mr. Vaida, 150 members of the Romanian National Council were elected, and the National Assembly empowered the leadership of the Great Council to subsequently expand that number up to 250, ensuring that all the walks of life would have representatives in the Great Council, in the appropriate proportion. On 2 December, the members of the Great National Council also held their first meeting in the courtroom of Alba Iulia, electing the *Ruling Council*, which consisted of 15 members, as well as a delegation of 4 members (Dr. Miron Cristea, Dr. Iuliu Hossu, V[asile] Goldiș and Dr. Vaida) to present the decision to the National Assembly to His Majesty King Ferdinand, to the Romanian legislative bodies and to the representatives of the Allied Powers in Bucharest.⁸¹

The conclusion of the historian participating in those events is expressed in the following closing phrase:

What has been said so far has briefly outlined the chief moments of the *National Assembly of Alba Iulia*, which was the most wonderful day of triumph and celebration in the life of Transylvanian Romanians and of all Romanians. The imposing order in which our people showed up on this day of celebration astonished everyone. And the participation of the brothers from Bessarabia, Bukovina and the Kingdom contributed to sealing forever the Union of all Romanians into one state.⁸²

On 1 September 1919, Archpriest and Academy Member Ioan Lupaş was appointed, by the decree of the Ruling Council of Transylvania, Professor in the Department of the History of the Romanians and the History of Transylvania, at the new Romanian University of 'Dacia Superior' in Cluj, renamed, in 1927, the 'King Ferdinand I' University, in honor of the deceased sovereign, who had united the country. For the next two and a half decades, Ioan Lupaş served with dedication and professionalism the department of the university and he devoted himself, at the same time, to scientific research at the Institute of National History (which he founded on 1 February 1920). He was committed to disseminating knowledge of the history of Transylvania and of national Romanian history at the events organized by the University Extension and by the ASTRA Association, as well as to supervising the scientific and methodological work of the younger generation of historians at undergraduate and doctoral level. Among Professor Ioan Lupaş's doctoral students are a series of names that have become outstanding in Romanian historiography, such as priest Sebastian Stanca, Ioachim Crăciun, Ioan Moga, David Prodan, Aurel Decei, Dimitrie Braharu, Ștefan Pascu and Mihail P. Dan.⁸³

On the anniversary of one year since 'the great day of the National Assembly in Alba Iulia,' Ioan Lupaş wrote an editorial under the suggestive leitmotif *Toți împreună* [All Together], published, not coincidentally, in the first issue of the newspaper 'Dacia' in Bucharest. Although a year had passed, not without memorable events for Ioan Lupaş, the text still reflects the general enthusiasm experienced by the more than one hundred

⁸¹ Lupaş 1919, 6.

⁸² Lupaş 1919, 6.

⁸³ Edroiu et alii 2008, 41–50.

thousand Transylvanian Romanians on *Câmpul lui Horea* in the ancient citadel of Bălgrad, when it was decided democratically and by plebiscite that Transylvania should unite with Romania. In the author's opinion, the annexation of Transylvania and the Banat region to Greater Romania represented the culmination of a process that had begun in the spring of the same year, with the unification of Bessarabia, which continued with the union of Bukovina and was perfected by the proclamation of Alba Iulia – a process that had brought the majority of the Romanians within the boundaries of the same state.⁸⁴

At the end of a decade since the creation of Greater Romania, Ioan Lupaş was invited by the Sibiu Branch of the Astra Association to give a lecture on the *Union of Alba Iulia*. From the beginning, the historian – a participant in the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia – recognized the 'difficulty' of the theme of his conference, because the event he had been invited to speak about was a recent one. The truth was more difficult to bring to light, objectively, because 'ambitions and passions still unquenched try to obscure or distort it, exploiting it in the service of secular interests, often completely alien to any scientific concerns.' Ioan Lupaş did not want to play the game of those who had written about 1 December 1918 to display their own merits and to win the laurels of the makers of the Great Union. This idea clearly emerges from the following phrases of his conference:

'The role of appeasing the flame of passion and casting the veil of impartiality over the various factors that contributed to the historical event of ten years ago, which occurred as it had to occur, belongs to time itself. In particular, the analysis of personal factors is delicate and requires multiple reservations. A kind of egocentrism, explicable by the imperfection of human nature, causes some of our contemporaries to claim a totally exaggerated personal role in the unfolding of this event, which was not produced by the personal worthiness of any of those who are alive today, but by the age-old evolution of some mysterious powers, more significant and more complex than an individual or a generation.'⁸⁵

For this reason, the professor chose to avoid, in his lecture, references to 'the memory of anyone of those who claim personal merits,' and focused on the research of the 'historical factors which together produced the event of ten years ago.' He focused on 'the two concurrent historical processes: 1) the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and 2) the preparation of the Romanian national-political unity'. The text is a serious historical analysis of the antecedents and roots of the Great Union. The author does not insist on the unfolding of the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia for the simple reason that the event was well-known by all his contemporaries, 'either from their own experience or from the daily communications of those who had actively or passively participated in these historical events.' The professor preferred to explain and unravel complex historical causes and processes rather than to recall events in which he had participated as an important actor, reserving nevertheless the satisfaction of uttering, together with all the others, 'with satisfaction, the words: we were also present there!'⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Lupaş 2018, 97–100.

⁸⁵ Lupaş 2018, 64.

⁸⁶ Lupaş 2018, 63–80.

Conclusions

The archpriest and professor Ioan Lupaș asserted himself before the Great Union as one of the leading fighters of the Romanian national cause in Transylvania. Thrown into Hungarian prisons because of his unstoppable spoken and written ideas, with a commensurate echo in the Romanian society, Lupaș then settled in Sălișteea as the archpriest of Mărginimea Sibiului and became a member of the Romanian Academy. He strengthened the religious and national feelings of his parishioners in peacetime and in the difficult times of the First World War. Undeterred by the humiliation and the chicaneries of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, he made a major contribution in the autumn of 1918, both to the Romanians' peaceful take-over of the administration in Sibiu, and to the proper organization of the people of Sălișteea on the way to the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia, in which he took part, as one of the 1,228 official deputies. Appointed professor at the University of Dacia Superior in Cluj, Ioan Lupaș exerted a positive influence on Romanian historiography. His extensive historical, cultural and publishing work, as well as his involvement in the political life of interwar Romania brought him wide social and national fame. Ioan Lupaș played a central role among the historians who forged the Union of Transylvania with Romania, his memorialistic and analytical works having a special value for the reconstruction and understanding of this major event in the history of the Romanians. Written on the occasion of some anniversary moments of the Union of 1918, at the request of some institutions and publications, Lupaș's memorialist texts can be considered an incipient historiography of the Great Union. None of them puts emphasis on the role of the author in that year of grace, 1918, but they all outline the events and integrate them into a broader perspective of the history of the Romanians and of Transylvania. One of the main ideas in the text is that the union of the Romanians cannot be considered to be the outcome of the elite's efforts without the participation of the masses. On the contrary, it was the work of the entire people and of the elites that people had given birth to. Moreover, for Ioan Lupaș the Union of 1918 was not only the fulfilment of the plans and actions of contemporary actors, but the crowning of the cultural, spiritual and political aspirations and efforts of several generations.

Bibliography

- Abrudan 2018 M.-Gh. Abrudan, *Henri Mathias Berthelot și românii ardeleni: imaginea generalului francez în «Gazeta Poporului» de la Sibiu*, *Academica*, XXVIII/12 (December 2018), 107–111.
- Abrudan 2020 M.-Gh. Abrudan, *De la amvon, universitate și academie în beciurile 'Securității Poporului': arestarea preotului profesor dr. Ioan Lupaș în 'noaptea demnitarilor' (5–6 mai 1950)*, *Îndrumător bisericesc*, 168 (2020), 164–191.
- Albani 1938 T. Albani (ed.), *Douăzeci de ani de la Unire. Monografie comemorativă a Unirii*, vol. I, Oradea 1938.
- Bârlea 2004 E. Bârlea, *Perspectiva lumii rurale asupra Primului Război Mondial*, Cluj-Napoca 2004.
- Benga 2016 D. Benga, *Istoria și semnificația clopotului și a toacei în Biserica Ortodoxă*, București 2016.

- Boromiz 2019 M. Boromiz (ed.), *Mărginenii Sibiului pentru Marea Unire*, Sibiu 2019.
- Broșu 2018 I. Broșu, *Casa de la Ierihon. Omilii și cuvântări bisericești*, ed. and introductory study by Pr. Constantin Necula, Sibiu 2018.
- Broșu 1918 I. Broșu, *Marșul legionarilor români*, *Gazeta Poporului*, I/46 (Sibiu, 17 November 1918), 1.
- Buculei, 2000 T. Buculei, *Clio încarcerată. Mărturii și opinii privind destinul istoriografiei românești în epoca totalitarismului comunist*, Brăila 2000.
- Cosma 2020 E. Cosma (ed.), *Patrimoniul istorico-juridic românesc din Mărginimea Sibiului (Rășinari, Săliște)*, Cluj-Napoca/Gatineau, 2020.
- Crăciun 1943 I. Crăciun, Bibliografia. In: *Omagiu lui Ioan Lupaș la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani. August 1940*, București 1943, XXVII–LXVIII.
- Crișan 2013 V. Crișan, *Ioan Lupaș (1880–1967). Studiu monografic*, Sibiu, 2013.
- Deteșan 2015 D. Deteșan, *Ațiuni caritabile din protopopiatul ortodox Săliște în timpul primului război mondial*. In: I. Bolovan, Gh. Cojocaru, O. M. Tămaș (eds.), *Primul război mondial – perspectivă istorică și istoriografică*, Cluj-Napoca, 2015, 535–549.
- Edroiu 2017 N. Edroiu, *Ioan Lupaș – ctitor și codirector al Institutului de Istorie Națională din Cluj (1920–1945)*, *Tabor*, XI/7 (2017), 21–28.
- Edroiu et alii 2008 N. Edroiu, Al. Moraru, D. Man, V. Turcuș, *Ioan Lupaș (1880–1967): slujitor al științelor istorice, învățământului și Bisericii*, Cluj-Napoca 2008.
- Gazeta Transil. 1916 *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, LXXIX/110, Brașov (24 May/6 June 1916), 2.
- Grosu 1990 V. Grosu (ed.), *Săliștea Sibiului, străveche vatră românească*, Sibiu 1990.
- Hanzu 2009 M. Hanzu, *Monografia școlilor din Săliște Sibiu*, Sibiu, 2009.
- Holom 2006 E. C. Holom, *Sunet și sensibilități colective: funcția socială a clopotelor în comunitățile românești din Transilvania (sec. XIX–XX)*, Cluj-Napoca 2006.
- Iosof 1943 Al. Iosof, *Amintiri din activitatea profesorului Dr. Ion Lupaș*. In: *Omagiu lui Ioan Lupaș la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani. August 1940*, București 1943, 386–393.
- Irimie et alii 1985 C. Irimie, N. Dunăre, P. Petrescu (eds.), *Mărginenii Sibiului. Civilizație și cultură populară românească*, București 1985.
- Lăpădat 1943 D. Lăpădat, *Amintiri dintr-o viață închinată binelui obștesc*. In: *Omagiu lui Ioan Lupaș la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani. August 1940*, București 1943, 463–476.
- Lupaș 1904 I. Lupaș, *Az erdélyi görög-keleti egyház és a vallás-unio a XVIII század folyamán*, Ph.D. thesis, Budapesti Tudományegyetem, Budapest 1904.

- Lupaș 1911 I. Lupaș, *Mitropolitul Andrei Șaguna. Monografie istorică* (2nd edn.), Sibiu 1911.
- Lupaș 1916 I. Lupaș, *‘Mângăiați poporul!’ Cuvântări bisericești*, Sibiu 1916.
- Lupaș 1918 I. Lupaș, *Căzut-a cununa capului nostru. Cuvântări funebreale*, Arad 1918.
- Lupaș 1937 I. Lupaș, *Paralelism istoric*, București 1937.
- Lupaș 1977 I. Lupaș, *Scrieri alese I*, introduction, ed., notes, and commentaries by Șt. Pascu and P. Teodor, Cluj-Napoca 1977.
- Lupaș 1988 I. Lupaș, *Din istoria Transilvaniei*, ed., notes, and commentaries by M. Vlasiu, foreword by Fl. Constantiniu, București 1988.
- Lupaș 1999 I. Lupaș, *Mitropolitul Andrei Șaguna. Monografie*, afterword by M. Albastru, București, 1999.
- Lupaș 2004 I. Lupaș, *Biserica ortodoxă română din Transilvania și unirea religioasă în cursul veacului al XVIII-lea*, ed., introduction, and notes by C. Teodor, Târgu Mureș 2004.
- Lupaș 2006 I. Lupaș, *Căzut-a cununa capului nostru*, (2nd edn.), ed. by Dorel Man, Cluj-Napoca 2006.
- Lupaș 2006 I. Lupaș, *Scrieri alese. Vol. I. Studii asupra istoriei evului mediu și istoriei bisericești*, N. Edroiu (ed.), București 2006.
- Lupaș 2007 I. Lupaș, *Scrieri alese. Vol. II. Studii privind istoria modernă*, ed. by C. Mureșanu, București 2007.
- Lupaș 2007 I. Lupaș, *Cuvântări bisericești*, ed. and introductory study by D. Man, Cluj-Napoca 2007.
- Lupaș 2011 I. Lupaș, *Istoria bisericească a românilor ardeleni*, introduction, notes, and commentaries by D. Radosav (3rd edition), Cluj-Napoca 2011.
- Lupaș 2018 I. Lupaș, *Prăbușirea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare și Importanța istorică a zilei de 1 Decembrie 1918*, ed., introductory study, notes, and index by M.-Gh. Abrudan, Cluj-Napoca 2018.
- Lupaș 1909 I. Lupaș, *O convorbire cu Dr. Augustin Bunea. Amintiri*, *Lucașfărul*, VIII /24 (16 December 1909), 545–548.
- Lupaș 1916 I. Lupaș, *Clopotele...*, *Foaia Poporului*, 24/15, Sibiu (2/15 April 1916), 1–2.
- Lupaș 1916 I. Lupaș, *Adio clopotelor...*, *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, LXXIX/110 (24 May/6 June 1916), 1.
- Lupaș 1918 I. Lupaș, *Un sfat creștinesc către toți fiii națiunii române*, *Românul*, VII/11 (8/21 November 1918), 2.
- Lupaș 1918/1919 I. Lupaș, *Cuvânt latinesc de bineventare*, *Telegraful Român*, LXVI/149–150 (25 December 1918/7 January 1919), 546–547.
- Lupaș 1919 I. Lupaș, *Adunarea națională de la Alba Iulia*, *Lucașfărul*, XIV/1 (1 January 1919), 3–8.
- Lupaș 1927 I. Lupaș, *Câteva amintiri despre Regele Ferdinand*, *Transilvania*, 59/7 (1927), 267–276.

- Lupaș 1931 I. Lupaș, *În amintirea unui prieten*, Revista Teologică, XXI/3 (1931), 102–104.
- Lupaș 1938 I. Lupaș, *Câteva amintiri din copilăria și din tinerețea lui Octavian Goga*, Țara noastră, XVII/13–14 (29 May 1938), 397–402.
- Opriș 2004 I. Opriș, *Istoricii și Securitatea*, București 2004.
- Păcurariu 1986 M. Păcurariu, *Politica statului ungar față de Biserica românească din Transilvania în perioada dualismului (1867-1918)*, București 1986.
- Păcurariu 2014 M. Păcurariu, *Dicționarul teologilor români* (3rd revised edn.), Sibiu 2014.
- Păcurariu 2015 M. Păcurariu, *Cărturari sibieni de altădată* (revised edn.), Sibiu 2015.
- Păcurariu 2016 M. Păcurariu, *230 de ani de învățământ teologic la Sibiu 1786–2016* (revised edn.), Sibiu 2016.
- Petruțiu 2000 S. N. Petruțiu, *Cronica neamului Lupaș*, Sibiu 2000.
- Pleșa 2008 L. Pleșa, *Istoricul Ioan Lupaș în timpul regimului comunist*, Caietele CNSAS, I/2 (2008), 165–198.
- Pleșa 2017 Liviu Pleșa, *Istoriografia clujeană sub supravegherea Securității (1945-1965)*, Târgoviște, 2017.
- Rusu et alii 2016 D. N. Rusu, M. Porumb, S. Mândruț, *Membrii Academiei Române din Transilvania 1866–2016. Dicționar*, București – Cluj-Napoca 2016.
- Sofronie 1980 M. Sofronie, *Ioan Lupaș protopop la Săliște (1909–1919)*, Mitropolia Ardealului, XXV/7–9 (1980), 703–709.
- Stanca 2015 S. Stanca, *Contribuția preoțimii române din Ardeal la războiul pentru întregirea neamului (1916-1919)*, ed., introductory study, notes, and indices by M.-O. Groza and M.-Gh. Abrudan, Cluj-Napoca – Deva 2015.
- Stricatu 2017 I. Stricatu, *Pe cărările destinului. Romanul unei vieți trăite (1914-1918)*, ed., introductory study, notes, and indices by M.-O. Groza, G.-M. Nisipeanu, I.-M. Morariu, Cluj-Napoca 2017.
- Tatu et alii 2018a Al. Tatu, S. Borș, B. Andriescu, *Participanți din localități sibiene la Marea Adunare Națională de la Alba Iulia din 1 Decembrie 1918*, Sibiu – Cluj-Napoca 2018.
- Tatu et alii 2018b Al. Tatu, S. Borș, B. Andriescu, *Franța. O inimă care a bătut pentru Marea Unire*, Sibiu – Cluj-Napoca 2018.
- Țața 2006 D. Țața, *Istoria religioasă a românilor din ‘Scaunul Săliștii’*, Sibiu 2006.
- Vulcuțiu 2018 I. Vulcuțiu, *Aciliu. O picătură de suflet pentru România Mare*, București 2018.
- Wünsch 2007 W. Wünsch, *Der Auftrag der Kulturorthodoxie. Ein Beitrag zum Wirken des Protopresbyters Dr. Ioan Lupaș*, Series Academia, EAS/EAT, Band II / Vol. II, București 2007.
- Wünsch 2017 W. Wünsch, *Ioan Lupaș – Protopop de Săliște (1909-1919)*, Tabor, XI/7 (2017), 72–84.

A ‘HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION’ THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN TREATY OF 1996

MARIUS MUREȘAN*

Abstract: This article analyses Romania’s foreign policy during the transition from communism to democracy, between 1990 and 1996, through the lens of its relations with Hungary. These were conditioned by the historical background, antagonistic feelings best describing public opinion attitudes in the two states. The analysis considered the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the way in which inter-ethnic tensions (such as the street fights in Târgu-Mureș in March 1990) influenced diplomatic cooperation, as well as the way in which the political class positioned on this issue. The study focuses on the adoption of the ‘Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good neighborliness concluded between Romania and the Republic of Hungary,’ a condition for the acceptance of the two countries in the negotiations for accession to NATO and the European Union. The tortuous process that led to the signing of this document was analyzed through the lens of specialized literature, but also by reference to some decision-makers at that time, such as the US ambassador to Romania, Alfred H. Moses, or President Ion Iliescu. As regards the reactions of politicians and the media in both states to the signing of the treaty, in the context of the Romanian electoral campaign that was taking place at that time, sources from the written press were used, *Evenimentul Zilei* and *Adevărul* being the most widely read dailies.

Keywords: diplomacy, reconciliation, Romanian-Hungarian relations, Euro-Atlantic integration, treaty.

Rezumat: Articolul de față analizează politica externă a României în perioada tranziției de la comunism la democrație, între 1990 și 1996, prin intermediul relațiilor cu Ungaria. Acestea au fost condiționate de raporturile istorice existente, sentimentele antagonice descriind cel mai bine atitudinea opiniei publice din cele două state. În cadrul analizei s-a avut în vedere situația minorității maghiare din România și modul în care tensiunile inter-etnice (așa cum au fost luptele de stradă de la Târgu-Mureș din martie 1990) au influențat cooperarea diplomatică, dar și modul în care s-a poziționat clasa politică. Punctul central al studiului este constituit de adoptarea ‘Tratatului de înțelegere, cooperare și bună vecinătate încheiat între România și Republica Ungară,’ o condiție pentru acceptarea celor două țări în cadrul negocierilor pentru aderarea la NATO și Uniunea Europeană. Parcursul sinuos care a condus la semnarea acestui document a fost analizat prin intermediul literaturii de specialitate, dar și a unor factori de decizie de la acel moment, precum ambasadorul SUA în România, Alfred H. Moses, sau președintele Ion Iliescu. Despre reacțiile la adresa semnării tratatului, din partea politicienilor și presei din ambele state, în contextul campaniei electorale din România care avea loc la acel moment, au fost utilizate surse din presa scrisă, *Evenimentul Zilei* și *Adevărul* fiind cotidienele cele mai citite.

Cuvinte cheie: diplomație, reconciliere, relațiile româno-maghiare, integrare euro-atlantică, tratat

* Ph.D., Instructor of record, Faculty of History and Philosophy, ‘Babeș-Bolyai’ University, Cluj-Napoca, email: muresan.marius91@gmail.com

Introduction

The year 1989 marked the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which led to the beginning of a process of transition to democracy and reform of societies. In the literature, historians and political scientists have referred to the 1990s as a paradigm of transition, which coexisted with Samuel Huntington's theory of the *third wave* of democracy. Some of these views, exemplified by the historian Florin Abraham, belong to the political scientists Markus I. Kurtz and Andrew Barnes, who consider that there was a direct link between the structure of society and the consistency of democratization, while Geoffrey Pidham suggests that the determining factor was the foreign element. According to the latter, the influence of the allogeneic factor can be exercised either directly, through presence in one territory, or indirectly, considering, for example, the withdrawal of the influence of the USSR from certain states as an element that fostered a process of democratization of society.¹ They are opposed by Thomas Carothers, an American author who questions the paradigm of transition, considering that, in the last decade of the twentieth century, the promoters of democracy expanded the model of transition as a universal paradigm for understanding democracy from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to Africa, which was a mistake.² At the basis of his theory is that the removal of a dictatorial regime does not ensure the success of the transition, unless there is a prior liberalization of the original regime, leading to its own downfall, followed by the slow development and consolidation of democratic institutions. In addition to that, some assumptions need to be abandoned. In time it is proved that: some countries were not, in fact, engaged in a transition to democracy, not all countries have followed a three-step process of democratization, the holding of free elections did not ensure, in all cases, the legitimacy of those elected to power, the actions of the political elite are not enough, to the detriment of the role played by the economic factors, and the political and socio-cultural tradition of the respective country.³ These interpretative frameworks lead us to consider, relative to the Romanian-Hungarian treaty, seen as part of the transition and transformation of the two countries, perspectives such as: the existence of a favorable context and alignment with a regional trend, the involvement of a third factor, with a mediating role, and the functioning of the respective societies, starting from political traditions and continuing with the specific local economic and societal features.

Referring particularly to the subject of the bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary, the literature offers other models of analysis that must be considered. For example, analyzing the Hungarian State's legislation on ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states within the broad framework of the post-communist transition, Kinga Gál considers an interpretative model in which the signing of bilateral treaties in the 1990s was a first after the Second World War, given the bilateral codification of relations between the state of origin, the minority and the host state. In addition, they formed the basis of regulations discussed and subsequently adopted by international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Venice Commission.⁴ This type of approach was formulated

¹ Abraham 2006a, 21.

² Carothers 2002, 6.

³ Carothers 2002, 17.

⁴ Gál, 2004, 396–398.

immediately after the fall of the communist regime by József Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary, and then became an official policy and part of the process of transition and regional cooperation.

In the case of the present subject, that of the signing of the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty in 1996, we opted for a hybrid system of interpretation. The first component admits the *center-periphery model*, according to which external factors, especially through the involvement of the United States of America, ultimately influenced and determined the signing of the treaty. The second also considers the point of view of Th. Carothers regarding the interpretation of the historical process, in the conditions in which economic and social factors both in Romania and Hungary created the premises of mutual understanding. At stake was the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration of the two countries, conditioned by the resolution of bilateral problems, especially with regard to minorities. In other words, the progress made by the two states was part of a trend in Central and South-Eastern Europe towards the democratization of society, in which the influence void created after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation's concerns about internal problems, or shrouded in the crisis caused by the Chechnya War of 1994–1996, was replaced by Western soft diplomacy. To give an example, as early as January 1990, European Commissioner Frans Andriessen visited Romania,⁵ arguing for the need to strengthen democracy and hold elections. He stated that negotiations on exchanges and the cooperation agreement would begin soon, which revealed an active *Ostpolitik* based on the principle of concentric circles. A number of observers saw it as a compromise whereby Eastern Europe was included in Europe, but maintained an essential difference between the Community, as the main player, and those who were helped by it. In the case of the United States of America, the proximity to these states was made through economic instruments, such as the granting the *Most Favored Nation clause*, and through diplomatic means, for instance, through embassies and official channels of communication between the President of the United States and the leaders of the former communist states.

In order to support the model of interpretation, which endorses the hypothesis of the present research, namely, the fact that the United States played a leading role in the signing of the Treaty between Romania and Hungary in 1996, which turned into a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic integration of both countries, we have proposed an architecture in which the analysis is carried out diachronically. The starting point concerns Romanian-Hungarian relations, which are the subject of the first subchapter. We took into account the historical elements, but especially the developments that followed in the first half of 1990: the interethnic tensions on the territory of Romania, the positioning of political factors regarding the events, the way in which they rendered the prospect of a future reconciliation questionable. I wanted to point out that in the absence of a third actor, compromise would have been almost impossible to achieve. That is why the following subchapter is focused on the role played by the United States of America in the relations between Romania and Hungary, following, step by step, the progress made and its correlation with the involvement of the American factor. The last part looks at the period after the signing of the treaty through the lenses of the written press in Romania and Hungary, but also at the positions adopted by the political people of the two states.

⁵ Smith 2004, 62.

Like any study that addresses a topic of recent history, careful criticism of the sources is required. It should be said that the type of sources used, as well as the method of analysis, differ from one subchapter to another. The first subchapter, regarding the evolution of Romanian-Hungarian relations, has a classical structure, of a diachronic type, in which the events are presented through the Romanian written press and the secondary sources in which the subject is examined. In the Romanian historiography, Florin Abraham's analyses stand out: they embrace a globalizing viewpoint and are applied to the process of transforming Romania internally and becoming connected to Euroatlanticism. Regarding the events in Târgu-Mureș in March 1990, a complete analysis was undertaken to the historians Márton László and Zoltán Csaba Novák. In the second part, the study draws on memorialistic sources, authored by former President Ion Iliescu and Alfred H. Moses, the American ambassador in Bucharest during the signing of the treaty. To these are added the debates in the US Congress, brought together by Professor Vasile Pușcaș in the volume *Sticks and Carrots*. They offer a complex picture of the process itself, presenting the official perspective offered by the debates of the US Congressmen, as well as the personal impressions of some decision-makers. Moreover, in order to put the signing of the treaty in a broader context, I resorted to information about the 1996 Romanian presidential elections from the volume *Destinația Controceni*, authored by Marius Mureșan, and *Cea mai bună dintre lumile posibile*, written by Bogdan Theodorescu, Dorina Guțu and Radu Enache. The last part, concerning the signing of the treaty and the reactions of public opinion, analyses a series of articles published by the most read Romanian dailies of 1996, *Evenimentul zilei* and *Adevărul*. They provide an overview of the state of mind of Romanian politicians, in the particular context of the signing of the treaty at the very beginning of the election campaign. One of the main limitations of the research is the limited access to Hungarian-language sources, especially as regards the print media, as this would have completed the analysis. Another limitation is the lack of archival sources. Therefore, the present research can be further developed by showing the extent of the involvement of the United States of America in mediating the relations between the two countries as some of the documents from the diplomatic archives have ceased to be secret and access to them is facilitated by publishing them, along with the doubling of the information about the Romanian and the Hungarian visions of the period 1990–1996, either through memoirs, or through official sources.

Romanian-Hungarian relations after the fall of the communist regime

In the wake of the 1989 Revolution, after nearly half a century in which the dominant issues of the society had been related to the lack of rights and freedoms of the citizens, i.e. the economic scarcity that affected large parts of the population, the topics promoted by the decision-makers were new (the criticism of the interwar political parties that resumed their activity at the beginning of the 1990s, of the monarchy, etc.), and the great Other of the Romanian people, the Hungarian community, was reactivated in the popular consciousness. Florin Abraham points out that in the immediate post-communist era, the Hungarian issue had its roots in two key areas: on the one hand, László Tókéş was considered to be a catalyst for the Revolution

of 1989,⁶ with Hungarian support for the fall of the Ceaușescu regime; on the other hand, the appeal to events in history, from the medieval period and, continuing into the present, to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, and the Vienna Diktat of 1940.⁷

In this way, the interpretation of the realities of the new world, which took the place of socialism (whose stance envisaged integrating all the states on the eastern side of the former Iron Curtain), can only be understood through an analysis of the current state of affairs in the two states, where populism and nationalism have been described as two of the main features (as has been the case in most of Central and Eastern Europe). In the early years of democracy, József Antall was at the head of the conservative Hungarian government. He was the representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), whose rhetoric, largely symbolical, was dominated by the idea of national revival through the recreation of Greater Hungary, which was possible only by the abolition of the Treaty of Trianon.⁸ He projected himself as 'prime minister for 15 million Hungarians.'⁹ On the other hand, in Romania, during the popular movements of December 1989, power was assumed by the Council of the *Frontul Salvării Naționale* (FSN, National Salvation Front), which presented itself as an instrument designed to ensure the provisional governance until the organization of free elections, with the aim of establishing a genuine democracy. Its leader was Ion Iliescu, who became the main representative of the country's leadership.¹⁰ The response of the Romanian authorities to the statements of the rulers of the neighboring state was marked by a reactive nationalism, through which the problem of minorities, specific to the interwar period, was reenergized.

Over the past three decades, the relationship between Romania and Hungary can be divided into several stages: between 1989 and 1994, the first few governments appealed to nationalism and relations between them were frozen; between 1995 and 1996, there was a transition to normal thanks to negotiations on the treaty between the two countries; between 1997 and 2005, there was an improvement of cooperation, especially from 2000 to 2004, which coincided with a period of socialist governments in Bucharest and Budapest;¹¹ after 2005, there was a gradual degradation, due largely to the leaders of the two countries and the rhetoric of President Traian Băsescu (2004 to 2012) and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (since 2010).

In order to understand more clearly the attitude of the general population and the approach of the political class to diplomatic relations between the two countries, it is necessary to take into account the developments that took place in the first few months of 1990, because disagreements between the two countries expanded also because of various

⁶ The Romanian revolution began in Timișoara on 16 December 1989, when the population protested that the communist authorities had ordered Pastor László Tőkés to evacuate his home. This was the result of actions that had defied with the Ceaușescu regime: Tőkés opposed the systematization of villages, gave interviews in the foreign press, organized cultural activities not approved by the authorities, etc. After the events in Timișoara, the popular uprising spread throughout the country and led to the collapse of the communist regime.

⁷ Abraham 2006a, 247.

⁸ Abraham 2006a, 249.

⁹ Vădean 2011, 65. All the quotations and transcriptions in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

¹⁰ Mureșan 2019, 21.

¹¹ Abraham 2006a, 248.

events in Romania. The anti-Hungarian discourse was promoted both by political leaders and by organizations such as the *Vatra Românească* (VR, Romanian Hearth),¹² which played an important role in propagating this rhetoric against the *Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România* (UDMR, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania).¹³ For example, the mayor of Târgu-Mureș, Ioan Judea, argued that ‘Hungarians became arrogant, defiant and tried to impose their privileges at any cost.’¹⁴ The date of 20 March 1990, recorded the most violent civil clashes since the revolution, and they broke out in Târgu-Mureș.

The starting point can be identified in January 1990, when the decision was made that the ‘Alexandru Papiu Ilarian’ High School should operate only in Romanian, while the ‘Bolyai Farkas’ High School should have Hungarian as the teaching language. This caused protests on both sides. Following the position of the Institute of Medicine and Pharmacy, the Hungarian students requested the separation of higher education according to the languages of instruction. The Revolution of 1848¹⁵ was celebrated, the date of 15 March being considered, since 1991, the National Day of Hungarians all around the world. On this occasion, wreaths decorated with the Hungarian flag were laid, while the nationalists hoped for ‘changing the Treaty of Trianon.’¹⁶ Simultaneously, several statues representing Romanian leaders of the national emancipation movement, such as Nicolae Bălcescu in Sovata or Avram Iancu in Târgu-Mureș, were desecrated or destroyed. In the latter case, the perpetrators were not caught, but the leaders of the *Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională al județului Mureș* (Provisional Council of National Union in Mureș County) appealed to the population to identify the culprits.¹⁷ These accumulated events created a state of social tension, fueled also by newspaper articles published at that time. László and Novák provide an example of this assumption: the positions taken by the newspaper *Cuvântul liber*, which overtly lambasted manifestos of the Hungarian diaspora concerning the so-called genocide against the Hungarian community in Romania, versus the statements of some leaders of the VR who claimed the language and culture of the Romanian people were under serious threat.¹⁸ This organization was also perceived by foreign observers who participated in the electoral campaign of 20 May 1990 as a disruptive element for those who pursued interethnic harmony. The criticism of the opponents concerned the labelling of some ethnic groups as ‘foreign elements, who never had their home on our land.’¹⁹ The days of 16–19 March can be considered a preamble to the bloody events that

¹² VR is a non-governmental organization, founded in Târgu-Mureș in early 1990. In its manifesto, it assumes nationalism and patriotism, considering itself a reply to the emergence of UDMR. It proclaimed itself as ‘an organization of Romanian spirituality in Transylvania,’ ‘an expression of the identity of those who feel and speak Romanian in that part of the country,’ The main artisan was Radu Ceontea, an artist and a member of the editorial staff of the magazine *Vatra*. See Gallagher 1992, 575.

¹³ The first Congress of the UDMR took place in April 1990, but the foundations of this association of the Hungarian community in Romania, which included territorial organizations, opinion groups and associate members, were laid on 25 December 1989, immediately after the collapse of the communist regime. See Teodorescu, Gutu, Enache 2005, 225.

¹⁴ László, Novák 2016, 121.

¹⁵ Mureșan 2019, 22.

¹⁶ Abraham 2006b, 427.

¹⁷ László, Novák 2016, 133.

¹⁸ László, Novák 2016, 133.

¹⁹ NRIIA, NDIIA 1991, 48.

followed. Dailies such as *Adevărul* or *Cuvântul liber* presented the case of Pharmacy no. 28, where the Romanian signboard was replaced with one in Hungarian. Pharmacist Emese Körmöczki, who was said to have refused to serve Romanian customers, defended herself, claiming that she did not get into contact with the public and that the installation of bilingual inscriptions had been decided by the FSN itself at the beginning of the year. An investigation by the Ministry of Health proved her innocence.²⁰ The consequences were disproportionate to the act itself: soon, spontaneous rallies were organized in the city and they quickly degenerated into violence. What was less widespread was the information that on 19 March 1990, about 5,000 Romanians and Hungarians had marched through the streets of Cluj-Napoca, protesting against attempts to fuel tensions between them.²¹

The consequences of the events of March 1990 can be interpreted in both practical terms, considering the victims, 3 dead and 269 injured, and symbolically, in terms of the statistical significance for inter-ethnic relations and the capacity of the Romanian state to handle such a crisis. Abraham identified the following in the second category: the worsening of relations between the majority and the minority, the growing sense of mistrust and mutual suspicion, the fact that the institutions did not act decisively to keep violence in check, and the signals transmitted to the outside regarding the difficulties Romania was facing in its transition to democracy.²² At the same time, the authorities were reproached for reacting slowly, although the signs of social unrest were there. Provisional President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman limited themselves to describing the violence, euphemistically, as 'regrettable events.'²³ The easing of the tensions – the protests had also occurred in other cities – was also possible through the joint statement made by VR and UDMR of 22 March, when they reiterated issues such as: an equidistant reporting of the events in Târgu-Mureş, in line with reality, the UDMR's public acknowledgment of the territorial integrity of Romania and the VR's dissemination of this position among the Romanian community, the cessation of political strikes and demonstrations in Mureş County, etc.²⁴

Former President Ion Iliescu claimed, post-factum, that the violent clashes in Târgu-Mureş were a prelude to the developments of nationalist and secessionist movements in the Balkans,²⁵ but the facts had been intentionally distorted to the detriment of the Romanians. He gave the example of Mihai Cofariu, who had been wounded in the center of Târgu-Mureş but was presented as an ethnic Hungarian in the international press.²⁶ The same view was shared by the second president of the post-communist period, Emil Constantinescu, who pointed out that the above-referenced article, published by an Irish journalist, had wrongly assigned the guilt for the violent events of March 1990 and that Romania's image was therefore seriously affected.²⁷

²⁰ László, Novák 2016, 147–148.

²¹ Gallagher 1992, 576.

²² Abraham 2006b, 428.

²³ Gallagher 1992, 577.

²⁴ László, Novák 2016, 183.

²⁵ Teodorescu et alii 2005, 37.

²⁶ Iliescu 2011, 92.

²⁷ Teodorescu et alii 2005, 37–38.

These conflicts, to which the Romanian authorities could not give an immediate solution, further destabilized relations between the two states. To respond to the violence in Transylvania, Hungary defined the Hungarian community in Romania as a component of the security of the Hungarian nation, and the reply offered by the authorities in Budapest led to attempts to isolate Romania geopolitically: in 1993 they tried to block the entry of the Romanian state into the Council of Europe, the headquarters of the Eurocarpathian region, from which Romania was excluded, was set up in Debrecen, Romania was not invited in the Trilateral of Visegrád, and President Iliescu was not asked by Hungarian President Árpád Göncz to attend the meeting of the Central European Initiative.²⁸

The United States of America, a mediator of Romanian-Hungarian relations

Beyond the hypothesis of direct American involvement in the resolution of diplomatic differences between Romania and Hungary and their shared awareness of the need to embark on a Euro-Atlantic path of development, the international context proved to be particularly important for the signing of the treaty in 1996. In this regard, we will focus, briefly, on four directions. First, after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, its last shreds of influence in the region disappeared. Boris Yeltsin's seizure of power meant the beginning of the reformation of the Russian state, through the adoption of a new constitution, the country's joining of the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and its rapprochement to the West. Moreover, the outbreak of the War in Chechnya in 1994 led to the Russian Federation no longer having the status of a great power in the ex-socialist space. Secondly, since 1993 and the Copenhagen European Council, clear criteria for the admission of new states to the European Union were in place. These were met with generally positive attitudes by the member states, especially for reasons of political stability and security. Thus, prior to the Amsterdam European Council of 1997, the principle of eastward expansion was accepted and paved the way for achieving the goal formulated by the slogan 'From the Atlantic to the Urals.'²⁹ Thirdly, the experience of the Balkans in the 1990s provided a negative example of how interstate disputes could be resolved. In the first post-communist decade there were many conflicts, including the Slovenian War (1991), the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995), the Bosnian War (1992–1995), followed by the Kosovo War (1998–1999) and others on the territory of Serbia or Macedonia. The last elements that spurred the resolution of geostrategic differences between Romania and Hungary were the NATO's willingness to integrate several Central-Eastern European states and the European Union's eastward expansion. Thus, a treaty of understanding between Romania and Hungary was required in order to comply with the Perry Principle on NATO³⁰ expansion.

Former U.S. ambassador to Romania, Alfred H. Moses, admits that President Ion Iliescu's rhetoric on the historical injustices suffered by the Romanians in Transylvania

²⁸ Abraham 2006a, 249–250.

²⁹ Bardi, Rhodes, Nello, 2002, 227.

³⁰ Former Secretary of Defence in the administration led by U.S. President Bill Clinton, William J. Perry supported the collaboration between Eastern Europe's new democracies and NATO through the Partnership for Peace, seen as a compromise between their desire for membership and Russia's opposition. In addition, with a view to full membership, a long list of political and military steps had to be taken. They remained known as the 'Perry principles', such as collective defence, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security.

during the Hungarian occupation tempered when NATO membership was seen as a real possibility.³¹ The Most Favored Nation clause awarded by the US in 1993 also contributed to this.³² The difficulties encountered by such a process were also made aware by American decision-makers. In a speech in the US Senate, Senator Joseph I. Lieberman admitted the different cultural traditions of the two states, as well as the fact that politicians on both sides had an interest in both repressing cultural and ethnic minorities and amplifying old tensions. The Yugoslav negative example was given to support the need for such an approach of the US authorities.³³ Moreover, among the facilitating elements was the 1995 message of US President Bill Clinton to Romania, Hungary and Slovakia on the importance of good unneighborly treaties. Romania was the first country to sign the framework agreement of the Peace Partnership in January 1994. Although this did not provide the security guarantees of NATO membership, it avoided a new international isolation of Romania, such as the one that had occurred after the violences in Târgu-Mureș and during the Mineriad of 13–15 June 1990.

In addition, Romania's joining the Council of Europe required the application of precise standards for the protection of minorities, a more conciliatory attitude of the Hungarian Socialist government led by Gyula Horn, and an internationalist vision, along with the previously mentioned pressure for Euro-Atlantic integration that was reactivated by the Essen Summit of 1994.³⁴ The White Charter was adopted in Essen. It was an instrument designed to assist the states in obtaining the community *acquis* and provided that one of the most important criteria for accession for the associated states was not to have unresolved problems concerning minorities and borders, as these problems would have subsequently hindered the decision-making processes of the European Union.³⁵

In 1995, after Romania signed the association agreement with the European Union, President Ion Iliescu set up the Snagov Commission, with the objective of identifying solutions for full membership in the European Union.³⁶ The Snagov Declaration was adopted on 21 June 1995, and among its signatories were representatives of all parties, the academia and civil society. The consensus was unprecedented, but it was also an encouraging sign for the country's development direction. Within the framework of the document, the national strategic objective, i.e. the accession of Romania to the European Union was highlighted, the year 2000 being projected to meet the necessary criteria.³⁷ This change demonstrated a maturation of the politicians in power, the formation around Ion Iliescu having supported, since 1990, an ambiguous direction for the country's foreign policy, along with the implementation of an original democracy, without imports from outside. The fact that in 1995 the modernization of the country was directly linked to European integration showed the willingness of the Bucharest authorities to heal wounds of the past and to collaborate with neighboring states. The feeling of belonging to the Euro-Atlantic World encouraged the political class in Romania to re-establish the dialogue

³¹ Moses 2019, 202.

³² Mureșan 2019, 428.

³³ Pușcaș 2006, 520.

³⁴ Abraham 2006a, 252.

³⁵ Vădean 2011, 57.

³⁶ Abraham 2017, 184.

³⁷ Iliescu 2011, 295.

with Hungary, following the model of the Franco-British reconciliation from the aftermath of the Second World War.

The first bilateral meetings held in early 1995 were unsuccessful. During his visit to Bucharest, the Hungarian Secretary of State failed to reach an agreement on the autonomy of the Hungarians in Romania, proposing a formula that included decentralization and autonomy at the local level, while a visit to Budapest by Teodor Meleșcanu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a similar fate.³⁸ Differences of opinion on the negotiation of the good unneighborly treaty stemmed from the integration of Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201, which contained a section on the granting local autonomy to minorities. Article 11 stipulated that: 'In regions where they are the majority, persons belonging to a national minority have the right to have adequate local autonomous administrations or a special status, corresponding to the specific historical and territorial situation, in accordance with the national legislation of the state.'³⁹

The difficulty of reaching a consensus was also fuelled by the composition of the Romanian political echelon, where the Partidul Unității Națiunii Române (PUNR, Romanian National Unity Party)⁴⁰ and the Partidul România Mare (PRM, Greater Romania Party)⁴¹, which were also part of the governing coalition, were at war with the UDMR. The conflict between the UDMR and the Minister of Justice, Iosif Chiuzbaian, a PUNR member, who demanded in January 1995 the condemnation of the Hungarian organization for demanding territorial autonomy, was mediated by the US ambassador himself, since it jeopardized the progress made up to that point. In his memoirs, Moses recalls how Chiuzbaian tried to blame the media for the distortion of his statements and stated that he took pride in the 'friendship that binds him to the Hungarians,' while Markó Béla, the leader of UDMR, distanced himself from the initial statement, claiming that he had only called for regional autonomy, which he detailed further: 'more education in Hungarian, the restoration of the status of 'Babeș-Bolyai' University as a Hungarian university, the abrogation of the law whereby public meetings were to be held in Romanian and the making of several signboards with street names in Hungarian.'⁴² In the dynamics of Romanian political life, Romanian-Hungarian relations were also reflected by the positioning of the parties: the collaboration between the PUNR, PRM and the Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale (FDSN, Democratic Front of National Salvation)⁴³ in government,

³⁸ Moses 2019, 202.

³⁹ Recommendation 1201.

⁴⁰ PUNR was a party that had as its first adherents the supporters of the VR. The first political actions were centred on the Hungarian community in Transylvania and were predicated on strong xenophobia: they criticized the school separatism initiated by the Hungarians in Transylvania and demanded the dismissal from the government of a secretary of state of Hungarian origin. Its leader was Gheorghe Funar, Mayor of Cluj-Napoca. See Mureșan 2019, 86.

⁴¹ The party was born in 1991 around the magazine *România Mare*, with Corneliu Vadim Tudor, court poet of the Ceausescu spouses, as its leader, with a speech that often had an extremist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic and nostalgic overtones towards the communist regime. In the first years after the Revolution, Tudor defined reform attempts as criminal, accused the colonization of the Romanian economy by the west, and claimed there were attempts by some occult forces to dismantle the country. See Mureșan 2019, 145.

⁴² Moses 2019, 160.

⁴³ In February 1992, the FSN split in two: one party controlled by Ion Iliescu, which took the name of the FDSN (later PDSR – Partidul Democrației Sociale din România / Party of Social Democracy of Romania), and the other led by Petre Roman, keeping the name of the FSN.

respectively the association between the UDMR and the Convenția Democrată Română (CDR, Democratic Convention of Romania)⁴⁴, as the main opposition force. By the end of 1995, relations within the governing coalition were broken. To this had contributed the obstacles that the Romanian authorities were experiencing within the government, as well as the concerns expressed by the US officials during meetings with President Iliescu. Alfred H. Moses even says that 'I was pleased that ... the government stopped dealing with extremists.'⁴⁵

The prospect of 'historical reconciliation' was officially presented by Ion Iliescu, in a speech given on 30 August 1995, when he referred to the Franco-British reconciliation and the role played by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.⁴⁶ The statement preceded an official visit by the president to Washington, where, according to the official White House statement, 'President Clinton expressed appreciation for the constructive efforts made by Romania to improve relations with Hungary and took note of President Iliescu's recent initiative on reconciliation. He has encouraged further efforts to be made in this direction and stressed that improving relations at regional level would enhance prospects for Central Europe's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.'⁴⁷ During this period there was a series of confusions, due to insufficient communication, including at the level of the US diplomatic representations. For example, the American Embassy in Budapest produced a series of reports blaming Romania for the slow pace at which things were progressing, without taking into account that the treaty negotiations between Hungary and Slovakia were delayed for the same reason: the integration of Resolution 1201.⁴⁸ Despite Romania's openness, negotiations with Hungary were blocked by the neighboring state itself, as it preferred to clarify the disagreements with Slovakia first.

This time, too, the US intervention as a mediator played a decisive role. During a visit by Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn to the American continent, where he met with President Bill Clinton, they discussed the fact that Romania would accept a special reference to Recommendation 1201, 'provided there is an explanatory phrase that excludes the application of collective rights or ethnicity-based territorial autonomy.'⁴⁹ The compromise was also achieved following a visit across the Atlantic, this time by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Meleșcanu. Following bilateral talks between Meleșcanu and the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, László Kovács, the deal was finalized.

The signing of the Romanian-Hungarian Treaty and reactions to it

The 'Treaty of understanding, cooperation and good neighborliness concluded between Romania and the Hungarian Republic' was to be signed in Timișoara on 16 September 1996. Predictably or not, the date coincided with the beginning of the electoral

⁴⁴ Emerging at the beginning of 1992, it was an alliance of parties grouped around the Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat (PNȚCD, Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party), quickly gaining the status of the most important opposition force. The coalition of several parties, albeit heterogeneous, was determined by the sliding victory obtained by Ion Iliescu and FSN in the elections of 20 May 1990.

⁴⁵ Moses 2019, 331.

⁴⁶ Pușcaș 2006, 520.

⁴⁷ Iliescu 2011, 312.

⁴⁸ Moses 2019, 277.

⁴⁹ Moses 2019, 214.

campaign for parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania. The event boosted the new image that Ion Iliescu, candidate for a new term of President, wanted to send to the public. In 1996, the theme of nationalism was still present and strongly represented at the level of political parties, through the PUNR and the PRM, both with their own presidential candidates, so a conciliatory approach to interethnic relations was in line with the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country. Even before the signing of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty, during the celebrations held in Țebea in memory of the revolution of 1848 and of the leader of the Romanian movement in Transylvania, Avram Iancu, President Iliescu gave a speech in which he issued an invitation to political opponents to collaborate for the national good. To further legitimize the treaty, he even evoked a statement made by Avram Iancu, who claimed that 'weapons should never influence the relations between Romanians and Hungarians.'⁵⁰ Not even the choice of Timișoara was accidental, although the media had claimed that various other cities, including Vienna, the capital of Austria, were possible variants. Finally, the option for the Banat city was also a symbolic one, according to Ion Iliescu, 'as tolerance, mutual understanding and coexistence among citizens of various ethnicities living in the city are all well-known.'⁵¹ Because the election campaign had already started, Ion Iliescu tried to capitalize on the moment, so he constantly promoted his candidacy (unlike in previous campaigns) by reference to the results of foreign policy: 'the spirit of Snagov,' that is, the convergent views on foreign policy, EU integration, NATO membership, obtaining the clause, and better relations with the neighbors. In this regard, he mentioned the treaty with Hungary, as proof that 'President Iliescu's ceaseless effort for good relations with Hungary has achieved its goal,' as well as the initiative for the 'historical reconciliation between Romania and Hungary,' announced for the very first time in Bucharest, in September 1994, on the occasion of the Parliamentary Colloquium 'Central Europe and Its National Minorities.'⁵²

The reactions of the political class to the signing of the treaty were diverse. The Social Democratic Union was one of the groups that had supported, from the beginning, the need to sign such a document, so it was represented by Adrian Severin at the signing ceremony of the treaty. PNȚCD, the main party of the CDR alliance, was represented by Ion Diaconescu and Emil Constantinescu, and the official position was that the Treaty, even an imperfect one, was a 'certificate of good repute for Romania' and had to be signed as soon as the elections ended. Those that refused to participate were PUNR, which, through the voice of President Gheorghe Funar, claimed that 'this document endangers the Romanian unitary national state, the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Romania,' and PRM. Among the parties that sent representatives but expressed dissatisfaction with the actual content were UDMR and the Partidul Socialist al Muncii (PSM, Socialist Labor Party).⁵³

The treaty consists of a preamble and 25 articles. Two representative sections are Art. 4, by which the parties reaffirm their respect for the inviolability of the common border and territorial integrity, and Art. 15, which regulates the rights and obligations of

⁵⁰ Corpade, Achim 1996, 1.

⁵¹ Gheorghe 1996, 32.

⁵² Truth 1996, 2.

⁵³ Feraru, Roșca 1996, 2.

national minorities in accordance with European regulations in the field, provided that the respective state does not have more favorable legislation in the field. The international documents on minorities underlying the treaty are the 'document of the OSCE Copenhagen Meeting of 29 June 1990,' the 'UN Declaration on the rights of national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities of 18 December 1992,' and 'Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.' The latter had been a cause for disputes, so the common interpretation in the annex stated that 'The contracting parties agree that R. 1201 does not refer to collective rights nor does it oblige the parties to grant those persons the right to a special status of territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria.'⁵⁴ The positive result consisted, according to Moses, in the fact that 'the phrasing was ambiguous enough to allow both sides to claim victory.'⁵⁵

The fact is that the treaty was both challenged and supported by both countries. In an interview for *Evenimentul zilei*, the Romanian ambassador in Budapest, Ioan Donca, responded to criticism from the conservative Hungarian press that promoted the idea that the Romanian-Hungarian agreement was, in fact, 'an American dictate.' According to him, a direct third-party intervention was excluded, but he admitted the idea that the US had encouraged the reconciliation of the two states through the decisions adopted: the promotion of the Most Favored Nation clause or the benevolent attitude of the US Congress.⁵⁶ In reality, the American role had been an important one, because it had encouraged both sides by promoting the advantages of association to the Euro-Atlantic structures, but also by the interventions of President Bill Clinton or the American ambassadors in the two states. However, negotiations on the treaty clauses remained the responsibility of the officials, i.e. the foreign ministers and the negotiating teams led by Dumitru Ceașu and György Szénási. The Hungarian press was, generally, reserved with regard to the success of the Treaty, the left-wing newspaper *Népszabadság* talking about the beginning of a long-term process. The exception was the newspaper *Uj Magyarország*, the official mouthpiece of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (whose representatives had suggested, at the beginning of the 1990s, the removal of the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon), which claimed that the treaty was not going to solve the problem of divisiveness that would result in future anti-Hungarian pogroms, while the Hungarian community could never give up on the idea of autonomy for the population outside the borders of Hungary.⁵⁷

As for the attitude of the Romanian central newspapers, they were mostly in favor of signing the treaty. In an editorial in the newspaper *Adevărul*, Dumitru Tinu pointed out that all Romanian politicians, whether in power or in the opposition, were trying to take political advantage of the treaty. In addition, the idea of reconciliation according to the Franco-German model was linked by the same author to the existence, at the time, of a treaty of an economic and social development, so the process was the reverse to that promoted by the treaty.⁵⁸ Politicians, mostly, voiced their adversity to the treaty. For

⁵⁴ Zidaru 1996, 2.

⁵⁵ Moses 2019, 177.

⁵⁶ Stoian 1996a, 2.

⁵⁷ Stoian 1996b, 3.

⁵⁸ Tinu 1996, 1.

example, in Cluj-Napoca, on the very day of the signing of the treaty, Mayor Gheorghe Funar organized, together with the employees of the city hall, a funeral march through the city center, with gravediggers bearing cards with the names of President Iliescu, Prime Ministers Nicolae Văcăroiu and Gyula Horn, and Foreign Minister Meleşcanu. The procession, accompanied by a brass band, moved to the city cemetery, on a route that connected the Memorandists' Statue, Avram Iancu Square, and Calea Turzii St., where a full-fledged funeral was organized. The cross on the grave had the written message 'The Romanians' Peace. 16 September 1996, 12.30.'⁵⁹ Because of this, the representatives of CDR Cluj accused Funar of practices reminiscent of the American Ku Klux Klan and the neo-Nazis.⁶⁰ The rest of the political parties supported the treaty, or were moderately opposed to it: Nicolae Manolescu, leader of the Civic Alliance, regarded the treaty as a first for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country and a good opportunity for the development of Romanian-Hungarian relations; PNȚCD dismissed the treaty as acceptable, requesting UDMR not to seek an interpretation of the provisions in the sense of achieving greater rights; the Socialist Labor Party, represented by the poet Adrian Păunescu, considered that this document helped only Hungary in the process of integration into NATO, and that Romania had not managed to get equal rights with the neighboring state; the Liberal Party '93 believed that the signing of the treaty might be able to block membership in NATO and the EU, while Petre Roman, the leader of the Democratic Party, pointed out that the document met the interests of Romania.⁶¹

As regards the importance of signing this treaty, at the suggestion of Sandy Berger, US deputy National Security adviser, Alfred H. Moses and Donald M. Blinken, the US ambassadors in Bucharest and Budapest, published the article entitled *Beyond Bosnia* in the *Washington Post*. In this article, adopted by the US Congress and printed as such in the Congressional Record,⁶² the treaty was said to be of equal importance for Central Europe as the Franco-British reconciliation. Among the challenges that required solutions were the reconciliation of the rights and responsibilities of minorities in a part of the world where peoples and borders did not coincide – the age-old problem that had led to disputes between Romania and Hungary, following the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. This process of strengthening democracy and improving relations with the neighbors was boosted by US President Clinton's decision in January 1994 to open NATO to new members and partners, and by the eastward enlargement of the European Union.⁶³ Simultaneously, in the USA, House Concurrent Resolution 220, of 26 September 1996, and Senate Resolution 303, of 28 September 1996, were adopted. Both appreciated the visionary leadership of the two governments, as well as their open political dialogue.⁶⁴

Conclusions

Relations between Romania and Hungary during the first years of the post-communist period overlapped with the evolution of the political class in both states, as well

⁵⁹ Eduard, Mureșan 1996, 3.

⁶⁰ Chis 1996, 2.

⁶¹ Mediafax 1996, 2.

⁶² Pușcaș 2006, 591–593.

⁶³ Moses 2019, 591–592.

⁶⁴ Pușcaș 2006, 585–587.

as with the shaping of clear foreign policy objectives. In the case of Romania, according to some historians, 1996 marked the end of the process of transition to democracy from the point of view of internal politics, since the elections of the autumn of that year ensured the first exchange between the power and the opposition to the country's leadership, as Emil Constantinescu, the most important opposition candidate, won the presidential election. At the same time, from a foreign policy perspective, the agreement with Hungary is placed at the beginning of the transition period, which ended almost a decade later with NATO membership in 2004 and EU membership in 2007. The signing of this treaty had an essential role in transforming the perception of Western states regarding Romania and its capacity to reform the state and mentalities. Regarding the working hypothesis, we found that Romanian-Hungarian relations reached an impasse in the first years after 1989, amplified most of the time by the politicians of both states. The international context was a determining factor in easing the situation: Russia's loss of influence in the area, the adoption by the European Union of a favorable attitude towards eastward expansion, the negative example offered by the Balkan peoples on the resolution of disputes, and NATO's benevolent attitude towards this area of geopolitical importance. In this context, the United States of America can be considered the catalyst of common Romanian-Hungarian interests, with the help of diplomatic actions carried out through the embassies, members of the American Congress or through frequent bilateral meetings held in Washington.

After 1996, Romanian-Hungarian relations were somewhat oscillating, characterized by regional cooperation, so the focus on national minorities was as little as possible. Thus, the 'Declaration on Romanian-Hungarian Cooperation and Strategic Partnership for Europe in the 21st Century' was signed in 2002, which was the basis of four joint government meetings between 2005 and 2008.⁶⁵ The first meeting was held on 20 October 2005, in Bucharest, followed by those held in Budapest in 2006, in Sibiu in 2007 and in Szeged in 2008.⁶⁶ Later, the attitude of the FIDESZ Party, in power in Budapest, fueled the tensions between Romania and Hungary, as its leaders assumed the protection of the 'Hungarian nation' outside the country's borders. Moreover, during elections in Romania, whether parliamentary or presidential, the UDMR representatives perpetuated and exploited for electoral purposes the idea of Székely Land autonomy, while some representatives of the other parties adopted a critical attitude, sometimes bordering on xenophobia, for the same electoral purpose. In other words, in the short term, the signing of the Treaty of Timișoara fulfilled its purpose, being part of the country's strategy of Euro-Atlantic integration, but in the long run one cannot speak of a considerable improvement in the relations between the two states. In recent years, Hungary has become a quasi-isolated state within the European Union, due to the illiberal ideology (in fact, a limited democracy) assumed by Viktor Orbán, which entails cold relations with Romania as well.

⁶⁵ Abraham 2016, 204.

⁶⁶ See *Relații bilaterale: Ungaria* [Bilateral relations: Hungary].

Bibliography

Books and chapters

- Abraham 2006a Fl. Abraham, *Transformarea României: 1989–2006. Rolul factorilor externi*, București 2006.
- Abraham 2006b Fl. Abraham, *România de la comunism la capitalism*, București 2006.
- Abraham 2016 Fl. Abraham, *Romania since the Second World War: a political, social and economic history*, New York 2016.
- Iliescu 2011 I. Iliescu, *Fragmente de viață și istorie trăită*, București 2011.
- Gál, 2004 K. Gál, *The Hungarian Legislation on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries*. In: Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs Vizi, Iván Halász (eds.), *The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection*, Slavic Eurasian Research Centre, Sapporo, 396–410.
- László, Novák 2016 M. László, Z. Cs. Novák, *Provocarea libertății: Târgu-Mureș, 16–21 martie 1990*, Cluj-Napoca 2016.
- Moses 2019 A. H. Moses, *Jurnal de București: drumul României de la întuneric la lumină*, București 2019.
- Mureșan 2019 M. Mureșan, *Destinația Cotroceni. Alegerile prezidențiale în România 1990–2014*, Cluj-Napoca 2019.
- Pușcaș 2006 V. Pușcaș, *'Sticks and Carrots': Regranting the Most Favored-Nation Status for Romania (US Congress 1990–1996)*, Cluj-Napoca 2006.
- Smith 2004 K. E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy* (2nd edn.), New York 2004.
- Teodorescu et alii 2005 B. Teodorescu, D. Guțu, R. Enache, *Cea mai bună dintre lumile posibile. Marketingul politic în România – 1990–2005*, București 2005.
- Vădean 2011 M.-R. Vădean, *Relațiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene și euroatlantice: 1989–2010*, Iași 2011.

Journal studies

- Bardi, Rhodes, Nello 2002 L. Bardi, M. Rhodes, S. S. Nello, *Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and from Central and Eastern Europe: Introduction*, IPSR, 23/3 (July 2002), 227–233.
- Carothers 2002 Th. Carothers, *The end of the Transition Paradigm*, Journal of Democracy, 13/1 (January 2002), 5–21.
- Gallagher 1992 T. Gallagher, *Vatra Românească and resurgent nationalism in Romania*, ERS, 17/4 (October 1992), 570–598.

Articles in periodicals

- Adevărul 1996 *** *Campania electorală Ion Iliescu. Perseverența președintelui (P)*, Adevărul, no. 1972, 14 September 1996.
- Chiș 1996 C. M. Chiș, *Gh. Funar – acuzat de practici tip KU KLUX KLAN*, Adevărul, no. 1975, 18 September 1996.

- Corpade, Achim 1996 C. Corpade, S. Achim, *Ion Iliescu și Emil Constantinescu și-au strâns mâinile*, *Adevărul*, no. 1973, 16 September 1996.
- Eduard, Mureșan 1996 B. Eduard, S. Mureșan, *Gheorghe Funar a înmormântat, în Cimitirul Central din Cluj, Tratatul româno-maghiar*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996.
- Feraru, Roșca 1996 M. Feraru, Cristina Sofronie Roșca, *Numeroși lideri politici au refuzat să fie prezenți astăzi la Timișoara*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996.
- Gheorghe 1996 L. Gheorghe, *Ion Iliescu a remarcat toleranța ce domnește în Timișoara*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996.
- Mediafax 1996 Mediafax, *Liderii politici despre tratatul româno-ungar*, *Adevărul*, no. 1974, 17 September 1996.
- Stoian 1996a M. Stoian, *Prin semnarea Tratatului, Ungaria nu se află mai aproape nici mai departe de NATO, dar România se află mai aproape, susține ambasadorul român la Budapesta*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996a.
- Stoian 1996b M. Stoian, *Tratatul de bază nu rezolvă disensiunile care pot duce la noi pogromuri antimaghiare, scrie 'Uj Magyarorszag'*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996b.
- Tinu 1996 D. Tinu, *Ungaria – NATO, România – felicitări*, *Adevărul*, no. 1973, 16 September 1996.
- Zidaru 1996 I. Zidaru, *Scurtă descriere a Tratatului româno-ungar*, *Evenimentul zilei*, no. 1287, 16 September 1996.
- Electronic sources**
- Recommendation 1201 'Recommendation 1201,' Parliamentary Assembly / Assemblée Parlementaire, 1993, <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15235&lang=en>, accessed 13 June 2019.
- Relații bilaterale: Ungaria 'Relații bilaterale: Ungaria,' Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, <https://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1748>, accessed 23 June 2019.

CULTURAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF MIGRATION IN HUNGARY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

MARIA-MINERVA ZAH*

Abstract: The article analyses the anti-immigration campaign of the Hungarian government as an element of the securitization of migration, both at the level of political discourse and at that of political legislative instruments. The securitization of migration is seen as a filter through which all migrants are passed, in order to select those who have the same cultural background and, therefore, could adapt to the host country's national culture and do not represent a threat to the national security. In the case of Hungary, the securitization of migration unfolds on two levels. At the discursive level the migrants are presented as a threat to Hungarian culture, endangering the nation-building process. The migrants are also identified as a threat to the Hungarian economy, since they are allegedly going to take up jobs that otherwise, Hungarians would have been able to access, and to the whole of Europe, creating a connection between the presence of immigrants and the incidence of terrorist acts. The second level is of an institutional kind, involving the adoption of public policies and the creation of security agencies that exercise control over migration through a certain set of practices, such as the bureaucratic ones. The Hungarian anti-immigration policy seems to serve the Kremlin's objectives, being directed against the European Union.

Keywords: Hungary, securitization of migration, Viktor Orbán, European Union, nationalism.

Rezumat: Articolul analizează campania anti-imigrație a guvernului ungar ca un element al securizării migrației, atât la nivelul discursului politic, cât și la cel al instrumentelor legislative politice. Securizarea migrației este văzută ca un filtru prin care sunt trecuți toți migrații, pentru a-i selecta pe cei care au același background cultural și care, prin urmare, s-ar putea adapta la cultura națională a țării gazde și nu ar reprezenta o amenințare la adresa securității naționale. În cazul Ungariei, securizarea migrației se desfășoară pe două nivele. La nivel discursiv, migrații sunt prezentate ca o amenințare la adresa culturii maghiare, aceștia punând în pericol procesul de construire a națiunii. Migrații sunt, de asemenea, identificați ca o amenințare pentru economia maghiară, deoarece se presupune că ei vor lua locuri de muncă ale cetățenilor maghiari, dar și pentru întreaga Europă, fiind creată o legătură între prezența imigranților și incidența actelor teroriste. Al doilea nivel este cel de tip instituțional, implicând adoptarea politicilor publice și crearea agențiilor de securitate care exercită controlul asupra migrației printr-un anumit set de practici, precum cele birocratice. Politica maghiară anti-imigrație pare să servească obiectivelor Kremlinului, fiind îndreptată împotriva Uniunii Europene.

Cuvinte cheie: Ungaria, securizarea migrației, Viktor Orbán, Uniunea Europeană, naționalism.

Introduction

Hungarian comedian and cartoonist Robert Laszlo Szabo, known under the pseudonym Marabu, brought up the topic of the circulation of old jokes during communism

* MA Student, Faculty of History and Philosophy, 'Babeș-Bolyai' University of Cluj-Napoca, email: maria_zah96@yahoo.com.

in Viktor Orbán's Hungary. Thus, a fire breaks out in the Hungarian Parliament. FIDESZ¹ spokesman Laszlo Kover returns to the Parliament building to save the Transylvanian flag. Then Antal Rogan, a corrupt politician in charge of the Public Communication Department of the FIDESZ Party, returns to the headquarters and fetches a Gucci bag filled with money. Finally, an elderly woman, in charge of cleaning the toilets, also runs towards the premises. 'What did you forget?' the security guard asks her. The lady answers: 'I forgot to lock Viktor Orbán up!' Three decades after the collapse of communism in Hungary, jokes are rebranded into a tool to counter the policies of the Budapest executive, due to their exposure in the public milieu. A telling example is that of the poster campaign of the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party.³ This initiative was a reaction to the poster information campaign launched by the Hungarian government in the summer of 2015 to discourage migration and influence public opinion in such a way as to oppose the admission of asylum seekers in Hungary. Reading one of the posters displayed by the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party, it is impossible not to take heed of the following humorous expression: 'We must apologize for our Prime Minister. He is trying to distract us from seeing the stolen money.' Considering where the posters were exhibited, the sponsorship of the campaign by citizens willing to make donations and the fact that it was a reaction to a government policy, this was a satirical critique of the political class, whose measures, hostile to the population, had fostered a resurgence of jokes on political topics. In this register, it is worth mentioning an assessment made by Marabu, according to whom satire is dependent on the freedom of the press, since to joke is to deliver already known information with a humorous tinge. However, the subject of the freedom of the press in Hungary or, rather, the relativity of this freedom incites criticism and heated debate. This intervention by the cartoonist on the issue of the freedom of the press was no accident, since the periodical for which he was working, the main daily newspaper in Hungary, *Nepszabadsag* [Freedom of the People] was abolished just six days after the 2016 referendum on mandatory quotas for the resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens was declared invalid.⁴ It should be noted that the shutting down of periodicals is part of a package of legislative measures taken by the Budapest Parliament to restrict the freedom of the press.

This introduction was meant to make a smoother transition towards discussing the problem of migration in Hungary, a complex phenomenon addressed by the Budapest executive, which poses as an agent of *migration securitization*, both at the level of political discourse and at that of political legislative instruments.

In view of that, an analysis of the issue of migration in Hungary in the twenty-first century requires that, prior to the research on the political culture of Hungary, the political party with a majority in Parliament (FIDESZ) and the influences exerted on this party's political agenda and ideology from the various sources, this subject will be addressed from the vantage point of current transnational approaches. In terms of the methodology, in order to illustrate the particularities of the Budapest executive's discourse

¹ FIDESZ–Magyar Polgári Szövetség (The Hungarian Civic Alliance).

² All the quotations and transcriptions in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

³ Nolan 2017.

⁴ Nolan 2016.

on migration, I have analyzed both the proposals outlined in the European Agenda on Migration and the commitments made by Hungary under the 2013 National Strategy on Migration, drawing parallels between them. Subsequently, I assessed situations such as the poster information campaign, the national consultation on migration (2015) and the referendum on mandatory redistribution quotas (2016) in order to see the degree to which the measures adopted by the Hungarian executive complied with the provisions of the two documents mentioned above. In order to evaluate the influence of the Kremlin on the discourse of migration in Hungary, I have tried to identify some of the parallels in the sphere of state control over the media, and the rhetoric of Putin and Orbán on the profile of migrants. This is relevant in the context in which the two leaders' application of the *theory of securitization* legitimizes either foreign (in the case of Russia's intervention in Ukraine) or domestic policy measures (to the monopoly on the political scene exerted by FIDESZ, which capitalizes on the argument of the threat posed by immigrants).

In particular, I consulted articles published in the journals of research institutes in the field of migration, and selected those whose authors debated the nature of Orbán's governance and Euroscepticism in Hungary. I have also used studies on the influence of the Kremlin on the political agenda in Hungary, by means of explicit or implicit actions (operations of the national intelligence service, official meetings, the launching of various websites, various forms of financial support), in view of the destabilization of the European Union, the legitimization of the regime in Russia (through ideological support or by monitoring the electoral process), and the spread of a particular rhetoric and misinformation (the dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda in all member states of the European Union).

General framework

In 2015, the pressure of the wave of migration headed towards Europe from areas of conflict such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia reached the maximum level. On 13 May 2015, the European Commission, which was chaired by Jean-Paul Juncker, adopted a European Agenda on Migration, a document containing a series of immediate, medium-term and long-term solutions to migration. The period concerned is important due to the context in which it is placed: migration generated by socio-political events and uprisings of the *Arab Spring* phenomenon, which began spreading to the regions of the Middle East and North Africa in 2011. One of the conflicts that erupted then, the Civil War in Syria, caused the internal and external migration of nearly 13 million people, some of whom moved to Turkey. This country initially responded by opening its borders and receiving Syrians, who were granted temporary protection and humanitarian assistance. The *open-door* policy ended with Turkey building a wall on the border with Syria. The European Union did not get involved by offering solutions and implementing measures until 2015, when migrants from Syria changed their route, heading to states in the European Union. The change in route is explained, firstly, by Turkey's inability to manage and absorb the flows of migrants and, secondly, by the fact that the migrants were not offered permanent solutions in Turkey. Under these circumstances, on 29 November 2015, an agreement was signed between the European Union and Turkey, according to which 'for every Syrian steered to Turkey from the Greek Islands, another Syrian will be

resettled in the European Union.’ The agreement covers the illegal migration of refugees moving from Greece to Turkey on the Aegean Sea route. The document drew criticism for the way in which the stipulated measures were implemented, one of which consisted of relocation schemes applying to the member states of the European Union.⁵ This year is also relevant when it comes to the situation in Hungary. Faced with an unusual number⁶ of asylum seekers (in 2015, according to the Central Statistical Office, there were 177,135 applicants compared to 2014, when there were 42,777 people) who crossed the border illegally, Hungary took actions contrary to the objectives set out in the European Agenda on Migration. Moreover, in 2015, Hungary began to develop a symptomatology characterized by *Brusselism*⁷ and *Islamophobia*. In what follows, I will explain the two key words that characterize Hungary’s approach to the migrant crisis and will analyse the situations that are subsumed to these two umbrella terms. These notions cannot be explained separately, as the Euroscepticism displayed by the Hungarian authorities over the manner in which European Commission has drawn up the European Agenda on Migration is closely linked to the Islamophobia recently embraced as an attitude among Hungarian society thanks to the measures taken by the ruling FIDESZ Party. After winning the legislative elections in 2014, in order to eliminate the opposition (Jobbik Party⁸) and to have more popularity among voters, FIDESZ started an anti-migration propaganda, especially given that, according to a survey focused on the 2014–2015 period, the anti-migrant attitude had expanded, with only 10% of citizens stating that they were willing to receive migrants in Hungary.⁹ The skepticism expressed by the survey respondents regarding the admission of asylum seekers was imprinted precisely by the electoral campaign of Viktor Orbán, who instrumented the anxieties of the population about migration in favor of his party. He thus managed to obtain a victory in the legislative elections, despite his illiberal practices (the adoption of a new Constitution in 2011, without consulting the opposition, and restrictions on the freedom of the press).¹⁰ Therefore, the inseparability of the two terms – *Brusselism* and *Islamophobia* – can be explained by the fact that they represent the two dimensions of Viktor Orbán’s speech, structured on an *inside – outside* logic, according to which, on the one hand, it is the Hungarian nation that stands out and, on the other hand, immigrants, along with the institutions of the European Union and exponents of the left-wing political orientation, are also highlighted.¹¹

Hungary’s National Strategy on Migration (2013)

In 2013, the Budapest government adopted its own migration strategy, in line with the recommendations of the European Union. According to it, Hungary has committed itself to providing protection for asylum seekers, to taking measures to integrate migrants

⁵ Elitok, 2019, 1–3.

⁶ Juhász 2017, 36.

⁷ Canveren, Durakçay 2017, 867.

⁸ Jobbik – Jobboldali Ifjúsági Kö zösség – Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (the Movement for a Better Hungary).

⁹ Benková 2019, 2.

¹⁰ Benková 2019, 1.

¹¹ Mendelski 2019, 1830.

and refugees, to eliminate the phenomenon of illegal migration and to reduce cases of abuse of residence in Hungary, along with making communication with the media transparent and providing credible information to citizens on the incidence of migration in Hungary, reducing stereotypes and prejudices. According to the 2013 document, Hungary must cope with the migration phenomenon as a transit country, the countries of destination being those more economically developed EU member states. The large number of asylum applications from Greece was influencing and exerting pressure on the Hungarian asylum system, which was supposed to take over some of the migrants. Hungary undertook to provide asylum seekers with detention centers equipped with facilities and spaces to allow free movement in a secure setting. Hungary was also committed to providing protection to stateless persons and those asylum seekers from conflict areas who were at risk of persecution. It was also stipulated that local government authorities must initiate procedures for the construction of refugee centers. The principle of Hungary's solidarity in relation to other states facing a large number of migrants has been introduced into the strategy, so the legal framework for the resettlement of asylum seekers has been outlined. At the heart of the measures that Hungary has committed to take is the transparency and accessibility of the procedures necessary for granting asylum.¹² Summarizing the content of the 2013 document, some mentions are necessary. Thus, although it was stipulated in 2013 that Hungary was a transit country, in 2015 the political discourse changed radically, witnessing a definition of the Hungarian state as a country of destination, which started from the erroneous premise that most people who applied for asylum intended to settle in Hungary. Although it cannot be denied that 2015 was a key moment for Hungary in terms of the number of asylum applications (according to Eurostat, between January and September 2015, Hungary was the leader among European countries in terms of the number of asylum applications reported at 100,000 citizens), one cannot ignore the tendency of migrants to apply for asylum only on a formal basis, since from Hungary they were heading to Western Europe, particularly to Germany. Comparing the situation, in the 1990s, during the Yugoslav wars, asylum seekers who actually stayed on the territory of Hungary for a longer period were in the tens of thousands. However, in 2015, according to the data of the Hungarian Helsinki Commissariat, a non-governmental organization whose remit concerns asylum seekers, people in detention centers and stateless persons, although at first there had been about 180,000 asylum applications, by the end of 2015, around 900–1,000 asylum seekers had remained in the country. Moreover, although Hungary, according to the 2013 strategy, committed itself to providing protection for asylum seekers and showing solidarity with other European states whose asylum systems were beginning to fail to cope with the large number of applicants (the cases of Italy and Greece), it imposed restrictions within the asylum system, the refugee status becoming increasingly difficult to obtain (in 2015, the approval rate of asylum applications was below 0.5%).¹³

¹² Juhász 2017, 38–39.

¹³ Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015, 9–10.

Redistribution quotas – the opportunity to change the direction of political discourse

The change in Hungary's political discourse, notable in relation to the commitments made in the 2013 national strategy and revealed through the contrasting situations highlighted above, is due to the mandatory redistribution quotas proposed by the European Commission in the framework of the European Agenda on Migration. The solution was to provide greater protection for asylum seekers and to ensure a fair participation of all member states in the joint effort to receive and relocate migrants, with Italy and Greece bearing the greatest pressure on their asylum systems. According to the two-year emergency resettlement plan, by 26 September 2017, 1,294 asylum seekers were to be resettled in Hungary in the two years but, contrary to Brussels' expectations, neither Hungary nor Poland received asylum seekers and they were redistributed to other member states. Subsequently, the Hungarian government lodged a complaint with the European Court of Justice regarding the European Commission's decision on the redistribution of migrants, on the grounds that, in the absence of an agreement from the European population, there could be no social legitimacy of the measure and that the rights of national parliaments were not respected in relation to European Union legislation.¹⁴ This legal action served not only as an affirmation of Hungary's position on Brussels' policy, but also as a pretext for changing the direction of public debate within Hungarian society. Thus, while before the proposal of mandatory quotas for the resettlement of migrants, public debate had been dominated by issues such as corruption scandals, the failures of the Orbán government, the underperforming economy, the high rate of unemployment, the government's aggressive policies, the divisions within the party in power (FIDESZ)¹⁵ and the phenomenon of *brain drain* affecting Hungarian youth,¹⁶ in the spring of 2015 the government's political agenda began to target migration and the profile of asylum-seekers.

Securitization of migration in Hungary

It is necessary to analyse how the securitization of migration (a phrase used by researchers such as Jef Huysmans, András Szalai, Gabriella Göbl and Marius Ghinea) can be achieved, through two complementary processes and in three directions. First, the two processes through which the securitization of migration is carried out will be presented. This means, in the case of Hungary, increased control over migration, by rejecting candidates who do not qualify for having their asylum application granted and staying in the country, because of their country of origin, the risks posed to national security by the specifics of the conflict and the combatants there, or due to external features that become the object of prejudice. The securitization of migration is a filter through which all migrants are passed, in order to separate those who have the same cultural background and, therefore, could contribute to the demographic growth of Hungary, from those who, because of their country of origin, present a threat to the safety of citizens. Viktor Orbán's reference to the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attack, presented as a consequence of the failure to carry out rigorous border controls and of the implementation of the *open-borders* policy, is

¹⁴ Juhász 2017, 48–49.

¹⁵ Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015, 6.

¹⁶ Gunesch et alii 2016, 26.

relevant. One type of process that envisages the securitization of migration is the discursive one, which is used by political actors interested in attracting to their side the alienated electorate, which might develop anxieties about some previously unknown others, in this case, migrants. Politicians therefore take advantage of this xenophobic background. The second process is of an institutional kind, involving the adoption of public policies and the creation of security agencies that exercise control over migration through a certain set of practices, such as the bureaucratic ones. They consist of complete and repeated checks on the origin and relations of the asylum seeker. The idea that there is a danger and that, as a consequence, measures are required to ensure additional security, is induced in the public mind through tracking and border surveillance techniques, or through procedures for keeping records of entries and exits from the community area. The militarized aspect of these techniques is, moreover, partly responsible for convincing the public of the existence of a threat posed by the migrants.¹⁷ With regard to the directions in which greater control over migration is exercised, one may refer to the securitization of culture, the Budapest authorities presenting migrants as a threat to Hungarian culture (language, religion, traditions, values, norms and institutions). Culture is considered vital for the survival of a nation. Hence, the imperiousness of securitizing culture in order to protect the nation-building process.¹⁸ Secondly, migrants are presented as a threat to the Hungarian economy, since they are allegedly going to take up jobs that Hungarian citizens would have been able to access. They would also benefit from the social assistance provided by the Hungarian state. Finally, the migration flow is perceived as a threat not only to Hungary, but to the whole of Europe, creating a connection between the presence of immigrants and the incidence of terrorist acts. What is confirmed is the strong tendency of the Budapest authorities to control migration, or the penchant for practices subsumed by this type of control. Although in public speeches they do not necessarily target a particular ethnicity or race, they address those people who come from areas considered to be of high risk. In time, in Hungary, a political discourse with obvious racial and xenophobic overtones has emerged, these features being taken over from the far-right party, Jobbik. The terrorist acts of the twenty-first century were blamed on the failure of multiculturalism and, in the case of a Eurosceptic like Viktor Orbán, on the failure of the European project and the impossibility for migrants to integrate into Europe and assimilate its culture. The inseparability of the concepts of Brusselism and Islamophobia is noticed, therefore, in the context in which – by highlighting migrants from the Middle East and Africa as ‘the otherness,’ a carrier of a high risk for Hungary from the point of view of culture, identity, and security – there emerges, at the level of the European Union, a division between, on the one hand, the member states which comply with the regulations of the European Agenda on Migration, accepting participation in the joint effort of the redistribution of migrants, and, on the other hand, the states that challenge the solutions proposed by the European Union, adopting a Eurosceptic stance (in the case of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – the Visegrad Group).¹⁹

¹⁷ Ghincea 2016, 12.

¹⁸ Canveren, Durakçay 2017, 861.

¹⁹ Szalai, Göbl 2015, 9–11.

Brusselism and Islamophobia

In what follows, it is necessary to discuss the situations subsumed under the two umbrella terms mentioned above. We may recall the poster information campaign, initiated by the Hungarian government on 1 June 2015, with a clear interest in discouraging migration and influencing public opinion, in order to oppose the admission of asylum seekers in Hungary. Although posters with messages such as 'If you come to Hungary, you must respect our culture,' 'If you come to Hungary, you must obey our laws,' 'If you come to Hungary, you cannot take our jobs' were addressed to immigrants, they were written in Hungarian, and this was an impediment to the transmission and reception of the message. Asked about this omission, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán replied that the messages inscribed on the posters were addressed to migrant traffickers. Opposition leaders and citizens who did not agree with this intention of the Hungarian authorities to influence the population destroyed, painted or removed those posters from the very first day in which they were displayed. As a result, FIDESZ members issued press statements that those acts were acts of vandalism, and several of those who had participated in the damage and removal of the posters were subsequently arrested. However, on 7 July 2015, the Pest Central District Court ruled that the damage to the posters was a manifestation of the freedom of expression, in this case, of the free expression of political opinions, so the punishment of those persons was out of the question. Reacting to the government's campaign, the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party and a politics-oriented blog, *Vastagbőr*, launched a campaign for which they received donations that served to produce 500 humorous posters ('We apologize on behalf of our Prime Minister. He is trying to distract us,' 'Come to Hungary, our jobs are in London,' 'We have survived the Hungarian anti-immigration campaign'), which were displayed between 1 and 31 July 2015.²⁰ Both the government's poster information campaign and the humorous initiative delivered as a reply were topics that were intensely debated in the press, even more intensely than the national consultation on migration. The scale to which I relate in terms of assessing the coverage of the subject is that of the number of articles published in a given time frame (more articles published in six weeks on the theme of the poster campaign than the articles published in six months on the theme of the National Migration consultation). Also, most of the articles on the government campaign and the reply from the satirical party were found in the domestic political section. Few appeared under the international section, one in the culture section and none in the society section. This is an important remark because it indicates that migration was presented as a phenomenon with profound political implications, and not one connected with aspects such as integration into society and culture.²¹

Hungary's challenge to the quota system for the redistribution of migrants was also accompanied by a national consultation on migration. The 8 million citizens who received the document with the related questions had the opportunity to read a letter signed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in which he brought up the terrorist attack at the Charlie Hebdo editorial office in January 2015 and outlined a causal link between immigration and terrorism. In this register, the lack of social security that had led to the

²⁰ Kiss 2016, 48–51.

²¹ Kiss 2016, 56.

incidence of terrorist attacks was blamed on the policies of the Brussels authorities, which had failed to control the phenomenon of illegal migration. Thus, the institutions of the European Union, at least in terms of their position on the migrant crisis, were presented as undemocratic and illegitimate. On 27 July 2015, the spokesperson of the Hungarian Executive published the results of the national consultation. 1,254,000 citizens of the 8 million who had received the documents for completion returned their envelopes with the corresponding answers. To this number were added 58,000 answers uploaded online. More than 93% of respondents agreed that a stricter migration policy was needed. Criticism of this national consultation did not take long to appear, blaming the fact that a link between immigration and terrorism had been created in a non-fundamental way. It was also argued that, in relation to the 8 million citizens, the answers of the respondent minority were not representative of the entire population of Hungary. The criticism also concerned the manner in which the questions had been addressed, since they were likely to arouse feelings of fear about immigration, accentuate prejudices about immigrants and, ultimately, influence the answers citizens were to give in a national consultation aimed at legitimizing the following actions initiated by the Budapest executive, namely, the erection of the barbed wire fence at Hungary's border with Serbia, and the amendment of asylum-related legislation, of the Criminal Code and of the Criminal Procedure Code.²²

The symptom of Islamophobia in the Budapest executive's political discourse was also manifested by blaming leftist European political actors for the migration policy of the European Union. They were labelled as *populists*, who allegedly thought that migrants could be mobilized to serve a political purpose. Thus, the Hungarian government accused the left-leaning political actors in Brussels of influencing the migration policy of the European Union, so that Muslims – future immigrants – could become future voters, hence, vehicles of the political success of a party.

Discussing the Islamophobia manifested in Hungary, it should be noted that, before 2015, the political discourse of the right did not contain references to a possible anti-Islamic attitude, especially since the Muslim immigrant community was not back then a reason for securitizing migration policy. In fact, this was a small minority (according to the 2011 census, there were 5,579 Muslims in Hungary, that is, 0.056% of the total population),²³ but here was a higher level of Islamophobia than that of other states with considerable Muslim communities, precisely because of the factors mentioned above.²⁴ What did, however, decisively change the political discourse of the Hungarian executive was the dynamics of the migration flow in 2015. The 2015 campaign against immigrants revealed that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán relied on ethnic rather than religious considerations, despite a growing sense of Islamophobia among the population. To give us a clearer idea of why Viktor Orbán primarily relied on ethnic considerations in order to promote his anti-immigration campaign, it is worth referring to the interpretation that Peter Boross, former Prime Minister of Hungary and former adviser to Viktor Orbán, gave to the migration flow from the Middle East. Peter Boross's closeness to the FIDESZ and Jobbik political parties contributes to a better understanding of how the radical right in Hungary presents

²² Juhász 2017, 40.

²³ Vidra 2017, 7.

²⁴ Vidra 2017, 5–6.

the problem of migration. Thus, according to Boross, migration from the Middle East to Europe is not necessarily a cultural problem, but rather, it endangers Hungary and Europe from a biological and genetic point of view, since the risks in question cannot be diminished or annihilated through the assimilation of immigrants. Peter Boross's perspective was embraced by the radical right in Hungary, which began to define the Hungarian nation in terms of ethnicity and national Christianity, respectively.²⁵

An assessment of the Kremlin's influence on Hungary's domestic and foreign policy

Under Viktor Orbán's leadership, Hungary has become a member state whose controversial measures are closely monitored by the European institutions. Orbán's orientation towards Russia as of November 2010 is a relevant factor in monitoring external influences. In the context in which Hungary relies on the energy resources of Russia, and one can talk about the existence of 'soft power' influences exerted by way of diplomatic relations and various cultural events, it is necessary to consider to what extent there is a connection between Russia and Viktor Orbán's anti-immigration politics. If there is such a connection, one must look at the areas in which the anti-immigration and anti-EU ideas propagated in Russia have an impact on Hungary as well.

Firstly, the development of diplomatic relations between Russia and Hungary after Viktor Orbán won the 2010 elections and was sworn in as prime minister should be analyzed. Thus, after 2010, Viktor Orbán took steps to strengthen political-diplomatic relations between Hungary and Russia, the new element on the foreign policy scene being that of 'opening up to the East'. This was presented as a solution that Hungary would resort to, especially in terms of trade, since the effects of the changes brought about by the economic crisis, tensions within the European Union and political developments in Hungary needed to be appropriately managed.²⁶

With regard to diplomatic missions, the Russian Embassy in Budapest has close links with Russian-Hungarian cultural milieus and with Hungarian universities where Russian Studies departments operate. The Kremlin's narrative vis-à-vis such topics as the presence of Russia in Syria, the 'Civil War in Ukraine,' and the 'return of the Crimean Peninsula to Russia' is supported through the prism of photo exhibitions on the premises of the Embassy and General Consulate in Debrecen. There is no clear evidence to support the claim according to which Russian diplomats consult, along informal channels, with representatives of non-governmental organizations on issues such as foreign policy and security (even though Russian diplomats take part in events attended by the representatives of certain NGOs). However, according to a study by the Institute for Security Studies in Prague, the Russian Embassy had contacts with some far-right organizations, responsible for spreading the propaganda of the pro-Russian parties, especially after an incident of 2016 that led to the death of a police officer in the town of Bőny, in the western part of Hungary.²⁷ The incident of 26 October 2016 is relevant because Istvan Györkös, leader of a neo-Nazi organization, founded a pro-Russian news platform (*hidfo.net*), which was taken

²⁵ Ádám, Bozóki 2016, 114–115.

²⁶ Juhász et alii 2015, 12.

²⁷ Bartha, Deák, Rácz 2017, 15–16.

over by a professional team of Russian officers. The page was later transferred to a server in Russia. The incident prompted a meeting within the parliamentary committee responsible for national security to determine the extent to which Russian services participated in the activities of that neo-Nazi group. The present case only demonstrates that there is support from the Kremlin for both the far-right and the far-left.²⁸

Secondly, I must assess the link between Hungary's dependence on Russia's energy reserves and the electoral success of FIDESZ and Viktor Orbán. With regard to the nuclear sector and energy reserves, a partnership signed by Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin on 14 January 2014 and renewed on 17 February 2015 is relevant. The partnership concerns the construction by the Russian company Rosatom of two new nuclear reactors at Paks, the project being financed by a loan from the Russian government. The details of the deal have not been made public, but what is known is that the partnership has created new openings in the labor market, helping to reduce Hungary's dependence on the energy sector by doubling the capacity of the Paks nuclear power plant. As for the suspicions that the Kremlin is exerting influence on the government in Budapest to maintain the control over the gas price, in order to avoid sanctions from the European Union, they seem to be well-founded, given the fact that, in 2015, the contract for the supply of gas between Gazprom and the government in Budapest was renewed, due to Hungary's action of September 2014, when it suspended gas supplies to Ukraine, until 10 January 2015, when tensions in Ukraine started rising. In a speech he gave in 2014, Viktor Orbán called for autonomy for the Transcarpathian region, inhabited by a numerically significant Hungarian minority. His speech coincided with rising tensions in Ukraine, so his statement was an attack on Ukraine's stability and the position taken by Western states. Later, when Putin paid a visit to Budapest in February 2015, there were discussions both about the possibility of sanctions by the European Union and about the possibility of continuing cooperation between Russia and Hungary, so it is quite obvious that, in exchange for Hungary stopping gas shipments to Ukraine, Gazprom renewed the contract as a reward for Orbán's political favors.

Illiberal trends in Hungary and Russia

One cannot ignore the similarities between Hungary and the Russian Federation in terms of freedom of the press. Thus, Russia is among the countries with the most cases of violation of the rights of journalists, with freedom of expression severely restricted, according to Freedom House reports. During the crisis in Ukraine, freedom of the press was further damaged, putting pressure on publications or administrators of online platforms that bring up cases of flagrant violation of individual rights. To deliver its propaganda, Russia entered the field of content production, laying the foundations of *Rossiia Segodnya* [Russia Today]. This press channel has become popular, as has *Sputnik*,²⁹ another propaganda channel that broadcasts in 34 countries. Some opposition online platforms have also been shut down.³⁰ Turning our attention to Hungary, although those who comment online on government measures are not arrested in Hungary, unlike in Russia, those who post

²⁸ Political Capital 2016.

²⁹ Nance 2018, 122–123.

³⁰ Juhász, László, Zgut 2015, 33–34.

or distribute critical content against the government risk having a defamation lawsuit filed against them. Since 2010, control over press publications has been imposed, and it is necessary that they be registered with the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH). In the context of the migrant crisis of 2015, NMHH banned content depicting minor refugees, the decision being justified by the need to protect children from content that could cause trauma. The measure was similar to the legislation in the Russian Federation, the Kremlin citing that same reason for the monopoly established on media content. The tendency of the state to control what appears in the press is also evidenced by the fact that press agencies that comply with government directives are promised to conclude profitable advertising contracts with the state. The conflict with the *enemies* of the Hungarian state – sympathizers of left-wing policies, whether they are pro-European or pro-migration – meant tightening control over non-governmental organizations receiving funding from abroad. And this measure seems to reproduce the legislation adopted in Russia in 2012. Orbán's NGO policies were an attack on the Central European University, funded by George Soros, perceived as an exponent of liberalism. Thus, George Soros was the target of Viktor Orbán's anti-immigration campaign, which considered Soros's actions to promote humane treatment of refugees inadmissible. On this occasion the 'Stop Soros' package entered the political scene. It consists of a set of legislative measures that impose a tax of 25 percent on NGOs supporting refugees, calculated in relation to the injection of foreign capital. If these organizations are considered by the Hungarian authorities as 'national security risks,' their activities may be stopped and they may be closed down.³¹

Earlier, I highlighted the directions in which migration control is carried out in Hungary. Vladimir Putin's vision is similar, and to understand how he relates to the migrant crisis, I shall refer to an interview with the *Financial Times* (published in July 2019). In this interview Putin called Germany's decision to receive more than one million refugees a big mistake. According to him, if the commitment to liberal values leads to a scenario in which 'migrants can't kill, steal, or rape without being punished, because of their rights, as migrants need to be protected,' this means that the increase has turned out to be a mistake, and, as a consequence, it should be abandoned as obsolete, if its own citizens, with a shared cultural background, cannot be protected in the face of the migratory flow.³²

The Kremlin's tools in influencing Hungary's political agenda

Having pointed out some of the similarities between Hungary and Russia in regard to the measures taken for restricting the freedom of speech and expression, monitoring the activity of some press corporations, and countering the phenomenon of migration, it should be noted that the conditions in Hungary are elements the Kremlin takes into account in determining the channels whereby it can influence the destabilization of the European Union and establish the legitimacy of its own regime. One of these channels is the Jobbik Party or the Right-Wing Youth Alliance – The Movement for a Better Hungary. Thus, in matters of energy policy, Jobbik supports decisions that are in line with the interests of the Kremlin both in the European Parliament and in the Hungarian legislative

³¹ Roache 2018.

³² Smith 2019.

body. This proves that Jobbik aims to maintain Hungary's energy dependence on Russia. Jobbik also recognized the annexation of Crimea and received funding from the Kremlin. The opening of Jobbik to Kremlin funds was created by Béla Kovács,³³ a former Russian intelligence officer who joined the party in 2005, being responsible for foreign policy issues. From his position as MEP, he has dealt with issues between the European Union and Russia. Operating from Transcarpathia, he monitored the Crimean referendum. Later, Kovacs was accused of spying on the European institutions for the Russian government. Amid the impeachment of Kovács and a distancing between Jobbik and Russia in this context, the Kremlin began to consider FIDESZ as a strategic partner.³⁴

Another medium through which Russian propaganda penetrates and influences the discourse on migration is that of online platforms (Facebook pages, online publications). They appeared in the context of the Crimean crisis, with the Russian government creating a propaganda network in Eastern Europe, including Hungary. The advantages of using more conventional information platforms consisted in the fact that no funds had to be invested to support the offices of publications, the constant reports that brought the information gathered to the attention of the government were eliminated, emphasis was placed on the personalization of content and the disclosure of sources was no longer required. Relevant examples are the pages *South Front HU*, *KárpátHír* and *Orientalista*. Pro-Russian propaganda pages record successes in disseminating information due to the fact that, considering the large number of news items on the same topic and the diversity of information presented, a favorable ground is created for building a *mélange* of false information, alongside authentic news reports. Pro-Russian propaganda sites are also successful due to the fact that attacks are launched on the insightful domestic and foreign policies of EU member states. With regard to dealing with the migrant crisis, the European Union is presented in these pages as a victim of the migratory flux, given that an adaptation of the legislation has been required, but also as a factor that has contributed to the perpetuation of the crisis. It should be noted that, although immigration themes had permeated pro-Russian propaganda sites since the first half of 2015, they did not gain momentum until August that year. This timeline suggests that the Hungarian public did not follow the refugee issue as soon as the anti-immigration campaign of the Hungarian government was launched. In fact, the debate over the migrant crisis intensified with Russia's military intervention in Syria and rising tensions in refugee camps.³⁵

Conclusions

In this paper I aimed to present the anti-immigration campaign of the Hungarian government as a securitization case. Also, from the analysis of the variables of pro-Russian propaganda, it appears that it serves the Kremlin's objectives, being directed against the European edifice. Thus, the Kremlin is seeking to drive a wedge between the member states of the European Union through pressures related to the refugee crisis. At the same time, the Kremlin's use of online platforms and the collaboration of Russian diplomats with paramilitary formations were intended, at the height of the migrant crisis, to distract

³³ Hegedus 2016, 7–8.

³⁴ Bartha, Deák, Rácz 2017, 17.

³⁵ Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015, 28–29.

European institutions from the conflict in Ukraine. Another objective pursued by Vladimir Putin is to support the separatist tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe in order to provoke the destabilization and disintegration of the European Union. The role that far-right media players play in this equation is to drive member states to adopt nationalist measures and thereby strengthen extremist forces that gain support for Russia's policies in Crimea.³⁶

Bibliography

Secondary Literature

- Ádám, Bozóki 2016 Z. Ádám, A. Bozóki, *State and Faith: Right-Wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary*, IEEJSP, 2/1 (2016), 98–122.
- Bartha, Deák, Rácz 2017 D. Bartha, A. Deák, A. Rácz, *Hungary*. In: I. Smoleňová, B. Chrzová (eds.), *United We Stand, Divided We Fall: The Kremlin's Leverage in the Visegrad Countries*, Prague (November) 2017, 15–21.
- Benková 2019 L. Benková, *Hungary – Orbán's project towards 'Illiberal democracy'*, AIES Fokusz, 2 (2019), 1–4.
- Canveren, Durakçay 2017 Ö. Canveren, F. A. Durakçay, *The Analysis of the Hungarian Government's Discourse towards the Migrant Crisis: A Combination of Securitization and Euroscepticism*, Yönetim ve Ekonomi, 24/3 (2017), 857–876.
- Elitok 2019 S. P. Elitok, *Three Years On: An Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal*. MiReKoc (Migration Research Centre, Koç University), Istanbul, Working Papers, 2019, 1–3.
- Ghincea 2016 M. Ghincea, 'Securitized migration in Europe: a theoretical analysis,' *Putere, Pace, Securitate* Conference, București, 13 April 2016.
- Gunesch et alii 2016 J. Gunesch, A. Kallius, J. Mahr, A. Rodgers, *Hungary's Long Summer of Migration – irresponsible governance fails people seeking international protection*, Migszol (Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary), Budapest 2016.
- Hegedus 2016 D. Hegedus, *The Kremlin's Influence in Hungary – Are Russian Vested Interests Wearing Hungarian National Colors?*, DGAPkompakt, 8 (February 2016), 1–11.
- Juhász 2017 K. Juhász, *Assessing Hungary's Stance on Migration and Asylum in Light of the European and Hungarian Migration Strategies*, Politics in Central Europe, 13/1 (2017), 35–54.
- Juhász et alii 2015 A. Juhász, L. Györi, P. Krekó, A. Dezső, 'I am Eurasian'. *The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right*, Political Capital (Policy Research and Consulting Institute) – Social Development Institute, Working Paper, March 2015.

³⁶ Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015, 31.

- Juhász, Hunyadi, Zgut 2015 A. Juhász, B. Hunyadi, E. Zgut, *Focus on Hungary: Refugees, Asylum and Migration*, Praga 2015.
- Juhász, László, Zgut 2015 A. Juhász, R. László, E. Zgut, *Consequences of an Illiberal Vision up to the Present Day*, Political Capital (Policy Research and Consulting Institute) – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Budapest, Working Paper, September 2015.
- Kiss 2016 E. Kiss, 'The Hungarians Have Decided: They Do Not Want Illegal Migrants' *Media Representation of the Hungarian Governmental Anti-Immigration Campaign*, *Acta Humana*, 6 (2016), 45–77.
- Mendelski 2019 B. Mendelski, *The Rhetoric of Hungarian Premier Victor Orbán: Inside X Outside in the Context of Immigration Crisis*. In: St. Ratuva (ed.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity*, Singapore 2019, 1829–1852.
- Nance 2018 M. Nance, *The Plot to Destroy Democracy. How Putin and His Spies are Undermining America and Dismantling the West*, New York 2018.
- Szalai, Göbl 2015 A. Szalai, G. Göbl, *Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary*, Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University, Budapest, Working Paper, 30 November 2015.
- Vidra 2017 Zs. Vidra, *Dominant Islamophobic Narratives: Hungary*, Centre for Ethnicity and Racism Studies, University of Leeds, Working Paper 7, 2017.

Online resources

- Nolan 2016 D. Nolan, 'Hungary's newspaper of record *Nepszabadsag* faces oblivion,' *Deutsche Welle* (12 October 2016), <https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-newspaper-of-record-nepszabadsag-faces-oblivion/a-36022420>, accessed 18 February 2019.
- Nolan 2017 D. Nolan, 'Satire – one of few remaining bastions in Orbán's Hungary,' *Deutsche Welle* (4 January 2017), <https://www.dw.com/en/satire-one-of-few-remaining-bastions-in-Orbán-hungary/a-36972883>, accessed 18 February 2019.
- Political Capital 2016 'Far-Right Murder of Hungarian Police Officer: Pro-Russian Radicalization in the CEE,' *Political Capital*. Policy Research and Consulting Institute, (4 April 2016, https://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=320, accessed 21 June 2019.
- Roache 2018 M. Roache, 'Is Hungary Mimicking Putin's Authoritarianism?,' *New Internationalist* (1 May 2018), <https://newint.org/features/web-exclusive/2018/04/16/Orbán-putin-managed-democracy>, accessed on 21 June 2019.
- Smith 2019 P. Smith, 'Russia's Vladimir Putin: Liberalism in Europe is obsolete,' *NBC News* (28 June 2019), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-s-vladimir-putin-liberalism-europe-obsolete-n1024411>, accessed 1 June 2019.

CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION

THE RESTORATION OF A DACIAN OVERSIZED DECORATED ‘TACK’: CONVENTIONAL MECHANICAL CLEANING AND ULTRASOUND CLEANING

RADU CORDOȘ*

Abstract: This paper presents the restoration of an iron decorated ‘tack’ with a diameter of about 20 cm, which was discovered in the area of the Dacian fortresses. The method of restoration is conventional mechanical cleaning alternating with ultrasonic cleaning, for the object’s ornaments.

Keywords: Dacian ‘tack’, ornaments, mechanical cleaning, ultrasound cleaning

Rezumat: Lucrarea prezintă restaurarea unei ținte ornamentate descoperită în zona cetăților dacice confecționată din fier cu diametrul de circa 20 de centimetri. Metoda de restaurare este de curățire mecanică clasică completată de curățirea ornamentelor cu ajutorul unui aparat cu ultrasunete.

Cuvinte cheie: țintă dacică, ornamente, curățire mecanică, curățire cu ultrasunete.

Iron processing was one of the crafts that underwent considerable development by the Geto-Dacians from the first century BC to the first century AD. This is proved by the numerous and varied tools discovered to date.

An impressive number of iron pieces and artifacts have been unearthed, such as anvils, tongs, sledgehammers, hammers, chisels, punches, and iron blooms; the objects have been found mainly in the area of Sarmizegetusa – the capital of the Dacian Kingdom.

The pieces were crafted by forging iron blooms obtained by the direct reduction of the iron ore. The resulting material had a good plasticity at 900–1,000°C.¹

Forging involves deformation – molding the hot metal by applying blows to the object with sledgehammers and hammers, the ornamental decorations being outlined with chisels, punches, and compasses.

I propose the restoration of an oversized decorated Dacian ‘tack’ made of iron that was found in this area of the Dacian fortresses.

In the past, in 1949, several iron ‘tacks’ were discovered at the Piatra Roșie Fortress, and they were similar to the item presented here. Pieces like this one were probably nailed onto the poles of wooden gates, not only in order to strengthen them, but also to embellish or adorn them.²

The piece has a diameter of about 20 cm, with consistent metal core, and one can notice the presence of massive deposits of iron corrosion products (Fig. 1).

* Expert in metal restoration, National Museum of Transylvanian History, Cluj-Napoca; email: radu_cordos@yahoo.com.

¹ Glodariu, Iaroslavschi 1979, 14–36.

² Daicoviciu 1954, 20–50.

At a first visual and microscopic analysis, the 'tack' shows an ornamental decoration underneath the layer of corrosion by-products.

After studying the item, I opted for a method of complete mechanical cleaning, following the various stages of this type of restoration.

In the first stage, I performed a mechanical detachment of the iron's coarse corrosion by-products with the help of a pick.

According to the initial microscopic analysis, the existence of ornamental decoration on the surface of the 'tack' was clearly revealed.

The next step was mechanical cleaning with abrasive separation discs, using a suspended technical motor; this operation was carried out under a suction unit and wearing protective equipment (glasses and mask). It was possible to remove a consistent layer of iron corrosion products, thus reaching the more detailed outline of the ornamental decoration.

The next stage of mechanical cleaning consisted in the use of milling cutters and abrasive stones of various profiles (abrasive tools used in dental practice), with which it was possible to clean the object in depth, better revealing the ornamental decoration (this operation was also performed with the MTS).

An intermediary polishing with the help of rotating steel micro-brushes led me to the next phase of cleaning – the fine mechanical cleaning where I used profiled diamond cutters and special needles (again, with the application of the MTS).

The cleaning of the ornamental decoration raised a problem – certain recesses and details could not be cleaned with milling cutters and fine needles. This is where ultrasound cleaning came into play.

The machine with which this cleaning was carried out is the AMDENT US30 type – ultrasounds with frequencies between 28 – 32 hz, using a 37 probe.

Ultrasound cleaning was carried out without water, respecting the cooldown times of the device. With the help of the probe of the apparatus, it was possible to completely clean the ornamental decoration of the 'tack'. It was possible to reach into every point of the ornamental inlay, which could not have been done with the special cutters and needles.

The maximum effectiveness of cleaning with the ultrasonic probe was reached at 80% of the maximum intensity of the device.

I should mention that the entire cleaning process (mechanical and ultrasound cleaning) took almost the same amount of time as the chemical cleaning process (orthophosphoric acid baths, repeated brushing under water, phosphating).

Cleaning the opposite side of the ornamental decoration did not raise any special problems, and was carried out mechanically, with the help of abrasive discs and profiled cutters of a larger diameter and hardness.

A final grinding was carried out with rotating steel microbrushes.

The piece was degreased with alcohol, and then dried.

The next step was the application of the tannin solution to the item, followed by drying and, then, fully graphitizing it. The application of the tannin solution was carried out by brushing and coating it, thus ensuring the full coverage of the ornamental surface.

The graphitization process was conducted with fine industrial glazing powder.

In the end, the piece was film-coated in a thin layer of Paraloid type B72 dissolved in toluene (Fig. 2).

As a conclusion, ultrasound cleaning proves to be effective in the case of objects that have embossed decorations – objects that cannot be completely cleaned through classical mechanical processes and for which this type of cleaning-restoration is better suited.

Bibliography

- Diacoviciu 1954 C-tin. Daicoviciu, *Cetatea dacică de la Piata Roșie: monografie arheologică*, București 1954.
- Glodariu, Iaroslavschi 1979 I. Glodariu, E. Iaroslavschi, *Civilizația fierului la daci*, Cluj-Napoca 1979.
- Mourey 1998 W. Mourey, *Conservarea antichităților metalice de la săpătură la muzeu*, București 1998.
- Scott 2007 et alii D. A. Scott, J. Podany, B. B. Considine, *Ancient and Historic Metals. Conservation and Scientific Research*, Getty Conservation Institute, 2007.



Fig. 1. Object before the interventions (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 2. Object after all the interventions (Image from the MNIT Archive)

REPAIRED LACUNAE AND RECONSTRUCTED PARTS OF A BRONZE AGE CERAMIC URN FROM THE 1970S EMBODIED IN A NEW RESTORATION PROCESS

CORNELIA ROTARIU*

Abstract: This is an object which was restored in the 1970s by the restorers of that time. A fragment representing the bottom of the vessel was found inside the vessel, which was kept in the storage facilities of the National Museum of Transylvanian History. The vessel had white plaster reconstructed parts, reintegrating the original fragments existing at the time of restoration. The missing fragment, subsequently found, was thus integrated into the body of the vessel.

Keywords: restoration, excised, embedded, bottom of the vessel.

Rezumat: Este vorba de un obiect restaurat în anii 1970, de către restauratorii din aceea vreme. În interiorul vasului păstrat în depozitul Muzeului Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei s-a găsit un fragment ce reprezenta fundul vasului, care era deja completat cu gips alb până la nivelul fragmentelor existente în momentul restaurării. Astfel, fragmentul găsit ulterior a fost integrat în corpul vasului.

Cuvinte cheie: restaurare, excizat, înglobat, fundul vasului.

The National Museum of Transylvanian History (hereafter abbreviated as MNIT) stores in its collections numerous rare pieces of historical value, discovered on archaeological sites throughout the country.

This particular completed vessel is an urn from an incineration tomb in Dumbrăvița (Bistrița-Năsăud), discovered during the archaeological excavations undertaken by Tudor Soroceanu in the middle of the twentieth century.¹ The necropolis from which the urn comes is part of the Wietenberg Culture.² This culture represents the characteristic group for the middle period of the Bronze Age in the Transylvanian Plateau. A special feature of Wietenberg Culture is the burial rite, namely that of cremation (in urns).

More than 50% of the fragments were discovered. The profile of the vessel could be reconstituted, but not its bottom. The latter was found later, which made it possible for the fragment to be integrated within the original urn, through a modern day restoration process (Fig. 1).

The shape of the vessel is of the amphora type, with a flared lip, a cylindrical neck and an alveolar band segmented by buttons, arranged at the base of the neck (Fig. 2). The size of the vessel is: height 25 cm, diameter of the lip 22 cm, diameter of the base 15 cm.

* Expert in ceramics restoration, National Museum of Transylvanian History; email: cornelia_rotariu68@yahoo.com.

¹ Soroceanu 1981, 195–229.

² Horedt 1960, 107–137; Chidiosa 1980; Andrițoiu 1992; Boroffka 1994; Rotea 1999.

The ceramic object was reduction fired.³ This is a muffled combustion through which a lot of carbon monoxide is produced, which enters the walls of the vessels, creating the blackened color, in various shades, from gray to black.

The vessel was first restored at the Zonal Restoration Laboratory in Cluj-Napoca in the 1970s by the restorers of that time. A fragment representing the bottom was found inside the vessel kept in the MNIT storage facility. The vessel had white plaster reconstructed parts, reintegrating the original fragments existing at the time of restoration (Fig. 3). The fragment in question was probably found after the restoration of the object (Fig. 3). Given the fact that the details of the previous restoration operations are unknown, why the fragment was not initially embedded is also a mystery.

Following the reorganization of the basic exhibition of the MNIT, it was decided to chromatically integrate the ceramic vessels that had white gypsum additions, to preserve a uniformity of the exhibits. Thus, the urn arrived in the laboratory of ceramic restoration and it was decided to insert the fragment found separately in the vessel in the body of the vessel, in its original place, and to restore thus the wholeness of the object. The process of attaching the original fragment was a real challenge, given that the vessel was initially restored impeccably and with reinforcing fixtures.

In keeping up with the restoration principle of *minimal intervention*,⁴ only the area necessary to enclose the original fragment was excised. The attachment of the original fragment was carried out as follows:

- The original fragment was positioned in the place where it was to be inserted and the outline of the fragment was traced on the area of the vessel that was filled with white gypsum with a pencil (Fig. 4).
- The marked gypsum was cut bit by bit, until the contour was reached. During the cutting, the brass fixtures that supported the weight of the vessel, reinforced the gypsum and prevented the destruction of the completed part, were also discovered (Fig. 5).
- The original fragment was degreased and coated with Paraloid-B72 for proper adhesion and preservation.⁵
- The fragment was fixed to the cutout using restoration glue.

The vessel was made whole again and the existent ornaments were attached, since all the conditions necessary and recommended by the current restoration norms were finally met in order to perform these operations:

- A clay paste mold was made of the original area of the bottom of the pot, and the mold was laid on the missing area. Then, it was filled with gypsum. After that, the surplus was sanded when the gypsum had hardened (Fig. 6).
- The missing areas of the band of buttons were filled in through molding and sculpting (Fig.7).
- Finally, the decoration of the vessel was reintegrated chromatically in keep with the initial reason for the object's subsequent restoration (Fig. 8).

³ Dan Anghel 2011, 339–340.

⁴ HG 1546/18.12.2003 for the approval of the Norms on the Conservation and Restoration of Classified Movable Cultural Assets, Art.32

⁵ Mihalcu 1970, 223–225.

The restoration of archaeological ceramics is always a challenge for the restorer. Defects in the material, or those pertaining to burning, or the shape of a vessel – as well as many other challenges that may arise along the way – force the restorer to find unique and ingenious solutions that do not conflict with the generally accepted rules and norms of restoration.

Bibliography

- Andrițoiu 1992 I. Andrițoiu, *Civilizația tracilor din sud-vestul Transilvaniei în epoca bronzului*, București 1992.
- Anghel 2011 D. Anghel, *Experimente de ardere a ceramicii în cuptoare de tip arhaic*, Terra Sebus, 3 (2011), 342–343.
- Boroffka 1994 N.G.O. Boroffka, *Die Wietenberg-Kultur. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Bronzezeit in Südosteuropa*, Universitätsforschungen zur Prahistorischen Archäologie 19, Bonn 1994.
- Chidioșan 1980 N. Chidioșan, *Contribuții la istoria tracilor din nord - vestul României. Așezarea Wietenberg de la Derșida*, Oradea 1980.
- Horedt 1960 K. Horedt, *Die Wietenbergkulltur*, Dacia N.S., 4 (1960), 107–137.
- Mihalcu 1970 M. Mihalcu, *Conservarea obiectelor de artă și a monumentelor istorice*, București 1970.
- Rotea 1999 M. Rotea, *Cultura Wietenberg*, PhD Thesis, Institutul Român de Tracologie, București 1999.
- Soroceanu, Retegan 1981 T. Soroceanu, Al. Retegan, *Neue spätbronzezeitliche Funde im Norden Rumäniens*, Dacia N.S. 25 (1981), 195–229.



Fig. 1. The urn, previously restored (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 2. The urn, previously restored (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 3. Detail-previous restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 4. Detail-during restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 5. Detail-during restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 6. The urn-during restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 7. Detail-during restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)



Fig. 8. The urn-after the modern restoration (Image from the MNIT Archive)

REVIEWS

Marin POP (ed.), *Cooperativizare și decooperativizare în România* [Cooperativization and Decooperativization in Romania], Mega Publishing House – Porolissum Press, Cluj-Napoca, 2019, pp. 395 ISBN 978–606-020–196-0; 978–606-8483–26-9.

Reviewed by ADRIAN CONSTANTIN ROTAR*

In the predominantly agrarian countries of the Communist bloc, including Romania, the collectivization of agriculture was the first major mass campaign with which the new communist regime began its program targeted at the country's political, social, economic and cultural transformation. In addition to being an aspect of the broad industrial development policy, collectivization was also a devastating attack on the foundations of rural life.¹ The present volume tries and largely manages to capture this phenomenon in detail, providing examples from several regions of the country.

The volume edited by Marin Pop, *Cooperativizare și decooperativizare în România* published in Cluj-Napoca, by Mega and Porolissum publishers in 2019, represents one of the most recent academic efforts to bring to the fore the importance of studying a phenomenon as complex and profound as the collectivization of agriculture. This volume is the result of a symposium that took place in 2019 in Zalău (County Museum of History and Art), on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the beginning of collectivization. The volume comprises studies authored by 16 researchers from different university centers, with different training backgrounds and areas of interest.

The opening article is signed by Radu Ciuceanu, the founding Director of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism. The study entitled *Colectivizarea agriculturii în România: represiune și rezistență* [The Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania: Repression and Resistance] insists on the importance of two laws prior to collectivization: the Agrarian Reform of 1945 and the imposition of mandatory quotas. The author analyses the reaction of the peasantry after their standard of living was affected by the measures imposed by the state in 1945–1948. Through countless examples, Radu Ciuceanu demonstrates that the violent reaction of the peasantry after 1949 was influenced and amplified by the harassment of the rural population in the years before collectivization.²

In the article *Dosarul colectivizării agriculturii în România – provocările unui început* [The File of the Collectivization of Agriculture in Romania – The Initial Challenges], Claudiu Degeratu presents the first efforts of historians in the early 1990s to investigate the phenomenon of collectivization. The study focuses on the investigative endeavors of the president of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuses and Petitions, Radu Ciuceanu, and the coordinator of the research program of this commission, Octavian

* Ph.D. Candidate, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza University', Iași, email: aditarotar93@yahoo.com.

¹ Kligman and Verdery 2015a, 22.

² Other prominent authors who studied the first post-war years are Octavian Roske and Dumitru Șandru. They have published studies on the Agrarian Reform of 1945 and, respectively, on the system of tax collections.

Roske.³ The study of Claudiu Degeratu is important primarily because it sheds light on many of the obstacles encountered by Romanian historians in the first years after the fall of communism when they turned their attention to post-war history. Secondly, it highlights one of the first serious examinations of collectivization in Romania, carried out mainly on the basis of the testimonies of those who were victims of the trial. Last but not least, the study ‘speaks’ of the inability of the Romanian state to provide a minimum framework for research, which makes the work of historians difficult.

Procesul de transformare socialistă a agriculturii în paginile literaturii militante [Representations of the Process of the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in Militant Literature], signed by Augustin Țărău, analyses various economic syntheses compiled by Communist specialists who wished to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist agricultural system compared to the previous one. The works examined in this study often distorted the statistics or events they reported, which led the author to characterize them as ‘lacking the form and substance necessary for an essentially historical undertaking.’⁴ The Communists also tried to divide the rural world with these works, in such a way as to have complete control over the Romanian villages.⁵ Even if the examples are mostly from Bihor, Sălaj and Satu Mare Counties, one can draw conclusions about the Communists’ general policy in the period 1950–1970.

In the study *La Frontiera istoriei. Despre ideologie, politică și colectivizare în raionul Marghita, județul Bihor, la sfârșitul anilor 1940 și începutul anilor 1950* [On the Frontier of History. On Ideology, Politics and Collectivization in Marghita District, Bihor County, in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s], Gabriel Moisa shows that the establishment of the Communist regime in Romania also involved taking some measures in the administrative area. It was considered that the collectivization process could not advance without the division of the territory into rayons (districts), in a context in which the party apparatus could monitor the rural population more closely. In many situations, this reasoning paid off, but there were exceptions: Marghita district, Bihor region. The main causes for which the desired results were not achieved in that district were: the ethnic structure of the party members and, above all, their poor training.⁶

De la reforma agrară la colectivizarea agriculturii în județul Satu Mare. Studiu de caz: dr. Ilie Carol Barbul (1883–1946). Povestea unui chiabur [From the Agrarian Reform to the Collectivization of Agriculture in Satu Mare County. Case study: Dr. Ilie Carol Barbul (1883–1946). The Story of a Kulak], signed by Claudiu Porumbăcean, highlights another strategy of the Communist regime to divide the rural world. The 1945 reform was primarily aimed at ‘sharpening the class struggle’ and not raising the poor peasants’ standard of living.⁷ The stigmatization of the kulaks was supposed to secure the loyalty of the poor peasantry, but the results differed: some sided with the regime, but there were also countless cases in which the community supported the families considered to

³ Roske 1992.

⁴ All the quotations in this paper were translated from Romanian to English by Carmen Borbély.

⁵ Negrici 2005, 154–173.

⁶ The authors Katherine Verdery and Gail Kligman have written about the poor training of party members, see Verdery and Kligman 2015b, 10.

⁷ Șandru 2000.

be kulaks.⁸ Another study that analyses the kulaks' situation is written by Ilie Ghergheș: *Prigoana chiaburilor din raionul Vișeu în perioada 1950–1959* [The Persecution of the Kulaks in the Vișeu District in 1950–1959]. The author presents a brief overview of the kulaks' predicament, followed by a list of their names in Vișeu district, Maramureș region.

The study signed by Marin Pop and Daniel-Victor Săbăceag is *Noaptea moșierilor în Sălaj. Decretul 83/1949* [The Night of the Landowners in Sălaj. Decree 83/1949]. After the initial signs had suggested that the Agrarian Reform would benefit the poor peasantry, on 3–5 March 1949, a Plenary of the C.C. of the P.M.R. decided the collectivization of agriculture. However, there was one possible obstacle to the achievement of cooperativization: landowners. Those who escaped the confiscations of the Agrarian Reform of 1945 or those who had since accumulated more than 50 hectares of land were considered a threat to the transformation of the Romanian villages. That is why, on the night of 1–2 March 1949, the 'liquidation of the landowners' remains' took place by confiscating their assets and deporting their families.⁹

The study of Cristina Liana Pușcaș, which analyses *Versiunea oficială adoptată de Partidul Mulcitoresc Român față de revoltele țărănești din 1949 în cotidianul 'Crișana'* [The Official Version Adopted by the Romanian Workers' Party in Relation to the Peasant Uprisings of 1949 in the *Crișana* Daily Newspaper], complements the studies signed by Radu Ciuceanu and Augustin Țărău. First, the riots that took place in Bihor at the beginning of collectivization were caused by a law preceding collectivization: threshing by area.¹⁰ The peasants were obliged to take their harvest directly to the 'area' (a place established by the authorities) from where the quotas were collected.¹¹ Thus, the peasants no longer had any control over their agricultural products, since quotas often exceeded production. Secondly, Cristina Liana Pușcaș analyses the reflection of these dramatic events (public executions of peasants who had caused and led the riots) in the local press of the time.¹² The regime's strategy of completely ignoring these events in the newspapers is explained by the author as one that 'masterfully manipulated public opinion.'

The volume also includes a series of studies by Ion Zainea¹³ (together with Beáta Menesi), Cosmin Budeanca,¹⁴ Amalia Barbă,¹⁵ Constantin Mănescu,¹⁶ and Augustin-Leontin Gavra¹⁷ (together with Horațiu-Traian Năprădean) that analyze the process of

⁸ Rotar 2018, 147–160.

⁹ Ionescu-Gură 2010, 15–57.

¹⁰ Șandru 2007, 584.

¹¹ Roske 2005, 113.

¹² ANIC, CC al PCR-Secția Admin.-Pol., file 17/1949, folio 58.

¹³ The study *Înființarea Gospodăriilor Colective și a Întovărășirilor Agricole – momentul zero al agriculturii de tip socialist. Cazul Regiunii Bihor* [The creation of state agricultural farms and agricultural associations – the beginning of socialist agriculture. The case of Bihor region].

¹⁴ An article about a village in the south of Moldova: *Aspecte privind colectivizarea agriculturii în județul Vrancea. Cazul localității Ciorăști (1957–1958)* [Aspects regarding the collectivization of agriculture in Vrancea county. The case of Ciorăști locality].

¹⁵ The study *Despre colectivizarea în zona Nădlacului – destine și amintiri* [On the collectivization in Nădlac area – destinies and memories].

¹⁶ On *Cooperativizarea agriculturii în localitatea Horezu din județul Vâlcea* [Cooperativization of agriculture in Horezu locality in Horezu county].

¹⁷ The study *Câteva considerații privind colectivizarea agriculturii în comuna Cehu Silvaniei* [Few considerations on the collectivization of agriculture in Cehu Silvaniei commune].

collectivization at the local level, in different villages, districts or regions. A history of Communism in Romania would be incomplete without studies of regional or local history that highlight the functioning of the mechanisms of the new Communist power in the territory and their real impact on society.¹⁸ Therefore, these studies are indispensable for understanding such a complex phenomenon as the collectivization of agriculture. The authors used both archival documents and interviews with actors or witnesses of collectivization.

Another study is dedicated to *Colectivizarea pământurilor bisericesti în Protopopiatul Reformat Șimleu Silvaniei* [The Collectivization of Church Lands in the Reformed Deanery of Șimleu Silvaniei]. Zoltán Kiss demonstrated very well how the process of collectivization was used for the total subordination of the Reformed Church. The Communist state set out, firstly, to bring the church to its knees materially, through collectivization, and secondly, to alienate its believers, believing that their 'desertion' would lead to the disappearance of the Church as an institution. This did not happen especially because of the reaction of the parishes, which put up a remarkable resistance.

The last study in the volume is dedicated to the Romanian agricultural sector of the socialist and transitional period, from the de-collectivization of agriculture (1991) to its reform in the context of the accession negotiations with the European Union. Cornel Micu manages to capture very well the fate of the production cooperatives whose land was returned, while their patrimony was generally destroyed. As a topic, the destruction of the patrimony of the Agricultural Production Cooperatives is practically abandoned in the literature, so the author tries to fill a historiographical gap through this study. The article launches new directions of research and identifies a number of questions regarding the future fate of property in Romania's agriculture. The author concludes that the agricultural policies promoted in the early 1990s were influenced by the negotiations for accession to the European Union.

At least in the last century and a half, the peasant was a much more important character than historiographic research so far may lead us to believe. Also, during this period, the rural world went through very difficult trials: three agrarian reforms, the collectivization of agriculture, and de-collectivization and adjustment to the Common Agricultural Policy promoted by the EU. In Romanian historiography there is no serious and institutionalized research direction on rural history. The peasants are approached in history and historiography mainly at two moments: when they receive land and when they rebel. The Marxist influence of this vision is evident, but the peasant and rural world of the twentieth century means much more, as this collection of studies amply demonstrates.

¹⁸ Dobrinu, Iordachi 2005.

Bibliography

Primary sources

ANIC, CC al PCR-Secția
Admin.-Pol.

Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, CC al PCR – Secția
Administrativ-Politică.

Secondary sources

Dobrincu, Iordachi 2005

D. Dobrincu, C-tin. Iordachi (eds.), *Țărănimea și Puterea. Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în România (1949–1962)*, Iași 2005.

Ionescu-Gură 2010

N. Ionescu-Gură, *Dimensiunea represunii din România în regimul comunist. Dislocări de persoane și fixări de domiciliu obligatoriu*, București 2010.

Kligman, Verdery 2015a

G. Kligman, K. Verdery, *Țăranii sub asediu. Colectivizarea agriculturii în România (1949–1962)*, tr. by J. Bandol, Iași 2015.

Kligman, Verdery 2015b

G. Kligman, K. Verdery, *Limitele cadrelor în implementarea dictaturii partidului. Studiu de caz: colectivizarea agriculturii*, SAI, 82 (2015), 7–16.

Negrici 2005

E. Negrici, *Rolul literaturii în campania de colectivizare*. In: D. Dobrincu, C-tin. Iordachi (eds.), *Țărănimea și Puterea. Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în România (1949–1962)*, Iași 2005, 154–176.

Roske 2005

O. Roske, *Colectivizarea și mecanismul colectărilor: istorii paralele*. In: D. Dobrincu, C-tin. Iordachi (eds.), *Țărănimea și Puterea. Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii în România (1949–1962)*, Iași 2005, 113–135.

Roske 1992

O. Roske, (ed.), *Dosarul colectivizării agriculturii în România, 1949–1962*, Study drafted by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuses and Petitions, Chamber of Deputies, Romanian Parliament, București 1992.

Rotar 2018

A. C-tin. Rotar, *Eliminarea elitei sociale rurale. Deschiaburirea satelor regiunii Suceava (1949–1962)*, Arhivele Totalitarismului, XXVI/1–2 (2018), 147–160.

Șandru 2000

D. Șandru, *Reforma agrară din 1945 în România*, București 2000.

Șandru 2006–2007

D. Șandru, *Agricultorii din România și colectările forțate*, AIIX, XLIII–XLIV (2006–2007), 573–596.

Sarah S. SNYDER, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War. A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 293, ISBN 9780511851964.

Review by GABRIEL ZVÎNCĂ*

The Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 is seen in history as one of the turning points of the history of the Cold War. Signed in the capital of Finland, after more than two years of negotiations, the document included ten principles, informally known as the *Helsinki Decalogue*, which were divided in three main parts or baskets. The first one addressed issues related to security and cooperation between the signatory parties and included refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The second basket considered the economic collaboration and the exchange of technology between East and West. The third and most important basket, which was included at West's insistence, dealt with observance of human rights and set the scene for public debate regarding this issue. Moreover, it was planned that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to have several follow-up meetings. They were to be held in order to assess the respect for human rights as well as other international developments that occurred from one meeting to another.

The impact of the Helsinki Final Act on the history of the Cold War was addressed by numerous researchers that approached the subject from different perspectives, including its consequences on economic cooperation between the two camps,¹ on building of security² or the changes in international relations that occurred after 1 August 1975.³

In comparison, following Daniel Thomas's theoretical framework,⁴ Sarah S. Snyder addressed the issue of human rights activism inside both camps after the signing of Helsinki Final Act. More precisely, she explores how the third basket of the Final Act paved the way for the establishment of a 'transnational network' of human rights activism which set on the global agenda the issue of respecting the principles of the *Decalogue*. Moreover, the author shows how the human rights topic influenced the relations between the East and the West during the so-called Second Cold War.

Sarah Snyder's work is divided in eight different chapters, each of them dealing with issues regarding the signing of the Final Act, its significance for the international relations and the influence it had on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Her opinion regarding the establishment of a transnational network of human rights activism is stated at the beginning of the second chapter, where she addresses the

* BA Student, Faculty of History and Philosophy, 'Babeş-Bolyai' University, Cluj-Napoca, email: gabriel.zvinca7@gmail.com.

¹ See, for example, Berend 2009.

² See, Berg, Rotfeld 1986.

³ Bloed 1994.

⁴ Thomas 2001.

creation of the Helsinki Commission in the United States. In her opinion, this was a step in the monitorization of the implementation of the Final Act in the East bloc. Snyder's main idea was that the Commission helped the human rights activists in the East to develop their movement on the one hand, and it influenced the human rights agenda of the United States at the Helsinki's follow-up in Belgrade (1977–1978), on the other hand. The transnational network, which Snyder refers to, was informally founded at the end of the 1970s. Its purpose was to present the human rights violations in communist states, as well as to underline how the East respected the Final Act provisions mentioned in the third basket. The actual functioning of the transnational human rights network is analyzed in the third chapter. It focuses on how the Moscow Helsinki Group, which reported on the wrong doings and human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, and other dissident groups managed to collaborate in order to address the human rights issue. They also united their efforts in asking for backing from the West, which saw in human rights an opportunity to further weaken the East.

In the following chapters, Snyder goes on with this argument and presents how the transnational network's work on human rights was eventually used by the United States government in its subsequent negotiations with the Soviet Union. Using over fifty archival collections, Snyder argued that the Helsinki Final Act set a global standard for respecting human rights, which was eventually used by the United States' government. In Snyder's view, the monitoring groups inside the Soviet Union and its satellites found a way to press their leaders for respecting the principles stated in the Helsinki Final Act.

The author argues that the human rights groups inside the communist camp had strong connections with the West, especially with the Helsinki Watch and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF). They directly supported former's actions and Western support proved to be essential in their fight for the observation of human rights. That was because the Western governments won the possibility to press the communist regimes for observing the principles they accepted in 1975 if the latter wanted to close the economical gap. Moreover, Snyder argued that even though the Soviet Union invoked the principle of non-interference when West presented various cases of the human rights abuses, the United States and its allies made use of the reports gathered by the transnational network and had publicly pressed the Soviets for respecting the principles of the third basket or else they would face consequences.

Snyder further develops this argument and presents how the Carter and Reagan administrations placed the topic of human rights at the center of their negotiations with the Soviet Union, how the transnational network evolved during their terms and how the West stressed the human rights problem at the follow-up meetings of the CSCE at Belgrade (1977–1978), Madrid (1980–1983) and Vienna (1986–1989).

Regarding the Soviet Union's position after the human rights groups and the West began to openly press for the observance of Helsinki's third basket, Snyder presents two different attitudes. The first one corresponds to the leaderships of Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Constantin Chernenko. The Soviets did not change their usual uncooperative and petrified positions and refused to engage in any discussions on the topic of human rights violations and refused to acknowledge any abuses committed inside the Soviet Union. However, Snyder argues that starting with Gorbachev's rule, the

Soviet Union entered in a new era concerning human rights. If during the first years of his leadership, Gorbachev followed the footsteps of his predecessors and used the same way of dealing with problems, and by these, I mean creating commissions to address the topic or releasing few detained dissidents when there were clear evidences of human rights abuses, after 1987 he changed his view. Snyder presents how the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* changed the Soviet leader's perspective on the human rights topic. Moreover, Alexander Yakolev and Eduard Shevardnadze advised Gorbachev to have a different approach on the issue if he wanted to continue the improvement of Soviet Union's relations with the West.

Snyder's main argument of the book is that the work of transnational network, constituted of human rights activists and monitoring groups, pressed the communist regimes for making compromises on their policy regarding the human rights. She stresses that the West had started to use this topic to pressure and thus, weaken the Eastern bloc, somehow following the example of a Trojan horse. Incapable of altering their positions in the first years, the Soviets began to lose grip on their control over the actions of the activists. Moreover, their close connections with the West prevented the regime from taking actions against them, as their cases were used in the negotiations between the Soviets and the United States and its allies. Because he realized that there was no going back, Snyder considers, Gorbachev followed the wind and endorsed the observance of human rights inside the Soviet Union.

In spite of being well researched, and documented, Sarah Snyder, has few weak spots in her research. The author argues that the United States somehow forgot about the human rights basket inserted in the Helsinki Final Act in the first years after the Conference and thus, they did not press the Soviets regarding this topic during the Ford administration. Her argument is that the American people were not interested in the subject, but, however, at the main negotiations of the CSCE, the United States government pressed the topic on the Soviets. Another weak point of Snyder's work is that her main focus is centered on the activists inside the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, where, she argues, the human rights groups managed to create a connection with the West. However, she could have included in her research how other communist states reacted to this trend and examine how the groups inside Romania or Bulgaria, for example, militated for the observance of human rights inside their countries, what the reaction of their governments was and if and how they tried to connect with the Helsinki monitoring groups.

Bibliography

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| Berend 2009 | I. T. Berend, <i>From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and Social Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973</i> , New York 2009. |
| Berg, Rotfeld 1986 | R. Berg, A.-D. Rotfeld, <i>Building Security in Europe: Confidence Building Measures and the CSCE</i> , New York 1986. |
| Bloed 1994 | C. A. Bloed, <i>The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath</i> , Boston 1994. |
| Thomas 2001 | D. C. Thomas, <i>The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of communism</i> , Princeton 2001. |

Darkness at Dawn: The Metaphor for Russia's Post-Soviet Transition. Review on David Satter's *Darkness at Dawn. The Rise of the Russian Criminal State*, New Haven – London, 2003, pp. 336, ISBN 9780300098921.

Reviewed by IOANA URSU*

At the moment of submitting this review, it has been 6 days since the beginning of Russia's constitutional referendum (June 2020), which will grant Vladimir Putin political power until 2036, by making possible two more presidential candidacies/tenures under his name; the constitutional changes also extend the president's prerogatives into naming and removing judges, as well as amendments against same-sex marriage. In this context, it is worthwhile to take a look back at the post-Soviet Russia of the late 1990s and early 2000s, a time when Putin rose to power in the context of the Second Chechen War, following the 1999 Russian apartment bombings. The allegation that the bombings were not Chechen acts of terrorism but rather planned by the FSB in order to justify Russia's military intervention made journalist and Russian affairs writer David Satter an unwanted guest in Russia, his expulsion taking place in 2013.¹

'Darkness at dawn', the phrase which gives title to David Satter's book on post-Soviet Russia, uses a metaphor to describe the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a juxtaposition of antagonistic elements: freedom and the absence of freedom; development of criminality and corruption versus the population's impoverishment; an unjust circuit of power and money which, although radically different from the previous regime, continued to disfavor the majority of the population; the rise of what Satter calls 'the Russian Criminal State' – all in all, 'darkness', when it should have been 'dawn'. The importance of this research regarding post-Soviet Russia and its transition resides in it being a matter of recent history, subscribing within the topics of politics and social dynamics, while also representing an extremely useful inquiry into the issue of post-communist countries' transition.

Former Moscow correspondent and long-time observer of Russia and the former Soviet Union, David Satter is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). After graduating from the University of Chicago and Oxford University, he worked for four years as a police reporter for the Chicago Tribune and, in 1976, he was named Moscow correspondent of the London Financial Times. After completing his term in Moscow, he became a special correspondent on Soviet affairs for The Wall Street Journal.² Satter has so far authored four volumes about Russia: *Age of Delirium: the Decline*

* Ph.D., Museum curator, National Museum of the Union, Alba Iulia, email: ioana_ursu@hotmail.com.

¹ Satter explains all the details in his latest volume, Satter 2016.

² 'David Satter' / *Hudson Institute*.

and Fall of the Soviet Union (Knopf, 1996; paperback, Yale, 2001); *Darkness at Dawn: the Rise of the Russian Criminal State* (Yale, 2003), *It Was a Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past* (Yale, 2011); and *The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep* (Yale, 2016). His public standpoints include having testified on Russian affairs before Congressional committees: notably, his allegation on the responsibility and involvement of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the 1999 bombings of Russian apartment buildings, deeming the event as a justification for the invasion of Chechnya. His testimony took place in front of the U.S. House of Representatives on 17 May 2007.³ In what appears to be a larger tendency of rejecting visa applications from Western scholars whose publications are not agreeable to the leadership, Satter was expelled from Russia by the federal government in December 2013.

Subject and methodology

As stated within the *Preface* of the volume, the author's thesis is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, business criminal elites took over the machinery of the Russian state, causing great deal of impoverishment and demoralization to the majority of the population. The purpose of the volume is to describe the rise of this elite, the history of its achieving dominance in Russia, as well as its mechanisms of functioning.

In his descriptive approach of the subject, the author chose to appeal to narrative histories and personal stories; while the former depict how criminal oligarchic power achieved its dominance in Russia, the latter provide a social context for the activities of this 'elite'. Satter's motivation of using personal stories as means for describing post-communist Russia lies in his understanding of Russia's reform period as an experience of a spiritual crisis resulted from the confrontation with a new way of life, which the people's previous experience had not been prepared for. A second reason is found in the attempt to understand this spiritual crisis by grasping the psychology of Russia – and this is to be achieved only through stories of individual lives, Satter shows.

The purpose of this review is to explore the manner in which the author covers the areas of research announced in the book's preface, as well as the way in which the book contributes in general to the understanding of the issue of organized crime and social conditions in post-1991 Russia. In order to understand these two essential aspects, we will focus upon the connection between this criminal elite and state dignitaries, also inquiring into what extent corruption and organized crime affected the lives of ordinary Russian people in the 1990s and early 2000s. We will also question the author's hypothesis: that the reason for the endemic corruption and flourishing of organized crime lies within the moral vacuum and the spiritual crisis that the population of Russia had been experiencing in the early 2000s.

Sources, structure, and content of the volume

A look into the book's bibliography indicates a large number of sources used during Satter's research. The two types of stories mentioned in the preface: narrative histories and personal/life stories are found firstly in a large number of Russian or international

³ Satter 2007.

newspapers and publications;⁴ second, in television broadcasts; third, inside relevant literature; and last, through people's personal experience or confessions: leaders of the independent trade union movement, as well as other Russians 'who prefer not to be named'.

The book contains thirteen chapters preceded by a preface and an introduction and followed by conclusions and extensive references. *The Kursk* tells the story of the sinking of the *Kursk* submarine. The chapter follows and deconstructs the myth created and perpetrated by the Russian authorities regarding the sinking of the ship and the death of its crew. It describes the events through the eyes of a mother whose son had been on board of the submarine when the tragedy occurred. It is a chronological depiction of the events during the 8 days between the initial announcement made by the Russian officials and the news regarding the crew's death.

Ryazan is an investigation dedicated to the Russian apartment bombings in 1999, with particular attention to the case of Ryazan, where a bomb was found inside the basement of a twelve-story building. There were no victims, as the police was announced and the bomb was discovered and removed in time, but two days later the government officials' declaration were stating that the event was nothing more than an exercise. For the local police and the inhabitants, doubts remained, while the newspapers' investigations seemingly indicated a connection of the FSB (the Federal Security Service) to the event, in an attempt to induce a Chechen responsibility. Satter's presumption, as publicly stated various times, is that this unsuccessful bombing attempt was supposed to provide the reason for Russia's invasion in Czecheny, which happened two days after the Ryazan incident, fueled by Russia's declarations against Czechen terrorism.

The Young Reformers is dedicated to the generation that ran Russia during the critical 1991–1995 years, creating and operating the economic reforms, mainly the 'shock therapy'. The main characters of the chapter are Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, Alfred Koch, some of their reforms and their social and economic consequences.

The History of the Reform is an analytical insight into the creation of the oligarchic system, whose untrammelled development started in January 1992 with the beginning of the post-Soviet reforms. To resume, 'the reforms were dominated by three processes: hyperinflation, privatization and criminalization. Furthermore, their interaction led to economic collapse, mass poverty and the effective privatization of the Russian state.'

The Gold Seekers lively tells the saga of the dummy firms, stock companies and investment funds that defrauded millions of Russians of their money in what was called 'the theft of the century.'

The Workers illustrates the problems workers in factories confronted with, and the violation of their working rights, especially after the privatization of firms; the most frequent issue was the prolonged nonpayment of salaries, along with massive restructuring and reducing wages.

⁴ Such as *Trud*, *Kriminalnaya Khronika*, *Express Gazeta*, *Kurskaya Pravda*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Submarine Review*, *Novaya Gazeta*, *Izvestiya*, *Argumenty i Fakty*, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta—Politekonomiya*, *Obshchaya Gazeta*, *Moskovsky Komsomolets*, *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, *Vladivostok*, *Demokratizatsiya*, *Kommersant*, *Nizhegorodskie Novosti*, *Crossroads of Russia*, *Gazette of the Nizhegorodsky Province*, *Moskovsky Komsomolets in Nizhny Novgorod*, *Weekly Standard*, *Rusky Telegraf*, *The Times (London)*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Moscow Times*, *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *Washington Times*.

Law enforcement depicts the shocking reality of a flawed police and administration who not only abstained from enforcing law, but accepted and even openly asked for bribes; who abused their function in order to receive such bribes, and did not serve citizens both due to unwillingness and excessive bureaucracy, therefore openly leading to people's insecurity and to a dramatic rise in violence and criminality – transforming what should have not existed even as exception into a daily occurrence.

Organized Crime deals with the stories of some of the biggest gangs and gangsters in Russia, successfully depicting the organized crime phenomenon, its extent and its social pervasion, revealing the social impact, the economic and the political connections established between rich businessmen/leaders in organized crime and high dignitaries from the state apparatus.

Ulyanovsk tells the story of the five hundred teachers who went on hunger strike to protest the non-payment of their salaries. The tragic outcome involved one teacher's death, gained little attention from the authorities and even less fulfilment of the teachers' demands, outlining the authorities' lack of basic consideration towards their citizens and their rightful demands.

Vladivostok represents another page of the poverty and insecurity of the Russian saga, expressed by the frequent and long electricity cuts in one of the coldest places in the world.

Krasnoyarsk shows the connected fates of the Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Factory and Anatoly Bykov, the versed businessman whose destiny circled from poverty, to detaining a large part of the Russian aluminium industry, nevertheless ending by paying for his crimes after losing the tacit support of the political authorities.

The Value of Human Life is an incursion into what Satter identified as a basic reality in Russia at the beginning of the 2000s: the low value attached to human life, proved, on a smaller scale, by common practices such as dignitaries hiding murder cases resulted from reckless driving, human trafficking by stealing new-born babies and claiming them dead, and on a larger scale, by government policies inconsiderate towards the people's welfare.

Finally, *The Criminalization of Consciousness* deals with the moral vacuum within the Russian society, showing how people were forced, on one hand, to adapt to the realities of the deeply morally flawed environment (that generated, beside extensive alcoholism, strange solutions such as the use of black magic or the need for suicide prevention clinics), and on the other hand, to adopt the set of values of the groups that attained and detained power in Russian society: corruption, swindling, violence.

Arguments

The author's thesis is fairly demonstrated by the gradually exposed argumentation associated with facts and evidence that support his arguments. Does the author particularly define the Russian elites under discussion? Are they entirely made of gangster groups or do they encompass political elites, and high dignitaries as well? Although the opinion is not clearly stated, the definition of the criminal elite, as extracted from the *Gold Seekers* chapter includes everyone who had or has gained a lot of wealth through illicit means. To quote Satter, 'In post-communist Russia, money was in the hands of gangsters, corrupt former members of the Soviet nomenklatura, and veterans of the underground economy.'

Resources were controlled by government officials. In a society without moral or legal rules, these parties made common cause.’ (*The Young Reformers*)

As to the birth of the criminal elite, it was favored by the influence of the 1991–1995 reforms, especially by the attitude of the people behind the reforms. Among the set of attitudes that shaped the course of reform, Satter names social Darwinism, economic determinism, as well as a tolerant attitude towards crime. The first two values are also connected, since their philosophical assumption is the belief that morality and law have no independent validity but are a function of underlying economic relations. In addition to this, the reformers found it difficult to be strongly anticrime (possibly because their assumption that the initial accumulation of capital in a market economy is almost always criminal); since the bandits and black-market operators also wanted a free economy, the reformers began to see them as ‘socially friendly’ and reacted to the criminals’ growing wealth and property with equanimity and even approval, assuming that the gangsters would be able to hold on to their capital only as long as they were able to make it work ‘for the benefit of society.’

Secondly, the author illustrates the evolution of these elites from small gangster groups to rich businessmen, as well as the ways used to accumulate their wealth in post-Soviet years; among these: appropriating government credits, obtaining permission to export raw materials (the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which functioned like a market, granted licenses in return for bribes, soliciting insignificant license fees compared to the bribe value), subsidized imports, privatizations.

Furthermore, these elites naturally became potential partners of conversation for the state. For example, the large consortiums detained by gangster-businessmen were constant winners of auctions for public services, engrossing different branches of business. Chapters *Organized Crime* and *Krasnoyarsk* illustrate how gangsters were tightly connected to the authorities/dignitaries who granted them political support. These elites had also established their own set of rules by which they govern themselves. Moreover, they even had their own argotic language, *fenya*, adopted by ordinary people and even officials, which reveals the enormous impact and the omnipresence of the criminal elite within social life.

Another argument lies within the omnipresence of corruption within the state apparatus, its causes and the way they lead to a cycle of corruption inside the bureaucracy pyramid (varying from police corruption to organized crime). All these sets of facts lead to the author’s idea that power in post-Soviet Russia has been transferred from state control to private control (oligarchies) through the means and mechanisms mentioned above.

Last but not least, one of the main issues the author takes into consideration is the way in which all these aspects of criminality drastically affected society. People were being affected both directly and indirectly by defectuous government policies (such as releasing cheap alcohol on market as a means of social control during the years of the ‘shock therapy’, tolerating corruption and criminality which lead to a proliferation of swindling on people’s cost) which often extended to threatening peoples’ lives (the police who refused to offer support, protection or collaboration within its duties, human trafficking, disregarding citizens’ personal security and welfare – such as the Ryazan or Ulyanovsk cases or the hot pipes accidents leading to numerous deaths etc.).

Personal opinions

Although the majority of the topics are tightly related to the announced theme, one cannot help wonder how the Kursk and Ryazan issues connect to the topic of corruption and organized crime. While the first case expresses the lack of transparency coming from the Russian state whilst handling human lives, the second implies the theory that the Ryazan incident was not an accident, not even a terrorist Chechen bombing, but a political frame-up that would grant Russia the necessary pretext to invade Chechnya. Both, therefore, express the doubt towards the political leaders' actions and do not expressly relate to the main theme, although they are precious investigations that acquaint us to some aspects of post-Soviet Russia.

Secondly, a narrative red wire to give the text unity is rather missing, as the different-themed chapters compose a puzzle-image of 1990s Russia. However, this may also be considered a writing technique, since the reader is left with establishing his own conclusions based on the stories and facts which the journalist-writer talentedly exposes.

Nonetheless, there is also a background plan on which the author projects his personal view on Russia's situation: the moral vacuum and the spiritual crisis which people were confronted with in the 1990s and the early 2000s, as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unexpected contact with a new, more complex world and society, marked by poverty and social insecurity. In his final analysis, Satter concludes that 'the individual in Russia can reclaim his status as a moral actor and aid his country's transition only if he is supported by society's recognition of the authority of universal, transcendent values. Unfortunately, it was this element that was missing in the whole reform process.'

Conclusions

The book manages to describe in live colors the social risks that Russians were daily confronted with in the early 2000s, as well as some shocking examples concerning the proliferation of gangs, organized crime, and all the dramatic consequences of the high corruption in the state apparatus, that directly and dramatically impacted Russian citizens.

Far from simply being a journalistic investigation, David Satter's *Darkness at Dawn* is a brilliant example of recent social history, being representative not only for illustrating the sinuous transition of a post-Soviet country, but for individualizing Russia itself within this transitional process: its specific historical background with its typical emergence and fermentation of political and social ideas, as well as historical circumstances together with the specific ethos, determined a unique type of social and political landscape which combines the elements and challenges highlighted and minutely described by David Satter: corruption, criminality, swindling, bribe, poverty, insecurity, impoverishment, demoralization. In its attempt to inquire upon these aspects, the volume sheds, metaphorically, the light of *dawn* upon the *darkness* of our ignorance.

Bibliography

- Satter 2007 D. Satter's testimony in front of the Congress, 17 May 2007, at:<https://web.archive.org/web/20110927065706/http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SatterHouseTestimony2007.pdf>, accessed 1 July 2020.
- Satter 2016 D. Satter, *The Less You Know, The Better You Sleep. Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin*, Yale University Press, 2016.
- 'David Satter' / *Hudson Institute* D. Satter's biography, at the Hudson Institute's webpage: <https://www.hudson.org/experts/362-david-satter>, accessed 30 June 2020.

ABBREVIATIONS

Academica	Academica, Revistă editată de Academia Română, București.
Adevărul	Adevărul, București.
Aetas	AETAS. Történettudományi folyóirat, AETAS Könyv és Lapkiadó Egyesület, Szeged.
ActaHistHung	Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest.
Acta Humana	Acta Humana, Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, Lublin.
ActaMN	Macta Musei Napocensis. Historica, Muzeul Național de Istorie a Transilvaniei, Cluj-Napoca.
AIES Fokus	Focus, Austria Institut Für Europa-und Sicherheitspolitik, Hinburg an der Donau.
AIIC	Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj, Institutul de Istorie 'George Barițiu' din Cluj-Napoca al Academiei Romane, Cluj-Napoca.
AIIX	Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 'A. D. Xenopol', Academia Română – Filiala Iași, Institutul de Istorie 'A. D. Xenopol', Iași.
AIO	Anuarul de Istorie Orală, Institutul de Istorie Orală, Cluj-Napoca.
Archiv N. F.	Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde N. F., Hermannstadt.
Arhivele Totalitarismului	Arhivele Totalitarismului Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului al Academiei Române, București.
AUA hist.	Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica, Universitatea '1 Decembrie 1918', Alba Iulia.
Caietele CNSAS	Caietele CNSAS, Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, București.
DGAPkompakt	DGAPkompakt, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V., Berlin.
Erdélyi Évszázadok	Erdélyi Évszázadok. A Kolozsvári Magyar Történeti Intézet Évkönyve, Kolozsvár.
ERS	Ethnic and Racial Studies, Taylor and Francis Group, UK.
Evenimentul zilei	Evenimentul zilei, București.
Foaia Poporului	Foaia Poporului. Foaie Politică, Sibiu.
Forschungen	Forschungen zur Volks und Landeskunde, Hermannstadt.
Furniture History	Furniture History. Journal of the Furniture History Society.
Gazeta Poporului	Gazeta Poporului. Foaie politică-culturală, Sibiu.
Gazeta Transilvaniei	Gazeta Transilvaniei, Brașov.
HK	Hadtörténelmi Közlemények, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest.
HU	Historia Urbana, Comisia de istorie a orașelor din România, Sibiu–București.

IEEJSP	Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, founded by Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, published currently by Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest.
IPSR	International Political Science Review, International Political Science Association.
Îndrumător bisericesc	Îndrumător bisericesc pe anul de la Hristos 2020, Sibiu.
JbLkNÖ	Jahrbuch für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich, Verein für Landeskunde von Niederösterreich, Horn.
Kolozsvári Közlöny	Kolozsvári Közlöny. Politikai napilap. Az erdélyrészi szabadelvűpárt lapja, Cluj-Napoca.
Korunk	Korunk. Fórum–Kultúra–Tudomány, Kolozsvár.
Luceafărul	Luceafărul. Revistă pentru literatură și artă, București.
Mitropolia Ardealului	Mitropolia Ardealului. Revista oficială a Arhiepiscopiei Sibiului și a Episcopiiilor Clujului și Oradiei, Sibiu.
MKA (N.F.)	Mitteilungen des K. und K. Kriegs-Archivs, Direction des K. K. Kriegs-Archivs, Wien.
MÖStA	Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs Generaldirektion des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Wien.
OOKK	Az Országos Orvostörténeti Könyvtár Közleményei/Communications ex Bibliotheca Historiae Medicae Hungarica, Budapest.
Politics in Central Europe	Politics in Central Europe, The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association, Prague.
Revista Teologică	Revista Teologică, Organ pentru știința și viața bisericească, Sibiu.
Românul	Românul, Arad.
SAI	Studii și articole de istorie, Societatea de Științe Istorice din România, București.
Sargetia	Sargetia. Acta Musei Devensis, Muzeul Civilizației Dacice și Romane, Deva.
SEER	The Slavonic and East European Review, University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, The Modern Humanities Research Association, London.
Tabor	Tabor. Revistă de cultură și spiritualitate românească, Mitropolia Clujului, Albei, Crișanei și Maramureșului, Cluj-Napoca.
Telegraful Român	Telegraful Român. Arhiepiscopia Ortodoxă Română a Sibiului, Sibiu.
Transilvania	Transilvania. Revista lunară, culturală-literară, Organul 'Asociațiunii pentru literatura română și cultura poporului român' ('Astra'), Sibiu.
Turcica	Turcica. Revue des études turques, Institut d'études arabes, turques et islamiques, Paris, Louvain, Strasbourg.
Țara noastră	Țara noastră, București.
Yönetim ve Ekonomi	Yönetim ve Ekonomi [Journal of Management and Economics], Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi.